Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
28 California opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2025 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. J.J.green2 sentences2025But, as our Supreme Court found in I.J., these are not dispositive factors. 34 Moreover, as the juvenile court noted, “[T]he magnitude of the harm [to the other children] is potentially very great.” “[T]he more severe the type of sibling abuse, the lower the required probability of the child’s experiencing such abuse to conclude the child is at a substantial risk of abuse or neglect under section 300.” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 778 .) Even if there were a lower probability that Father would abuse Ethan or N.B., the severity of his abuse of Audrey supports the juvenile court’s conclu 2025(See ibid. [“the more severe the type of sibling abuse, the lower the required probability of the child’s experiencing such abuse to conclude the child is at a substantial risk of abuse or neglect under section 300”].) As a result, because the type of abuse at issue here is sexual abuse, the degree of probability required is low. | 2 | 18 |
L. A. Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Lisa E. (In Re R.T.)green2 sentences2024(See, e.g., In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633 [“‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings . . . , we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them”].) We are not persuaded. 2024If the sibling abuse is relatively minor, the court might reasonably find insubstantial a risk the child will be similarly abused; but as the abuse becomes more serious, it becomes more necessary to protect the child from even a relatively low probability of that abuse.” (Id. at 778.) “ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings . . . , we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.]’ ” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633 .) Under this standard, “we view the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s determinations, drawing al | 1 | 2 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Tyrone V.green1 sentence2024Mother argues on appeal that after the transfer, K.’s “attendance at the numerous appointments improved.” She asserts that “[b]y the time of the jurisdictional hearing on February 16, 2023,” there was no basis 3 for the court to assert jurisdiction over K.2 (See In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [“‘the question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm’”].) Mother notes that on January 26 and February 8, the Kaiser social worker told DCFS that Kaiser had “no safety concerns for the child at [this] time.” Mother | 1 | 1 |
San Diego Cnty. Health & Human Servs. Agency v. T.B. (In re D.B.)green1 sentence2022The provision thus accords the trial court greater latitude to exercise jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has been found to have been abused than the court would have in the absence of that circumstance.’ ” (Ibid.) In assessing the risk of harm posed to a child, it also is necessary to recognize that “ ‘[s]ome risks may be substantial even if they carry a low degree of probability because the magnitude of the harm is potentially great.’ ” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 778 .) Accordingly, “[t]he more severe the type of sibling abuse, the lower the required probability of the child | 1 | 1 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Shirley S.green1 sentence2020The provision thus accords the trial court greater latitude to exercise jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has been found to have been abused than the court would have in the absence of that circumstance.’” (I.J., at p. 774; accord, In re Francisco D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 73, 81 .) “[T]he more severe the type of sibling abuse, the lower the required probability of the child’s experiencing such abuse to conclude the child is at a substantial risk of abuse or neglect under section 300.” (I.J., at p. 778; accord, In re S.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 204 , 207.) 13 “The court need not wait unt | 1 | 1 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Shahida R.green1 sentence2020The provision thus accords the trial court greater latitude to exercise jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has been found to have been abused than the court would have in the absence of that circumstance.’” (I.J., at p. 774; accord, In re Francisco D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 73, 81 .) “[T]he more severe the type of sibling abuse, the lower the required probability of the child’s experiencing such abuse to conclude the child is at a substantial risk of abuse or neglect under section 300.” (I.J., at p. 778; accord, In re S.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 204 , 207.) 13 “The court need not wait unt | 1 | 1 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Kevin M.green1 sentence2020The provision thus accords the trial court greater latitude to exercise jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has been found to have been abused than the court would have in the absence of that circumstance.’” (I.J., at p. 774; accord, In re Francisco D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 73, 81 .) “[T]he more severe the type of sibling abuse, the lower the required probability of the child’s experiencing such abuse to conclude the child is at a substantial risk of abuse or neglect under section 300.” (I.J., at p. 778; accord, In re S.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 204 , 207.) 13 “The court need not wait unt | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hallgreen1 sentence2013Thus, in order to determine whether a risk is substantial, the court must consider both the likelihood that harm will occur and the magnitude of potential harm . . . .” (People v. Hall (Colo. 2000) 999 P.2d 207, 217-218 [considering what constitutes a “substantial and unjustifiable risk” of death].) In other words, the more severe the type of sibling abuse, the lower the required probability of the child’s experiencing such abuse to conclude the child is at a substantial risk of abuse or neglect under section 300. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Christina P.green2 sentences1987(In re Jack H. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 257, 265-266 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 646 ]; In re T.M.R. *778 (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 694, 700 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; cf. In re Christina P. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 115, 132-133 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 525 ].) Because the Legislature reenacted the cited language without change in the wake of these judicial interpretations, the Legislature is deemed to have approved and adopted the meaning given the statute by the courts. 1987(In re Jack H. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 257, 265-266 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 646 ]; In re T.M.R. *778 (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 694, 700 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; cf. In re Christina P. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 115, 132-133 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 525 ].) Because the Legislature reenacted the cited language without change in the wake of these judicial interpretations, the Legislature is deemed to have approved and adopted the meaning given the statute by the courts. | 1 | 1 |
Detrich v. Dorothy H.green2 sentences1987(In re Jack H. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 257, 265-266 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 646 ]; In re T.M.R. *778 (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 694, 700 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; cf. In re Christina P. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 115, 132-133 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 525 ].) Because the Legislature reenacted the cited language without change in the wake of these judicial interpretations, the Legislature is deemed to have approved and adopted the meaning given the statute by the courts. 1987(In re Jack H. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 257, 265-266 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 646 ]; In re T.M.R. *778 (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 694, 700 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; cf. In re Christina P. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 115, 132-133 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 525 ].) Because the Legislature reenacted the cited language without change in the wake of these judicial interpretations, the Legislature is deemed to have approved and adopted the meaning given the statute by the courts. | 1 | 1 |
In Re TMRgreen2 sentences1987(In re Jack H. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 257, 265-266 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 646 ]; In re T.M.R. *778 (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 694, 700 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; cf. In re Christina P. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 115, 132-133 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 525 ].) Because the Legislature reenacted the cited language without change in the wake of these judicial interpretations, the Legislature is deemed to have approved and adopted the meaning given the statute by the courts. 1987(In re Jack H. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 257, 265-266 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 646 ]; In re T.M.R. *778 (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 694, 700 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 292 ]; cf. In re Christina P. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 115, 132-133 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 525 ].) Because the Legislature reenacted the cited language without change in the wake of these judicial interpretations, the Legislature is deemed to have approved and adopted the meaning given the statute by the courts. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency v. R.V.
green
2 sentences2024(In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 , superseded by statute on other grounds.) “The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843 .) “ ‘[T]he more severe the type of . . . abuse, the lower the required probability of the child’s experiencing such abuse to conclude the child is at a substantial risk of abuse or neglect under section 300.’ [Citation.]” (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family 51 Services v. Superior Court (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 2016(In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843 , italics added (R.V.) [jurisdiction based on substantial risk of abuse or neglect under § 300, subd. (j)].) 2. | 2 | 2016–2024 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2024(In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 , superseded by statute on other grounds.) “The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843 .) “ ‘[T]he more severe the type of . . . abuse, the lower the required probability of the child’s experiencing such abuse to conclude the child is at a substantial risk of abuse or neglect under section 300.’ [Citation.]” (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family 51 Services v. Superior Court (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 2014Our Supreme Court explained: “[T]he more severe the type of sibling abuse, the lower the required probability of the child’s experiencing such abuse to conclude the child is at a substantial risk of abuse or neglect under section 300.” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 778 ; Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 149, 164 .) The father also argues except for the sexual abuse allegations as to H.P., he has appropriately parented the children and provided for the family. | 2 | 2014–2024 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Paul M.
yellow
2 sentences2021However, substantial evidence is not synonymous with any evidence. . . . [W]hile substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be a product of logic and reason and must rest on the evidence . . . ; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding.” (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 763 , internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) We agree with DCFS that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under subdivision (b)(1) of medical neglect that endangered M.E. (count (b)-1) and under s 2014(Id. at p. 766.) In Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 754 , the court found the father was not a substance abuser because there was no evidence he failed to fulfill his work obligations, suffered from substance-related legal problems, drove his car while under the influence of drugs or continued using drugs in the face of social or interpersonal problems caused by drug use. | 2 | 2014–2021 |
In Re Rocco M.
yellow
1 sentence2024(In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 , superseded by statute on other grounds.) “The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843 .) “ ‘[T]he more severe the type of . . . abuse, the lower the required probability of the child’s experiencing such abuse to conclude the child is at a substantial risk of abuse or neglect under section 300.’ [Citation.]” (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family 51 Services v. Superior Court (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th | 1 | 2024–2024 |
L. A. Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Richard C. (In re Alexzander C.)
red
1 sentence2021(See e.g., In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438 , 15 442-443 [methamphetamine is an inherently dangerous drug, and those under its influence cannot be trusted to safely and appropriately care for a child], disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 .) In short, substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (d) and (j) that mother’s failure to protect S.A. from father’s sexual abuse placed the three youngest girls at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm and/or sexual abuse. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. B.A.
neutral
1 sentence2014If the sibling abuse is relatively minor, the court might reasonably find insubstantial a risk the child will be similarly abused; but as the abuse becomes more serious, it becomes more necessary to protect the child from even a relatively low probability of that abuse.” (Ibid.) In resolving the Court of Appeal split in favor of jurisdiction over the male children, the Supreme Court discussed this court’s In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339 (P.A.) opinion with approval. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Phillip B.
green
2 sentences1983They felt that surgery would be merely life-prolonging rather than life-saving, presenting the possibility that *418 they would be unable to care for Phillip during his later years. 9 A few months later, in early 1978, appellants’ decision was challenged in a juvenile dependency proceeding initiated by the district attorney on the ground that the withholding of surgery constituted neglect within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b); the juvenile court’s dismissal of the action on the basis of inconclusive evidence was ultimately sustained on appeal {In re P 1983They felt that surgery would be merely life-prolonging rather than life-saving, presenting the possibility that *418 they would be unable to care for Phillip during his later years. 9 A few months later, in early 1978, appellants’ decision was challenged in a juvenile dependency proceeding initiated by the district attorney on the ground that the withholding of surgery constituted neglect within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b); the juvenile court’s dismissal of the action on the basis of inconclusive evidence was ultimately sustained on appeal {In re P | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Bothman v. Warren B.
green
2 sentences1983Bothman v. Warren B. (1980) 445 U.S. 949 [ 63 L.Ed.2d 784 , 100 S.Ct. 1597 ], In September 1978, upon hearing from a staff member of We Care that Phillip had been regularly spending weekends at respondents’ home, Mr. B. promptly forbade Phillip’s removal from the facility (except for medical purposes and school attendance) and requested that respondents be denied personal visits with Phillip at We Care. 1983Bothman v. Warren B. (1980) 445 U.S. 949 [ 63 L.Ed.2d 784 , 100 S.Ct. 1597 ], In September 1978, upon hearing from a staff member of We Care that Phillip had been regularly spending weekends at respondents’ home, Mr. B. promptly forbade Phillip’s removal from the facility (except for medical purposes and school attendance) and requested that respondents be denied personal visits with Phillip at We Care. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.