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30 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hoffer-Adou v. Adougreen2 sentences2024Contrary to the defendant's further contention, "the opposing spouse in a no fault divorce action pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170(7) is not entitled to litigate the other spouse's sworn statement that the relationship has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months" ( Trbovich v Trbovich , 122 AD3d 1381, 1382 ; see Johnston v Johnston , 156 AD3d 1181, 1182 ; Matter of Motta v Motta , 145 AD3d 560, 561 ; Hoffer-Adou v Adou , 121 AD3d 618, 619 ; Palermo v Palermo , 100 AD3d 1453, 1453 ). "[M]aintenance is a support payment awarded to assist the less affluent spouse in 2017With respect to the grounds for divorce, the husband’s sworn testimony that his marriage to the wife had irretrievably broken down for a period of at least six months was sufficient to establish, as a matter of law, his cause of action for divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (7) (see Matter of Motta v Motta, 145 AD3d 560, 561 [2016]; Gonzalez v Garcia, 134 AD3d 989, 990 [2015]; Hoffer-Adou v Adou, 121 AD3d 618, 619 [2014]). | 2 | 3 |
Rinzler v. Rinzlergreen2 sentences2014Rinzler v Rinzler, 97 AD3d 215, 218 [2012]; A.C. v D.R., 32 Misc. 3d 293, 306 [2011]). 2014Rinzler v Rinzler, 97 AD3d 215, 218 [2012]; A.C. v D.R., 32 Misc. 3d 293, 306 [2011]). | 2 | 3 |
A.C. v. D.R.green2 sentences2014Rinzler v Rinzler, 97 AD3d 215, 218 [2012]; A.C. v D.R., 32 Misc. 3d 293, 306 [2011]). 2014Rinzler v Rinzler, 97 AD3d 215, 218 [2012]; A.C. v D.R., 32 Misc. 3d 293, 306 [2011]). | 2 | 3 |
Christian v. Christiangreen2 sentences2009Thus, it is the physical separation of the parties, not the written agreement, that supplies the ground for a divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) (see Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 69 [1977]; Littlejohns v Littlejohns, 76 Misc 2d 82, 86 [1972], affd on op of Korn, J., 42 AD2d 957 [1973]). 1991Plaintiff contends that the holding of this court in the appeal from the judgment of divorce addressed the issue of defendant’s substantial compliance with the separation agreement only in the context of entitlement to a divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) (see, Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 69 ). | 1 | 5 |
Matter of Motta v. Mottagreen2 sentences2024Contrary to the defendant's further contention, "the opposing spouse in a no fault divorce action pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170(7) is not entitled to litigate the other spouse's sworn statement that the relationship has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months" ( Trbovich v Trbovich , 122 AD3d 1381, 1382 ; see Johnston v Johnston , 156 AD3d 1181, 1182 ; Matter of Motta v Motta , 145 AD3d 560, 561 ; Hoffer-Adou v Adou , 121 AD3d 618, 619 ; Palermo v Palermo , 100 AD3d 1453, 1453 ). "[M]aintenance is a support payment awarded to assist the less affluent spouse in 2017With respect to the grounds for divorce, the husband’s sworn testimony that his marriage to the wife had irretrievably broken down for a period of at least six months was sufficient to establish, as a matter of law, his cause of action for divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (7) (see Matter of Motta v Motta, 145 AD3d 560, 561 [2016]; Gonzalez v Garcia, 134 AD3d 989, 990 [2015]; Hoffer-Adou v Adou, 121 AD3d 618, 619 [2014]). | 1 | 2 |
Johnston v. Johnstongreen1 sentence2024Contrary to the defendant's further contention, "the opposing spouse in a no fault divorce action pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170(7) is not entitled to litigate the other spouse's sworn statement that the relationship has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months" ( Trbovich v Trbovich , 122 AD3d 1381, 1382 ; see Johnston v Johnston , 156 AD3d 1181, 1182 ; Matter of Motta v Motta , 145 AD3d 560, 561 ; Hoffer-Adou v Adou , 121 AD3d 618, 619 ; Palermo v Palermo , 100 AD3d 1453, 1453 ). "[M]aintenance is a support payment awarded to assist the less affluent spouse in | 1 | 1 |
Gonzalez v. Garciagreen1 sentence2017With respect to the grounds for divorce, the husband’s sworn testimony that his marriage to the wife had irretrievably broken down for a period of at least six months was sufficient to establish, as a matter of law, his cause of action for divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (7) (see Matter of Motta v Motta, 145 AD3d 560, 561 [2016]; Gonzalez v Garcia, 134 AD3d 989, 990 [2015]; Hoffer-Adou v Adou, 121 AD3d 618, 619 [2014]). | 1 | 1 |
TUPER, PATRICIA P. v. TUPER, KENNETH E.green1 sentence2015And similar to the majority of courts on the issue of grounds trials, all of these courts held that extensive pleadings were not required in cases brought pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (7) (Taper, 98 AD3d at 57 [“Because a cause of action for divorce under Domestic Relations Law § 170 (7) does not require a showing of any ‘misconduct’ by either party, the requirements of CPLR 3016 (c) are inapplicable”]). | 1 | 1 |
Townes v. Cokergreen1 sentence2014Contrary to the husband’s contention, the wife was entitled to a judgment of divorce under the no-fault provision of Domestic Relations Law § 170 (7), since her statement under oath that the marriage was irretrievably broken for a period of six months was sufficient to establish her cause of action for divorce as a matter of law (see Townes v Coker, 35 Misc 3d 543, 547 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2012]). | 1 | 1 |
Leon v. Martinezgreen1 sentence2012In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that a plaintiff seeking a divorce under the no-fault statute is required to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate that the marriage is broken down irretrievably rather than simply allege as much in conclusory terms (see generally CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Goldin v Engineers Country Club, 54 AD3d 658, 659-660 [2008], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 13 NY3d 763 [2009]), we note that “ ‘[i]n assessing a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ... a court may freely consider affidavits ... to remedy any defects in the complaint’ ” (Parker v Leonard, 24 AD3d 1255 , 1 | 1 | 1 |
Goldin v. Engineers Country Clubgreen1 sentence2012In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that a plaintiff seeking a divorce under the no-fault statute is required to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate that the marriage is broken down irretrievably rather than simply allege as much in conclusory terms (see generally CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Goldin v Engineers Country Club, 54 AD3d 658, 659-660 [2008], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 13 NY3d 763 [2009]), we note that “ ‘[i]n assessing a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ... a court may freely consider affidavits ... to remedy any defects in the complaint’ ” (Parker v Leonard, 24 AD3d 1255 , 1 | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Thomasgreen1 sentence2012In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that a plaintiff seeking a divorce under the no-fault statute is required to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate that the marriage is broken down irretrievably rather than simply allege as much in conclusory terms (see generally CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Goldin v Engineers Country Club, 54 AD3d 658, 659-660 [2008], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 13 NY3d 763 [2009]), we note that “ ‘[i]n assessing a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ... a court may freely consider affidavits ... to remedy any defects in the complaint’ ” (Parker v Leonard, 24 AD3d 1255 , 1 | 1 | 1 |
Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co.green1 sentence2012In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that a plaintiff seeking a divorce under the no-fault statute is required to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate that the marriage is broken down irretrievably rather than simply allege as much in conclusory terms (see generally CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Goldin v Engineers Country Club, 54 AD3d 658, 659-660 [2008], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 13 NY3d 763 [2009]), we note that “ ‘[i]n assessing a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ... a court may freely consider affidavits ... to remedy any defects in the complaint’ ” (Parker v Leonard, 24 AD3d 1255 , 1 | 1 | 1 |
Stone v. Stonegreen1 sentence2010A stipulation entered into by the parties in April 2004 is not a separation agreement within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) for the purpose of awarding the defendant a conversion divorce, as it contains affirmative language that its purpose was to settle certain issues pendente lite (see Sint v Sint, 225 AD2d 606, 607 [1996]; Frasca v Frasca, 213 AD2d 589, 590 [1995]; Stone v Stone, 45 AD2d 967, 968 [1974]). | 1 | 1 |
Frasca v. Frascagreen1 sentence2010A stipulation entered into by the parties in April 2004 is not a separation agreement within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) for the purpose of awarding the defendant a conversion divorce, as it contains affirmative language that its purpose was to settle certain issues pendente lite (see Sint v Sint, 225 AD2d 606, 607 [1996]; Frasca v Frasca, 213 AD2d 589, 590 [1995]; Stone v Stone, 45 AD2d 967, 968 [1974]). | 1 | 1 |
Sint v. Sintgreen1 sentence2010A stipulation entered into by the parties in April 2004 is not a separation agreement within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) for the purpose of awarding the defendant a conversion divorce, as it contains affirmative language that its purpose was to settle certain issues pendente lite (see Sint v Sint, 225 AD2d 606, 607 [1996]; Frasca v Frasca, 213 AD2d 589, 590 [1995]; Stone v Stone, 45 AD2d 967, 968 [1974]). | 1 | 1 |
Littlejohns v. Littlejohnsgreen1 sentence2009Thus, it is the physical separation of the parties, not the written agreement, that supplies the ground for a divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) (see Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 69 [1977]; Littlejohns v Littlejohns, 76 Misc 2d 82, 86 [1972], affd on op of Korn, J., 42 AD2d 957 [1973]). | 1 | 1 |
Seligman v. Seligmangreen1 sentence2008Seligman v Seligman at 635; Hummel v Hummel at 599; Taft v Taft at 445 ; Jessup v LaBonte at 295 .) Thus, even though a part of a separation agreement is declared void, the separation agreement still retains vitality as a basis for dissolution of the marriage. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
PALERMO, CHRISTINE L. v. PALERMO, JOSEPH A.
neutral
2 sentences2024Contrary to the defendant's further contention, "the opposing spouse in a no fault divorce action pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170(7) is not entitled to litigate the other spouse's sworn statement that the relationship has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months" ( Trbovich v Trbovich , 122 AD3d 1381, 1382 ; see Johnston v Johnston , 156 AD3d 1181, 1182 ; Matter of Motta v Motta , 145 AD3d 560, 561 ; Hoffer-Adou v Adou , 121 AD3d 618, 619 ; Palermo v Palermo , 100 AD3d 1453, 1453 ). "[M]aintenance is a support payment awarded to assist the less affluent spouse in 2014We agree with plaintiff that the opposing spouse in a no-fault divorce action pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (7) is not entitled to litigate the other spouse’s sworn statement that the relationship has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months (see Palermo v Palermo, 35 Misc. 3d 1211[A] , 2011 NY Slip Op 52506[U] , *15 [2011], affd for reasons stated 100 AD3d 1453 [2012]; see e.g. | 4 | 2014–2024 |
Brady v. Brady
green
2 sentences2001(Brady v Brady, 64 NY2d 339 ; Doyle v Doyle, 214 AD2d 918 ; Walczak v Walczak, 206 AD2d 900 ; Biegeleisen v Biegeleisen, 253 AD2d 474 .) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment granting her a “conversion” divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) is granted. 1997A plaintiff seeking a divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (1) “must show serious misconduct, and not mere incompatibility” (Brady v Brady, 64 NY2d 339, 343 ). | 3 | 1994–2001 |
Kahn v. Kahn
green
2 sentences2024Once again recalling Kahn , "anything that terminates the legal fiction of the unity of two separate persons ought to have an effect upon the estate [i.e., the tenancy by the entirety] whose creation depended upon such unity." Kahn, 43 NY2d at 207 . 2024Once again recalling Kahn , "anything that terminates the legal fiction of the unity of two separate persons ought to have an effect upon the estate [i.e., the tenancy by the entirety] whose creation depended upon such unity." Kahn, 43 NY2d at 207 . | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Gleason v. Gleason
green
2 sentences2009All that a party seeking a divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) must prove “is that there is some kind of formal document of separation” (Gleason, 26 NY2d at 37 ). 2009Indeed, the written agreement “is simply intended as evidence of the authenticity and reality of the separation” (Gleason, 26 NY2d at 35 ; see Christian, 42 NY2d at 69 ; Harris v Harris, 36 AD2d 594 [1971]). | 2 | 2002–2009 |
Elwood v. Elwood
neutral
2 sentences2002For a separation agreement to be a valid predicate for a conversion divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6), the parties thereto must actually have separated before executing the agreement, or the separation must immediately follow the execution (see Matter of Wilson, 66 AD2d 893 , affd 50 NY2d 59 ; Elwood v Elwood, 51 AD2d 1090 ). 1987The evidence adduced at trial indicates that the separation agreement, as amended, was made in contemplation of an immediate separation and in fact was followed by an immediate separation and is therefore valid (see, LaMontagne v LaMontagne, supra; cf., Elwood v Elwood, 51 AD2d 1090 ). | 2 | 1987–2002 |
Angeloff v. Angeloff
green
2 sentences1994Although a separation agreement which is void ab initio due to fraud, duress or incapacity cannot serve as the basis for a conversion divorce under Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) (see, Angeloff v Angeloff, 56 NY2d 982 ; Howard v Howard, 134 AD2d 571 ), such is not the case here. 1987The plaintiff has alleged that the agreement was void on the basis of fraud, duress and incapacity, which, if found to be true at the trial, would preclude the entry of summary judgment awarding the conversion divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) (Angeloff v Angeloff, 56 NY2d 982 ; Weinstock v Weinstock, 122 AD2d 790 ; Davidoff v Davidoff, 93 AD2d 805 ). | 2 | 1987–1994 |
Trbovich v. Trbovich
green
1 sentence2024Contrary to the defendant's further contention, "the opposing spouse in a no fault divorce action pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170(7) is not entitled to litigate the other spouse's sworn statement that the relationship has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months" ( Trbovich v Trbovich , 122 AD3d 1381, 1382 ; see Johnston v Johnston , 156 AD3d 1181, 1182 ; Matter of Motta v Motta , 145 AD3d 560, 561 ; Hoffer-Adou v Adou , 121 AD3d 618, 619 ; Palermo v Palermo , 100 AD3d 1453, 1453 ). "[M]aintenance is a support payment awarded to assist the less affluent spouse in | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Parker v. Leonard
green
1 sentence2012In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that a plaintiff seeking a divorce under the no-fault statute is required to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate that the marriage is broken down irretrievably rather than simply allege as much in conclusory terms (see generally CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Goldin v Engineers Country Club, 54 AD3d 658, 659-660 [2008], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 13 NY3d 763 [2009]), we note that “ ‘[i]n assessing a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ... a court may freely consider affidavits ... to remedy any defects in the complaint’ ” (Parker v Leonard, 24 AD3d 1255 , 1 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Goldin v. ENGINEERS COUNTRY CLUB
neutral
1 sentence2012In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that a plaintiff seeking a divorce under the no-fault statute is required to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate that the marriage is broken down irretrievably rather than simply allege as much in conclusory terms (see generally CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Goldin v Engineers Country Club, 54 AD3d 658, 659-660 [2008], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 13 NY3d 763 [2009]), we note that “ ‘[i]n assessing a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ... a court may freely consider affidavits ... to remedy any defects in the complaint’ ” (Parker v Leonard, 24 AD3d 1255 , 1 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Harris v. Harris
neutral
1 sentence2009Indeed, the written agreement “is simply intended as evidence of the authenticity and reality of the separation” (Gleason, 26 NY2d at 35 ; see Christian, 42 NY2d at 69 ; Harris v Harris, 36 AD2d 594 [1971]). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Littlejohns v. Littlejohns
neutral
1 sentence2009Thus, it is the physical separation of the parties, not the written agreement, that supplies the ground for a divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) (see Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 69 [1977]; Littlejohns v Littlejohns, 76 Misc 2d 82, 86 [1972], affd on op of Korn, J., 42 AD2d 957 [1973]). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Matisoff v. Dobi
green
1 sentence2004While the formality of a proper acknowledgment may be essential to the validity and enforcement of separation agreements (see, Matisoff, supra at 133-136 ), under the circumstances of this case, the defect should not bar the parties from obtaining a judgment of divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Klein v. Klein green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| In re the Estate of Wilson green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Rose v. Rose green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Costa v. Costa green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| In Re the Estate of Wilson green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Biegeleisen v. Biegeleisen green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Walczak v. WalcZak green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Doyle v. Doyle green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| O'Brien v. O'Brien green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Blickstein v. Blickstein green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Hessen v. Hessen green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Hirschhorn v. Hirschhorn green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Martin v. Martin green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Tsakis v. Tsakis green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Meyn v. Meyn neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Howard v. Howard neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Wiecek v. Wiecek neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Zuckerman v. City of New York green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| LaMontagne v. LaMontagne neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Rado v. Rado neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Davidoff v. Davidoff neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Weinstock v. Weinstock neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.