section 835 condition of public property in California

2025Palaioroutas argued that under Cameron v. State of California (1972) 7 Cal.3d 318 and Flournoy v. State of California (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 806 , design immunity did not categorially bar section 835, subdivision (b) dangerous condition claims.

2023Regardless of the availability of the active negligence theory, plaintiffs were entitled to go before a jury on the passive negligence theory, i.e., an accident caused by the state’s failure to warn the public against icy danger known to it but not apparent to a reasonably careful highway user.” (Flournoy, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 811 .) The court also rejected the state’s argument that section 830.6’s design immunity provisions “ ‘prevail[]’ over any liability 14 TANSAVATDI v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. for a dangerous condition of public property under

2025Rather, Tansavatdi reaffirmed the court’s earlier decision in Cameron v. State of California (1972) 8 7 Cal.3d 318 (Cameron), that according to the statute’s plain language design immunity under section 830.6 applies to claims alleging that a public entity created a dangerous condition through a defective design under section 835, subdivision (a), but not to claims alleging that a public entity failed to warn of a design element that resulted in a known dangerous condition under section 835, subdivision (b).

2025Palaioroutas argued that under Cameron v. State of California (1972) 7 Cal.3d 318 and Flournoy v. State of California (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 806 , design immunity did not categorially bar section 835, subdivision (b) dangerous condition claims.

2023(Id. at p. 138; Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803 .) To support her claim for a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code section 835, the plaintiff analogized the city’s conduct to that of the negligent premises owners in Kesner who failed to 27 KUCIEMBA v. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC.

2023Issues Pursuant to the Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.), public entities are liable only to the extent provided by statute. (§ 815, subd. (a); Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803 .) As we introduced ante, Plaintiff alleged liability for a dangerous condition of public property under section 835, and Caltrans’s principal defense was design immunity under section 830.6. 7 Caltrans’s sixth affirmative defense provides in full: “The alleged condition of property was created by construction in accordance with a plan or design of construction or of improveme

2026(Washington v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1531 , 1537-1538.) As found in Constantinescu, a dangerous condition of public property may be based on an amalgam of factors.

1993(Washington v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 1537 .) One of the conditions of section 835 is the public entity’s having had “notice” of the dangerous condition. (§ 835, subd. (b).) As we have noted above, it was not shown that City had notice (see pt. 4.B., ante) and hence section 830.8 would not apply. *601 Disposition The judgment is affirmed.

2026We acknowledge however a public entity may “be liable where a dangerous condition ‘exists for reasons other than or in addition to the “mere[ ]” failure to provide [traffic] controls or markings.’ ” (Mixon, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 135 .) For example, a public entity was found liable as a dangerous condition of public property under section 835 where the failure to provide regulatory traffic signals combined with metal pillars and shadows to visually obstruct motorists at an intersection.

2025A. Standard of Review “We independently review the superior court’s ruling on a demurrer and determine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725 .) We accept as true all material facts properly pled and matters which may be judicially noticed, but disregard contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.

2023To state a claim against a public entity under the statute, a plaintiff must plead: “(1) a dangerous condition existed on the public property at the time of the injury; (2) the condition 13 proximately caused the injury; (3) the condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury sustained; and (4) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the property in sufficient time to have taken measures to protect against it.” (Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 434, 439 , citing Gov.

2023“Section 835, part of the Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.), ‘sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property.’ [Citation.]” (Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 102 , 108.) Section 835 states: “Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangero

2022Governing law “Under the Government Claims Act, ‘[a] public entity is not liable for an injury,’ ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.’” (Hampton v. County of San Diego, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 347 , quoting § 815, subd. (a);7 accord, Guzman v. County of Monterey 7 Section 815, subdivision (a), provides that, except as otherwise provided by statute, “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” 12 (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 897 [“there is no common law tort liability for pub

2021The court stated, “Utilizing the clear language in the statute, the immunity of section 855.4 is applicable to causes of action for alleged dangerous conditions of public property under section 835.” (Wright, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 688 .) The court also stated that sections 835 and 855.4, read together, “[make] it clear that the immunity provided in section 855.4 prevails over the liability established in section 835.” (Id. at p. 689.) 22 The court next held that 855.4 applies “‘where a public entity’s substandard maintenance of public property is the sole cause in fact of an individual[’

2021The City has immunity under section 855.4 “[T]he immunity of section 855.4 is applicable to causes of action for alleged dangerous conditions of public property under section 835.” (Wright, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 688 .) This is consistent with “[t]he Act’s purpose that specific immunities should prevail over general rules of actionable duty.” (Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 985 [emphasis in original].) Section 855.4 states in full: “(a) Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury resulting from the decision to perform or not to perform any act to promote the p

2016However, Kamal relied upon Johnston v. County of Yolo (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 46 (Johnston) in support of these principles in the trial court, thus raising the same legal issue as that in Martinez. 11 dangerous condition of public property within the meaning of section 835.

2015(South Lake Tahoe, supra, at p. 974 .) The city moved for summary judgment, claiming that section 830.4 precludes liability as a matter of law.

2015(Id. at pp. 629–630.) In Shipley v. Arroyo Grande (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 748 (Shipley), the defendant city was sued by a pedestrian who was injured by a car that jumped the two-inch curb of a city sidewalk.

2015(Saunders v. Taylor (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1541-1542 .) Applying these standards, we examine plaintiffs' contention the court erred in granting nonsuit on each of their causes of action: (1) dangerous condition of government property under section 835; and (2) negligence based on a vicarious liability theory.

2013DISCUSSION “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo; we must decide independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. [Citations.]” (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348 .) Under the Tort Claims Act, it is generally true that a public entity is not derivatively liable for the act or omission of a public employee unless there is a statutory basis for liability. (§ 815, subd. (a).) The public entity can be directly liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of public property under section 835.

2003(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 347, 65 P.3d at p. 812 .) Warden , however, is easily distinguished.

2003"Government cannot guarantee that roadways will not be used by defective cars or careless drivers." ( Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 724 , 159 Cal.Rptr. 835 , 602 P.2d 755 (cone. & dis. opn. of Clark, J.).) In the course of holding that the location of a bus stop may constitute a dangerous *358 condition of public property within the meaning of Government Code section 835, the majority asserts "[t]hat the location of a public improvement or, more broadly, its relationship to its surroundings, may create dangers to users is by no means a novel idea." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 347,

2002In Hayes v. State of California (1974) 11 Cal.3d 469 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 599 , 521 P.2d 855 ], for example, this court in interpreting section 835 acknowledged that “[liability for injury caused by a dangerous condition of property has been imposed when an unreasonable risk of harm is created by a combination of defect in the property and acts of third parties.” (Hayes, at p. 472, italics omitted.) We warned, however, that “courts have consistently refused to characterize harmful third party conduct as a dangerous condition—absent some concurrent contributing defect in the property itself.” {Ibid.

2002In Hayes v. State of California (1974) 11 Cal.3d 469 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 599 , 521 P.2d 855 ], for example, this court in interpreting section 835 acknowledged that “[liability for injury caused by a dangerous condition of property has been imposed when an unreasonable risk of harm is created by a combination of defect in the property and acts of third parties.” (Hayes, at p. 472, italics omitted.) We warned, however, that “courts have consistently refused to characterize harmful third party conduct as a dangerous condition—absent some concurrent contributing defect in the property itself.” {Ibid.

2002“But,” we said, “determining and regulating the use of public property are better left to *1136 legislative and administrative bodies, rather than to the judiciary.” (Id. at p. 473, fn. omitted.) Similarly, in Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 707 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 823 ], the court determined that although a school district owed a duty to protect students from injuries inflicted by nonstudents on school grounds, the district’s failure to provide security measures that would prevent persons from bringing weapons onto school grounds did not constitute a dangerous co

2002“But,” we said, “determining and regulating the use of public property are better left to *1136 legislative and administrative bodies, rather than to the judiciary.” (Id. at p. 473, fn. omitted.) Similarly, in Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 707 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 823 ], the court determined that although a school district owed a duty to protect students from injuries inflicted by nonstudents on school grounds, the district’s failure to provide security measures that would prevent persons from bringing weapons onto school grounds did not constitute a dangerous co