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31 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.green2 sentences2019Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”) (Emphasis deleted.); Arrington-Bey v. Bedford Hts. 858 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir.2017) (“Municipalities are not vicariously liable in § 1983 actions merely because they employ someone who has committed a constitutional violation.”). 2019Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”) (Emphasis deleted.); Arrington-Bey v. Bedford Hts. 858 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir.2017) (“Municipalities are not vicariously liable in § 1983 actions merely because they employ someone who has committed a constitutional violation.”). | 2 | 13 |
Polk County v. Dodsongreen2 sentences2022Delasoft claims that signing the contract was sufficient for Damschroder to be liable under Section 1983. {¶ 39} "Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability." Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). 2021Graham at 165-166 . “[A] governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when the entity itself is a ‘ “moving force” ’ behind the deprivation[.]” Id. at 166, quoting Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 , 102 S.Ct. 445 , 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981), quoting Monell at 694 . “[T]he entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Graham at 166 , quoting Monell at 694 . “[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that | 2 | 5 |
Anita Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heightsgreen2 sentences2021See Arrington-Bey v. Bedford Hts., 858 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir.2017) - 11 - Clermont CA2020-09-054 ("[m]unicipalities are not vicariously liable in § 1983 actions merely because they employ someone who has committed a constitutional violation"); see also Gregory v. Shelby Cty., 220 F.3d 433 , 441 (6th Cir.2000) ("[f]or liability to attach, there must be execution of a government's policy or custom which results in a constitutional tort"). {¶ 33} Simply stated, where a claim brought against a township pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 "is based solely on respondeat superior, it will be dismissed." (Emp 2019Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”) (Emphasis deleted.); Arrington-Bey v. Bedford Hts. 858 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir.2017) (“Municipalities are not vicariously liable in § 1983 actions merely because they employ someone who has committed a constitutional violation.”). | 2 | 2 |
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnatired2 sentences2019Under Section 1983, local governments are responsible only for “their own illegal acts.” (Emphasis deleted.) Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 , 106 S.Ct. 1292 , 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). 2019Under Section 1983, local governments are responsible only for “their own illegal acts.” (Emphasis deleted.) Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 , 106 S.Ct. 1292 , 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). | 1 | 3 |
Kinney v. Ohio Department of Administrative Servicesgreen2 sentences2007Monnel v. Dept. of Social Services City of New York (1978) 436 U.S. 658 ; see, also, Kinney v. Ohio Dept. of Administrative Servises (1986), 30 Ohio App.3d 121 , 122 (holding "the liability of supervisory personnel must be based upon more than the mere right to control employees"). 2000Monell, supra; Kinney v. Ohio Dept. of Administrative Services (1986), 30 Ohio App.3d 121 , 122 , 507 N.E.2d 399 ("the liability of supervisory personnel must be based upon more than the mere right to control employees"). | 1 | 2 |
Boler v. Earleygreen1 sentence2022See also Boler v. Early, 865 F.3d 391, 417 (6th Cir.2017) (citing Dodson); Kinney v. Ohio Dept. of Admin. | 1 | 1 |
Gregory v. Shelby Countyred1 sentence2021See Arrington-Bey v. Bedford Hts., 858 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir.2017) - 11 - Clermont CA2020-09-054 ("[m]unicipalities are not vicariously liable in § 1983 actions merely because they employ someone who has committed a constitutional violation"); see also Gregory v. Shelby Cty., 220 F.3d 433 , 441 (6th Cir.2000) ("[f]or liability to attach, there must be execution of a government's policy or custom which results in a constitutional tort"). {¶ 33} Simply stated, where a claim brought against a township pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 "is based solely on respondeat superior, it will be dismissed." (Emp | 1 | 1 |
Fletcher Altman Smith, and Marguerite Elizabeth Smith v. Don Heath, and Jack Rohtertgreen1 sentence2007See, e.g., Smith v. Heath (C.A.6, 1982), 691 F.2d 220 , 224-225 ; Mick v. Brewer (C.A.10, 1996), 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 ; O'Neill v. Krzeminski (C.A.2, 1988), 839 F.2d 9 , 11 ; Fundiller v. Cooper City (C.A.11, 1985), 777 F.2d 1436 , 1441-1442 . | 1 | 1 |
Mayes v. City of Columbusgreen1 sentence2004See, also, Mayes v. Columbus (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 728 (city was not liable under Section 1983 absent any evidence that policy of police department was to arrest burglary suspects without probable cause). | 1 | 1 |
Shockey v. Foutygreen2 sentences2003See id.; see, also, Shockey v. Fouty (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 420, 426 , 666 N.E.2d 304 , citing Polk Cty. v. Dodson (1981), 454 U.S. 312, 325 , 102 S.Ct. 445 , 70 L.Ed.2d 509 ; Wells v. Akron (1987), 42 Ohio App.3d 148 , 537 N.E.2d 229 ; Foster v. Walsh (C.A.6 1988), 864 F.2d 416 ; O’Banion v. Bowman (S.D.Ohio 1993), 824 F.Supp. 743 . 2003See id.; see, also, Shockey v. Fouty (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 420, 426 , 666 N.E.2d 304 , citing Polk Cty. v. Dodson (1981), 454 U.S. 312, 325 , 102 S.Ct. 445 , 70 L.Ed.2d 509 ; Wells v. Akron (1987), 42 Ohio App.3d 148 , 537 N.E.2d 229 ; Foster v. Walsh (C.A.6 1988), 864 F.2d 416 ; O’Banion v. Bowman (S.D.Ohio 1993), 824 F.Supp. 743 . | 1 | 1 |
Kerans v. Porter Paint Co.green2 sentences1994Id. at 172 , 381 S.E.2d at 308 ; see, *678 also, Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. (C.A.7, 1986), 797 F.2d 1417 (finding the issue of individual liability waived on appeal); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico (C.A.1, 1988), 864 F.2d 881, 901-902 (finding supervisors liable under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code), both cases cited with approval in Kerans, 61 Ohio St.3d at 492 , 575 N.E.2d at 433, fn. 3 . 1994Id. at 172 , 381 S.E.2d at 308 ; see, *678 also, Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. (C.A.7, 1986), 797 F.2d 1417 (finding the issue of individual liability waived on appeal); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico (C.A.1, 1988), 864 F.2d 881, 901-902 (finding supervisors liable under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code), both cases cited with approval in Kerans, 61 Ohio St.3d at 492 , 575 N.E.2d at 433, fn. 3 . | 1 | 1 |
Annabelle Lipsett v. University of Puerto Ricogreen1 sentence1994Id. at 172 , 381 S.E.2d at 308 ; see, *678 also, Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. (C.A.7, 1986), 797 F.2d 1417 (finding the issue of individual liability waived on appeal); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico (C.A.1, 1988), 864 F.2d 881, 901-902 (finding supervisors liable under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code), both cases cited with approval in Kerans, 61 Ohio St.3d at 492 , 575 N.E.2d at 433, fn. 3 . | 1 | 1 |
Alvin Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corporation, Engine Division, and Andre J. Lambert, Defendantsred1 sentence1994Id. at 172 , 381 S.E.2d at 308 ; see, *678 also, Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. (C.A.7, 1986), 797 F.2d 1417 (finding the issue of individual liability waived on appeal); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico (C.A.1, 1988), 864 F.2d 881, 901-902 (finding supervisors liable under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code), both cases cited with approval in Kerans, 61 Ohio St.3d at 492 , 575 N.E.2d at 433, fn. 3 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Canton v. Harris
red
2 sentences2009“It is only when the ‘execution of the government’s policy or custom * * * inflicts the injury’ that the municipality may be held liable under § 1983.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 385 , 109 S.Ct. 1197 , 103 L.Ed.2d 412 , quoting Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 , 107 S.Ct. 1114 , 94 L.Ed.2d 293 . 2009“It is only when the ‘execution of the government’s policy or custom * * * inflicts the injury’ that the municipality may be held liable under § 1983.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 385 , 109 S.Ct. 1197 , 103 L.Ed.2d 412 , quoting Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 , 107 S.Ct. 1114 , 94 L.Ed.2d 293 . | 4 | 1999–2009 |
Bachtel v. Jackson, 08ap-714 (3-31-2009)
neutral
2 sentences2021Franklin No. 08AP-714, 2009-Ohio-1554, ¶ 17 , citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694-695 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). 2009Harris claimed that the prosecutorial staff, with final decision-making authority, violated his rights only in his brief in opposition to the city’s summary judgment motion, not in his complaint. {¶ 22} In Bachtel v. Jackson, the Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissed a Section 1983 claim because the “appellant’s complaint [failed to] sufficiently put appellees on notice that he was seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.1983.” Franklin App. No. 08AP-714, 2009-Ohio-1554 , 2009 WL 840606 , at ¶ 22. | 2 | 2009–2021 |
Mitchell Ex Rel. Mitchell v. McNeil
green
1 sentence2012Although government officials may be sued in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. 1983, “a local government may be held liable under § 1983 only for adopting a ‘policy or custom’ that violates federally protected rights.” Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374 , 376 (6th Cir.2007), citing Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown
green
2 sentences2010Board of Cty Commrs. of Bryan Cty. v. Brown (1997), 520 U.S. 397, 403-404 , 117 S.Ct. 1382 , 137 L.Ed.2d 626 . "[I]it is not enough for - 24 - a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. 2010Board of Cty Commrs. of Bryan Cty. v. Brown (1997), 520 U.S. 397, 403-404 , 117 S.Ct. 1382 , 137 L.Ed.2d 626 . "[I]it is not enough for - 24 - a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
City of Springfield v. Kibbe
green
2 sentences2009“It is only when the ‘execution of the government’s policy or custom * * * inflicts the injury’ that the municipality may be held liable under § 1983.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 385 , 109 S.Ct. 1197 , 103 L.Ed.2d 412 , quoting Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 , 107 S.Ct. 1114 , 94 L.Ed.2d 293 . 2009“It is only when the ‘execution of the government’s policy or custom * * * inflicts the injury’ that the municipality may be held liable under § 1983.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 385 , 109 S.Ct. 1197 , 103 L.Ed.2d 412 , quoting Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 , 107 S.Ct. 1114 , 94 L.Ed.2d 293 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Mick v. Brewer
green
1 sentence2007See, e.g., Smith v. Heath (C.A.6, 1982), 691 F.2d 220 , 224-225 ; Mick v. Brewer (C.A.10, 1996), 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 ; O'Neill v. Krzeminski (C.A.2, 1988), 839 F.2d 9 , 11 ; Fundiller v. Cooper City (C.A.11, 1985), 777 F.2d 1436 , 1441-1442 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
O'Neill v. Krzeminski
green
1 sentence2007See, e.g., Smith v. Heath (C.A.6, 1982), 691 F.2d 220 , 224-225 ; Mick v. Brewer (C.A.10, 1996), 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 ; O'Neill v. Krzeminski (C.A.2, 1988), 839 F.2d 9 , 11 ; Fundiller v. Cooper City (C.A.11, 1985), 777 F.2d 1436 , 1441-1442 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Michael Jamie Fundiller and Rae Winder Fundiller, His Wife, Plaintiffs v. The City of Cooper City, a Municipal Corp.
green
1 sentence2007See, e.g., Smith v. Heath (C.A.6, 1982), 691 F.2d 220 , 224-225 ; Mick v. Brewer (C.A.10, 1996), 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 ; O'Neill v. Krzeminski (C.A.2, 1988), 839 F.2d 9 , 11 ; Fundiller v. Cooper City (C.A.11, 1985), 777 F.2d 1436 , 1441-1442 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
O'Banion v. Bowman
green
1 sentence2003See id.; see, also, Shockey v. Fouty (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 420, 426 , 666 N.E.2d 304 , citing Polk Cty. v. Dodson (1981), 454 U.S. 312, 325 , 102 S.Ct. 445 , 70 L.Ed.2d 509 ; Wells v. Akron (1987), 42 Ohio App.3d 148 , 537 N.E.2d 229 ; Foster v. Walsh (C.A.6 1988), 864 F.2d 416 ; O’Banion v. Bowman (S.D.Ohio 1993), 824 F.Supp. 743 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Wells v. City of Akron
green
2 sentences2003See id.; see, also, Shockey v. Fouty (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 420, 426 , 666 N.E.2d 304 , citing Polk Cty. v. Dodson (1981), 454 U.S. 312, 325 , 102 S.Ct. 445 , 70 L.Ed.2d 509 ; Wells v. Akron (1987), 42 Ohio App.3d 148 , 537 N.E.2d 229 ; Foster v. Walsh (C.A.6 1988), 864 F.2d 416 ; O’Banion v. Bowman (S.D.Ohio 1993), 824 F.Supp. 743 . 2003See id.; see, also, Shockey v. Fouty (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 420, 426 , 666 N.E.2d 304 , citing Polk Cty. v. Dodson (1981), 454 U.S. 312, 325 , 102 S.Ct. 445 , 70 L.Ed.2d 509 ; Wells v. Akron (1987), 42 Ohio App.3d 148 , 537 N.E.2d 229 ; Foster v. Walsh (C.A.6 1988), 864 F.2d 416 ; O’Banion v. Bowman (S.D.Ohio 1993), 824 F.Supp. 743 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
David M. Foster v. Lawrence J. Walsh, Clerk, Akron Municipal Court
green
1 sentence2003See id.; see, also, Shockey v. Fouty (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 420, 426 , 666 N.E.2d 304 , citing Polk Cty. v. Dodson (1981), 454 U.S. 312, 325 , 102 S.Ct. 445 , 70 L.Ed.2d 509 ; Wells v. Akron (1987), 42 Ohio App.3d 148 , 537 N.E.2d 229 ; Foster v. Walsh (C.A.6 1988), 864 F.2d 416 ; O’Banion v. Bowman (S.D.Ohio 1993), 824 F.Supp. 743 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Patrolman \X\" v. City of Toledo"
green
1 sentence2002The entity may also be liable under Section 1983 for the deprivation of a constitutional right when the deprivation arises from a governmental `custom' or `policy.' Additionally, the governmental entity may be liable under Section 1983 for harm caused by a specific unauthorized disclosure if the entity had failed to investigate previous similarly harmful and unauthorized disclosures." (Citations omitted.) Patrolman "X" v. Toledo (1999), 132 Ohio App.3d 374 , 398 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Secot v. City of Sterling Heights
green
1 sentence2002Secot v. City of Sterling Heights , 985 F. Supp. 715 , 719 (1997). {¶ 13} Ms. Stinnett argues that the trial court erred in determining that she had not pointed to a custom or policy of the City of Springfield through which she was injured. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale
green
1 sentence1997Id.; Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv.; Brown v. Fort Lauderdale (C.A.11, 1991), 923 F.2d 1474 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Coleman v. Housing Authority
green
2 sentences1994Id. at 172 , 381 S.E.2d at 308 ; see, *678 also, Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. (C.A.7, 1986), 797 F.2d 1417 (finding the issue of individual liability waived on appeal); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico (C.A.1, 1988), 864 F.2d 881, 901-902 (finding supervisors liable under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code), both cases cited with approval in Kerans, 61 Ohio St.3d at 492 , 575 N.E.2d at 433, fn. 3 . 1994Id. at 172 , 381 S.E.2d at 308 ; see, *678 also, Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. (C.A.7, 1986), 797 F.2d 1417 (finding the issue of individual liability waived on appeal); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico (C.A.1, 1988), 864 F.2d 881, 901-902 (finding supervisors liable under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code), both cases cited with approval in Kerans, 61 Ohio St.3d at 492 , 575 N.E.2d at 433, fn. 3 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Hafer v. Melo
green
2 sentences1992Given that the United States Supreme Court has recently concluded that public officials may be held personally liable under Section 1983, Hafer v. Melo (1991), 502 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 358 , 116 L.Ed.2d 301 , plaintiffs have a personal stake in this litigation commenced for the purpose of establishing that they acted properly under and correctly interpreted Article XI of the Ohio Constitution. 1992Given that the United States Supreme Court has recently concluded that public officials may be held personally liable under Section 1983, Hafer v. Melo (1991), 502 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 358 , 116 L.Ed.2d 301 , plaintiffs have a personal stake in this litigation commenced for the purpose of establishing that they acted properly under and correctly interpreted Article XI of the Ohio Constitution. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Jackson v. Kurtz
green
1 sentence1990Section 1983 reads as follows: "Every person who, under color of any statute; ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or *261 other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." Appellants' claims under Section 1983 fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas because that court is | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.