section 300 harm specified in California

2025“While visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the children ‘and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm specified in section 300.’ [Citation.] This includes the ‘possibility of adverse psychological consequences of an unwanted visit between [parent] and child.’” (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 50 .) The evidence amply 10 supported the court’s finding that requiring visitation with father against T.G.’s wishes posed a high risk to T.G.’s

2021Even in the reunification stage of the dependency process, “the court must focus on the best interests of the children ‘and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm specified in section 300.’ (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376 .) This includes the ‘possibility of adverse psychological consequences of an unwanted visit between mother and child.’ (In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1238 .)” (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 50 .) If the children were no longer benefit

2026(See In re T.M. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1220 [explaining “ ‘[w]hile visitation is a key element of reunification, the court 6 must focus on the best interests of the child[] “and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm specified in section 300” ’ ”].) The juvenile court’s decision was also supported by the fact that Mother engaged in a violent confrontation with another individual after Child was removed.

2023(See In re T.M. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1220 [explaining that “ ‘[w]hile visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the child[] “and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm specified in section 300” ’ ”]; Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317 [after termination of reunification services, the court continues to focus on determining what is in the best interest of the child].) On more than one occasion, Mother was also dishonest with the Agency a

2021Even in the reunification stage of the dependency process, “the court must focus on the best interests of the children ‘and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm specified in section 300.’ (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376 .) This includes the ‘possibility of adverse psychological consequences of an unwanted visit between mother and child.’ (In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1238 .)” (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 50 .) If the children were no longer benefit

2014(In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41 , 50–51; In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961 , 973–974.) “While visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the children ‘and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm specified in section 300.’” (In re Julie M., supra, at p. 50 , quoting In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376 .) A visitation order determining the best interests of a dependent 16 child may be reversed only upon a clear showing of ab

2023(See In re T.M. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1220 [explaining that “ ‘[w]hile visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the child[] “and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm specified in section 300” ’ ”]; Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317 [after termination of reunification services, the court continues to focus on determining what is in the best interest of the child].) On more than one occasion, Mother was also dishonest with the Agency a

2014(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318 ; In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 ; In re Shawna M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1686, 1690 .) The juvenile court acted within its discretion to grant sole physical and legal custody to Father based on Mother’s prior neglect of the child.

2022In In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634 , the reviewing court outlined a set of factors courts should consider when determining whether a parent’s use of physical discipline “on a particular occasion falls within (or instead exceeds) the scope of [the] parental right to discipline.” (Id. at p. 641.) Those factors include: “(1) whether the parent’s conduct is genuinely disciplinary; (2) whether the punishment is ‘necess[ary]’ (that is, whether the discipline was ‘warranted by the circumstances’); and (3) ‘whether the amount of punishment was reasonable or excessive.’ ” (Ibid.) As to the first

2021(See In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 438 [jurisdiction proper where mother punished three-year-old child by striking him with belt on stomach and forearms leaving deep purple bruises]; compare In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 640-642 [section 300 protects against excessive discipline, not reasonable discipline; spanking child on buttocks with hand or sandal did not constitute serious physical harm under section 300] with In re Benjamin D. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1472 [repeated pinching of two-year-old child that left “visible pinch marks” supported dependency jurisdiction

2026(See In re Sofia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1047 (Sofia M.); see also Serena M., at p. 673.) “ ‘Where the minor is reluctant to visit, and family therapy is needed to promote visitation, such therapy may be critical to reunification.’ [Citation.] ‘But a parent’s liberty interest in the care, custody and companionship of children cannot be maintained at the expense of their well-being.’ [Citation.] ‘While visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the children “and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding tha

2026(See In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [“A parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future behavior.”]; In re Ana C., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1332 [father’s conduct “has been ‘so sexually aberrant’ to support the commonsense conclusion that most every person in the family home was at risk of sexual abuse”]; In re Y.G., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 116 [section 300, subdivision (b), permits “a finding of danger to the parent’s child based on evidence of conduct with an unrelated child”].) Norma argues there was no “current risk” of harm under section 300, subdivision (b), at t

2026Standard of Review “ ‘When a finding that reunification services were adequate is challenged on appeal, we review it for substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘In general, when presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by this standard of proof.’ [Citation.] ‘The adequacy of the reunification plan and of the department’s effo

2026(See In re Sofia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1047 (Sofia M.); see also Serena M., at p. 673.) “ ‘Where the minor is reluctant to visit, and family therapy is needed to promote visitation, such therapy may be critical to reunification.’ [Citation.] ‘But a parent’s liberty interest in the care, custody and companionship of children cannot be maintained at the expense of their well-being.’ [Citation.] ‘While visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the children “and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding tha

2026(See In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [“A parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future behavior.”]; In re Ana C., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1332 [father’s conduct “has been ‘so sexually aberrant’ to support the commonsense conclusion that most every person in the family home was at risk of sexual abuse”]; In re Y.G., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 116 [section 300, subdivision (b), permits “a finding of danger to the parent’s child based on evidence of conduct with an unrelated child”].) Norma argues there was no “current risk” of harm under section 300, subdivision (b), at t

2026Standard of Review “ ‘When a finding that reunification services were adequate is challenged on appeal, we review it for substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘In general, when presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by this standard of proof.’ [Citation.] ‘The adequacy of the reunification plan and of the department’s effo

2022(In re Manolito L. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 753, 761-762 [preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applies]; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 773-774 [clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applies.].) There also appears to be some disagreement regarding the standard of review.

2022(In re Manolito L. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 753, 761-762 [preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applies]; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 773-774 [clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applies.].) There also appears to be some disagreement regarding the standard of review.

2021(See In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 438 [jurisdiction proper where mother punished three-year-old child by striking him with belt on stomach and forearms leaving deep purple bruises]; compare In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 640-642 [section 300 protects against excessive discipline, not reasonable discipline; spanking child on buttocks with hand or sandal did not constitute serious physical harm under section 300] with In re Benjamin D. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1472 [repeated pinching of two-year-old child that left “visible pinch marks” supported dependency jurisdiction

2021(See In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 438 [jurisdiction proper where mother punished three-year-old child by striking him with belt on stomach and forearms leaving deep purple bruises]; compare In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 640-642 [section 300 protects against excessive discipline, not reasonable discipline; spanking child on buttocks with hand or sandal did not constitute serious physical harm under section 300] with In re Benjamin D. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1472 [repeated pinching of two-year-old child that left “visible pinch marks” supported dependency jurisdiction

2020Yet, based on A.C.’s traumatic experiences as both a victim of father’s abuse and a child of parents’ high- conflict divorce, she more than likely will not decide on her own to visit father, at least not in the near term. . . . ‘(See also In re Brittany S. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1407 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 50 ] [“By not providing visitation, SSA virtually assured the erosion (and termination) of any meaningful relationship between Sheri and Brittany.”].)’ (In re Julie M. [(1999)] 69 Cal.App.4th [41,] 50.) [¶] Clearly, the juvenile court was appropriately focused here on A.C.’s best interests an

2020Yet, based on A.C.’s traumatic experiences as both a victim of father’s abuse and a child of parents’ high- conflict divorce, she more than likely will not decide on her own to visit father, at least not in the near term. . . . ‘(See also In re Brittany S. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1407 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 50 ] [“By not providing visitation, SSA virtually assured the erosion (and termination) of any meaningful relationship between Sheri and Brittany.”].)’ (In re Julie M. [(1999)] 69 Cal.App.4th [41,] 50.) [¶] Clearly, the juvenile court was appropriately focused here on A.C.’s best interests an

2017Luis H. and Alan H. have argued that the evidence showed that Morena H.’s failure to protect and Manuel B.’s sexual abuse of Leslie O. placed them at substantial risk of harm, but they have not argued or demonstrated that the evidence “was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) Luis H. and Alan H. have failed to meet their burden on appeal.