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30 California opinions name it 3 courts 2000–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Vinesred2 sentences2018(Stats. 1997, ch. 817, § 2, pp. 5519-5520; People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830 , 869, fn. 20, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830 , 251 P.3d 943 ; People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225 , 232 & fn. 2, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533 , 973 P.2d 512 .) The relevant sex offenses specified in section 667.61, subdivision (c) are in concert rape or forcible oral copulation. 2018(Stats. 1997, ch. 817, § 2, pp. 5519-5520; People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830 , 869, fn. 20, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830 , 251 P.3d 943 ; People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225 , 232 & fn. 2, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533 , 973 P.2d 512 .) The relevant sex offenses specified in section 667.61, subdivision (c) are in concert rape or forcible oral copulation. | 4 | 6 |
People v. Zaldanared2 sentences2023(Zaldana, at p. 535.) Instead, the information alleged that, “ ‘within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.61(b),’ ” the defendant “ ‘committed an offense specified in Section 667.61(c) against more than one victim.’ ” (Ibid.) We concluded that this was sufficient to put the defendant on notice that he could be sentenced to section 667.61’s longer term because the information specifically referenced subdivision (b), which “itself refers to subdivision (j), identifying it as an exception to the shorter 15-year-to-life term.” (Zaldana, at p. 535.) Further, “[b]ecause the information alleged bo 2023(Zaldana, at p. 535.) Instead, the information alleged that, “ ‘within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.61(b),’ ” the defendant “ ‘committed an offense specified in Section 667.61(c) against more than one victim.’ ” (Ibid.) We concluded that this was sufficient to put the defendant on notice that he could be sentenced to section 667.61’s longer term because the information specifically referenced subdivision (b), which “itself refers to subdivision (j), identifying it as an exception to the shorter 15-year-to-life term.” (Zaldana, at p. 535.) Further, “[b]ecause the information alleged bo | 3 | 6 |
People v. Mancebogreen2 sentences2026(People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 741 (Mancebo).) The One Strike law “mandates an indeterminate sentence of 15 or 25 years to life in prison when the jury has convicted the defendant of a specified felony sex crime (§ 667.61 [listing applicable crimes]) and has also found certain factual allegations to be true (§ 667.61, subds. (d), (e)).” (People v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 102 .) At all relevant times, a violation of section 288, subdivision (a) has been a One Strike offense enumerated in section 667.61, subdivision (c), and section 667.61, subdivision (e) has included a multip 2021(Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 751 .) In Mancebo, the Attorney General argued the multiple-victim circumstance was sufficiently alleged because the pleading charged the defendant with committing two qualifying offenses under section 667.61(c) against two different victims—the multiple-victim circumstance was inherent in the charges. ( Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 744-745.) The court rejected this argument, noting that the statute required 31. section 667.61, subdivisions (d) and (e) be specifically pleaded and proven. ( Mancebo, supra, at p. 745 .) Moreover, the pleading was inadequate | 2 | 5 |
People v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2015Section 667.61 "sets forth an alternative and harsher sentencing scheme for certain enumerated sex crimes . . . ." (People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 741 ; People v. Rodriguez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 204, 211 .) The statute provides, among other things, for mandatory sentences of 15-years-to-life sentences for defendants convicted of one of the sex offenses enumerated in section 667.61, subdivision (c), and under one of the 25 circumstances listed in section 667.61, subdivision (e).2 (Former § 667.61, subd. (b); see People v. Rodriguez (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1261 ["section 667.61—o 2014Section 667.61 “sets forth an alternative and harsher sentencing scheme for certain enumerated sex crimes . . . .” (People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 741 ; People v. Rodriguez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 204, 211 .) The statute provides, among other things, for mandatory sentences of 15 years to life sentences for defendants convicted of one of the sex offenses enumerated in section 667.61, subdivision (c), and under one of the circumstances listed in section 667.61, subdivision (e).3 (Former § 667.61, subd. (b); see 2 Molina does not challenge his sentence on count 4. 3 Former section 667.6 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Palmergreen2 sentences2015Section 667.61 "sets forth an alternative and harsher sentencing scheme for certain enumerated sex crimes . . . ." (People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 741 ; People v. Rodriguez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 204, 211 .) The statute provides, among other things, for mandatory sentences of 15-years-to-life sentences for defendants convicted of one of the sex offenses enumerated in section 667.61, subdivision (c), and under one of the 25 circumstances listed in section 667.61, subdivision (e).2 (Former § 667.61, subd. (b); see People v. Rodriguez (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1261 ["section 667.61—o 2014Section 667.61 “sets forth an alternative and harsher sentencing scheme for certain enumerated sex crimes . . . .” (People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 741 ; People v. Rodriguez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 204, 211 .) The statute provides, among other things, for mandatory sentences of 15 years to life sentences for defendants convicted of one of the sex offenses enumerated in section 667.61, subdivision (c), and under one of the circumstances listed in section 667.61, subdivision (e).3 (Former § 667.61, subd. (b); see 2 Molina does not challenge his sentence on count 4. 3 Former section 667.6 | 2 | 2 |
Coito v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2014(Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 488 [ 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 , 278 P.3d 860 ].) Section 667.61, part of what is commonly known as the “One Strike” law, was enacted in 1994. 2014(Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 488 [ 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 , 278 P.3d 860 ].) Section 667.61, part of what is commonly known as the “One Strike” law, was enacted in 1994. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Yartzgreen2 sentences2014As we explain below, we agree with Huynh that the prior conviction must precede the currently charged offense under section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1). “ ‘In construing a statute, our task is to determine the Legislature’s intent and purpose for the enactment. [Citation.] We look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] If there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, its plain meaning controls; we presume the Legislature meant what it said. [Citation.] “However, if the statutory language permits more than one reaso 2014As we explain below, we agree with Huynh that the prior conviction must precede the currently charged offense under section 667.61, subdivision (d)(1). “ ‘In construing a statute, our task is to determine the Legislature’s intent and purpose for the enactment. [Citation.] We look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] If there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, its plain meaning controls; we presume the Legislature meant what it said. [Citation.] “However, if the statutory language permits more than one reaso | 1 | 2 |
People v. Woodworthgreen2 sentences2022(See People v. Zaldana (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 527 , 536 [because “section 288, subdivision (a) does not fall within [subdivision (c)(1)-(7)]—it is listed in section 667.61, subdivision (c)(8)— . . . the court retains discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive 25-year-to-life terms for the three violations of section 288, subdivision (a)”], review granted 26 Mar. 18 , 2020, S259731.) Section 667.61, subdivision (i), “by implication leaves the decision to impose consecutive or concurrent terms” for the nonspecified offenses in section 667.61, subdivision (c), “to the sentencing court’s discre 2022(See People v. Zaldana (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 527 , 536 [because “section 288, subdivision (a) does not fall within [subdivision (c)(1)-(7)]—it is listed in section 667.61, subdivision (c)(8)— . . . the court retains discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive 25-year-to-life terms for the three violations of section 288, subdivision (a)”], review granted 26 Mar. 18 , 2020, S259731.) Section 667.61, subdivision (i), “by implication leaves the decision to impose consecutive or concurrent terms” for the nonspecified offenses in section 667.61, subdivision (c), “to the sentencing court’s discre | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gollardogreen1 sentence2022Lopez’s interpretation of section 667.61 is correct. “‘The expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other things not expressed.’” (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1105 ; accord, People v. Gollardo (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 547, 557 .) Because section 667.61, subdivision (i), requires a trial court to impose consecutive sentences for certain offenses in section 667.61, subdivision (c)—namely, those listed in subdivision (c)(1) to (7)—it does not require the court to impose consecutive sentences for other offenses in the statute—namely, subdivision (c)(8) | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bradfordgreen2 sentences2022(See People v. Zaldana (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 527 , 536 [because “section 288, subdivision (a) does not fall within [subdivision (c)(1)-(7)]—it is listed in section 667.61, subdivision (c)(8)— . . . the court retains discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive 25-year-to-life terms for the three violations of section 288, subdivision (a)”], review granted 26 Mar. 18 , 2020, S259731.) Section 667.61, subdivision (i), “by implication leaves the decision to impose consecutive or concurrent terms” for the nonspecified offenses in section 667.61, subdivision (c), “to the sentencing court’s discre 2022(See People v. Zaldana (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 527 , 536 [because “section 288, subdivision (a) does not fall within [subdivision (c)(1)-(7)]—it is listed in section 667.61, subdivision (c)(8)— . . . the court retains discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive 25-year-to-life terms for the three violations of section 288, subdivision (a)”], review granted 26 Mar. 18 , 2020, S259731.) Section 667.61, subdivision (i), “by implication leaves the decision to impose consecutive or concurrent terms” for the nonspecified offenses in section 667.61, subdivision (c), “to the sentencing court’s discre | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cookgreen1 sentence2022(See People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 935 [“statutory language is the best indicator of the Legislature’s intent”].) The People ignore section 667.61, subdivision (i), entirely. | 1 | 1 |
People v. RETANANgreen1 sentence2015(People v. Crooks (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 797, 803-812 ; People v. Retanan (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1230-1232 [upholding a sentence of 135 years pursuant to the one strike law].) A sentence of over 283 years for multiple sex offenses not charged under the one strike law has overcome a challenge based on cruel and unusual punishment. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. DeSimonegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Jimenezgreen2 sentences2023(Zaldana, at p. 535.) Instead, the information alleged that, “ ‘within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.61(b),’ ” the defendant “ ‘committed an offense specified in Section 667.61(c) against more than one victim.’ ” (Ibid.) We concluded that this was sufficient to put the defendant on notice that he could be sentenced to section 667.61’s longer term because the information specifically referenced subdivision (b), which “itself refers to subdivision (j), identifying it as an exception to the shorter 15-year-to-life term.” (Zaldana, at p. 535.) Further, “[b]ecause the information alleged bo 2019Under these circumstances, imposition of sentence under section 667.61(j)(2) violated Jimenez’s constitutional right to due process.” ( Jimenez, supra, at p. 397 , fn. omitted.) As in both Jimenez and Vaquera, the information here alleged, “within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.61(b) and (e)(4), as to defendant, BEDAVID ZALDANA, as to count(s) 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 that the following circumstances apply: The defendant in the present case committed an offense specified in Section 667.61(c) against more than one victim.” For each count, the jury found the multiple victim circumstance true. | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Martinez
red
2 sentences2018(Stats. 1997, ch. 817, § 2, pp. 5519-5520; People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830 , 869, fn. 20, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830 , 251 P.3d 943 ; People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225 , 232 & fn. 2, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533 , 973 P.2d 512 .) The relevant sex offenses specified in section 667.61, subdivision (c) are in concert rape or forcible oral copulation. 2018(Stats. 1997, ch. 817, § 2, pp. 5519-5520; People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830 , 869, fn. 20, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830 , 251 P.3d 943 ; People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225 , 232 & fn. 2, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533 , 973 P.2d 512 .) The relevant sex offenses specified in section 667.61, subdivision (c) are in concert rape or forcible oral copulation. | 6 | 2016–2018 |
People v. Wutzke
green
2 sentences2020(People v. Hammer (2003) 30 Cal.4th 756, 759 ; People v. Perez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1223 .) Subject to exceptions provided in subdivisions (j), (l), and (m), section 667.61 provides that a defendant must be sentenced to an indeterminate life term when convicted of a sex offense enumerated in section 667.61, subdivision (c), under one or more of the circumstances listed in subdivisions (d) or (e) of the statute.4 (See People v. Wutzke (2002) 28 Cal.4th 923, 930 ; People v. Perez, at p. 1223.) Specifically, if the defendant is convicted of a section 667.61, subdivision (c) offense and at 2015The People also must plead and prove at least one aggravating circumstance specified in section 667.61, subdivision (d) or (e)." (People v. Wutzke (2002) 28 Cal.4th 923, 930 .) 2 Former section 667.61 provided, in relevant part: "(a) A person who is convicted of an offense specified in subdivision (c) under one or more of the circumstances specified in subdivision (d) or under two or more of the circumstances specified in subdivision (e) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life and shall not be eligible for release on parole for 25 years except as provided in subdivision | 3 | 2014–2020 |
People v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences2015Section 667.61 "sets forth an alternative and harsher sentencing scheme for certain enumerated sex crimes . . . ." (People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 741 ; People v. Rodriguez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 204, 211 .) The statute provides, among other things, for mandatory sentences of 15-years-to-life sentences for defendants convicted of one of the sex offenses enumerated in section 667.61, subdivision (c), and under one of the 25 circumstances listed in section 667.61, subdivision (e).2 (Former § 667.61, subd. (b); see People v. Rodriguez (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1261 ["section 667.61—o 2014Section 667.61 “sets forth an alternative and harsher sentencing scheme for certain enumerated sex crimes . . . .” (People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 741 ; People v. Rodriguez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 204, 211 .) The statute provides, among other things, for mandatory sentences of 15 years to life sentences for defendants convicted of one of the sex offenses enumerated in section 667.61, subdivision (c), and under one of the circumstances listed in section 667.61, subdivision (e).3 (Former § 667.61, subd. (b); see 2 Molina does not challenge his sentence on count 4. 3 Former section 667.6 | 2 | 2014–2015 |
People v. Farr
green
2 sentences2013(People v. Calhoun, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 402-405; Farr, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 845 ; People v. Manners, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at p. 833 .) And a defendant violates section 264.1 when he commits sexual penetration as an aider and abettor. (§ 264.1, subd. (a); People v. Lopez, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at pp. 884-885.) Speight argues that even if an aider and abettor can “commit” a sexual offense within the meaning of section 667.61(e)(2), there was insufficient evidence to establish his liability under a direct aiding and abetting theory. 2013(People v. Calhoun, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 402-405; Farr, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 845 ; People v. Manners, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at p. 833 .) And a defendant violates section 264.1 when he commits sexual penetration as an aider and abettor. (§ 264.1, subd. (a); People v. Lopez, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at pp. 884-885.) Speight argues that even if an aider and abettor can “commit” a sexual offense within the meaning of section 667.61(e)(2), there was insufficient evidence to establish his liability under a direct aiding and abetting theory. | 2 | 2000–2013 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2026Counts 5 through 32, 34 through 89, and 90 through 99 included an allegation under section 667.61, subdivisions (c) and (e), that the offenses were committed against more than one victim, which made Moffat eligible for an indeterminate life term for each offense under section 667.61, the so-called “One Strike” law (People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99 , 110). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Anderson
green
1 sentence2026(People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 741 (Mancebo).) The One Strike law “mandates an indeterminate sentence of 15 or 25 years to life in prison when the jury has convicted the defendant of a specified felony sex crime (§ 667.61 [listing applicable crimes]) and has also found certain factual allegations to be true (§ 667.61, subds. (d), (e)).” (People v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 102 .) At all relevant times, a violation of section 288, subdivision (a) has been a One Strike offense enumerated in section 667.61, subdivision (c), and section 667.61, subdivision (e) has included a multip | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Salazar
green
2 sentences2025Ramirez was convicted in count 11 of aggravated sexual assault of a child, not rape, and aggravated sexual assault of a child is not one of the qualifying offenses under section 667.61. 44 and therefore, it would have imposed the same sentence even if it had been aware of the error. ““‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that ‘informed discretion’ than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinforma 2025Ramirez was convicted in count 11 of aggravated sexual assault of a child, not rape, and aggravated sexual assault of a child is not one of the qualifying offenses under section 667.61. 44 and therefore, it would have imposed the same sentence even if it had been aware of the error. ““‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that ‘informed discretion’ than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinforma | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Gutierrez
green
2 sentences2025Ramirez was convicted in count 11 of aggravated sexual assault of a child, not rape, and aggravated sexual assault of a child is not one of the qualifying offenses under section 667.61. 44 and therefore, it would have imposed the same sentence even if it had been aware of the error. ““‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that ‘informed discretion’ than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinforma 2025Ramirez was convicted in count 11 of aggravated sexual assault of a child, not rape, and aggravated sexual assault of a child is not one of the qualifying offenses under section 667.61. 44 and therefore, it would have imposed the same sentence even if it had been aware of the error. ““‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that ‘informed discretion’ than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinforma | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Valdez
green
2 sentences2022(See People v. Zaldana (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 527 , 536 [because “section 288, subdivision (a) does not fall within [subdivision (c)(1)-(7)]—it is listed in section 667.61, subdivision (c)(8)— . . . the court retains discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive 25-year-to-life terms for the three violations of section 288, subdivision (a)”], review granted 26 Mar. 18 , 2020, S259731.) Section 667.61, subdivision (i), “by implication leaves the decision to impose consecutive or concurrent terms” for the nonspecified offenses in section 667.61, subdivision (c), “to the sentencing court’s discre 2022(See People v. Zaldana (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 527 , 536 [because “section 288, subdivision (a) does not fall within [subdivision (c)(1)-(7)]—it is listed in section 667.61, subdivision (c)(8)— . . . the court retains discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive 25-year-to-life terms for the three violations of section 288, subdivision (a)”], review granted 26 Mar. 18 , 2020, S259731.) Section 667.61, subdivision (i), “by implication leaves the decision to impose consecutive or concurrent terms” for the nonspecified offenses in section 667.61, subdivision (c), “to the sentencing court’s discre | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Le Francois v. Goel
green
1 sentence2022Lopez’s interpretation of section 667.61 is correct. “‘The expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other things not expressed.’” (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1105 ; accord, People v. Gollardo (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 547, 557 .) Because section 667.61, subdivision (i), requires a trial court to impose consecutive sentences for certain offenses in section 667.61, subdivision (c)—namely, those listed in subdivision (c)(1) to (7)—it does not require the court to impose consecutive sentences for other offenses in the statute—namely, subdivision (c)(8) | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Anderson
green
1 sentence2021To be subjected to any of the harsher penalties under the One Strike law, due process mandates a defendant be provided sufficient notice. “‘“No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are 12 There are currently seven different circumstances identified under subdivision (d), and another seven circumstances identified under subdivision (e) of section 667.61. (§ 667.61, subds. (d)(1)–(7) & (e)(1)–(7).) 29. among the constitutional rights of every ac | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Carbajal
green
1 sentence2020The question of whether Foley should have been sentenced pursuant to subdivision (j)(2) is not before us. 5 subdivision (e) circumstances are found true, he or she must be sentenced to a term of 25 years to life. (§ 667.61, subd. (a).) If only one subdivision (e) circumstance is found true, he or she must be sentenced to 15 years to life. (§ 667.61, subd. (b); People v. Wutzke, at p. 930.) Commission of a lewd act upon a child under 14 years old in violation of section 288, subdivision (a)—the crime of which Foley was convicted in counts 6, 7, and 8—is an offense enumerated in subdivision (c). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Hammer
green
1 sentence2020(People v. Hammer (2003) 30 Cal.4th 756, 759 ; People v. Perez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1223 .) Subject to exceptions provided in subdivisions (j), (l), and (m), section 667.61 provides that a defendant must be sentenced to an indeterminate life term when convicted of a sex offense enumerated in section 667.61, subdivision (c), under one or more of the circumstances listed in subdivisions (d) or (e) of the statute.4 (See People v. Wutzke (2002) 28 Cal.4th 923, 930 ; People v. Perez, at p. 1223.) Specifically, if the defendant is convicted of a section 667.61, subdivision (c) offense and at | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Perez
green
1 sentence2020(People v. Hammer (2003) 30 Cal.4th 756, 759 ; People v. Perez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1223 .) Subject to exceptions provided in subdivisions (j), (l), and (m), section 667.61 provides that a defendant must be sentenced to an indeterminate life term when convicted of a sex offense enumerated in section 667.61, subdivision (c), under one or more of the circumstances listed in subdivisions (d) or (e) of the statute.4 (See People v. Wutzke (2002) 28 Cal.4th 923, 930 ; People v. Perez, at p. 1223.) Specifically, if the defendant is convicted of a section 667.61, subdivision (c) offense and at | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Cooper
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Cooper (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 815, 819-831 .) The one strike law for sex offenses under section 667.61 mandating an automatic minimum sentence of 25 years to life has been upheld against constitutional challenges. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Crooks
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Crooks (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 797, 803-812 ; People v. Retanan (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1230-1232 [upholding a sentence of 135 years pursuant to the one strike law].) A sentence of over 283 years for multiple sex offenses not charged under the one strike law has overcome a challenge based on cruel and unusual punishment. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Majors
green
1 sentence2014In People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385 , 410–411 (Majors), the California Supreme Court held that a trial court’s obligation to instruct sua sponte on a lesser included offense does not extend to enhancements. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Manners green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Lopez green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Jones yellow | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Calhoun green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Byrd green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| People v. Craft red | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Jones green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.