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28 California opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2024 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Beltrangreen2 sentences2024The trial court, however, does not appear to have ruled on appellant’s motion to strike or otherwise disposed of the 5 “[T]he Courts of Appeal have long construed Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (g)’s bar on imposing the great bodily injury enhancement when ‘infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the offense’ to mean that the enhancement may not be imposed where serious bodily injury is an element of the underlying offense.” (In re Cabrera (2023) 14 Cal.5th 476 , 490; see People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1375 [“‘serious bodily injury’ and ‘great bodily injury’ 2023(See, e.g., People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693 , 696–697; Hawkins, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1375–1376.) In Hawkins, the court stated that great bodily injury and serious bodily injury have “substantially the same meaning” and on that basis concluded that “great bodily injury is indeed an element of battery under section 243, subdivision (d).” (Hawkins, at p. 1375.) Hawkins was decided before Apprendi, and the degree of similarity that Hawkins assigned to these terms in reaching its conclusion says nothing about the degree of similarity they must have to satisfy Apprendi. | 4 | 5 |
People v. Buenogreen2 sentences2022(See People v. Bueno (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1508 [“one can commit a battery within the meaning of section 243, subdivision (d) without committing a serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8)”].) 8 In this case, the trial court took judicial notice of a transcript from a 2003 plea hearing. 2022(See People v. Bueno (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1508 [“one can commit a battery within the meaning of section 243, subdivision (d) without committing a serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8)”].) 8 In this case, the trial court took judicial notice of a transcript from a 2003 plea hearing. | 4 | 5 |
People v. Hawkinsgreen2 sentences2024The trial court, however, does not appear to have ruled on appellant’s motion to strike or otherwise disposed of the 5 “[T]he Courts of Appeal have long construed Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (g)’s bar on imposing the great bodily injury enhancement when ‘infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the offense’ to mean that the enhancement may not be imposed where serious bodily injury is an element of the underlying offense.” (In re Cabrera (2023) 14 Cal.5th 476 , 490; see People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1375 [“‘serious bodily injury’ and ‘great bodily injury’ 2023(See, e.g., People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693 , 696–697; Hawkins, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1375–1376.) In Hawkins, the court stated that great bodily injury and serious bodily injury have “substantially the same meaning” and on that basis concluded that “great bodily injury is indeed an element of battery under section 243, subdivision (d).” (Hawkins, at p. 1375.) Hawkins was decided before Apprendi, and the degree of similarity that Hawkins assigned to these terms in reaching its conclusion says nothing about the degree of similarity they must have to satisfy Apprendi. | 3 | 9 |
People v. Pinholsterred2 sentences2015(People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1197-1198 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 ] [deputy’s testimony about the ‘“defendant’s assault upon him with a container filled with urine and feces was admissible”]; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 868 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] [each instance when the defendant ‘“threw water, urine, scouring powder, bleach, and other substances at correctional officers . . . constitute [d] a battery” and was admissible under § 190.3, factor (b)]; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 960-961 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 , 824 P.2d 571 ] [‘“throwi 2015(People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1197-1198 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 ] [deputy’s testimony about the ‘“defendant’s assault upon him with a container filled with urine and feces was admissible”]; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 868 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] [each instance when the defendant ‘“threw water, urine, scouring powder, bleach, and other substances at correctional officers . . . constitute [d] a battery” and was admissible under § 190.3, factor (b)]; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 960-961 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 , 824 P.2d 571 ] [‘“throwi | 3 | 3 |
People v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2022(People v. Cabrera (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 470, 478 ; see also Taylor, at p. 22 [“On the Particular Facts of This Case, the Trial Court Erred in Treating Taylor’s Conviction for Battery with Serious Bodily Injury as Equivalent to a Finding of Great Bodily Injury”].) In Taylor, the jury convicted the defendant of one count of battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) but found three great bodily injury enhancement allegations not true. 9 ( Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 17-18.) The trial court imposed a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), finding the ba 2022(People v. Cabrera (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 470, 478 ; see also Taylor, at p. 22 [“On the Particular Facts of This Case, the Trial Court Erred in Treating Taylor’s Conviction for Battery with Serious Bodily Injury as Equivalent to a Finding of Great Bodily Injury”].) In Taylor, the jury convicted the defendant of one count of battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) but found three great bodily injury enhancement allegations not true. 9 ( Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 17-18.) The trial court imposed a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), finding the ba | 2 | 5 |
People v. Lancastergreen2 sentences2015(See Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 94 [mere preparation for escape is insufficient under § 190.3].) Because we have previously concluded the evidence here demonstrated an attempted escape (see ante, at pp. 37-39), this contention fails. 2015(See Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 94 [mere preparation for escape is insufficient under § 190.3].) Because we have previously concluded the 53 evidence here demonstrated an attempted escape (see ante, pp. 40–41), this contention fails. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Burgenergreen2 sentences2015(People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1197-1198 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 ] [deputy’s testimony about the ‘“defendant’s assault upon him with a container filled with urine and feces was admissible”]; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 868 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] [each instance when the defendant ‘“threw water, urine, scouring powder, bleach, and other substances at correctional officers . . . constitute [d] a battery” and was admissible under § 190.3, factor (b)]; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 960-961 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 , 824 P.2d 571 ] [‘“throwi 2015(People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1197-1198 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 ] [deputy’s testimony about the ‘“defendant’s assault upon him with a container filled with urine and feces was admissible”]; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 868 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] [each instance when the defendant ‘“threw water, urine, scouring powder, bleach, and other substances at correctional officers . . . constitute [d] a battery” and was admissible under § 190.3, factor (b)]; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 960-961 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 , 824 P.2d 571 ] [‘“throwi | 2 | 2 |
People v. Sloangreen2 sentences2014(See, e.g., People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 117 [“‘“[s]erious bodily injury” is the essential equivalent of “great bodily injury”’”]; People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693, 696 [“The terms . . . have substantially the same meaning”].) As this division observed in People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373 , “great bodily injury, as defined in section 12022.7, is an element of the crime of battery under section 243, subdivision (d).” (Id. at p. 1376.) It follows, therefore, that subdivision (g) of section 12022.7 precludes application of the enhancement to a section 243 convictio 2013(See, e.g., People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 117 [“‘“[s]erious bodily injury” is the essential equivalent of “great bodily injury.”’”]; People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693, 696 [“The terms … have substantially the same meaning.”].) In People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373 , the Second District Court of Appeal held that “great bodily injury, as defined in section 12022.7, is an element of the crime of battery under section 243, subdivision (d).” (Id. at p. 1376.) It follows, therefore, that subdivision (g) of section 12022.7 precludes application of the enhancement to a sec | 2 | 2 |
People v. Mooregreen2 sentences2015As Taylor noted, “[i]t is settled that courts must make every effort to interpret a jury’s verdict as being consistent. [Citation.]” (Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 23 .) Additionally, Taylor acknowledged that Moore, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th 1868 held that “serious bodily injury” (§ 243, subd. (d)) is “essentially equivalent” to “great bodily injury” (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) (Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 26 .) Taylor distinguished that holding on the basis that Moore involved a question of law while Taylor involved a question of fact that had been expressly resolved by a jury. ( Ta 2015Numerous courts have recognized that '[t]he terms "serious bodily injury" and "great bodily injury" have substantially the same meaning.' [Citations.] In fact, great bodily injury has been held to be 'an element of battery under section 243, subdivision (d)' ([People v. Hawkins], supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375 ), including for purposes of establishing the enhancement contained in section 667, subdivision (a) ([ Moore, supra,] 10 Cal.App.4th [at p. 1871])." (Arnett, at pp. 1613- 1614.) We are bound by the California Supreme Court's holding in People v. Burroughs, supra, 35 Cal.3d 824 , that " | 1 | 4 |
People v. Burroughsred2 sentences2015Numerous courts have recognized that '[t]he terms "serious bodily injury" and "great bodily injury" have substantially the same meaning.' [Citations.] In fact, great bodily injury has been held to be 'an element of battery under section 243, subdivision (d)' ([People v. Hawkins], supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375 ), including for purposes of establishing the enhancement contained in section 667, subdivision (a) ([ Moore, supra,] 10 Cal.App.4th [at p. 1871])." (Arnett, at pp. 1613- 1614.) We are bound by the California Supreme Court's holding in People v. Burroughs, supra, 35 Cal.3d 824 , that " 2015Numerous courts have recognized that '[t]he terms "serious bodily injury" and "great bodily injury" have substantially the same meaning.' [Citations.] In fact, great bodily injury has been held to be 'an element of battery under section 243, subdivision (d)' ([People v. Hawkins], supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375 ), including for purposes of establishing the enhancement contained in section 667, subdivision (a) ([ Moore, supra,] 10 Cal.App.4th [at p. 1871])." (Arnett, at pp. 1613- 1614.) We are bound by the California Supreme Court's holding in People v. Burroughs, supra, 35 Cal.3d 824 , that " | 1 | 4 |
People v. Banksred2 sentences2015(People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1197-1198 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 ] [deputy’s testimony about the ‘“defendant’s assault upon him with a container filled with urine and feces was admissible”]; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 868 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] [each instance when the defendant ‘“threw water, urine, scouring powder, bleach, and other substances at correctional officers . . . constitute [d] a battery” and was admissible under § 190.3, factor (b)]; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 960-961 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 , 824 P.2d 571 ] [‘“throwi 2015(People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1197-1198 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 ] [deputy’s testimony about the ‘“defendant’s assault upon him with a container filled with urine and feces was admissible”]; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 868 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] [each instance when the defendant ‘“threw water, urine, scouring powder, bleach, and other substances at correctional officers . . . constitute [d] a battery” and was admissible under § 190.3, factor (b)]; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 960-961 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 , 824 P.2d 571 ] [‘“throwi | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hawkinsgreen2 sentences2015Our Supreme Court has "acknowledge[d] that ' "[s]erious bodily injury" and "great bodily injury" are essentially equivalent elements.' [Citation.]" People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831 , overruled on another ground in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 88-89 .) In People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1375 , the court concluded that "common sense dictates that great bodily injury is indeed an element of battery under section 243, subdivision (d)." In People v. Moore (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1868, 1871 , the court held "that the element of 3 'serious bodily injury,' as requi 2006Numerous courts have recognized that “[t]he terms ‘serious bodily injury’ and ‘great bodily injury’ have substantially the same meaning.” (People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1375 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 ] (Hawkins I); see, e.g., People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 319 , 678 P.2d 894 ]; People v. Chaffer (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1042 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 441 ]; People v. Hawkins (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 527, 531 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 ] (Hawkins II); People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693, 696-697 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 730 ]; People v. Kent (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 130 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Lindsaygreen1 sentence2021(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 30 [holding that misdemeanor sexual battery under § 243.4, subd. (d), is a crime of moral turpitude because “the degrading use of another, against her will, for one’s own sexual arousal is deserving of moral condemnation”]; People v. Lindsay (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 849, 858 [battery on a police officer under § 243, subd. (c), involves moral turpitude].) 22 special relationship with the perpetrator that makes the victim especially vulnerable, and that evinces a readiness to do evil so as to constitute a crime of moral turpitude. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chavezgreen1 sentence2021(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 30 [holding that misdemeanor sexual battery under § 243.4, subd. (d), is a crime of moral turpitude because “the degrading use of another, against her will, for one’s own sexual arousal is deserving of moral condemnation”]; People v. Lindsay (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 849, 858 [battery on a police officer under § 243, subd. (c), involves moral turpitude].) 22 special relationship with the perpetrator that makes the victim especially vulnerable, and that evinces a readiness to do evil so as to constitute a crime of moral turpitude. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Myersgreen1 sentence2015Instead, battery of a cohabitant reflects the rule that “an offensive touching, although it inflicts no bodily harm, may nonetheless constitute a battery . . . .” (People v. Myers (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 (Myers).) Section 243, subdivision (e)(1), simply defines the offense as a battery against a cohabitant by providing that “[w]hen a battery is committed against a spouse, a person with whom the defendant is cohabiting, a person who is the parent of the defendant’s child, former spouse, fiancé, or fiancée, or a person with whom the defendant currently has, or has previously had, a dating | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wilkinsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lewisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Chaffergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Martinezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Coopergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Meltongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cabrera
green
2 sentences2022(People v. Cabrera (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 470, 478 ; see also Taylor, at p. 22 [“On the Particular Facts of This Case, the Trial Court Erred in Treating Taylor’s Conviction for Battery with Serious Bodily Injury as Equivalent to a Finding of Great Bodily Injury”].) In Taylor, the jury convicted the defendant of one count of battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) but found three great bodily injury enhancement allegations not true. 9 ( Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 17-18.) The trial court imposed a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), finding the ba 2022(People v. Cabrera (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 470, 478 ; see also Taylor, at p. 22 [“On the Particular Facts of This Case, the Trial Court Erred in Treating Taylor’s Conviction for Battery with Serious Bodily Injury as Equivalent to a Finding of Great Bodily Injury”].) In Taylor, the jury convicted the defendant of one count of battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) but found three great bodily injury enhancement allegations not true. 9 ( Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 17-18.) The trial court imposed a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), finding the ba | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Parrish
green
2 sentences2016(People v. Parrish, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 343 .) Section 245, subdivision (a)(4) focuses on conduct against another person likely to produce great bodily injury regardless of actual contact or injury, while section 243, subdivision (e) focuses on harmful or offensive contact against a person with whom the defendant shares a special relationship. 2013(People v. Parrish (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 343 .) Feyrer concluded that the defendant’s plea agreement, which admitted the more serious form of a wobbler offense, did not prohibit the trial court from subsequently declaring the crime a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)(3). ( Feyrer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 430-431.) Footnote 8 of the opinion cites cases which illustrate the prosecutorial strategy of using section 12022.7 enhancements to “qualify and perfect” felony offenses as strikes for purposes of California’s Three Strikes law. | 2 | 2013–2016 |
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2015(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d at pp. 455-456.) By finding Smith guilty of battery with serious bodily injury, the jury necessarily found that he personally inflicted serious bodily injury on Brunner. 2015(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d at pp. 455-456.) By finding Bailey guilty of battery with serious bodily injury, as charged in count 2, the jury necessarily found that he personally inflicted serious bodily injury on Thompson. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Reid v. Google, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024The great bodily injury enhancement does not apply “if infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the offense.” (§ 12022.7, subd. (g).) We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.2 (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527 .) 2 The People contend this issue is moot because the abstract of judgment does not reflect a great bodily enhancement on count 2. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Miles
green
1 sentence2021Unless rebutted, such a document, standing alone, is sufficient evidence of the facts it recites about the nature and circumstances of the prior conviction.” (People v. Miles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1074, 1083 .) 8 “Battery with serious bodily injury is not one of the crimes specified in section 1192.7, subdivision (c) as a ‘serious felony.’” (People v. Bueno (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1508 .) “[O]ne can commit a battery within the meaning of section 243, subdivision (d) without committing a serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8).” (Ibid.) “[T]o establish that the | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Castro
green
1 sentence2021Admission of the felony contempt of court conviction was harmless error Section 166, subdivision (c)(1), provides, in relevant part, “a willful and knowing violation of a protective order or stay-away court order . . . shall constitute contempt of court.” (§ 166, subd. (c)(1).) Unlike a conviction for misdemeanor spousal battery under section 243, subdivision (e)(1), we cannot say, as a matter of law, violation of a domestic violence protective order is a crime of moral turpitude because, under Castro’s “least adjudicated elements” test, a perpetrator can violate a protective order by simply c | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Watson
green
1 sentence2021(Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) As explained above, there was ample evidence of Waltz’s guilt regarding the June 2018 incident, including the deputies’ observations of bruisings on Tracy’s body and the photographs of marks on her neck, arm, and leg that were taken the night of the incident. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Rodriguez
green
1 sentence2021Spousal battery under section 243, subdivision (e)(1), identifies a specific victim defined by a special relationship to the perpetrator—“a spouse, a person with whom the defendant is cohabiting, a person who is the parent of the defendant’s child, former spouse, fiancé or fiancée, or a person with whom the defendant currently has, or has previously had, a dating or engagement relationship.”8 As such, the crime of misdemeanor spousal battery adds to the crime of simple battery the requirement it be committed against a victim who has a kind of 7 The version of section 273.5 examined in Rodrigue | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Gallardo
green
1 sentence2021(Gallardo, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 136 , fn. omitted [trial court’s role is limited to “identifying those facts that were established by virtue of the conviction itself—that is, facts the jury was necessarily required to find … or that the defendant admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea”].) In the event the People forgo the opportunity for a retrial regarding the strike allegation based on the 2009 prior conviction for battery under section 243, subdivision (d), or the finding is not sustained upon retrial, defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the record does not | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Hamilton
red
1 sentence2020(Id. at p. 1374.) In concluding the enhancement could not properly be imposed, the Court of Appeal reasoned that because “[t]he terms ‘serious bodily injury’ and ‘great bodily injury’ have substantially the same 5. meaning . . . , common sense dictates that great bodily injury is . . . an element of battery under section 243, subdivision (d).” (Id. at p. 1375.) Defendant’s case does not present the situation addressed in Hawkins and the “limited judicial exception” described in People v. Hamilton, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at page 130 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Blakeley
green
1 sentence2015Our Supreme Court has "acknowledge[d] that ' "[s]erious bodily injury" and "great bodily injury" are essentially equivalent elements.' [Citation.]" People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831 , overruled on another ground in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 88-89 .) In People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1375 , the court concluded that "common sense dictates that great bodily injury is indeed an element of battery under section 243, subdivision (d)." In People v. Moore (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1868, 1871 , the court held "that the element of 3 'serious bodily injury,' as requi | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In re Hansen
green
1 sentence2015In Hawkins, the Second District squarely held as follows: “We conclude that great bodily injury, as defined in section 12022.7, is an element of the crime of battery under section 243, subdivision (d).” (Hawkins, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1376 .) Respondent does not address Hawkins and suggests no basis for distinguishing its holding. “[W]e ordinarily follow the decisions of other districts without good reason to disagree.” (In re Hansen (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 906, 918 , internal quotes omitted.) Respondent instead relies on People v. Taylor (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11 (Taylor). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Kelly
green
1 sentence2014“When a greater offense must be reversed, but a lesser included offense could be affirmed,” the People have the “option of retrying the greater offense, or accepting a reduction to the lesser offense.” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 528 .) Accordingly, the prosecutor has the option of retrying defendant or accepting a reduction of the conviction to misdemeanor cohabitant battery under section 243, subdivision (e)(1). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Feyrer
red
1 sentence2013(People v. Parrish (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 343 .) Feyrer concluded that the defendant’s plea agreement, which admitted the more serious form of a wobbler offense, did not prohibit the trial court from subsequently declaring the crime a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)(3). ( Feyrer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 430-431.) Footnote 8 of the opinion cites cases which illustrate the prosecutorial strategy of using section 12022.7 enhancements to “qualify and perfect” felony offenses as strikes for purposes of California’s Three Strikes law. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Jose H.
green
1 sentence2013An opinion by the Sixth District Court of Appeal, In re Jose H. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1090 (Jose H.), affirmed a trial court’s refusal to strike a great bodily injury enhancement in relation to the defendant’s battery conviction under section 243, subdivision (d). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Boyd green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Curtis red | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.