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32 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jett v. Dunlapgreen2 sentences2002The exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, section 31-284 (a), provides, in relevant part, as follows: "An employer who complies with the requirements of . . . this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained. . . ." In Jett v. Dunlap , 179 Conn. 215 , 425 A.2d 1263 (1979), the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized a narrow exception to the exclusivity provision of the Act. 2002The exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, section 31-284 (a), provides, in relevant part, as follows: "An employer who complies with the requirements of . . . this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained. . . ." In Jett v. Dunlap , 179 Conn. 215 , 425 A.2d 1263 (1979), the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized a narrow exception to the exclusivity provision of the Act. | 1 | 6 |
Grant v. Bassmangreen2 sentences2022In Grant v. Bassman, 221 Conn. 465, 470, 473 , 604 A.2d 814 (1992), our Supreme Court held that the defendants’ claim that the plaintiffs had made an exclusive election of workers’ compensation pursuant to General Statutes § 31-284 (a)9 was not raised properly by a motion to dismiss challenging the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and should have been raised by a special defense. 2022In Grant v. Bassman, 221 Conn. 465, 470, 473 , 604 A.2d 814 (1992), our Supreme Court held that the defendants’ claim that the plaintiffs had made an exclusive election of workers’ compensation pursuant to General Statutes § 31-284 (a)9 was not raised properly by a motion to dismiss challenging the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and should have been raised by a special defense. | 1 | 1 |
D'ERAMO v. Smithgreen2 sentences2020See D’Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 615 , 872 A.2d 408 (2005) (treating portion of Claims Commissioner’s motion to dismiss that addressed merits of action as motion for summary judgment and treating trial court’s dismissal as rendering of judgment in favor of Claims Commissioner). 2020See D’Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 615 , 872 A.2d 408 (2005) (treating portion of Claims Commissioner’s motion to dismiss that addressed merits of action as motion for summary judgment and treating trial court’s dismissal as rendering of judgment in favor of Claims Commissioner). | 1 | 1 |
Green v. General Dynamics Corp.green2 sentences2000See Green v. General Dymanics Corp. , 245 Conn. 66 , 71-72 , 712 A.2d 938 (1998). "[W]orkers' compensation is an employee's only remedy for injuries that arise during the course of his employment, and . . . the exclusivity provision of § 31-284 (a) applies whether the employee's claim is predicated on common-law tort, statute or contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conzo v. Aetna Ins. 2000See Green v. General Dymanics Corp. , 245 Conn. 66 , 71-72 , 712 A.2d 938 (1998). "[W]orkers' compensation is an employee's only remedy for injuries that arise during the course of his employment, and . . . the exclusivity provision of § 31-284 (a) applies whether the employee's claim is predicated on common-law tort, statute or contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conzo v. Aetna Ins. | 1 | 1 |
DaSilva v. Danbury Publishing Co.green2 sentences1996The question of whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor is a question of fact; see DaSilva v. Danbury Publishing Co., 39 Conn. App. 653 , 656-57 , 666 A.2d 440 (1995); not to be resolved CT Page 7218 on a motion to strike. 1996The question of whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor is a question of fact; see DaSilva v. Danbury Publishing Co., 39 Conn. App. 653 , 656-57 , 666 A.2d 440 (1995); not to be resolved CT Page 7218 on a motion to strike. | 1 | 1 |
Phipps v. Niejadlikgreen2 sentences1987As we have noted, § 10-235 sets forth three disjunctive circumstances where attorney’s fees may be recoverable, i.e., “in the discharge of [the employee’s] duties or within the scope of employment or under the direction of [the] board of education . . . .’’(Emphasis added.) While we have no doubt that “within the scope of his employment” means that the legal injury must be incurred by an employee of a board of education and that the legal injury must be causally connected to that employment; see Phipps v. Niejadlik, 175 Conn. 424 , 399 A.2d 1256 (1978); the three disjunctive bases set out in § 1987As we have noted, § 10-235 sets forth three disjunctive circumstances where attorney’s fees may be recoverable, i.e., “in the discharge of [the employee’s] duties or within the scope of employment or under the direction of [the] board of education . . . .’’(Emphasis added.) While we have no doubt that “within the scope of his employment” means that the legal injury must be incurred by an employee of a board of education and that the legal injury must be causally connected to that employment; see Phipps v. Niejadlik, 175 Conn. 424 , 399 A.2d 1256 (1978); the three disjunctive bases set out in § | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Reliance Insurance v. American Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences2005Co. v. American Casually Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania, 238 Conn. 285 , 679 A.2d 925 (1996), in holding that § 38a-336 (f) applied retroactively, our Supreme Court stated that the statute was “intended to be clarifying legislation and, as such, must be accepted as a declaration of the *428 legislature’s original intent pertaining to the interplay between the uninsured motorist provision of . . . § 38a-336 and the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision of § 31-284.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 291. 2005Co. v. American Casually Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania, 238 Conn. 285 , 679 A.2d 925 (1996), in holding that § 38a-336 (f) applied retroactively, our Supreme Court stated that the statute was “intended to be clarifying legislation and, as such, must be accepted as a declaration of the *428 legislature’s original intent pertaining to the interplay between the uninsured motorist provision of . . . § 38a-336 and the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision of § 31-284.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 291. | 3 | 1998–2005 |
Ferryman v. City of Groton
green
2 sentences2003However, in Ferryman , the Court held that the exclusivity bar of § 31-284 could be overcome by an express or an implied independent duty to indemnify. 212 Conn. at 146 . 2003However, in Ferryman , the Court held that the CT Page 2905-f exclusivity bar of § 31-284 could be overcome by an express or an implied independent duty to indemnify. 212 Conn. at 146 . | 3 | 2000–2003 |
Conzo v. Aetna Insurance
green
2 sentences2003Co., 243 Conn. 677 , 680-81 , 705 A.2d 1020 (1998). 2003Co., 243 Conn. 677 , 680-81 , 705 A.2d 1020 (1998). | 3 | 1998–2003 |
Bouley v. City of Norwich
yellow
2 sentences1996Bouley v. Norwich, supra; CNA Ins. 1996Bouley v. City of Norwich, 222 Conn. 744 (1992); CNA Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 222 Conn. 769 (1992). | 3 | 1995–1996 |
CNA Insurance Co. v. Colman
green
2 sentences1996Bouley v. City of Norwich, 222 Conn. 744 (1992); CNA Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 222 Conn. 769 (1992). 1995In Bouley v. City of Norwich, 222 Conn. 744 (1992) and CNA Insurance Co. v. Colman, 222 Conn. 769 (1992), the Supreme Court ruled that because § 31-284 (a) made benefit received under the Worker's Compensation Act the exclusive remedy, an injured employee could not receive benefits under the uninsured motorist benefits of an employer's insurance coverage for business vehicles. | 2 | 1995–1996 |
Doe v. Yale University
green
2 sentences2010Therefore, in the case at hand, even if the defendants' claim could fairly be read as an assertion that, as landlords, they are only the alter ego of Dymax, their claim is not amenable to summary disposition because its resolution requires a factual inquiry. [1] General Statutes § 31-284(a) is the exclusivity provision of the act and provides that an employer, although required to compensate an employee as set forth in the act for death or personal injury sustained in the course of employment, is not liable in a civil action for damages arising from that injury. [2] Since Doe v. Yale Universit 2010Therefore, in the case at hand, even if the defendants' claim could fairly be read as an assertion that, as landlords, they are only the alter ego of Dymax, their claim is not amenable to summary disposition because its resolution requires a factual inquiry. [1] General Statutes § 31-284(a) is the exclusivity provision of the act and provides that an employer, although required to compensate an employee as set forth in the act for death or personal injury sustained in the course of employment, is not liable in a civil action for damages arising from that injury. [2] Since Doe v. Yale Universit | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Driscoll v. General Nutrition Corp.
green
2 sentences2008Driscoll v. General Nutrition Corp., 252 Conn. 215, 220-21 , 752 A.2d 1069 (2000). 2008Driscoll v. General Nutrition Corp., 252 Conn. 215, 220-21 , 752 A.2d 1069 (2000). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
School Administrators v. Waterbury Financial Planning & Assistance Board
green
1 sentence2006“The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply.” School Administrators of Waterbury v. Waterbury Financial Planning & Assistance Board, 276 Conn. 355, 364 , 855 A.2d 1219 (2005). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Whitehead v. Safway Steel Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Further, Thermospas cites Whitehead v. Safeway Steel Products, Inc ., 304 Md. 67 , 497 A.2d 803 (1985), for the proposition that the plaintiff can be considered a dual employee of two employers. 2001Further, Thermospas cites Whitehead v. Safeway Steel Products, Inc ., 304 Md. 67 , 497 A.2d 803 (1985), for the proposition that the plaintiff can be considered a dual employee of two employers. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hall v. Bilow Builders, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2000The plaintiff cites Hall v. Bilow Builders, Inc. , 46 Conn. App. 346 , 699 A.2d 269 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 931 , 701 A.2d 661 (1997), for the proposition that uninsured employers should not experience windfalls by having potential workers' compensation cases transformed into negligence actions because the employers failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance. 2000The plaintiff cites Hall v. Bilow Builders, Inc. , 46 Conn. App. 346 , 699 A.2d 269 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 931 , 701 A.2d 661 (1997), for the proposition that uninsured employers should not experience windfalls by having potential workers' compensation cases transformed into negligence actions because the employers failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Hall v. Bilow Builders, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2000The plaintiff cites Hall v. Bilow Builders, Inc. , 46 Conn. App. 346 , 699 A.2d 269 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 931 , 701 A.2d 661 (1997), for the proposition that uninsured employers should not experience windfalls by having potential workers' compensation cases transformed into negligence actions because the employers failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance. 2000The plaintiff cites Hall v. Bilow Builders, Inc. , 46 Conn. App. 346 , 699 A.2d 269 , cert. denied, 243 Conn. 931 , 701 A.2d 661 (1997), for the proposition that uninsured employers should not experience windfalls by having potential workers' compensation cases transformed into negligence actions because the employers failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp.
green
2 sentences1997The common law exception to General Statutes § 31-284 allows "a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action against an employer where the evidence is sufficient to support an inference that the employer deliberately instructed an employee to injure himself." Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99 , 110 , 639 A.2d 507 (1994). 1997The common law exception to General Statutes § 31-284 allows "a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action against an employer where the evidence is sufficient to support an inference that the employer deliberately instructed an employee to injure himself." Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99 , 110 , 639 A.2d 507 (1994). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Crochiere v. Board of Education of Town of Enfield
green
1 sentence1996All rights and claims between employer and employees . . . arising out of personal injury . . . sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter. . ." "Proof that the injury occurred in the course of the employment, means that the injury must occur (a) within the period of employment: (b) at a place the employee may reasonably be; and (c) while the employee is reasonably fulfilling the duties of the employment or doing something incidental to it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cochiere v. Board of Education, 227 Conn. 333 , 349 (1993) | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Mingachos v. CBS, Inc.
green
1 sentence1993Under the test announced in Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91 , 102 (1985): "`A willful and malicious injury is one inflicted intentionally without just cause or excuse. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Ray v. Schneider
green
1 sentence1992Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660 , 674 (benefits paid by the Second Injury Fund). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Bahre v. Hogbloom
green
2 sentences1985We have previously recognized that in construing the Workers’ Compensation Act, this court “makes every part operative and harmonious with every other part insofar as is possible . . . .” Bahre v. Hogbloom, 162 Conn. 549, 554 , 295 A.2d 547 (1972). 1985We have previously recognized that in construing the Workers’ Compensation Act, this court “makes every part operative and harmonious with every other part insofar as is possible . . . .” Bahre v. Hogbloom, 162 Conn. 549, 554 , 295 A.2d 547 (1972). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.