section 1382 rights in California

1987That the local sheriff has a preference for transporting prisoners from jail to the courthouse rather than from Metropolitan State Hospital to the courthouse should not be the defendant’s concern insofar as it affects his rights under section 1382 (Cf. Sykes v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 83, 94 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 507 P.2d 90 ].) Further, even if the defendant would have had to be housed in county jail during his trial, according to the social worker’s letter it was not the trial but the possible deprivation of his medication which would cause detriment to defendant’s well-being.

1987That the local sheriff has a preference for transporting prisoners from jail to the courthouse rather than from Metropolitan State Hospital to the courthouse should not be the defendant’s concern insofar as it affects his rights under section 1382 (Cf. Sykes v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 83, 94 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 507 P.2d 90 ].) Further, even if the defendant would have had to be housed in county jail during his trial, according to the social worker’s letter it was not the trial but the possible deprivation of his medication which would cause detriment to defendant’s well-being.

1985(People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 151-152 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 44 , 383 P.2d 452 ].) In criminal proceedings involving multiple defendants the right to speedy prosecution under Penal Code section 1382 sometimes conflicts with the statutory policy favoring joint trial of jointly charged defendants expressed in Penal Code section 1098.

1985(People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 151-152 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 44 , 383 P.2d 452 ].) In criminal proceedings involving multiple defendants the right to speedy prosecution under Penal Code section 1382 sometimes conflicts with the statutory policy favoring joint trial of jointly charged defendants expressed in Penal Code section 1098.

2023(People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1162-1163 [(Engram)]. . . .) As such, the Court finds good cause to continue the jury trial until a courtroom becomes available.” Two months later, Estrada filed a motion to dismiss on the ground their4 speedy trial right under section 1382 had been violated.

2023(People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1162-1163 [(Engram)]. . . .) As such, the Court finds good cause to continue the jury trial until a courtroom becomes available.” Two months later, Estrada filed a motion to dismiss on the ground their4 speedy trial right under section 1382 had been violated.

2016(See § 871.) A defendant raising the claim of abridgement of his or her rights under section 1382 on appeal “must prove not only unjustified delay in bringing his case to trial 8 but also prejudice flowing from that delay.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 574 ; see also Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 755 .) “Section 1387 generally provides a ‘two dismissal’ rule barring further prosecution of a felony if the action against the defendant has twice been previously terminated according to the provisions of that statute. [Citation.]” (Berardi v. Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 21

2014(Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 561 .) Penal Code section 1382’s statutory provisions are not at issue here and there is no equivalent statutory deadline for trying SVP cases.

2004(People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 764-765 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 996 P.2d 32 ].) To evaluate a federal constitutional speedy trial right claim, the United States Supreme Court has established a four-part balancing test comprised of the “[l]ength of delay, the *202 reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his [or her] right, and prejudice to the defendant.” (Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530 , fn. omitted.) But the statutory right to be tried on a misdemeanor complaint within 30 days under Penal Code section 1382 “cannot properly be termed ‘fundamental’ . . . .” (Tow

1980In this connection we think it significant that the United States Supreme Court has clearly rejected the proposition that the constitutional right to a speedy trial \ .. can be quantified into a specified number of days or months.’ (Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 523 ....) “The case before us presents a confrontation between two of the defendant’s rights, the right to a speedy trial constitutionally guaranteed and statutorily implemented and amplified within the time framework of Penal Code section 1382 on the one hand, and his Sixth Amendment right to competent and adequately prepared c

2016(See § 871.) A defendant raising the claim of abridgement of his or her rights under section 1382 on appeal “must prove not only unjustified delay in bringing his case to trial 8 but also prejudice flowing from that delay.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 574 ; see also Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 755 .) “Section 1387 generally provides a ‘two dismissal’ rule barring further prosecution of a felony if the action against the defendant has twice been previously terminated according to the provisions of that statute. [Citation.]” (Berardi v. Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 21

2016(See § 871.) A defendant raising the claim of abridgement of his or her rights under section 1382 on appeal “must prove not only unjustified delay in bringing his case to trial 8 but also prejudice flowing from that delay.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 574 ; see also Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 755 .) “Section 1387 generally provides a ‘two dismissal’ rule barring further prosecution of a felony if the action against the defendant has twice been previously terminated according to the provisions of that statute. [Citation.]” (Berardi v. Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 21

2010The court in Teale concisely explained that “[w]here a continuance is granted upon good cause to a codefendant the rights of the other defendants are generally not deemed to have been prejudiced.” (Teale, supra, 63 Cal.2d atp. 186 , citing Ferenz v. Superior Court (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 639 [ 128 P.2d 48 ] and People v. McFarland (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 772 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 596 ]; see also People v. Clark (1965) 62 Cal.2d *560 870, 882-883 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 784 , 402 P.2d 856 ].) 14 And although past California decisions have held that a lengthy continuance of an objecting codefendant’s trial to facili

2010The court in Teale concisely explained that “[w]here a continuance is granted upon good cause to a codefendant the rights of the other defendants are generally not deemed to have been prejudiced.” (Teale, supra, 63 Cal.2d atp. 186 , citing Ferenz v. Superior Court (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 639 [ 128 P.2d 48 ] and People v. McFarland (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 772 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 596 ]; see also People v. Clark (1965) 62 Cal.2d *560 870, 882-883 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 784 , 402 P.2d 856 ].) 14 And although past California decisions have held that a lengthy continuance of an objecting codefendant’s trial to facili

2004(People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 764-765 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 996 P.2d 32 ].) To evaluate a federal constitutional speedy trial right claim, the United States Supreme Court has established a four-part balancing test comprised of the “[l]ength of delay, the *202 reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his [or her] right, and prejudice to the defendant.” (Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530 , fn. omitted.) But the statutory right to be tried on a misdemeanor complaint within 30 days under Penal Code section 1382 “cannot properly be termed ‘fundamental’ . . . .” (Tow

2004(People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 764-765 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 996 P.2d 32 ].) To evaluate a federal constitutional speedy trial right claim, the United States Supreme Court has established a four-part balancing test comprised of the “[l]ength of delay, the *202 reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his [or her] right, and prejudice to the defendant.” (Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530 , fn. omitted.) But the statutory right to be tried on a misdemeanor complaint within 30 days under Penal Code section 1382 “cannot properly be termed ‘fundamental’ . . . .” (Tow

2002In the typical case in which the defendant agrees to a continuance of trial beyond the time frame that is his statutory right under section 1382, the continuance is usually for more than one court day and, as the trial court in Griffin observed, "if it is a court continuance to a date that far off, we don't know what our trial situation is." (Id. at p. 1743, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 620 .) If the prosecutor does not agree otherwise, the People are automatically entitled to a 10-day grace period beyond the continued trial date under section 1382.

2002In the typical case in which the defendant agrees to a continuance of trial beyond the time frame that is his statutory right under section 1382, the continuance is usually for more than one court day and, as the trial court in Griffin observed, “ ‘if it is a court continuance to a date that far off, we don’t know what our trial situation is.’ ” (Griffin, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1743 , italics omitted.) If the prosecutor does not agree otherwise, the People are automatically entitled to a 10-day grace period beyond the continued trial date under section 1382.

2016(See § 871.) A defendant raising the claim of abridgement of his or her rights under section 1382 on appeal “must prove not only unjustified delay in bringing his case to trial 8 but also prejudice flowing from that delay.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 574 ; see also Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 755 .) “Section 1387 generally provides a ‘two dismissal’ rule barring further prosecution of a felony if the action against the defendant has twice been previously terminated according to the provisions of that statute. [Citation.]” (Berardi v. Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 21

2016(See § 871.) A defendant raising the claim of abridgement of his or her rights under section 1382 on appeal “must prove not only unjustified delay in bringing his case to trial 8 but also prejudice flowing from that delay.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 574 ; see also Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 755 .) “Section 1387 generally provides a ‘two dismissal’ rule barring further prosecution of a felony if the action against the defendant has twice been previously terminated according to the provisions of that statute. [Citation.]” (Berardi v. Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 21

2014(People v. Sanders (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 839, 846 [SVPA does not specify a time by which a commitment proceeding trial must commence].) Moreover, this case is distinguishable because nothing in the Johnson opinion indicates the defendant did not want to go to trial.

2010The court in Teale concisely explained that “[w]here a continuance is granted upon good cause to a codefendant the rights of the other defendants are generally not deemed to have been prejudiced.” (Teale, supra, 63 Cal.2d atp. 186 , citing Ferenz v. Superior Court (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 639 [ 128 P.2d 48 ] and People v. McFarland (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 772 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 596 ]; see also People v. Clark (1965) 62 Cal.2d *560 870, 882-883 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 784 , 402 P.2d 856 ].) 14 And although past California decisions have held that a lengthy continuance of an objecting codefendant’s trial to facili

2010The court in Teale concisely explained that “[w]here a continuance is granted upon good cause to a codefendant the rights of the other defendants are generally not deemed to have been prejudiced.” (Teale, supra, 63 Cal.2d atp. 186 , citing Ferenz v. Superior Court (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 639 [ 128 P.2d 48 ] and People v. McFarland (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 772 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 596 ]; see also People v. Clark (1965) 62 Cal.2d *560 870, 882-883 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 784 , 402 P.2d 856 ].) 14 And although past California decisions have held that a lengthy continuance of an objecting codefendant’s trial to facili

2008Justice Richardson, who authored Townsend , dissented from the majority's holding with respect to the right to speedy trial issue, and described the majority opinion as a reversal of Townsend . ( Johnson, at pp. 581-582.) [10] Because we conclude that good cause existed to continue Jackson's trial based on his counsel's unavailability, we need not determine whether Jackson waived or expressly or impliedly consented to the continuance under section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(A) and (B), an issue which is not raised by any party. [11] The record is not clear how far past the statutory deadline tri

2008Justice Richardson, who authored Townsend , dissented from the majority's holding with respect to the right to speedy trial issue, and described the majority opinion as a reversal of Townsend . ( Johnson, at pp. 581-582.) [10] Because we conclude that good cause existed to continue Jackson's trial based on his counsel's unavailability, we need not determine whether Jackson waived or expressly or impliedly consented to the continuance under section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(A) and (B), an issue which is not raised by any party. [11] The record is not clear how far past the statutory deadline tri

2008Justice Richardson, who authored Townsend , dissented from the majority's holding with respect to the right to speedy trial issue, and described the majority opinion as a reversal of Townsend . ( Johnson, at pp. 581-582.) [10] Because we conclude that good cause existed to continue Jackson's trial based on his counsel's unavailability, we need not determine whether Jackson waived or expressly or impliedly consented to the continuance under section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(A) and (B), an issue which is not raised by any party. [11] The record is not clear how far past the statutory deadline tri

2008Justice Richardson, who authored Townsend , dissented from the majority's holding with respect to the right to speedy trial issue, and described the majority opinion as a reversal of Townsend . ( Johnson, at pp. 581-582.) [10] Because we conclude that good cause existed to continue Jackson's trial based on his counsel's unavailability, we need not determine whether Jackson waived or expressly or impliedly consented to the continuance under section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(A) and (B), an issue which is not raised by any party. [11] The record is not clear how far past the statutory deadline tri

1980In view of our disposition of this appeal, however, we need not reconsider Townsend’s holding that a defendant’s rights under section 1382, a statute enacted to supplement and define the constitutional guarantee (see Sykes v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 83, 89 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 507 P.2d 90 ]; People v. Godlewski (1943) 22 Cal.2d 677, 682 [ 140 P.2d 381 ]) are not of fundamental character.

1980In view of our disposition of this appeal, however, we need not reconsider Townsend’s holding that a defendant’s rights under section 1382, a statute enacted to supplement and define the constitutional guarantee (see Sykes v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 83, 89 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 507 P.2d 90 ]; People v. Godlewski (1943) 22 Cal.2d 677, 682 [ 140 P.2d 381 ]) are not of fundamental character.

1966(People v. Wade, 215 Cal.App.2d 49, 51 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 822 ].) The purpose of an objection to a trial date beyond the statutory period is to give the trial court an opportunity to fix an earlier date for the trial.

1966(People v. Wade, 215 Cal.App.2d 49, 51 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 822 ].) The purpose of an objection to a trial date beyond the statutory period is to give the trial court an opportunity to fix an earlier date for the trial.