section 1286.2(a) powers in California

2025Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (a)(4).) We hold that, in this case, the parties did not agree to alter the usual scope of review and thus, even had the arbitrator failed to follow California law, such an “error” would not be a basis to vacate the arbitration award. 9 “Even where application of a particular law or body of law is required by the parties’ arbitration agreement, an arbitrator’s failure to apply such a law is not in excess of an arbitrator’s powers within the meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision (d).” (Marsch v. Williams (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 238, 244 (Marsch).)5 “[I]n considering applic

2014(Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 6 [decisions of arbitrators are not generally reviewable for errors of fact or law].) In any event, “Even where application of a particular law or body of law is required by the parties’ arbitration 5 agreement, an arbitrator’s failure to apply such a law is not in excess of an arbitrator’s powers within the meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision [(a)(4)].” (Marsch v. Williams (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 238, 244 ; see also Baize v. Eastridge Companies, LLC (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 293 , 300–301 [an arbitrator’s decision is not reviewable for errors of l

2015(See Kelly Sutherlin McLeod Architecture, Inc. v. Schneickert (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 519, 531 ; Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 443 .) However, in determining whether arbitrators exceeded their powers within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), courts must give “substantial deference to the arbitrators’ own assessments of their contractual authority . . . .” (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 373 .) A deferential standard is in keeping with the general rule of arbitral finality and ensu

2015(See Kelly Sutherlin McLeod Architecture, Inc. v. Schneickert (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 519, 531 ; Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 443 .) However, in determining whether the arbitrators exceeded their powers within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), courts must give “substantial deference to the arbitrators’ own assessments of their contractual authority . . . .” (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 373 .) A deferential standard is in keeping with the general rule of arbitral finality an

2014(Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 32 ; accord, Pearson, supra, at p. 676 .) Several courts have stated that an arbitrator exceeds his or her powers within the meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4) by issuing an award that violates “an explicit legislative expression of public policy.” (E.g., Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy v. Universal Paragon Corp. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1416 (Cotchett) [an arbitrator may exceed his powers “by issuing an award that violates an explicit legislative expression of public policy”]; Department of Personnel Administration v. California Correctional Peace

2013Absent a clear expression of illegality or public policy undermining this strong presumption in favor of private arbitration, an arbitral award should ordinarily stand immune from judicial scrutiny.” (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 32 .) Numerous courts have since construed Moncharsh to stand for the proposition that an arbitrator exceeds its powers within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2 by issuing an award that violates a party’s statutory rights or “an explicit legislative expression of public policy.” (Cotchett, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416 ; see Richey, supra,

2024Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(1)(C).) As in Pearson, the arbitrator committed a “clear error of law” when it found Li’s termination claims time-barred and the error deprived Li of the ability to obtain a hearing on the merits of her FEHA claim. ( Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 670, 680.) Thus, the arbitrator exceeded its powers within the meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), and the award was properly vacated.

2023Stated in other terms, construing the CAA in light of the Legislature’s intent that employees be able to enforce their right 12 to be free of unlawful discrimination under FEHA, an arbitrator whose legal error has barred an employee subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement from obtaining a hearing on the merits of a claim based on such right has exceeded his or her powers within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), and the arbitrator’s award may properly be vacated.” (Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 48 Cal.4th 665, 680 , italics

2025Those decisions permitting review of an award where an error of law appears on the face of the award causing substantial injustice have perpetuated a point of view that is inconsistent with the modern view of private arbitration and are therefore disapproved.” (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 28 .) The court held that an arbitrator’s error of fact or law in deciding the issue submitted did not qualify as an act in excess of the arbitrator’s powers under section 1286.2.

2015(Richey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 916 , citing Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1 .) “Moncharsh noted that judicial review may be warranted when a party claims that an arbitrator has enforced an entire contract or transaction that is illegal. [Citations.] Moncharsh observed that in the absence of an express written accord in the arbitration agreement, arbitrators may decide cases based on ‘“broad principles of justice and equity.”’ [Citation.] The court acknowledged that there 9 916.) Richey disposes of appellants’ argument that issuing an award that violates public policy is not an act in excess of

2025Review of Claims Under Section 1286.2(a)(4) Notwithstanding the ordinary non-reviewability of arbitration decisions, the California Supreme Court has identified “some limited and exceptional circumstances justifying judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision,” including when an arbitrator exceeds their powers under section 1286.2(a)(4) “by issuing an award that violates a party’s unwaivable statutory rights or that contravenes an explicit legislative expression of public policy.” (Richey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 916 .) An example of this occurred in Pearson Dental, where the Supreme Court 12

2025There, the court held that a reviewing court may vacate an arbitration award if “an employee subject to a mandatory employment-arbitration agreement [was] unable to obtain a hearing on the merits of [his or her] FEHA claims, or claims based on other unwaivable statutory rights, because of [an arbitrator’s] legal error.” (Ibid.) Stated otherwise, “construing the [California Arbitration Act] in light of the Legislature’s intent that employees be able to enforce their right to be free of unlawful discrimination under FEHA, an arbitrator whose legal error has barred an employee subject to a mandat

2021(See Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 443 [“An arbitrator exceeds his powers when he acts without subject matter jurisdiction”]; accord, O’Flaherty v. Belgum (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1055 (O’Flaherty.) In particular, Putnam claims the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to make a good cause determination because the Fairness Act ( 15 U.S.C. § 1226 ) and California’s New Motor Vehicle Board Act (§ 3000 et seq.) applied to the Satellite Service Agreement, as an exception to arbitration.

2006For example, in O'Flaherty v. Belgum (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1044 , 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 , a dispute involving dissolution of a law partnership, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment confirming an arbitration award, with directions to vacate the award, on the basis that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers by awarding a remedy that was forbidden by the parties' partnership agreement.

2014(See Bak v. MCL Financial Group, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1124 [FINRA rules permit arbitrators to make decisions and take action regarding discovery, and their decisions and actions are final and binding on the parties]; Alexander v. Blue Cross of California, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089 [erroneous discovery order does not exceed arbitrators’ powers under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4)].)10 Davis asserts that the arbitrators’ exclusion of Schulz’s testimony for discovery violations, without notice and an opportunity to cure, was improper.

2006The trial court could not properly find that the arbitrators exceeded their powers within the meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), by deciding the issue incorrectly. ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 28 , 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183 , 832 P.2d 899 ; Moshonov v. Walsh, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 775-776, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 , 996 P.2d 699 ; Moore v. First Bank of San Luis Obispo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 787, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 603 , 996 P.2d 706 ; Alexander v. Blue Cross of California, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 431 .) Disregard of an Express Provision in the Arbitration Agr

2014(Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 32 ; accord, Pearson, supra, at p. 676 .) Several courts have stated that an arbitrator exceeds his or her powers within the meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4) by issuing an award that violates “an explicit legislative expression of public policy.” (E.g., Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy v. Universal Paragon Corp. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1416 (Cotchett) [an arbitrator may exceed his powers “by issuing an award that violates an explicit legislative expression of public policy”]; Department of Personnel Administration v. California Correctional Peace

2013Absent a clear expression of illegality or public policy undermining this strong presumption in favor of private arbitration, an arbitral award should ordinarily stand immune from judicial scrutiny.” (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 32 .) Numerous courts have since construed Moncharsh to stand for the proposition that an arbitrator exceeds its powers within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2 by issuing an award that violates a party’s statutory rights or “an explicit legislative expression of public policy.” (Cotchett, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416 ; see Richey, supra,

2013Interpretation of the contract underlying [the] dispute being within the matter submitted to arbitration, such an interpretation could amount, at most, to an error of law on a submitted issue, which . . . is not in excess of the arbitrator‘s powers within the meaning of sections 1286.2 and 1286.6.‖ ( Moshonov, supra, at p. 779 , citing Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal. 4th at p. 28 .) Because the disputed issue of contractual interpretation in Moshonov ―was committed to final adjudication by the arbitrator, rather than the courts,‖ the court declined, ―to consider the issue‘s merits,‖ reasoning that ―[

2006The trial court could not properly find that the arbitrators exceeded their powers within the meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), by deciding the issue incorrectly. ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 28 , 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183 , 832 P.2d 899 ; Moshonov v. Walsh, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 775-776, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 , 996 P.2d 699 ; Moore v. First Bank of San Luis Obispo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 787, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 603 , 996 P.2d 706 ; Alexander v. Blue Cross of California, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 431 .) Disregard of an Express Provision in the Arbitration Agr

1997The court in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th 576 addressed an issue not raised in Intel—the power of an arbitrator to reform a contract without exceeding his or her power.

1994(See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 576, 588-589 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 ] [PG&E].) In PG&E the parties’ agreement made arbitration subject to a statute which requires statements of decision from trial courts in ordinary civil cases.

2025The court reasoned, “[a] contrary holding would permit the exception to swallow the rule of limited judicial review; a litigant could always contend the arbitrator erred and thus exceeded his powers.” (Ibid.) And as the trial court here recognized, the Supreme Court reiterated its Moncharsh holding in Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362 , 366: “[A]rbitrators do not exceed their powers merely by erroneously deciding a contested issue of law or fact.” Then in Heimlich v. Shivji, supra, 7 Cal.5th 350 (Heimlich), the Supreme Court held that “vacation of an award for ‘r

2025The court reasoned, “[a] contrary holding would permit the exception to swallow the rule of limited judicial review; a litigant could always contend the arbitrator erred and thus exceeded his powers.” (Ibid.) And as the trial court here recognized, the Supreme Court reiterated its Moncharsh holding in Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362 , 366: “[A]rbitrators do not exceed their powers merely by erroneously deciding a contested issue of law or fact.” Then in Heimlich v. Shivji, supra, 7 Cal.5th 350 (Heimlich), the Supreme Court held that “vacation of an award for ‘r

2025The court reasoned, “[a] contrary holding would permit the exception to swallow the rule of limited judicial review; a litigant could always contend the arbitrator erred and thus exceeded his powers.” (Ibid.) And as the trial court here recognized, the Supreme Court reiterated its Moncharsh holding in Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362 , 366: “[A]rbitrators do not exceed their powers merely by erroneously deciding a contested issue of law or fact.” Then in Heimlich v. Shivji, supra, 7 Cal.5th 350 (Heimlich), the Supreme Court held that “vacation of an award for ‘r

2023As relevant here, the [California Arbitration Act (CAA)] provides that a court may vacate an arbitration award when ‘[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (a)(4)).” (Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 59, 72 (Sheppard, Mullin).) “[T]he question whether the arbitrator exceeded his powers and thus whether the [appellate court] should vacate his award on that basis is generally reviewed on appeal d

2015(Cf. Sunnyvale Unified School Dist. v. Jacobs (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 168, 174-175 [because section 1286 et seq. does not permit a court to partially vacate an arbitration award, the appellate court would construe an appeal from an order partially vacating an award as an appeal from an order vacating the award].) Appellants do not contend that the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy affected, such that the court could correct rather than vacate the award.

2014(See Bak v. MCL Financial Group, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1124 [FINRA rules permit arbitrators to make decisions and take action regarding discovery, and their decisions and actions are final and binding on the parties]; Alexander v. Blue Cross of California, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089 [erroneous discovery order does not exceed arbitrators’ powers under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4)].)10 Davis asserts that the arbitrators’ exclusion of Schulz’s testimony for discovery violations, without notice and an opportunity to cure, was improper.

2014(Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 6 [decisions of arbitrators are not generally reviewable for errors of fact or law].) In any event, “Even where application of a particular law or body of law is required by the parties’ arbitration 5 agreement, an arbitrator’s failure to apply such a law is not in excess of an arbitrator’s powers within the meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision [(a)(4)].” (Marsch v. Williams (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 238, 244 ; see also Baize v. Eastridge Companies, LLC (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 293 , 300–301 [an arbitrator’s decision is not reviewable for errors of l

2013Absent a clear expression of illegality or public policy undermining this strong presumption in favor of private arbitration, an arbitral award should ordinarily stand immune from judicial scrutiny.” (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 32 .) Numerous courts have since construed Moncharsh to stand for the proposition that an arbitrator exceeds its powers within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2 by issuing an award that violates a party’s statutory rights or “an explicit legislative expression of public policy.” (Cotchett, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416 ; see Richey, supra,

1994Absent proof of one of the five grounds contained in section 1286.2, a court may not vacate an award for legal or factual error even if the error clearly appears on the face of the award and it causes substantial injustice. ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 27-28.) ‘Every reasonable intendment must be indulged in favor of the award.’ [Citation.]” (Luster v. Collins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1344-1345 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 215 ].) “Generally, a decision exceeds the arbitrator’s powers only if it is so utterly irrational that it amounts to an arbitrary remaking of the contract between the partie

1994Absent proof of one of the five grounds contained in section 1286.2, a court may not vacate an award for legal or factual error even if the error clearly appears on the face of the award and it causes substantial injustice. ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 27-28.) ‘Every reasonable intendment must be indulged in favor of the award.’ [Citation.]” (Luster v. Collins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1344-1345 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 215 ].) “Generally, a decision exceeds the arbitrator’s powers only if it is so utterly irrational that it amounts to an arbitrary remaking of the contract between the partie

1994Absent proof of one of the five grounds contained in section 1286.2, a court may not vacate an award for legal or factual error even if the error clearly appears on the face of the award and it causes substantial injustice. ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 27-28.) ‘Every reasonable intendment must be indulged in favor of the award.’ [Citation.]” (Luster v. Collins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1344-1345 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 215 ].) “Generally, a decision exceeds the arbitrator’s powers only if it is so utterly irrational that it amounts to an arbitrary remaking of the contract between the partie

1994Absent proof of one of the five grounds contained in section 1286.2, a court may not vacate an award for legal or factual error even if the error clearly appears on the face of the award and it causes substantial injustice. ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 27-28.) ‘Every reasonable intendment must be indulged in favor of the award.’ [Citation.]” (Luster v. Collins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1344-1345 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 215 ].) “Generally, a decision exceeds the arbitrator’s powers only if it is so utterly irrational that it amounts to an arbitrary remaking of the contract between the partie

1993Absent proof of one of the five grounds contained in section 1286.2, a court may not vacate an award for legal or factual error even if the error clearly appears on the face of the award and it causes substantial injustice. ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 27-28.). “[E]very reasonable intendment must be indulged in favor of the award.” (Lauria v. Soriano (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 163, 168 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 328 ].) II.

1993Absent proof of one of the five grounds contained in section 1286.2, a court may not vacate an award for legal or factual error even if the error clearly appears on the face of the award and it causes substantial injustice. ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 27-28.). “[E]very reasonable intendment must be indulged in favor of the award.” (Lauria v. Soriano (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 163, 168 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 328 ].) II.

1977Fire etc. Bureau v. Bookbinders’ Union (1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 111, 114 [ 251 P.2d 694 ]; see Bierlein v. Johnson (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 728, 733 [ 166 P.2d 644 ]; Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp. (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 184 [ 260 P.2d 156 ].) Where an arbitration award purports to decide unsubmitted issues, a vacation of the award is required as being in excess of the arbitrator’s powers within the meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

1977Fire etc. Bureau v. Bookbinders’ Union (1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 111, 114 [ 251 P.2d 694 ]; see Bierlein v. Johnson (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 728, 733 [ 166 P.2d 644 ]; Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp. (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 184 [ 260 P.2d 156 ].) Where an arbitration award purports to decide unsubmitted issues, a vacation of the award is required as being in excess of the arbitrator’s powers within the meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure.