section 844 knock notice requirement in California

1975It was then the officers took up pursuit and Deputy Reed yelled, "Halt, you're under arrest." This was sufficient notice to Bigham that he was accused of a crime and had been arrested. [1] Knowing full well they *79 were law enforcement officers, he was under arrest and their purpose in pursuing him was to perfect the arrest, Bigham continued to run toward the garage; he fled into the garage, the door closed and someone tried to bar the door on the inside whereupon the pursuing deputies forced entry, took Bigham into custody and arrested McVoy. (2) The notice requirements of section 844, Penal

1975It was then the officers took up pursuit and Deputy Reed yelled, "Halt, you're under arrest." This was sufficient notice to Bigham that he was accused of a crime and had been arrested. [1] Knowing full well they *79 were law enforcement officers, he was under arrest and their purpose in pursuing him was to perfect the arrest, Bigham continued to run toward the garage; he fled into the garage, the door closed and someone tried to bar the door on the inside whereupon the pursuing deputies forced entry, took Bigham into custody and arrested McVoy. (2) The notice requirements of section 844, Penal

1969There we applied People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal.2d 586 [ 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 , 432 P.2d 706 ] (which held that the mere fact that the case involved easily disposable evidence did not excuse compliance with the notice requirements of Penal Code section 1531 and which overruled cases to the contrary) in a case involving the substantially identical notice requirements of Penal Code section 844 where the officers' conduct had occurred before the decision in Gastelo .

1969There we applied People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal.2d 586 [ 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 , 432 P.2d 706 ] (which held that the mere fact that the case involved easily disposable evidence did not excuse compliance with the notice requirements of Penal Code section 1531 and which overruled cases to the contrary) in a case involving the substantially identical notice requirements of Penal Code section 844 where the officers' conduct had occurred before the decision in Gastelo .

2005The Courts of Appeal in both Flores and Brown cited in support of this proposition our decision in People v. Rosales, supra, 68 Cal.2d 299, 302 , 66 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 437 P.2d 489 , but we said nothing of the kind in Rosales . *139 In Rosales , we invalidated an arrest and resulting search because the officers entered the residence without complying with the knock-notice requirement of section 844.

2005The Courts of Appeal in both Flores and Brown cited in support of this proposition our decision in People v. Rosales, supra, 68 Cal.2d 299, 302 , 66 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 437 P.2d 489 , but we said nothing of the kind in Rosales . *139 In Rosales , we invalidated an arrest and resulting search because the officers entered the residence without complying with the knock-notice requirement of section 844.

1975It was then the officers took up pursuit and Deputy Reed yelled, "Halt, you're under arrest." This was sufficient notice to Bigham that he was accused of a crime and had been arrested. [1] Knowing full well they *79 were law enforcement officers, he was under arrest and their purpose in pursuing him was to perfect the arrest, Bigham continued to run toward the garage; he fled into the garage, the door closed and someone tried to bar the door on the inside whereupon the pursuing deputies forced entry, took Bigham into custody and arrested McVoy. (2) The notice requirements of section 844, Penal

1975It was then the officers took up pursuit and Deputy Reed yelled, "Halt, you're under arrest." This was sufficient notice to Bigham that he was accused of a crime and had been arrested. [1] Knowing full well they *79 were law enforcement officers, he was under arrest and their purpose in pursuing him was to perfect the arrest, Bigham continued to run toward the garage; he fled into the garage, the door closed and someone tried to bar the door on the inside whereupon the pursuing deputies forced entry, took Bigham into custody and arrested McVoy. (2) The notice requirements of section 844, Penal

2005He kicked the door open and rushed to the kitchen where he saw defendant with a spoon in his hand running toward the bedroom.” {Id. at p. 303.) This court rejected the defendant’s argument in Maddox that the arrest was illegal because the officer did not comply with the knock-notice requirement of section 844, stating: “When, as in this case, he has reasonable grounds to believe a felony is being committed and hears retreating footsteps, the conclusion that his peril would be increased or that the felon would escape if he demanded entrance and explained his purpose, is not unreasonable.” (Peop

2005He kicked the door open and rushed to the kitchen where he saw defendant with a spoon in his hand running toward the bedroom." ( Id. at p. 303, 294 P.2d 6 .) This court rejected the defendant's argument in Maddox that the arrest was illegal because the officer did not comply with the knock-notice requirement of section 844, stating: "When, as in this case, he has reasonable grounds to believe a felony is being committed and hears retreating footsteps, the conclusion that his peril would be increased or that the felon would escape if he demanded entrance and explained his purpose, is not unreas

2005This court concluded that exigent circumstances excused the officer’s failure to comply with the knock-notice requirement of section 844: “In the present case, the violent character of the crimes involved, the victim’s report that her assailants had a knife, the recovery of a gun from the Volkswagen, and the sound of running footsteps within fully justified Officer Moen’s stated belief that T felt that there was a possibility of bodily injury to myself or my partner if we hesitated.’ Compliance with section 844 was therefore excused.” (People v. Tribble, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 833, italics adde

2005This court concluded that exigent circumstances excused the officer’s failure to comply with the knock-notice requirement of section 844: “In the present case, the violent character of the crimes involved, the victim’s report that her assailants had a knife, the recovery of a gun from the Volkswagen, and the sound of running footsteps within fully justified Officer Moen’s stated belief that T felt that there was a possibility of bodily injury to myself or my partner if we hesitated.’ Compliance with section 844 was therefore excused.” (People v. Tribble, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 833, italics adde

2005This court concluded that exigent circumstances excused the officer’s failure to comply with the knock-notice requirement of section 844: “In the present case, the violent character of the crimes involved, the victim’s report that her assailants had a knife, the recovery of a gun from the Volkswagen, and the sound of running footsteps within fully justified Officer Moen’s stated belief that T felt that there was a possibility of bodily injury to myself or my partner if we hesitated.’ Compliance with section 844 was therefore excused.” (People v. Tribble, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 833, italics adde

2005This court concluded that exigent circumstances excused the officer’s failure to comply with the knock-notice requirement of section 844: “In the present case, the violent character of the crimes involved, the victim’s report that her assailants had a knife, the recovery of a gun from the Volkswagen, and the sound of running footsteps within fully justified Officer Moen’s stated belief that T felt that there was a possibility of bodily injury to myself or my partner if we hesitated.’ Compliance with section 844 was therefore excused.” (People v. Tribble, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 833, italics adde

2005He kicked the door open and rushed to the kitchen where he saw defendant with a spoon in his hand running toward the bedroom.” {Id. at p. 303.) This court rejected the defendant’s argument in Maddox that the arrest was illegal because the officer did not comply with the knock-notice requirement of section 844, stating: “When, as in this case, he has reasonable grounds to believe a felony is being committed and hears retreating footsteps, the conclusion that his peril would be increased or that the felon would escape if he demanded entrance and explained his purpose, is not unreasonable.” (Peop

2005He kicked the door open and rushed to the kitchen where he saw defendant with a spoon in his hand running toward the bedroom.” {Id. at p. 303.) This court rejected the defendant’s argument in Maddox that the arrest was illegal because the officer did not comply with the knock-notice requirement of section 844, stating: “When, as in this case, he has reasonable grounds to believe a felony is being committed and hears retreating footsteps, the conclusion that his peril would be increased or that the felon would escape if he demanded entrance and explained his purpose, is not unreasonable.” (Peop

1999(See New York v. Harris, supra, 495 U.S. 14, 17-20 [ 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1642-1644 ] [“following a Payton violation, the principle incentive to obey Payton still obtains: the police know that a warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or statements taken, inside the home.” (Italics added.)]; United States v. Crews (1980) 445 U.S. 463, 471, 474 [ 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1250, 1251 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 ]; People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 566-569 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710 , 822 P.2d 418 ].) Defendant also contends Grubensky’s entry was invalid because it did not satisfy the knock-no

1999(See New York v. Harris, supra, 495 U.S. 14, 17-20 [ 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1642-1644 ] [“following a Payton violation, the principle incentive to obey Payton still obtains: the police know that a warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or statements taken, inside the home.” (Italics added.)]; United States v. Crews (1980) 445 U.S. 463, 471, 474 [ 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1250, 1251 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 ]; People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 566-569 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710 , 822 P.2d 418 ].) Defendant also contends Grubensky’s entry was invalid because it did not satisfy the knock-no

1975It was then the officers took up pursuit and Deputy Reed yelled, "Halt, you're under arrest." This was sufficient notice to Bigham that he was accused of a crime and had been arrested. [1] Knowing full well they *79 were law enforcement officers, he was under arrest and their purpose in pursuing him was to perfect the arrest, Bigham continued to run toward the garage; he fled into the garage, the door closed and someone tried to bar the door on the inside whereupon the pursuing deputies forced entry, took Bigham into custody and arrested McVoy. (2) The notice requirements of section 844, Penal

1975It was then the officers took up pursuit and Deputy Reed yelled, "Halt, you're under arrest." This was sufficient notice to Bigham that he was accused of a crime and had been arrested. [1] Knowing full well they *79 were law enforcement officers, he was under arrest and their purpose in pursuing him was to perfect the arrest, Bigham continued to run toward the garage; he fled into the garage, the door closed and someone tried to bar the door on the inside whereupon the pursuing deputies forced entry, took Bigham into custody and arrested McVoy. (2) The notice requirements of section 844, Penal

1982Since it is established for the purposes of section 844 that a “breaking” includes “uninvited entries through open doors [citations], even where the door is opened in response to a police officer’s knock [citation]” (People. v. Baldwin (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 727, 739 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 427 ]), the police entry here violated the literal terms of section 844.

1982Since it is established for the purposes of section 844 that a “breaking” includes “uninvited entries through open doors [citations], even where the door is opened in response to a police officer’s knock [citation]” (People. v. Baldwin (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 727, 739 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 427 ]), the police entry here violated the literal terms of section 844.

1975It was then the officers took up pursuit and Deputy Reed yelled, "Halt, you're under arrest." This was sufficient notice to Bigham that he was accused of a crime and had been arrested. [1] Knowing full well they *79 were law enforcement officers, he was under arrest and their purpose in pursuing him was to perfect the arrest, Bigham continued to run toward the garage; he fled into the garage, the door closed and someone tried to bar the door on the inside whereupon the pursuing deputies forced entry, took Bigham into custody and arrested McVoy. (2) The notice requirements of section 844, Penal

1975It was then the officers took up pursuit and Deputy Reed yelled, "Halt, you're under arrest." This was sufficient notice to Bigham that he was accused of a crime and had been arrested. [1] Knowing full well they *79 were law enforcement officers, he was under arrest and their purpose in pursuing him was to perfect the arrest, Bigham continued to run toward the garage; he fled into the garage, the door closed and someone tried to bar the door on the inside whereupon the pursuing deputies forced entry, took Bigham into custody and arrested McVoy. (2) The notice requirements of section 844, Penal

1968(People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal.2d 586, 588 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 432 P.2d 706 ]; see also People v. Smith, 63 Cal.2d 779, 797 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 382 , 409 P.2d 222 ]; People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal.2d 690, 707 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 909 , 408 P.2d 365 ]; and People v. Hammond, 54 Cal.2d 846, 854 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 233 , 357 P.2d 289 ].) People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal.2d 586 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 432 P.2d 706 ], involved section 1531, Penal Code, with substantially identical notice requirements of section 844, Penal Code.

1968(People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal.2d 586, 588 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 432 P.2d 706 ]; see also People v. Smith, 63 Cal.2d 779, 797 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 382 , 409 P.2d 222 ]; People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal.2d 690, 707 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 909 , 408 P.2d 365 ]; and People v. Hammond, 54 Cal.2d 846, 854 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 233 , 357 P.2d 289 ].) People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal.2d 586 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 432 P.2d 706 ], involved section 1531, Penal Code, with substantially identical notice requirements of section 844, Penal Code.

1999(See New York v. Harris, supra, 495 U.S. 14, 17-20 [ 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1642-1644 ] [“following a Payton violation, the principle incentive to obey Payton still obtains: the police know that a warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or statements taken, inside the home.” (Italics added.)]; United States v. Crews (1980) 445 U.S. 463, 471, 474 [ 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1250, 1251 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 ]; People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 566-569 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710 , 822 P.2d 418 ].) Defendant also contends Grubensky’s entry was invalid because it did not satisfy the knock-no

1999(See New York v. Harris, supra, 495 U.S. 14, 17-20 [ 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1642-1644 ] [“following a Payton violation, the principle incentive to obey Payton still obtains: the police know that a warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or statements taken, inside the home.” (Italics added.)]; United States v. Crews (1980) 445 U.S. 463, 471, 474 [ 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1250, 1251 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 ]; People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 566-569 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710 , 822 P.2d 418 ].) Defendant also contends Grubensky’s entry was invalid because it did not satisfy the knock-no

1999(See New York v. Harris, supra, 495 U.S. 14, 17-20 [ 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1642-1644 ] [“following a Payton violation, the principle incentive to obey Payton still obtains: the police know that a warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or statements taken, inside the home.” (Italics added.)]; United States v. Crews (1980) 445 U.S. 463, 471, 474 [ 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1250, 1251 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 ]; People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 566-569 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710 , 822 P.2d 418 ].) Defendant also contends Grubensky’s entry was invalid because it did not satisfy the knock-no

1999(See New York v. Harris, supra, 495 U.S. 14, 17-20 [ 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1642-1644 ] [“following a Payton violation, the principle incentive to obey Payton still obtains: the police know that a warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or statements taken, inside the home.” (Italics added.)]; United States v. Crews (1980) 445 U.S. 463, 471, 474 [ 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1250, 1251 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 ]; People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 566-569 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710 , 822 P.2d 418 ].) Defendant also contends Grubensky’s entry was invalid because it did not satisfy the knock-no

1985In People v. Bruce (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 580 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 648 ], this court was faced with deciding whether to extend the section 844 knock and notice requirements to a detached garage located some 25 to 30 feet from the small residence located on the premises.

1985In People v. Bruce (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 580 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 648 ], this court was faced with deciding whether to extend the section 844 knock and notice requirements to a detached garage located some 25 to 30 feet from the small residence located on the premises.

2025(Ibid.) “Moreover, once the prosecution has offered a justification for a warrantless search or seizure, defendants must present any arguments as to why that justification is inadequate.” (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 130 .) Accordingly, although the “prosecution retains the burden of proving that the warrantless search or seizure was reasonable under the circumstances,” “if defendants detect a critical gap in the prosecution’s proof or a 8 flaw in its legal analysis, they must object on that basis to admission of the evidence or risk forfeiting the issue on appeal.” (Ibid.) “Defendants c

1999Rather, defendants must specify the knock-notice issue in the course of the trial court proceeding. ( Britton, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at pp. 699-700; see also People v. Kizzee (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 927, 934 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 784 ]; People v. Lopez (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 103, 108 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 165 ] (Lopez).) Moreover, once the prosecution has offered a justification for a warrant-less search or seizure, defendants must present any arguments as to why that justification is inadequate.

1999Rather, defendants must specify the knock-notice issue in the course of the trial court proceeding. ( Britton, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at pp. 699-700; see also People v. Kizzee (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 927, 934 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 784 ]; People v. Lopez (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 103, 108 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 165 ] (Lopez).) Moreover, once the prosecution has offered a justification for a warrant-less search or seizure, defendants must present any arguments as to why that justification is inadequate.

1999Rather, defendants must specify the knock-notice issue in the course of the trial court proceeding. ( Britton, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at pp. 699-700; see also People v. Kizzee (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 927, 934 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 784 ]; People v. Lopez (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 103, 108 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 165 ] (Lopez).) Moreover, once the prosecution has offered a justification for a warrant-less search or seizure, defendants must present any arguments as to why that justification is inadequate.

1999Rather, defendants must specify the knock-notice issue in the course of the trial court proceeding. ( Britton, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at pp. 699-700; see also People v. Kizzee (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 927, 934 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 784 ]; People v. Lopez (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 103, 108 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 165 ] (Lopez).) Moreover, once the prosecution has offered a justification for a warrant-less search or seizure, defendants must present any arguments as to why that justification is inadequate.

1999(People v. Britton (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 689, 699-700 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 882 ] (Britton).) For example, defendants who believe the police failed to comply with the knock-notice requirement of Penal Code section 844 cannot simply bring a motion to suppress alleging a warrantless search or seizure and then wait until the appeal to raise the knock-notice issue.

1999(People v. Britton (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 689, 699-700 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 882 ] (Britton).) For example, defendants who believe the police failed to comply with the knock-notice requirement of Penal Code section 844 cannot simply bring a motion to suppress alleging a warrantless search or seizure and then wait until the appeal to raise the knock-notice issue.

1986Superior Court (1983) 138 Cal.App.3d 934, 938 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 351 ], citing Duke v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 325.) “Since the court rested its holding in Duke not on the California Constitution but solely upon the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the holding is not affected by article I, section 28, subdivision (d) recently added to the California Constitution. ...” (Jeter s.

1986Superior Court (1983) 138 Cal.App.3d 934, 938 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 351 ], citing Duke v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 325.) “Since the court rested its holding in Duke not on the California Constitution but solely upon the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the holding is not affected by article I, section 28, subdivision (d) recently added to the California Constitution. ...” (Jeter s.

1986(People v. Neer (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 991 , 998 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 555 ].) An entry effected in violation of the knock-notice requirements of sections 844 and 1531 7 renders any subsequent search and seizure unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and thus requires exclusion of the evidence under Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 660 [ 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1093 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 84 A.L.R.2d 933 ], (Jeters.

1986(People v. Neer (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 991 , 998 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 555 ].) An entry effected in violation of the knock-notice requirements of sections 844 and 1531 7 renders any subsequent search and seizure unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and thus requires exclusion of the evidence under Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 660 [ 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1093 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 84 A.L.R.2d 933 ], (Jeters.

1985The court’s holding was premised on the finding that “[t]he entry had no demonstrable effect on the issuance of the search warrant.” (Hulbert, supra, at p. 417.) The same is true in the case at bench.

1985(People v. Superior Court (Hulbert) (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 407, 418 [141 CaI.Rptr. 497].) In Hulbert, the court held that even though an initial entry into the defendant’s residence was unlawful because the officers failed to comply with the knock-notice requirements of Penal Code section 844, the securing of the premises for three hours while a search warrant was obtained was reasonable, and evidence seized upon execution of the valid search warrant should not have been suppressed.