section 19 due course of law (Texas) · Go Syfert
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section 19 due course of law in Texas

35 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2023 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (15)

CaseFollowedCited
Harris v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1975 · cited in 4 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1979–1997
2 sentences

1997Harris v. State, 522 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex.Crim.App.1975).

1982Harris v. State, 522 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).

44
Ashish Patel, Anverali Satani, Nazira Momin, Minaz Chamadia, and Vijay Lakshmi Yogi v. Texas Department of Licensing and Regulationgreen
tex · 2015 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2018–2022
2 sentences

2022Our recent decision in Patel v. Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation endorsed this view, with a caveat: “[T]he Texas due course of law protections in Article I, § 19, for the most part, align with the protections found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 469 S.W.3d 69, 86 (Tex. 2015).

2018See, e.g., Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 86 (“Following the lead of our prior jurisprudence, we conclude that the Texas due course of law protections in Article I, § 19, for the most part, align with the protections found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”); Hearts Bluff, 381 S.W.3d at 477 (“Our case law on takings under the Texas Constitution is consistent with federal jurisprudence.”).

22
Adams v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1986 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1997–2015
2 sentences

2015See Therefore, an indictment which fails to name "a Adams v. Texas, 707 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). person" is not an indictment under the Texas Constitution and its validity may be challenged on appeal even if no 2 This language may well have been timely objection under Article 1.14(b) to it was made successfully challenged via a timely motion to before the date on which appellant's trial commenced. quash under Article 1.14(b) as being defective.

1997See Adams v. Texas, 707 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

22
Ex Parte Canadagreen
texcrimapp · 1988 · cited in 4 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1997–2010
2 sentences

2010(Do Not Publish) 2 “[D]enying credit for [time served pending a revocation hearing] pursuant to § 15 might ‘chill the parolee's decision to exercise his constitutional right to a pre-revocation hearing’ . . . and consequently violate the parolee’s right of due course of law under Article I, § 19, of the Texas Constitution.” Id. at 577, citing Ex parte Canada, 754 S.W.2d 660, 667 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). -3-

1998In Ex Parte Canada, 754 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Cr.App. 1988), the Court held that former Article 42.18, section 15(a) (1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Annotated, as it related to discretion to grant or deny credit for time served to a parolee confined pursuant to a pre-revocation warrant, violated the parolee's due course of law under Article I, section 19 of the Texas Constitution. (2) The Court analogized the relationship between a jailed defendant awaiting a hearing on revocation with that of a jailed defendant's right to appeal his conviction and reasoned that the availability of discr

14
Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. Stategreen
tex · 2012 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018See, e.g., Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 86 (“Following the lead of our prior jurisprudence, we conclude that the Texas due course of law protections in Article I, § 19, for the most part, align with the protections found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”); Hearts Bluff, 381 S.W.3d at 477 (“Our case law on takings under the Texas Constitution is consistent with federal jurisprudence.”).

11
Boykin v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1991 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013GOV ’T CODE § 508.253 (emphasis added). 4 Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim.

11
Jennings v. Stategreen
texapp · 2008 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010Because we are remanding this case to the court of appeals to analyze the purported jury verdict form error under Almanza, we need not address appellant's fourth ground for review. [2] Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim.App.1985). [3] Jennings v. State, 275 S.W.3d 574, 575 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008) (because appellant failed to request a verdict form that would allow the jury to find her "not guilty" of the lesser-included offense for which she was convicted, she waived the complaint on appeal). [4] Jennings, 275 S.W.3d at 575 . [5] Id. at 575 n. 1. [6] TEX.CODE CRIM.

2010Because we are remanding this case to the court of appeals to analyze the purported jury verdict form error under Almanza, we need not address appellant's fourth ground for review. [2] Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim.App.1985). [3] Jennings v. State, 275 S.W.3d 574, 575 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008) (because appellant failed to request a verdict form that would allow the jury to find her "not guilty" of the lesser-included offense for which she was convicted, she waived the complaint on appeal). [4] Jennings, 275 S.W.3d at 575 . [5] Id. at 575 n. 1. [6] TEX.CODE CRIM.

11
Hawkins v. Stategreen
texapp · 1991 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
1 sentence

2003See, e.g. , Luquis , 72 S.W.3d at 364 (parole instruction as sanctioned in Article 37.07(4)(a) does not violate the due course of law provisions in Article I, section 19 of the Texas Constitution nor the federal constitution = s due process clause); Washington , 59 S.W.3d at 266-67 (mandatory charge prescribed by Article 37.07, ' 4(b) does not violate right to due process and due course of law under the United States and Texas Constitutions); Hawkins v. State , 807 S.W.2d 874, 876 ( Tex.App .--Beaumont 1991, pet. ref = d)(upholding the constitutionality of Article 37.07(4)(b) charge).

11
Ex Parte Adamsgreen
texcrimapp · 1989 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
1 sentence

2002Ex parte Adams , 768 S.W.2d 281, 293 (Tex. Crim.

11
Dinkins v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1995 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996See Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 363 (Tex. Cr.App.1995) (Clinton, J., dissenting) (when all similarly situated capital murder defendants are treated the same, there simply is no colorable equal protection claim). [11] *229 VI Applicant also contends various provisions of Article 11.071 violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the due course of law provisions of Article 1, Section 19, of the Texas Constitution.

1996See Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 363 (Tex. Cr.App.1995) (Clinton, J., dissenting) (when all similarly situated capital murder defendants are treated the same, there simply is no colorable equal protection claim). 11 VI Applicant also contends various provisions of Article 11.071 violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the due course of law provisions of Article 1, Section 19, of the Texas Constitution.

11
Briggs v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1990 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
1 sentence

1995Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302, 319 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), overruled on other grounds, Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918, 921-22 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).

11
Long v. Statered
texcrimapp · 1987 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
1 sentence

1995Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302, 319 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), overruled on other grounds, Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918, 921-22 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).

11
Mellinger v. City of Houston (Tex. 1-18-1887)green
tex · 1887 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994The open courts provision provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” The provision is one of the two due course of law provisions of our Constitution, the other being the due course of law provision of Article I, § 19. 3 Due course of law, as used in Section 19, has traditionally been viewed as co-extensive with the United States Constitution’s due process of law guarantee. 4 See Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37 , 3 S.W. 249, 252-53 (1887); In re Estate of Touring, 775

1994The open courts provision provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” The provision is one of the two due course of law provisions of our Constitution, the other being the due course of law provision of Article I, § 19. 3 Due course of law, as used in Section 19, has traditionally been viewed as co-extensive with the United States Constitution’s due process of law guarantee. 4 See Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37 , 3 S.W. 249, 252-53 (1887); In re Estate of Touring, 775

11
In Re Estate of Touringgreen
texapp · 1989 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994The open courts provision provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." The provision is one of the two due course of law provisions of our Constitution, the other being the due course *56 of law provision of Article I, § 19. [3] Due course of law, as used in Section 19, has traditionally been viewed as co-extensive with the United States Constitution's due process of law guarantee. [4] See Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37 , 3 S.W. 249, 252-53 (1887); In re Estate of Tour

1994The open courts provision provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” The provision is one of the two due course of law provisions of our Constitution, the other being the due course of law provision of Article I, § 19. 3 Due course of law, as used in Section 19, has traditionally been viewed as co-extensive with the United States Constitution’s due process of law guarantee. 4 See Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37 , 3 S.W. 249, 252-53 (1887); In re Estate of Touring, 775

11
Massachusetts Indemnity & Life Insurance Co. v. Texas State Board of Insurancegreen
texapp · 1985 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994Co. v. Texas State Bd. of Ins., 685 S.W.2d 104, 113-14 (Tex.App.—Austin 1985, no writ).

1994Co. v. Texas State Bd. of Ins., 685 S.W.2d 104, 113-14 (Tex.App.—Austin 1985, no writ).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (15)

CaseCitedYears
In the Interest of J.W.T. green
tex · 1994
2 sentences

2011Id. at 198 .

2011Id. at 198 .

51996–2011
Almanza v. State red
texcrimapp · 1985
2 sentences

2010Because we are remanding this case to the court of appeals to analyze the purported jury verdict form error under Almanza, we need not address appellant's fourth ground for review. [2] Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim.App.1985). [3] Jennings v. State, 275 S.W.3d 574, 575 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008) (because appellant failed to request a verdict form that would allow the jury to find her "not guilty" of the lesser-included offense for which she was convicted, she waived the complaint on appeal). [4] Jennings, 275 S.W.3d at 575 . [5] Id. at 575 n. 1. [6] TEX.CODE CRIM.

2010Because we are remanding this case to the court of appeals to analyze the purported jury verdict form error under Almanza, we need not address appellant’s fourth ground for review. 2 Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim.

22010–2010
State v. Ferguson green
tenn · 1999
2 sentences

2006Relying on the Tennessee case of State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn.1999), he suggests that, rather than requiring that he show bad faith on the part of the State in destroying potentially useful evidence, we should employ a balancing test by considering the degree of negligence involved, the significance of the destroyed evidence considered in light of the probative value and reliability of secondary evidence that remains available, and the sufficiency of the other evidence used at trial to support the conviction. 2 S.W.3d at 917 .

2006Relying on the Tennessee case of State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn.1999), he suggests that, rather than requiring that he show bad faith on the part of the State in destroying potentially useful evidence, we should employ a balancing test by considering the degree of negligence involved, the significance of the destroyed evidence considered in light of the probative value and reliability of secondary evidence that remains available, and the sufficiency of the other evidence used at trial to support the conviction. 2 S.W.3d at 917 .

22006–2006
Sattiewhite v. State green
texcrimapp · 1989
1 sentence

2023See Blue v. State, No. 02-17-00265-CR, 2018 WL 6844134 , at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 31, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that running objection asserted on multiple grounds, some of which were specific to witness, did not extend to different witness’s testimony on same issue); Reid v. State, No. 10-14-00107-CR, 2015 WL 6584361 , at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 29, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that running objection “on this issue” raised during one witness’s testimony did not extend to similar testimony from thre

12023–2023
Aaron Sebastian Redmond v. State green
texapp · 2021
1 sentence

2023See Blue v. State, No. 02-17-00265-CR, 2018 WL 6844134 , at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 31, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that running objection asserted on multiple grounds, some of which were specific to witness, did not extend to different witness’s testimony on same issue); Reid v. State, No. 10-14-00107-CR, 2015 WL 6584361 , at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 29, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that running objection “on this issue” raised during one witness’s testimony did not extend to similar testimony from thre

12023–2023
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Kelly neutral
tex · 1942
1 sentence

2015Lone Star Gas Co. v. Kelly, 140 Tex. 15 , 165 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1942); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 26 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); 16A C.J.S.

12015–2015
Connally v. General Construction Co. green
scotus · 1926
2 sentences

2015Lone Star Gas Co. v. Kelly, 140 Tex. 15 , 165 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1942); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 26 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); 16A C.J.S.

2015Lone Star Gas Co. v. Kelly, 140 Tex. 15 , 165 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1942); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 26 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); 16A C.J.S.

12015–2015
Cook v. State green
texcrimapp · 1995
1 sentence

2015Cook, supra, at him the ability to prepare his defense and thereby denied 479-480 (citations and footnotes omitted). him of his right to due process and due course of law under Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution.

12015–2015
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Kelly green
texcommnapp · 1942
1 sentence

2015Lone Star Gas Co. v. Kelly, 140 Tex. 15 , 165 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1942); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 26 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); 16A C.J.S.

12015–2015
Michael H. v. Gerald D. green
scotus · 1989
1 sentence

2013We do say that one who is arbitrarily prevented from attempting to establish any relationship with his natural child, after making early and unqualified acceptance of parental duties as Larry has done, is denied due course of law under section 19 of our Texas Bill of Rights.” Id. at 198 .

12013–2013
Oakley v. State green
texcrimapp · 1992
1 sentence

2002In Oakley v. State , 830 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), the Court determined that Article 37.07, section 4 was properly re‑enacted by the Legislature pursuant to a grant of authority in the 1989 amendment to Article IV, section 11(a) of the Texas Constitution.

12002–2002
Ex Parte Bates green
texcrimapp · 1998
1 sentence

2001Id.

12001–2001
Simmons v. South Carolina green
scotus · 1994
2 sentences

1996Appellant relies primarily on Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 , 114 S.Ct. 2187 , 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), as his authority.

1996Appellant relies primarily on Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 , 114 S.Ct. 2187 , 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), as his authority.

11996–1996
Ex Parte Patterson red
texcrimapp · 1987
2 sentences

1989Indeed, because we identified the source of the notice required in Patterson, supra, in the due course of law provision of Article I, § 19 of the Texas Constitution, rather than in Article I, § 10, we held the pleading *268 necessary to support an affirmative finding did not necessarily have to appear in the indictment. 740 S.W.2d at 776 .

1989Indeed, because we identified the source of the notice required in Patterson, supra, in the due course of law provision of Article I, § 19 of the Texas Constitution, rather than in Article I, § 10, we held the pleading *268 necessary to support an affirmative finding did not necessarily have to appear in the indictment. 740 S.W.2d at 776 .

11989–1989
Morrissey v. Brewer green
scotus · 1972
2 sentences

1987As under the Fourteenth Amendment, a parolee enjoys a substantial, albeit conditional “liberty” interest under Article I, § 19, for “[sjubject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” 408 U.S. at 482 , 92 S.Ct. at 2600 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 495 .

1987As under the Fourteenth Amendment, a parolee enjoys a substantial, albeit conditional “liberty” interest under Article I, § 19, for “[sjubject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” 408 U.S. at 482 , 92 S.Ct. at 2600 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 495 .

11987–1987

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TX § Tex. Fam. Code § 160.606 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 35 (1979–2023) NC 8 (1983–2025) IN 2 (1979–2000)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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