section 74.053 objection in Texas

2015In re 50 Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex. 2001); Dunn v. Street, 938 S.W.2d 33 , 34—35 (Tex. 1997); Flores v. Banner, 932 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. 1996).

2015In re 50 Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex. 2001); Dunn v. Street, 938 S.W.2d 33 , 34—35 (Tex. 1997); Flores v. Banner, 932 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. 1996).

2015In re 50 Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex. 2001); Dunn v. Street, 938 S.W.2d 33 , 34—35 (Tex. 1997); Flores v. Banner, 932 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. 1996).

2015In re 50 Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex. 2001); Dunn v. Street, 938 S.W.2d 33 , 34—35 (Tex. 1997); Flores v. Banner, 932 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. 1996).

2015See In re Union Pacific Resources Co., FH 17 !B\ I 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998) (citing Mitchell Energy Corp. v. f Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 440-41 ; Fry v. Tucker, 146 Tex. 18 , 202 S.W.2d '•" 218,221(1947)).

2015Id. i Judge Ramsay was disqualified to proceed over Willing's motion to declare Appellant vexatious for all the reasons asserted in this brief. p Appellant may raise Ramsay's qualifications for the first time on appeal.

2009See Chandler v. Chandler, 991 S.W.2d 367, 383-84 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, pet. denied); Texas Employment Comm’n v. Alvarez, 915 S.W.2d 161, 165-66 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ). 7 Next, we consider whether SOS Alliance waived its objection under section 74.053(d).

2009See Chandler v. Chandler , 991 S.W.2d 367, 383-84 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1999, pet. denied); Texas Employment Comm'n v. Alvarez , 915 S.W.2d 161, 165-66 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1996, no writ). (7) Next, we consider whether SOS Alliance waived its objection under section 74.053(d).

2001See Weidner, 937 S.W.2d at 603-04 (visiting judge’s assignment was pursuant to Government Code section 75.003; therefore, judge was not assigned by the presiding judge of the administrative judicial region and a Section 74.053 objection to the assignment was not appropriate); Cabrera, 834 S.W.2d at 617-18 (sitting judge was assigned by local administrative judge, rather than the presiding judge; thus, sitting judge was not appointed under Chapter 74 and not subject to objection under Section 74.053).

1997Citing a case from the Austin Court of Appeals, 12 the Cabrera opinion then concluded that, because the sitting judge had been assigned by the local administrative judge, rather than the presiding judge, she was not appointed under Chapter 74 and was not subject to objection under section 74.053. 13 Id. at 617-18 .

2009See Gill v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice , 3 S.W.3d 576, 578-79 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (examining substance of objection to visiting judge and concluding that objection not made under section 74.053); Alvarez , 915 S.W.2d at 164 (indicating that assigned judge must be "presented with sufficient information to know that he was the subject of a timely objection under section 74.053").

2009See Chandler v. Chandler , 991 S.W.2d 367, 383-84 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1999, pet. denied); Texas Employment Comm'n v. Alvarez , 915 S.W.2d 161, 165-66 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1996, no writ). (7) Next, we consider whether SOS Alliance waived its objection under section 74.053(d).

2007"An objection under Section 74.053 is timely if it is made before the assigned judge, sitting on the bench and in open court, calls the case to hearing or to trial." Kellogg v. Martin, 810 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).

2007"An objection under Section 74.053 is timely if it is made before the assigned judge, sitting on the bench and in open court, calls the case to hearing or to trial.” Kellogg v. Martin, 810 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).

2022With respect to timeliness of Morrison’s objection, Section 74.053 “does not say that objections must be filed before the judge presides over any hearing under the assignment … 8 rather, [] to be timely an objection must be filed before the judge presides over any hearing.” Canales, 52 S.W.3d at 702 .

2015In re 50 Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex. 2001); Dunn v. Street, 938 S.W.2d 33 , 34—35 (Tex. 1997); Flores v. Banner, 932 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. 1996).

2015See In re Union Pacific Resources Co., 17 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998) (citing Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436,440-41 ; Fry v. Tucker, 146 Tex. 18 , 202 S.W.2d 218,221 (1947)).

2015See In re Union Pacific Resources Co., FH 17 !B\ I 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998) (citing Mitchell Energy Corp. v. f Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 440-41 ; Fry v. Tucker, 146 Tex. 18 , 202 S.W.2d '•" 218,221(1947)).

1995Brown v. Mulanax, 808 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex.App.— Tyler 1991, orig. proceeding).

1993Kellogg v. Martin, 810 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1991, orig. proceeding); Brown v. Mulanax, 808 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1991, orig. proceeding); Lewis v. Leftwich, 775 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, orig. proceeding).

1993Kellogg v. Martin, 810 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1991, orig. proceeding); Brown v. Mulanax, 808 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1991, orig. proceeding); Lewis v. Leftwich, 775 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, orig. proceeding).

1992Lewis v. Lefbwich, 775 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1989, orig. proceeding).

2009See Gill v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 3 S.W.3d 576, 578-79 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (examining substance of objection to visiting judge and concluding that objection not made under section 74.053); Alvarez, 915 S.W.2d at 164 (indicating that assigned judge must be “presented with sufficient information to know that he was the subject of a timely objection under section 74.053”).

2009See Gill v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice , 3 S.W.3d 576, 578-79 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (examining substance of objection to visiting judge and concluding that objection not made under section 74.053); Alvarez , 915 S.W.2d at 164 (indicating that assigned judge must be "presented with sufficient information to know that he was the subject of a timely objection under section 74.053").

2002See In re Hourani, 20 S.W.3d 819, 826 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding that an administrative judge could not use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166 to extend the deadline for objections under Government Code, section 74.053(b), and requiring any limitation, expansion, or elimination of the provision to be made by the legislature); see also Kirkpatrick v. Hurst, 484 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex.1972). (holding that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 4 may not be applied to enlarge the filing period).

2002See In re Hourani , 20 S.W.3d 819, 826 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding that an administrative judge could not use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166 to extend the deadline for objections under Government Code, section 74.053(b), and requiring any limitation, expansion, or elimination of the provision to be made by the legislature); see also Kirkpatrick v. Hurst , 484 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1972) (holding that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 4 may not be applied to enlarge the filing period).

2002See In re Hourani, 20 S.W.3d 819, 826 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding that an administrative judge could not use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166 to extend the deadline for objections under Government Code, section 74.053(b), and requiring any limitation, expansion, or elimination of the provision to be made by the legislature); see also Kirkpatrick v. Hurst, 484 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex.1972). (holding that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 4 may not be applied to enlarge the filing period).

2002See In re Hourani , 20 S.W.3d 819, 826 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding that an administrative judge could not use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166 to extend the deadline for objections under Government Code, section 74.053(b), and requiring any limitation, expansion, or elimination of the provision to be made by the legislature); see also Kirkpatrick v. Hurst , 484 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1972) (holding that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 4 may not be applied to enlarge the filing period).

1992See Starnes, 793 S.W.2d at 107 .

1991Starnes v. Chapman, 793 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1990, orig. proceeding); Curtis v. State, 762 S.W.2d 958, 959-60 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1988, no writ).

2015See In re Union Pacific Resources Co., 17 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998) (citing Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436,440-41 ; Fry v. Tucker, 146 Tex. 18 , 202 S.W.2d 218,221 (1947)).

2015See In re Union Pacific Resources Co., FH 17 !B\ I 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998) (citing Mitchell Energy Corp. v. f Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 440-41 ; Fry v. Tucker, 146 Tex. 18 , 202 S.W.2d '•" 218,221(1947)).

1991Starnes v. Chapman, 793 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1990, orig. proceeding); Curtis v. State, 762 S.W.2d 958, 959-60 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1988, no writ).

1991Brown v. Mulanax, 808 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.App.-Tyler, 1991) (original proceeding); Lewis v. Leftwich, 775 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.App. —Dallas 1989) (original proceeding); Curtis v. State, 762 S.W.2d 958 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no pet.).

2022See id. at 647 n.3.

2014See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).

2010See In re Perritt , 992 S.W.2d at 446–47; see also Flores v. Banner , 932 S.W.2d 500 , 501–02 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).

2010See id . § 74.053 ( a); In re Perritt , 992 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam).

2009Motor Stages, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 643 , 650- 51 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied) (“statutory grounds for recusal . . . can be waived if not raised by proper motion”); Pena v. Pena, 986 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied) (same); Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. Ater, 845 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, no writ) (“if a timely objection is filed, his recusation is mandatory”). 17 section 74.053); Alvarez, 915 S.W.2d at 164 (indicating that assigned judge must be “presented with sufficient information to know that he was the subject of a timely objection under section 7

2009Motor Stages, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 643 , 650- 51 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied) (“statutory grounds for recusal . . . can be waived if not raised by proper motion”); Pena v. Pena, 986 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied) (same); Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. Ater, 845 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, no writ) (“if a timely objection is filed, his recusation is mandatory”). 17 section 74.053); Alvarez, 915 S.W.2d at 164 (indicating that assigned judge must be “presented with sufficient information to know that he was the subject of a timely objection under section 7

2001See Weidner, 937 S.W.2d at 603-04 (visiting judge’s assignment was pursuant to Government Code section 75.003; therefore, judge was not assigned by the presiding judge of the administrative judicial region and a Section 74.053 objection to the assignment was not appropriate); Cabrera, 834 S.W.2d at 617-18 (sitting judge was assigned by local administrative judge, rather than the presiding judge; thus, sitting judge was not appointed under Chapter 74 and not subject to objection under Section 74.053).

1999In Erbs v. Bedard, 760 S.W.2d 750 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no writ), the court held that the presiding judge of the statutory probate courts, who had assigned himself to the case under section 25.0022©, did not abuse his discretion in refusing to remove himself pursuant to an objection under section 74.053(b).

1999In Erbs v. Bedard, 760 S.W.2d 750 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no writ), the court held that the presiding judge of the statutory probate courts, who had assigned himself to the case under section 25.0022©, did not abuse his discretion in refusing to remove himself pursuant to an objection under section 74.053(b).