section 1203.4 dismissal of the charges in California

2016(People v. Field (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1778, 1787 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 ], quoting Selby v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 470, 473 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 36 ].) As such, it was error for the trial court to deny defendant’s applications pursuant to section 1170.18 on the ground that he already had obtained dismissals pursuant to section 1203.4.

2016(People v. Field (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1778, 1787 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 ], quoting Selby v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 470, 473 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 36 ].) As such, it was error for the trial court to deny defendant’s applications pursuant to section 1170.18 on the ground that he already had obtained dismissals pursuant to section 1203.4.

2026(See Danser v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 885 , 892-893, 894-895 (Danser) [construing felony-forfeiture provision governing judges, and concluding that a judge found guilty of a felony suffered a final conviction despite the court’s suspended imposition of sentence and dismissal of criminal charges under Penal Code section 1203.4]; Padilla v. State Personnel Bd. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1142, 1145 [interpreting statute governing discipline of state employees for misdemeanor convictions involving moral turpitude, and concluding that “an ordinary plea of guilty

1980Code, § 1203.4, subd. (a)), A grant of relief under section 1203.4 is intended to reward an individual who successfully completes probation by mitigating some of the consequences of his conviction and, with a few exceptions, to restore him to his former status in society to the extent the Legislature has power to do so (Stephens v. Toomey (1942) 51 Cal.2d 864, 870-871 [ 122 P.2d 549 ]; Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners (1949) 34 Cal.2d 62, 65 [ 206 P.2d 1085 ]; In re Phillips (1936) 17 Cal.2d 55, 61 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 132 A.L.R. 644 ]).

2014In his reply brief, defendant “agrees that remand is appropriate.” Although defendant agrees that a remand is appropriate, he contends that: (1) the trial court’s decision on remand “cannot be determined without giving due deference to the inducement offered by the trial court . . . .”; and (2) “the matter of dismissal of the charges pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.4, subdivision (a), is mandatory under certain circumstances as set forth in People v. Mgebrov (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 579, 584, 589 ; People v. McLernon (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 569, 571 .” Because this case is being 6 remanded to

2009“With certain exceptions, a court is required to grant the defendant the relief [pursuant to section 1203.4] he requests if the defendant has fulfilled the conditions of his probation for the entire period.” (People v. Mgebrov (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 579, 584 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 778 ].) In contrast, in enacting former section 290.46, subdivision (e)(2)(C) in 2004 (Stats. 2004, ch. 745, § 1), and amending former section 290.46, subdivision (e)(2)(C) in 2005 (Stats. 2005, ch. 722, § 7), the Legislature provided that “ ‘a very narrow category of non-violent, intra-familial offenders’ ” could apply fo

1961The probation and the expiration of the period of probation as to the offense do not negate the prosecution impeachment “by showing . . . [appellant’s] conviction of a felony even though thereafter he obtains a dismissal of the action under section 1203.4.” (People v. O’Brand (1949), 92 Cal.App.2d 752, 756 [ 207 P.2d 1083 ].) The court admitted the evidence in the instant ease for purposes of impeachment. 7.

1961The probation and the expiration of the period of probation as to the offense do not negate the prosecution impeachment “by showing . . . [appellant’s] conviction of a felony even though thereafter he obtains a dismissal of the action under section 1203.4.” (People v. O’Brand (1949), 92 Cal.App.2d 752, 756 [ 207 P.2d 1083 ].) The court admitted the evidence in the instant ease for purposes of impeachment. 7.

2020(People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 890 .) 5 The People contend that “obtaining a certificate of rehabilitation is contingent upon obtaining dismissal of the charge pursuant to section 1203.4.” Persons convicted of felony offenses who are committed to custody are not required to first obtain a dismissal under section 1203.4. (§ 4852.01, subd. (a).) Indeed, persons convicted of felony offenses who are committed to custody are ineligible for relief pursuant to section 1203.4.

2015(People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868 , 880–893.) Subsequently, in 2000—after defendant had successfully completed his probationary term—the Legislature amended section 1203.4 to prohibit dismissal of convictions for felony violations of section 261.5, subdivision (d).

2016(People v. Field (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1778, 1787 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 ], quoting Selby v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 470, 473 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 36 ].) As such, it was error for the trial court to deny defendant’s applications pursuant to section 1170.18 on the ground that he already had obtained dismissals pursuant to section 1203.4.

2016(People v. Field (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1778, 1787 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 ], quoting Selby v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 470, 473 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 36 ].) As such, it was error for the trial court to deny defendant’s applications pursuant to section 1170.18 on the ground that he already had obtained dismissals pursuant to section 1203.4.

2013(Banks, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 387 .) After the defendant successfully completed his probation, he did not seek dismissal of the charge pursuant to section 1203.4.

1978(See People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 381-384 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 348 P.2d 102 ]; People v. Livingston (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 251, 254-255 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 237 ]; People v. Holzer (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 456, 460 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 11 ].) Likewise, since 1961, dismissal of a case pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.4 does not permit a defendant to own a concealable weapon.

2026(See Danser v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 885 , 892-893, 894-895 (Danser) [construing felony-forfeiture provision governing judges, and concluding that a judge found guilty of a felony suffered a final conviction despite the court’s suspended imposition of sentence and dismissal of criminal charges under Penal Code section 1203.4]; Padilla v. State Personnel Bd. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1142, 1145 [interpreting statute governing discipline of state employees for misdemeanor convictions involving moral turpitude, and concluding that “an ordinary plea of guilty

2024As we explain below, although we agree with the Attorney General that the instant order is not appealable, the substantive merits have “been thoroughly briefed and argued,” therefore it would be “ ‘ “unnecessarily dilatory and circuitous” ’ ” to “dismiss the appeal rather than exercising our power to reach the merits through a mandate proceeding.” (Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401 (Olson); see also Shrewsbury Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1213 , 1221–1222 (Shrewsbury).) Having examined the merits, we conclude that the order was properly denied and will deny th

2024As we explain below, although we agree with the Attorney General that the instant order is not appealable, the substantive merits have “been thoroughly briefed and argued,” therefore it would be “ ‘ “unnecessarily dilatory and circuitous” ’ ” to “dismiss the appeal rather than exercising our power to reach the merits through a mandate proceeding.” (Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401 (Olson); see also Shrewsbury Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1213 , 1221–1222 (Shrewsbury).) Having examined the merits, we conclude that the order was properly denied and will deny th

2023(See In re C.F. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 454, 462-463 [discussing CACI and process of removing reports from CACI].) Grandfather also obtained a dismissal of the charge pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.4.” (In re C.P.

2013(See, e.g., § 17, subd. (b)(3) [motion to reduce a ‘wobbler’ to a misdemeanor]; § 1016.5, subd. (b) [motion to vacate judgment and withdraw a plea based on the immigration consequences of the plea]; § 1203.4 [motion by probationer to vacate plea and dismiss charges]; § 1473.6 [motion to vacate judgment based on newly discovered evidence of fraud].)” (People v. Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 337, fn. 2 .) Chen asserts the trial court did have jurisdiction because his “section 1385 motion . . . arose as a supplemental companion to a motion to vacate plea and dismiss the charges under secti

1980Code, § 1203.4, subd. (a)), A grant of relief under section 1203.4 is intended to reward an individual who successfully completes probation by mitigating some of the consequences of his conviction and, with a few exceptions, to restore him to his former status in society to the extent the Legislature has power to do so (Stephens v. Toomey (1942) 51 Cal.2d 864, 870-871 [ 122 P.2d 549 ]; Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners (1949) 34 Cal.2d 62, 65 [ 206 P.2d 1085 ]; In re Phillips (1936) 17 Cal.2d 55, 61 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 132 A.L.R. 644 ]).

1980Code, § 1203.4, subd. (a)), A grant of relief under section 1203.4 is intended to reward an individual who successfully completes probation by mitigating some of the consequences of his conviction and, with a few exceptions, to restore him to his former status in society to the extent the Legislature has power to do so (Stephens v. Toomey (1942) 51 Cal.2d 864, 870-871 [ 122 P.2d 549 ]; Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners (1949) 34 Cal.2d 62, 65 [ 206 P.2d 1085 ]; In re Phillips (1936) 17 Cal.2d 55, 61 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 132 A.L.R. 644 ]).

1980Code, § 1203.4, subd. (a)), A grant of relief under section 1203.4 is intended to reward an individual who successfully completes probation by mitigating some of the consequences of his conviction and, with a few exceptions, to restore him to his former status in society to the extent the Legislature has power to do so (Stephens v. Toomey (1942) 51 Cal.2d 864, 870-871 [ 122 P.2d 549 ]; Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners (1949) 34 Cal.2d 62, 65 [ 206 P.2d 1085 ]; In re Phillips (1936) 17 Cal.2d 55, 61 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 132 A.L.R. 644 ]).