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28 California opinions name it 3 courts 1968–2021 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Townsend v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2009(See Townsend v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 781 [“The right to a speedy trial is undeniably ‘as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment’ [citation], and we have previously stated in dictum that counsel may not waive this constitutional right over his client’s objections. [Citation.] In contrast, however, the statutory right to be tried within 60 days (§ 1382, subd. 2) cannot properly be termed ‘fundamental’ in the foregoing sense and therefore beyond counsel’s primary control.”]; People v. Shane (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 196, 202 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 753 ] [“the sta 2004(People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 764-765 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 996 P.2d 32 ].) To evaluate a federal constitutional speedy trial right claim, the United States Supreme Court has established a four-part balancing test comprised of the “[l]ength of delay, the *202 reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his [or her] right, and prejudice to the defendant.” (Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530 , fn. omitted.) But the statutory right to be tried on a misdemeanor complaint within 30 days under Penal Code section 1382 “cannot properly be termed ‘fundamental’ . . . .” (Tow | 4 | 6 |
People v. Wilsongreen2 sentences1982As in Ferenz v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.App.2d 639 , the 60-day period specified in section 1382, subdivision 2 of the Penal Code has been described by the California Supreme Court as “‘supplementary to and a construction of the [state] Constitution.” (People v. Wilson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 145 .) Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent to vacate its orders denying petitioner’s motions to dismiss in Los Angeles Superior Court case number A588963, entitled People v. Gilbert Sanchez et al., and make a new and different order dismissing that information as to petitione 1973(Harris v. Municipal Court, supra, 209 Cal. 55, 60 .) “ ‘ “[I]t is not necessary to have specific legislation to carry into effect section 13 of article I. . . .” (Rost v. Municipal Court (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 507, 511 . . . .) The provisions of the Penal Code are merely “ ‘supplementary to and a construction of the Constitution.” (Pe ople v. Wilson, supra, 60 Cal.2d 139, 145 ; People v. Godlewski, 22 Cal.2d 677, 682 . . . .)’ It is thus unnecessary for petitioner, in asserting his constitutional right to a speedy trial, to rely on specific statutory provisions . . . .” (Jones v. Superior Cour | 3 | 6 |
People v. Shanegreen2 sentences2009(See Townsend v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 781 [“The right to a speedy trial is undeniably ‘as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment’ [citation], and we have previously stated in dictum that counsel may not waive this constitutional right over his client’s objections. [Citation.] In contrast, however, the statutory right to be tried within 60 days (§ 1382, subd. 2) cannot properly be termed ‘fundamental’ in the foregoing sense and therefore beyond counsel’s primary control.”]; People v. Shane (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 196, 202 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 753 ] [“the sta 2009(See Townsend v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 781 [“The right to a speedy trial is undeniably ‘as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment’ [citation], and we have previously stated in dictum that counsel may not waive this constitutional right over his client’s objections. [Citation.] In contrast, however, the statutory right to be tried within 60 days (§ 1382, subd. 2) cannot properly be termed ‘fundamental’ in the foregoing sense and therefore beyond counsel’s primary control.”]; People v. Shane (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 196, 202 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 753 ] [“the sta | 2 | 2 |
Sykes v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2009(Sykes v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 86 .) Sykes sought a writ of mandate to compel dismissal of the felony information when no new trial had been scheduled for a period of 228 days following the appellate court’s order, arguing he was entitled to a new trial within 60 days under section 1382. 1973We observe that section 1382 makes no provision as to when a defendant is to be tried after a petition for writ of prohibition filed by him has been denied as it does in cases of mistrial, entry of an order granting a new trial or the filing of a remittitur in the trial court when a conviction has been reversed on appeal. *596 In Sykes , where the petitioner had filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus resulting in the setting aside of a judgment of conviction and the guilty plea upon which it was based and an order was issued that petitioner be rearraigned for plea, it was held that, alth | 1 | 4 |
Harris v. Mun. Court of L.A.green2 sentences1975This conclusion may be questioned on its own terms, for we have long held that section 1382 embodies a legislative interpretation of the state constitutional right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. ( People v. Morino (1890) 85 Cal. 515, 517 [ 24 P. 892 ]; In re Begerow (1901) 133 Cal. 349, 352 [ 65 P. 828 ]; Harris v. Municipal Court (1930) 209 Cal. 55, 61 [ 285 P. 699 ]; People v. Clark (1965) 62 Cal.2d 870, 882 [ 44 Cal. Rptr. 784 , 402 P.2d 856 ]; Crockett v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 433, 438-439 [ 121 Cal. Rptr. 457 , 535 P.2d 3 1973(Harris v. Municipal Court, supra, 209 Cal. 55, 60 .) “ ‘ “[I]t is not necessary to have specific legislation to carry into effect section 13 of article I. . . .” (Rost v. Municipal Court (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 507, 511 . . . .) The provisions of the Penal Code are merely “ ‘supplementary to and a construction of the Constitution.” (Pe ople v. Wilson, supra, 60 Cal.2d 139, 145 ; People v. Godlewski, 22 Cal.2d 677, 682 . . . .)’ It is thus unnecessary for petitioner, in asserting his constitutional right to a speedy trial, to rely on specific statutory provisions . . . .” (Jones v. Superior Cour | 1 | 2 |
Achen v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.green1 sentence2018(See Achen v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 113, 125 [“‘It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. | 1 | 1 |
BAILON v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016(See Bailon v. Appellate Division (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1345-1349 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ].) We need not determine whether Giron-Chamul was “brought to trial” under section 1382 on February 23, however, because he fails to establish that any prejudice resulted from the purported delay. 2016(See Bailon v. Appellate Division (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1345-1349 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ].) We need not determine whether Giron-Chamul was “brought to trial” under section 1382 on February 23, however, because he fails to establish that any prejudice resulted from the purported delay. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2010(See, e.g., section 1050 and People v. Henderson (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 922, 939-940 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 655 ].) Thus, a court may not dismiss a case during the 10-day grace period under section 1382, but the committees believe that the court must deny a request for a continuance during the 10-day grace period that does not comply with the good cause requirement under section 1050. 2010(See, e.g., section 1050 and People v. Henderson (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 922, 939-940 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 655 ].) Thus, a court may not dismiss a case during the 10-day grace period under section 1382, but the committees believe that the court must deny a request for a continuance during the 10-day grace period that does not comply with the good cause requirement under section 1050. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2004(People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 764-765 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 996 P.2d 32 ].) To evaluate a federal constitutional speedy trial right claim, the United States Supreme Court has established a four-part balancing test comprised of the “[l]ength of delay, the *202 reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his [or her] right, and prejudice to the defendant.” (Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530 , fn. omitted.) But the statutory right to be tried on a misdemeanor complaint within 30 days under Penal Code section 1382 “cannot properly be termed ‘fundamental’ . . . .” (Tow 2004(People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 764-765 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 996 P.2d 32 ].) To evaluate a federal constitutional speedy trial right claim, the United States Supreme Court has established a four-part balancing test comprised of the “[l]ength of delay, the *202 reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his [or her] right, and prejudice to the defendant.” (Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530 , fn. omitted.) But the statutory right to be tried on a misdemeanor complaint within 30 days under Penal Code section 1382 “cannot properly be termed ‘fundamental’ . . . .” (Tow | 1 | 1 |
People v. Martingreen2 sentences1983(See People v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 913 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 619 ].) [9] Of course, substantive decisions as to what plea to enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify are ultimately to be made by the defendant after consultation with counsel. ( People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 214-215 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 166 , 466 P.2d 710 ]; People v. Freeman (1977) 76 Cal. App.3d 302, 310 [ 142 Cal. Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Martin (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 956, 961 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 40 ]; ABA Standards, Defense Function, std. 4-5.2; CPR of ABA, Ethical Consideration 7-7.) [10] Examples of such 1983(See People v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 913 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 619 ].) [9] Of course, substantive decisions as to what plea to enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify are ultimately to be made by the defendant after consultation with counsel. ( People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 214-215 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 166 , 466 P.2d 710 ]; People v. Freeman (1977) 76 Cal. App.3d 302, 310 [ 142 Cal. Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Martin (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 956, 961 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 40 ]; ABA Standards, Defense Function, std. 4-5.2; CPR of ABA, Ethical Consideration 7-7.) [10] Examples of such | 1 | 1 |
People v. Freemangreen2 sentences1983(See People v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 913 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 619 ].) [9] Of course, substantive decisions as to what plea to enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify are ultimately to be made by the defendant after consultation with counsel. ( People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 214-215 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 166 , 466 P.2d 710 ]; People v. Freeman (1977) 76 Cal. App.3d 302, 310 [ 142 Cal. Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Martin (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 956, 961 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 40 ]; ABA Standards, Defense Function, std. 4-5.2; CPR of ABA, Ethical Consideration 7-7.) [10] Examples of such 1983(See People v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 913 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 619 ].) [9] Of course, substantive decisions as to what plea to enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify are ultimately to be made by the defendant after consultation with counsel. ( People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 214-215 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 166 , 466 P.2d 710 ]; People v. Freeman (1977) 76 Cal. App.3d 302, 310 [ 142 Cal. Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Martin (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 956, 961 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 40 ]; ABA Standards, Defense Function, std. 4-5.2; CPR of ABA, Ethical Consideration 7-7.) [10] Examples of such | 1 | 1 |
People v. Roblesgreen2 sentences1983(See People v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 913 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 619 ].) [9] Of course, substantive decisions as to what plea to enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify are ultimately to be made by the defendant after consultation with counsel. ( People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 214-215 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 166 , 466 P.2d 710 ]; People v. Freeman (1977) 76 Cal. App.3d 302, 310 [ 142 Cal. Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Martin (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 956, 961 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 40 ]; ABA Standards, Defense Function, std. 4-5.2; CPR of ABA, Ethical Consideration 7-7.) [10] Examples of such 1983(See People v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 913 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 619 ].) [9] Of course, substantive decisions as to what plea to enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify are ultimately to be made by the defendant after consultation with counsel. ( People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 214-215 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 166 , 466 P.2d 710 ]; People v. Freeman (1977) 76 Cal. App.3d 302, 310 [ 142 Cal. Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Martin (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 956, 961 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 40 ]; ABA Standards, Defense Function, std. 4-5.2; CPR of ABA, Ethical Consideration 7-7.) [10] Examples of such | 1 | 1 |
Tudman v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1979The 10-day grace period in section 1382 began running on that date (Tudman v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.App.3d 129, 133 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 391 ]), and the trial court so assumed when it ordered on August 10 that “The court, due to congested calendar, trails trial to a date not later than 8-21-78 [August 20 being a Sunday].” After consultation with the trial coordinator as to how long the trailing time was likely to be, the court on August 10 ordered the parties to return on August 18. 1979The 10-day grace period in section 1382 began running on that date (Tudman v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.App.3d 129, 133 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 391 ]), and the trial court so assumed when it ordered on August 10 that “The court, due to congested calendar, trails trial to a date not later than 8-21-78 [August 20 being a Sunday].” After consultation with the trial coordinator as to how long the trailing time was likely to be, the court on August 10 ordered the parties to return on August 18. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Maninagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Klopfer v. North Carolinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Crockett v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Begerowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Morinogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Clarkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dulsky v. Municipal Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ferguson
green
2 sentences2021As described above, in Ferguson the Court of Appeal considered whether the trial court in that case had the authority to dismiss a felony prosecution when the assigned prosecutor was unavailable for trial and there remained several days under section 1382 for the defendant to be brought to trial.6 (See Ferguson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at contains no provision for the dismissal of a case when its terms are not complied with.” (Malengo v. Municipal (1961) 56 Cal.2d 813, 816 .) 5 This provision states in relevant part: “The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the appli 2021As described above, in Ferguson the Court of Appeal considered whether the trial court in that case had the authority to dismiss a felony prosecution when the assigned prosecutor was unavailable for trial and there remained several days under section 1382 for the defendant to be brought to trial.6 (See Ferguson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at contains no provision for the dismissal of a case when its terms are not complied with.” (Malengo v. Municipal (1961) 56 Cal.2d 813, 816 .) 5 This provision states in relevant part: “The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the appli | 3 | 2021–2021 |
Malengo v. Municipal Court
green
2 sentences2021As described above, in Ferguson the Court of Appeal considered whether the trial court in that case had the authority to dismiss a felony prosecution when the assigned prosecutor was unavailable for trial and there remained several days under section 1382 for the defendant to be brought to trial.6 (See Ferguson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at contains no provision for the dismissal of a case when its terms are not complied with.” (Malengo v. Municipal (1961) 56 Cal.2d 813, 816 .) 5 This provision states in relevant part: “The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the appli 2021As described above, in Ferguson the Court of Appeal considered whether the trial court in that case had the authority to dismiss a felony prosecution when the assigned prosecutor was unavailable for trial and there remained several days under section 1382 for the defendant to be brought to trial.6 (See Ferguson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at contains no provision for the dismissal of a case when its terms are not complied with.” (Malengo v. Municipal (1961) 56 Cal.2d 813, 816 .) 5 This provision states in relevant part: “The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the appli | 3 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Griffin
green
2 sentences2018DISCUSSION In the return to the petition, the People contend the trial court did not err in denying Pogosyan's motion to dismiss because (1) Pogosyan provided a general time waiver at the pretrial hearing on September *636 13; (2) Pogosyan did not trigger the 10-day grace period under section 1382, subdivision (a)(3)(B) because he did not announce ready for trial; and (3) even if Pogosyan had announced ready for trial, the continued date set by the trial court was within the 10-day grace period under the reasoning of People v. Griffin (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1740 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 620 ( Griffin ). 2018DISCUSSION In the return to the petition, the People contend the trial court did not err in denying Pogosyan's motion to dismiss because (1) Pogosyan provided a general time waiver at the pretrial hearing on September *636 13; (2) Pogosyan did not trigger the 10-day grace period under section 1382, subdivision (a)(3)(B) because he did not announce ready for trial; and (3) even if Pogosyan had announced ready for trial, the continued date set by the trial court was within the 10-day grace period under the reasoning of People v. Griffin (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1740 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 620 ( Griffin ). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Bryant v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
green
2 sentences2018In that case, we were asked to decide whether the defendant- who had announced unconditionally ready for trial on the continued date set for trial ( Bryant , supra , 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 486 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 777 )-was required to expressly object to the trailing of the matter to a date within the 10-day grace period or else be deemed to have consented to a further continuance with a new 10-day grace period. ( Id. at p. 497, 230 Cal.Rptr. 777 .) To reach our conclusion that no such objection was required, we examined several cases that appeared to hold that an objection to any delay, including a 2018In that case, we were asked to decide whether the defendant- who had announced unconditionally ready for trial on the continued date set for trial ( Bryant , supra , 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 486 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 777 )-was required to expressly object to the trailing of the matter to a date within the 10-day grace period or else be deemed to have consented to a further continuance with a new 10-day grace period. ( Id. at p. 497, 230 Cal.Rptr. 777 .) To reach our conclusion that no such objection was required, we examined several cases that appeared to hold that an objection to any delay, including a | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Barsamyan v. Appellate Division of Superior Court
green
1 sentence2018(Barsamyan, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 970 , citing Bryant, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at pp. 498-499.) In light of the issue actually before the court, and the court’s focus on the actual readiness of defense counsel rather than the requirement of a readiness announcement, we conclude that the court’s statement that an 16 announcement is required to trigger the 10-day grace period under section 1382 is dictum and therefore not binding authority. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Medina v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2018(Medina, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1283 .) The only issue presented to the appellate court was whether, under Griffin, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d 1740 , the trial 14 court’s advisement to the defendant when taking his time waiver that he would have a right to have his trial within 10 days of the agreed- upon continued trial date meant that the 10-day grace period under section 1382 did not begin to run until 10 days after the continued trial date to which the defendant had agreed. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Amati
green
1 sentence2010It explained that “the swearing of a panel of prospective jurors constitutes bringing a case to trial within the [then applicable] 45-day provisions of Penal Code section 1382, so long as the panel is sworn in as a good faith start to the jury selection process and not as a mere device to avoid the impact of the statute.” (Amati, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10, 12 , italics added, quoted with approval in Rhinehart, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 777-778.) In Sanchez , at 2:20 p.m. on the last day for trial pursuant to section 1382, the defendant’s case was called for trial in a regular misdemeanor tri | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Owens v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2006Relying principally on Owens v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 238 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 466 , 617 P.2d 1098 , petitioner's position is that "[e]ven if petitioner impliedly consented to delay in his [sic] trial (which ... he [sic] did not), that delay was within the then applicable 10-day `grace period' of Penal Code section 1382 [and] ... delays within a statutory time period, whether caused or consented to by the defendant, do not serve to toll or extend the time limit." (Emphasis in original.) A closer reading of Owens , however, does not support petitioner's position for the reason that a delay 2006Relying principally on Owens v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 238 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 466 , 617 P.2d 1098 , petitioner's position is that "[e]ven if petitioner impliedly consented to delay in his [sic] trial (which ... he [sic] did not), that delay was within the then applicable 10-day `grace period' of Penal Code section 1382 [and] ... delays within a statutory time period, whether caused or consented to by the defendant, do not serve to toll or extend the time limit." (Emphasis in original.) A closer reading of Owens , however, does not support petitioner's position for the reason that a delay | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
1 sentence2004(People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 764-765 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 996 P.2d 32 ].) To evaluate a federal constitutional speedy trial right claim, the United States Supreme Court has established a four-part balancing test comprised of the “[l]ength of delay, the *202 reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his [or her] right, and prejudice to the defendant.” (Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530 , fn. omitted.) But the statutory right to be tried on a misdemeanor complaint within 30 days under Penal Code section 1382 “cannot properly be termed ‘fundamental’ . . . .” (Tow | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Jones v. Wilson
neutral
1 sentence2004(Jones v. Wilson (E.D.Tenn. 1970) 309 F.Supp. 708, 709 ; 28 U.S.C. § 2243 .) Otherwise, as here, once the time frame in the conditional writ has expired, the accused must be retried as if it were an ordinary retrial during the 60-day time frame specified in section 1382, subdivision (a)(2). 4 , * DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Superior Court (Rodriguez)
green
1 sentence1986(See Townsend v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 783 .) For example, in People v. Superior Court (Rodriguez), supra, 151 Cal.App.3d 604 , defendant’s misdemeanor trial was continued with his consent to October 28, 1982, which was beyond the 45-day limit of section 1382. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Rhinehart v. Municipal Court
green
1 sentence1986In Rhinehart v. Municipal Court, supra, 35 Cal. 3d 772 , the ultimate issue was whether a defendant is “brought to trial” within the 10-day grace period of section 1382 when, for the sole purpose of avoiding the 10-day period, a jury is selected and sworn within that period with the intent that the earnest trial proceedings will thereafter be continued beyond the 10th day due to unavailability of trial courtrooms. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Kerwin
green
1 sentence1985People v. Kerwin, supra, 23 Cal.App.3d 466 , involved a People’s appeal of an order setting aside an information under Penal Code section 995 where, due to clerical error, the relevant period of unjustified delay in the appellate process exceeded by 30 days the 60-day time limit of section 1382, subdivision 2, which the Court of Appeal held was analogous, albeit imperfectly, to the constitutionally permissible period of delay under the state Constitution’s right to a speedy trial. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Locklar
green
2 sentences1983(See People v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 913 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 619 ].) [9] Of course, substantive decisions as to what plea to enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify are ultimately to be made by the defendant after consultation with counsel. ( People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 214-215 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 166 , 466 P.2d 710 ]; People v. Freeman (1977) 76 Cal. App.3d 302, 310 [ 142 Cal. Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Martin (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 956, 961 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 40 ]; ABA Standards, Defense Function, std. 4-5.2; CPR of ABA, Ethical Consideration 7-7.) [10] Examples of such 1983(See People v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 913 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 619 ].) [9] Of course, substantive decisions as to what plea to enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify are ultimately to be made by the defendant after consultation with counsel. ( People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 214-215 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 166 , 466 P.2d 710 ]; People v. Freeman (1977) 76 Cal. App.3d 302, 310 [ 142 Cal. Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Martin (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 956, 961 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 40 ]; ABA Standards, Defense Function, std. 4-5.2; CPR of ABA, Ethical Consideration 7-7.) [10] Examples of such | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Little v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1983(See People v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 913 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 619 ].) [9] Of course, substantive decisions as to what plea to enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify are ultimately to be made by the defendant after consultation with counsel. ( People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 214-215 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 166 , 466 P.2d 710 ]; People v. Freeman (1977) 76 Cal. App.3d 302, 310 [ 142 Cal. Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Martin (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 956, 961 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 40 ]; ABA Standards, Defense Function, std. 4-5.2; CPR of ABA, Ethical Consideration 7-7.) [10] Examples of such 1983(See People v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 913 [ 115 Cal. Rptr. 619 ].) [9] Of course, substantive decisions as to what plea to enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify are ultimately to be made by the defendant after consultation with counsel. ( People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 214-215 [ 85 Cal. Rptr. 166 , 466 P.2d 710 ]; People v. Freeman (1977) 76 Cal. App.3d 302, 310 [ 142 Cal. Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Martin (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 956, 961 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 40 ]; ABA Standards, Defense Function, std. 4-5.2; CPR of ABA, Ethical Consideration 7-7.) [10] Examples of such | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1983(See People v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 913 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 619 ].) Of course, substantive decisions as to what plea td enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testily are ultimately to be made by the defendant after consultation with counsel. 1983(See People v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 913 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 619 ].) Of course, substantive decisions as to what plea td enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testily are ultimately to be made by the defendant after consultation with counsel. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Ferenz v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1982As in Ferenz v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.App.2d 639 , the 60-day period specified in section 1382, subdivision 2 of the Penal Code has been described by the California Supreme Court as “‘supplementary to and a construction of the [state] Constitution.” (People v. Wilson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 145 .) Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent to vacate its orders denying petitioner’s motions to dismiss in Los Angeles Superior Court case number A588963, entitled People v. Gilbert Sanchez et al., and make a new and different order dismissing that information as to petitione | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Rost v. Municipal Court green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| People v. Godlewski green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.