section 1983 held liable in Massachusetts

2004A municipality may be liable under §1983, Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 688 (1978), but only if the injury is caused by “officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality,” or if there is a municipal policy or custom that caused the injury.

2001A municipality may be liable under § 1983, see Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 688, 694 (1978), but only if the injury is caused by “officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality,” or if there is a municipal policy or custom that caused the injury.

2007County Comm’r of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997); Kadlick v. Dep’t of Mental Health, 431 Mass. 850, 852 (2000).

2004County Comm'r of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997).

2025Saldivar v. Racine, 818 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2016).

2022See Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. 311, 317 (2004), quoting Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 1994) ("there must be an 'affirmative link' between the supervisory official's acts or omissions and his subordinate's violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights").

2022See Clancy v. McCabe, 441 Mass. 311, 317 (2004), quoting Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 1994) ("there must be an 'affirmative link' between the supervisory official's acts or omissions and his subordinate's violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights").

2021See Farmer, supra at 834 ; Earielo v. Carlo, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 110 , 116 (2020). "[A]n official acts with deliberate indifference where 'he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.'" Earielo, supra at 116, quoting Farmer, supra at 847 .

2021See Farmer, supra at 834 ; Earielo v. Carlo, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 110 , 116 (2020). "[A]n official acts with deliberate indifference where 'he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.'" Earielo, supra at 116, quoting Farmer, supra at 847 .

2021To be found liable under § 1983, a prison official must have "a sufficiently culpable state of mind, namely one of 'deliberate indifference' to an inmate's health or safety." Norton v. Rodrigues, 955 F.3d 176 , 185 (1st Cir. 2020), quoting Burrell, v. Hampshire County, 307 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002).

2016Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, and thus the burden of proof is on defendants-appellants.” DiMarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas, 238 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation omitted).

2007County Comm’r of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997); Kadlick v. Dep’t of Mental Health, 431 Mass. 850, 852 (2000).

2006Thus Sheriffs, Inc. argues that Bailey was acting under color of law, and is therefore liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 . “[S]tate officials literally are persons.” Haffer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991), quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

2006Thus Sheriffs, Inc. argues that Bailey was acting under color of law, and is therefore liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 . “[S]tate officials literally are persons.” Haffer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991), quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

2004See Dobos v. Driscoll, supra at 650 (declaring that police supervisors in 1978 could be held liable under § 1983 for not protecting motorists from abusive officer).

2004“An official displays such reckless or callous indifference when it would be manifest to any reasonable official that his conduct was very likely to violate an individual’s constitutional rights.” Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1989).

2004A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if his “conduct or inaction amounted to a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others.” Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 1999), quoting Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, supra at 562 .

1999See Smith v. Boston, 413 Mass. 607 , 611 n.8 (1992). “[I]t is a widely accepted rule of statutory construction that general words in a statute such as ‘persons’ will not ordinarily be construed to include the State or political subdivisions thereof.” Hansen v. Commonwealth, 344 Mass. 214, 219 (1962).

1999See id.-, Graham, supra at 995 (“Inaction by the state in the face of a known danger is not enough to trigger the obligation [to protect]; according to De- Shaney, the state must have limited in some way the liberty of a citizen to act on his own behalf”); Estate of Gilmore, supra at 721 (no liability under § 1983 because, “irrespective of any knowledge the state defendants had of the special danger that [the assailant] posed to [the victim, it] did nothing to render [her] any more or less capable of defending herself from a violent attacker than any other member of the general public”).

1999See Smith v. Boston, 413 Mass. 607 , 611 n.8 (1992). “[I]t is a widely accepted rule of statutory construction that general words in a statute such as ‘persons’ will not ordinarily be construed to include the State or political subdivisions thereof.” Hansen v. Commonwealth, 344 Mass. 214, 219 (1962).

1998State Action Although in an unrelated Section 1983 action, the MBTA agreed that it is a state actor, AIDS Action Committee of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 849 F.Supp. 79, 82 (D.Mass. 1993), here it moves to dismiss Bennett’s Section 1983 claim on the grounds that the plaintiff cannot prove state action and, therefore, the MBTA cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 . 7 Whether a defendant constitutes a “person acting under color of state law” is a question of federal law. 8 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375-76 (1990).

1998State Action Although in an unrelated Section 1983 action, the MBTA agreed that it is a state actor, AIDS Action Committee of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 849 F.Supp. 79, 82 (D.Mass. 1993), here it moves to dismiss Bennett’s Section 1983 claim on the grounds that the plaintiff cannot prove state action and, therefore, the MBTA cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 . 7 Whether a defendant constitutes a “person acting under color of state law” is a question of federal law. 8 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375-76 (1990).

1997Bowen v. Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1992).

1993See Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1157 (1st Cir. 1989) (supervisor allowing unconstitutional conduct of officers to continue pursuant to an official policy amounts to a deliberate indifference to citizens’ constitutional rights); Forand v. O’Brien, 602 F.Supp. 1182, 1185 (1st Cir. 1985) (supervisors may be personally liable under §1983 if they adopted an unconstitutional policy or condoned unconstitutional acts of their subordinates).