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28 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2023 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Paduagreen2 sentences2021The situation portion of § 53-21 [a] (1) encompasses the protection of the body as well as the safety and security of the environment in which the child exists, and for which the adult is responsible.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138 , 147-48, 869 A.2d 192 (2005). ‘‘Because risk of injury to a child is a general intent crime, proof of [s]pecific intent is not a necessary requirement . . . . 2021The situation portion of § 53-21 [a] (1) encompasses the protection of the body as well as the safety and security of the environment in which the child exists, and for which the adult is responsible.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138 , 147-48, 869 A.2d 192 (2005). ‘‘Because risk of injury to a child is a general intent crime, proof of [s]pecific intent is not a necessary requirement . . . . | 3 | 9 |
State v. Paynered2 sentences2006To the extent that the defendant advances such a claim, it is foreclosed by our holding in State v. Payne, 240 Conn. 766, 771-73 , 695 A.2d 525 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Romero, 269 Conn. 481, 490 , 849 A.2d 750 (2004), in which we concluded that the term “health,” as used in the “situation” prong of § 53-21 (a) (1), includes mental health as well as physical health. 2006To the extent that the defendant advances such a claim, it is foreclosed by our holding in State v. Payne, 240 Conn. 766, 771-73 , 695 A.2d 525 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Romero, 269 Conn. 481, 490 , 849 A.2d 750 (2004), in which we concluded that the term “health,” as used in the “situation” prong of § 53-21 (a) (1), includes mental health as well as physical health. | 2 | 5 |
State v. Romerogreen2 sentences2020See State v. Payne, 240 Conn. 766, 771 , 695 A.2d 525 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Romero, 269 Conn. 481, 490 , 849 A.2d 760 (2004). 2006To the extent that the defendant advances such a claim, it is foreclosed by our holding in State v. Payne, 240 Conn. 766, 771-73 , 695 A.2d 525 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Romero, 269 Conn. 481, 490 , 849 A.2d 750 (2004), in which we concluded that the term “health,” as used in the “situation” prong of § 53-21 (a) (1), includes mental health as well as physical health. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Burtongreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 161 , 778 A.2d 955 (2001) (‘[Section] 53-21 does not require a finding that the victim’s [health or] morals were actually impaired. 2023See, e.g., State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 161 , 778 A.2d 955 (2001) (‘[Section] 53-21 does not require a finding that the victim’s [health or] morals were actually impaired. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Schrivergreen2 sentences2022In the present appeal, the defendant challenges only his convictions of risk of injury to a child by raising the following three claims of error: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction under the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) because the state had failed to adduce any proof that he had ‘‘perpetrated an act directly on the person of a minor’’ as required by the judicial gloss first imposed by this court in State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456 , 542 A.2d 686 (1988); (2) the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because the conduct proven by the 2022In the present appeal, the defendant challenges only his convictions of risk of injury to a child by raising the following three claims of error: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction under the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) because the state had failed to adduce any proof that he had ‘‘perpetrated an act directly on the person of a minor’’ as required by the judicial gloss first imposed by this court in State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456 , 542 A.2d 686 (1988); (2) the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because the conduct proven by the | 1 | 5 |
Perruccio v. Connecticutgreen2 sentences2005The pertinent prong of § 53-21 provides that “[a]ny person who wilfully or unlawfully . . . does any act likely to impair the health or morals of [a child under the age of sixteen years], shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.” This prong has been construed to prohibit “acts directly perpetrated on the person of the minor and injurious to his [or her] moral or physical well-being.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perruccio, 192 Conn. 154, 159 , 471 A.2d 632 , appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 801 , 105 S. Ct. 55 , 83 L. 2005The pertinent prong of § 53-21 provides that “[a]ny person who wilfully or unlawfully . . . does any act likely to impair the health or morals of [a child under the age of sixteen years], shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.” This prong has been construed to prohibit “acts directly perpetrated on the person of the minor and injurious to his [or her] moral or physical well-being.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perruccio, 192 Conn. 154, 159 , 471 A.2d 632 , appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 801 , 105 S. Ct. 55 , 83 L. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Perrucciogreen2 sentences2005The pertinent prong of § 53-21 provides that “[a]ny person who wilfully or unlawfully . . . does any act likely to impair the health or morals of [a child under the age of sixteen years], shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.” This prong has been construed to prohibit “acts directly perpetrated on the person of the minor and injurious to his [or her] moral or physical well-being.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perruccio, 192 Conn. 154, 159 , 471 A.2d 632 , appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 801 , 105 S. Ct. 55 , 83 L. 2005The pertinent prong of § 53-21 provides that “[a]ny person who wilfully or unlawfully . . . does any act likely to impair the health or morals of [a child under the age of sixteen years], shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.” This prong has been construed to prohibit “acts directly perpetrated on the person of the minor and injurious to his [or her] moral or physical well-being.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perruccio, 192 Conn. 154, 159 , 471 A.2d 632 , appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 801 , 105 S. Ct. 55 , 83 L. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Pickeringgreen2 sentences2023Although proof of physical contact has been required to sustain a conviction under the act prong of § 53-21 in certain other contexts; see State v. Pickering, [ 180 Conn. 54, 64 , 428 A.2d 322 (1980)] (statutory proscription of acts likely to impair morals of children required ‘deliberate touching of the private parts of a child under the age of sixteen in a sexual and indecent manner’); neither the statute’s plain text nor the case law applying it requires proof of such contact in all cases.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Ares, supra, 345 Conn. 299-300. 2023Although proof of physical contact has been required to sustain a conviction under the act prong of § 53-21 in certain other contexts; see State v. Pickering, [ 180 Conn. 54, 64 , 428 A.2d 322 (1980)] (statutory proscription of acts likely to impair morals of children required ‘deliberate touching of the private parts of a child under the age of sixteen in a sexual and indecent manner’); neither the statute’s plain text nor the case law applying it requires proof of such contact in all cases.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Ares, supra, 345 Conn. 299-300. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Gewilygreen2 sentences2018See State v. Gewily , 280 Conn. 660 , 669, 911 A.2d 293 (2006) ("actual injury is not an element of the 'situation' prong of § 53-21 [a] [1]"), and cases cited therein. 2018See State v. Gewily , 280 Conn. 660 , 669, 911 A.2d 293 (2006) ("actual injury is not an element of the 'situation' prong of § 53-21 [a] [1]"), and cases cited therein. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Scruggsgreen2 sentences2011The situation portion of § 53-21 [(a) (1)] encompasses the protection of the body as well as the safety and security of the environment in which the child exists, and for which the adult is responsible.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scruggs, 279 Conn. 698, 713 , 905 A.2d 24 (2006). 2011The situation portion of § 53-21 [(a) (1)] encompasses the protection of the body as well as the safety and security of the environment in which the child exists, and for which the adult is responsible.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scruggs, 279 Conn. 698, 713 , 905 A.2d 24 (2006). | 1 | 2 |
State v. McClarygreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., State v. McClary, [ 207 Conn. 233, 240 , 541 A.2d 96 (1988)]; State v. Euclides L., 189 Conn. App. 151 , 161-62, 207 A.3d 93 (2019). ‘‘The second well established legal principle is that the state need not prove actual injury in order to secure a conviction under either the situation prong or the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1). 2023See, e.g., State v. McClary, [ 207 Conn. 233, 240 , 541 A.2d 96 (1988)]; State v. Euclides L., 189 Conn. App. 151 , 161-62, 207 A.3d 93 (2019). ‘‘The second well established legal principle is that the state need not prove actual injury in order to secure a conviction under either the situation prong or the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sullivangreen2 sentences2022Although the two prongs of § 53-21 (a) (1) derive from previously separate legislative enactments, precedent indicates that they ‘‘describe alternative means of committing a single crime.’’ State v. Tanzella, 226 Conn. 601, 612 , 628 A.2d 973 (1993); see also State v. Sullivan, 11 Conn. App. 80, 88 , 525 A.2d 1353 (1987) (defendant’s sixth amendment right to notice was not violated by state’s amendment of operative pleadings to charge violation of act prong in addition to violation of situation prong initially alleged because ‘‘[t]he original and the amended informations both charged the defen 2022Although the two prongs of § 53-21 (a) (1) derive from previously separate legislative enactments, precedent indicates that they ‘‘describe alternative means of committing a single crime.’’ State v. Tanzella, 226 Conn. 601, 612 , 628 A.2d 973 (1993); see also State v. Sullivan, 11 Conn. App. 80, 88 , 525 A.2d 1353 (1987) (defendant’s sixth amendment right to notice was not violated by state’s amendment of operative pleadings to charge violation of act prong in addition to violation of situation prong initially alleged because ‘‘[t]he original and the amended informations both charged the defen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kristygreen2 sentences2022Although the two prongs of § 53-21 (a) (1) derive from previously separate legislative enactments, precedent indicates that they ‘‘describe alternative means of committing a single crime.’’ State v. Tanzella, 226 Conn. 601, 612 , 628 A.2d 973 (1993); see also State v. Sullivan, 11 Conn. App. 80, 88 , 525 A.2d 1353 (1987) (defendant’s sixth amendment right to notice was not violated by state’s amendment of operative pleadings to charge violation of act prong in addition to violation of situation prong initially alleged because ‘‘[t]he original and the amended informations both charged the defen 2022Although the two prongs of § 53-21 (a) (1) derive from previously separate legislative enactments, precedent indicates that they ‘‘describe alternative means of committing a single crime.’’ State v. Tanzella, 226 Conn. 601, 612 , 628 A.2d 973 (1993); see also State v. Sullivan, 11 Conn. App. 80, 88 , 525 A.2d 1353 (1987) (defendant’s sixth amendment right to notice was not violated by state’s amendment of operative pleadings to charge violation of act prong in addition to violation of situation prong initially alleged because ‘‘[t]he original and the amended informations both charged the defen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Newtongreen2 sentences2022See State v. Padua, supra, 273 Conn. 148 ; see also, e.g., State v. Newton, 8 Conn. App. 528 , 530-32, 513 A.2d 1261 (1986) (trial court’s inclusion of instructions relating to uncharged portion of § 53-21 implicated defendant’s constitutional right to notice of accusations against him).12 Because the parties agree that the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh counts of the information are properly read as alleging violations under the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1), the question of whether a variance exists between the pleadings and the conviction in this case necessarily turns on a comparison of 2022See State v. Padua, supra, 273 Conn. 148 ; see also, e.g., State v. Newton, 8 Conn. App. 528 , 530-32, 513 A.2d 1261 (1986) (trial court’s inclusion of instructions relating to uncharged portion of § 53-21 implicated defendant’s constitutional right to notice of accusations against him).12 Because the parties agree that the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh counts of the information are properly read as alleging violations under the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1), the question of whether a variance exists between the pleadings and the conviction in this case necessarily turns on a comparison of | 1 | 1 |
State v. Martingreen2 sentences2022Although the two prongs of § 53-21 (a) (1) derive from previously separate legislative enactments, precedent indicates that they ‘‘describe alternative means of committing a single crime.’’ State v. Tanzella, 226 Conn. 601, 612 , 628 A.2d 973 (1993); see also State v. Sullivan, 11 Conn. App. 80, 88 , 525 A.2d 1353 (1987) (defendant’s sixth amendment right to notice was not violated by state’s amendment of operative pleadings to charge violation of act prong in addition to violation of situation prong initially alleged because ‘‘[t]he original and the amended informations both charged the defen 2022Although the two prongs of § 53-21 (a) (1) derive from previously separate legislative enactments, precedent indicates that they ‘‘describe alternative means of committing a single crime.’’ State v. Tanzella, 226 Conn. 601, 612 , 628 A.2d 973 (1993); see also State v. Sullivan, 11 Conn. App. 80, 88 , 525 A.2d 1353 (1987) (defendant’s sixth amendment right to notice was not violated by state’s amendment of operative pleadings to charge violation of act prong in addition to violation of situation prong initially alleged because ‘‘[t]he original and the amended informations both charged the defen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sorabellagreen2 sentences2011Thus, “a defendant who knowingly fails to provide for the protection of a child when that child is under [his or her] care . . . creates a situation that endangers the physical well-being of the child and, thus, [such failure] falls with the ambit of [§ 53-21 (a)].” State v. Branham, 56 Conn. App. 395, 402 , 743 A.2d 635 , cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937 , 747 A.2d 3 (2000); see also State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155, 173 , 891 A.2d 897 (“[I]t is not necessary, to support a conviction under § 53-21, that the [accused] be aware that his conduct is likely to impact a child younger than the age of si 2011Thus, “a defendant who knowingly fails to provide for the protection of a child when that child is under [his or her] care . . . creates a situation that endangers the physical well-being of the child and, thus, [such failure] falls with the ambit of [§ 53-21 (a)].” State v. Branham, 56 Conn. App. 395, 402 , 743 A.2d 635 , cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937 , 747 A.2d 3 (2000); see also State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155, 173 , 891 A.2d 897 (“[I]t is not necessary, to support a conviction under § 53-21, that the [accused] be aware that his conduct is likely to impact a child younger than the age of si | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Na'im B.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Eastwoodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Eastwoodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jason B.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. March
green
2 sentences2007Pursuant to State v. March, 39 Conn. App. 267 , 664 A.2d 1157 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 930 , 667 A.2d 801 (1995), to meet its burden of proof under the act portion of § 53-21 (a) (1), the state was required to prove: “(1) the victim was less than sixteen years old; (2) the defendant committed an act upon the victim-, (3) the act was likely to be injurious to the victim’s health . . . and (4) the defendant had the general intent to commit the act upon the victim.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 275. 2007Pursuant to State v. March, 39 Conn. App. 267 , 664 A.2d 1157 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 930 , 667 A.2d 801 (1995), to meet its burden of proof under the act portion of § 53-21 (a) (1), the state was required to prove: “(1) the victim was less than sixteen years old; (2) the defendant committed an act upon the victim-, (3) the act was likely to be injurious to the victim’s health . . . and (4) the defendant had the general intent to commit the act upon the victim.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 275. | 3 | 2005–2023 |
State v. Hauck
green
2 sentences2023See State v. Spigarolo, supra, 210 Conn. 390-92 (noting that state charged risk of injury count under ‘‘situation’’ prong of § 53-21 premised on multiple acts of sexual contact and presented it to jury as continuing course of conduct crime, and court cited to State v. Hauck, 172 Conn. 140, 150 , 374 A.2d 150 (1976), which held that violation of situation prong of § 53-21 may be premised on continuing course of conduct).26 Since the enactment of P.A. 95-142, § 1, we never have held that the legislature no longer intended that risk of injury to a child would be a continuing course of conduct cri 2023See State v. Spigarolo, supra, 210 Conn. 390-92 (noting that state charged risk of injury count under ‘‘situation’’ prong of § 53-21 premised on multiple acts of sexual contact and presented it to jury as continuing course of conduct crime, and court cited to State v. Hauck, 172 Conn. 140, 150 , 374 A.2d 150 (1976), which held that violation of situation prong of § 53-21 may be premised on continuing course of conduct).26 Since the enactment of P.A. 95-142, § 1, we never have held that the legislature no longer intended that risk of injury to a child would be a continuing course of conduct cri | 2 | 2022–2023 |
State v. NATHAN J.
green
2 sentences2020The defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury an instruction on the statutory (§ 53a-18 (1)) parental justification defense with respect to the situation prong of the risk of injury to a child charge in count two of the information was unavailing, as that court properly concluded that the defense did not apply to the situation prong of § 53-21 (a) (1): this court declined to extend the holding in State v. Nathan J. ( 294 Conn. 243 ), that the parental justification defense may be applied to conduct under the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1), to the situation prong of 2010Other than changes affecting sentencing, the legislature has not substantively amended this provision of the risk of iqjury statute since our decision in Schriver.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nathan J., 294 Conn. 243, 252-53 , 982 A.2d 1067 (2009). | 2 | 2010–2020 |
State v. March
green
2 sentences2007Pursuant to State v. March, 39 Conn. App. 267 , 664 A.2d 1157 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 930 , 667 A.2d 801 (1995), to meet its burden of proof under the act portion of § 53-21 (a) (1), the state was required to prove: “(1) the victim was less than sixteen years old; (2) the defendant committed an act upon the victim-, (3) the act was likely to be injurious to the victim’s health . . . and (4) the defendant had the general intent to commit the act upon the victim.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 275. 2007Pursuant to State v. March, 39 Conn. App. 267 , 664 A.2d 1157 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 930 , 667 A.2d 801 (1995), to meet its burden of proof under the act portion of § 53-21 (a) (1), the state was required to prove: “(1) the victim was less than sixteen years old; (2) the defendant committed an act upon the victim-, (3) the act was likely to be injurious to the victim’s health . . . and (4) the defendant had the general intent to commit the act upon the victim.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 275. | 2 | 2005–2007 |
State v. Ares
green
1 sentence2023There was sufficient evidence presented at trial to convict the defendant pursuant to the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1): under our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Ares ( 345 Conn. 290 ), a defendant need not touch or have direct physical contact with a child in order to be convicted under the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) for engaging in conduct likely to impair the health of a child, and the defendant’s attempts to distinguish other cases involving defendants who were convicted for their actions in either directly handing alcohol to a victim or physically pursuing a child with a dangerous | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Euclides L.
green
2 sentences2023See, e.g., State v. McClary, [ 207 Conn. 233, 240 , 541 A.2d 96 (1988)]; State v. Euclides L., 189 Conn. App. 151 , 161-62, 207 A.3d 93 (2019). ‘‘The second well established legal principle is that the state need not prove actual injury in order to secure a conviction under either the situation prong or the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1). 2023See, e.g., State v. McClary, [ 207 Conn. 233, 240 , 541 A.2d 96 (1988)]; State v. Euclides L., 189 Conn. App. 151 , 161-62, 207 A.3d 93 (2019). ‘‘The second well established legal principle is that the state need not prove actual injury in order to secure a conviction under either the situation prong or the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Tinsley
green
2 sentences2022A conviction under the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) requires the state to prove that the defendant, ‘‘with the general intent to do so, committed (1) an act (2) likely to impair the morals or health (3) of a child under the age of sixteen.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tinsley, 340 Conn. 425, 444 , 264 A.3d 560 (2021); see also State v. McClary, supra, 207 Conn. 240 (intent required is only general intent to do act; no specific intent to harm child is required). 2022A conviction under the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) requires the state to prove that the defendant, ‘‘with the general intent to do so, committed (1) an act (2) likely to impair the morals or health (3) of a child under the age of sixteen.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tinsley, 340 Conn. 425, 444 , 264 A.3d 560 (2021); see also State v. McClary, supra, 207 Conn. 240 (intent required is only general intent to do act; no specific intent to harm child is required). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Tanzella
green
2 sentences2022Although the two prongs of § 53-21 (a) (1) derive from previously separate legislative enactments, precedent indicates that they ‘‘describe alternative means of committing a single crime.’’ State v. Tanzella, 226 Conn. 601, 612 , 628 A.2d 973 (1993); see also State v. Sullivan, 11 Conn. App. 80, 88 , 525 A.2d 1353 (1987) (defendant’s sixth amendment right to notice was not violated by state’s amendment of operative pleadings to charge violation of act prong in addition to violation of situation prong initially alleged because ‘‘[t]he original and the amended informations both charged the defen 2022Although the two prongs of § 53-21 (a) (1) derive from previously separate legislative enactments, precedent indicates that they ‘‘describe alternative means of committing a single crime.’’ State v. Tanzella, 226 Conn. 601, 612 , 628 A.2d 973 (1993); see also State v. Sullivan, 11 Conn. App. 80, 88 , 525 A.2d 1353 (1987) (defendant’s sixth amendment right to notice was not violated by state’s amendment of operative pleadings to charge violation of act prong in addition to violation of situation prong initially alleged because ‘‘[t]he original and the amended informations both charged the defen | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Owens
green
1 sentence2021See State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138 , 147-48, 869 A.2d 192 (2005). ‘‘The ‘situation prong’ refers to the language in [the statute that] provides that ‘[a]ny person who . . . wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child are likely to be impaired . . . shall be guilty of a class C felony . . . .’ ‘‘The ‘act prong’ refers to the language . . . that provides: ‘or does any act likely to impair the health o | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. CLIFTON OWENS
green
2 sentences2021See State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138 , 147-48, 869 A.2d 192 (2005). ‘‘The ‘situation prong’ refers to the language in [the statute that] provides that ‘[a]ny person who . . . wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child are likely to be impaired . . . shall be guilty of a class C felony . . . .’ ‘‘The ‘act prong’ refers to the language . . . that provides: ‘or does any act likely to impair the health o 2021See State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138 , 147-48, 869 A.2d 192 (2005). ‘‘The ‘situation prong’ refers to the language in [the statute that] provides that ‘[a]ny person who . . . wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child are likely to be impaired . . . shall be guilty of a class C felony . . . .’ ‘‘The ‘act prong’ refers to the language . . . that provides: ‘or does any act likely to impair the health o | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Branham green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Hill
green
2 sentences2011“In making this determination, every reasonable presumption must be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hill, 256 Conn. 412, 425-26 , 773 A.2d 931 (2001). 7 Further, we note that the state charged the defendant with violating the “ ‘situation’ ” prong of § 53-21. 2011“In making this determination, every reasonable presumption must be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hill, 256 Conn. 412, 425-26 , 773 A.2d 931 (2001). 7 Further, we note that the state charged the defendant with violating the “ ‘situation’ ” prong of § 53-21. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Branham
green
2 sentences2011Thus, “a defendant who knowingly fails to provide for the protection of a child when that child is under [his or her] care . . . creates a situation that endangers the physical well-being of the child and, thus, [such failure] falls with the ambit of [§ 53-21 (a)].” State v. Branham, 56 Conn. App. 395, 402 , 743 A.2d 635 , cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937 , 747 A.2d 3 (2000); see also State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155, 173 , 891 A.2d 897 (“[I]t is not necessary, to support a conviction under § 53-21, that the [accused] be aware that his conduct is likely to impact a child younger than the age of si 2011Thus, “a defendant who knowingly fails to provide for the protection of a child when that child is under [his or her] care . . . creates a situation that endangers the physical well-being of the child and, thus, [such failure] falls with the ambit of [§ 53-21 (a)].” State v. Branham, 56 Conn. App. 395, 402 , 743 A.2d 635 , cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937 , 747 A.2d 3 (2000); see also State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155, 173 , 891 A.2d 897 (“[I]t is not necessary, to support a conviction under § 53-21, that the [accused] be aware that his conduct is likely to impact a child younger than the age of si | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Davila
green
2 sentences2011See State v. Na’im B., supra, 288 Conn. 292 -94 (defendant did not take child with third degree burns to hospital); State v. Sorabella, supra, 277 Conn. 163 -67 (defendant attempted to engage fictitious thirteen year old girl in sexual activities); State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 158-59 , 869 A.2d 192 (2005) (defendant allowed children to have access to marijuana); State v. Davila, 75 Conn. App. 432, 435 , 816 A.2d 673 (defendant fired gun into home wherein children were located), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 909 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 897 , 125 S. Ct. 92 , 160 L. 2011See State v. Na’im B., supra, 288 Conn. 292 -94 (defendant did not take child with third degree burns to hospital); State v. Sorabella, supra, 277 Conn. 163 -67 (defendant attempted to engage fictitious thirteen year old girl in sexual activities); State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 158-59 , 869 A.2d 192 (2005) (defendant allowed children to have access to marijuana); State v. Davila, 75 Conn. App. 432, 435 , 816 A.2d 673 (defendant fired gun into home wherein children were located), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 909 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 897 , 125 S. Ct. 92 , 160 L. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Davila
green
2 sentences2011See State v. Na’im B., supra, 288 Conn. 292 -94 (defendant did not take child with third degree burns to hospital); State v. Sorabella, supra, 277 Conn. 163 -67 (defendant attempted to engage fictitious thirteen year old girl in sexual activities); State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 158-59 , 869 A.2d 192 (2005) (defendant allowed children to have access to marijuana); State v. Davila, 75 Conn. App. 432, 435 , 816 A.2d 673 (defendant fired gun into home wherein children were located), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 909 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 897 , 125 S. Ct. 92 , 160 L. 2011See State v. Na’im B., supra, 288 Conn. 292 -94 (defendant did not take child with third degree burns to hospital); State v. Sorabella, supra, 277 Conn. 163 -67 (defendant attempted to engage fictitious thirteen year old girl in sexual activities); State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 158-59 , 869 A.2d 192 (2005) (defendant allowed children to have access to marijuana); State v. Davila, 75 Conn. App. 432, 435 , 816 A.2d 673 (defendant fired gun into home wherein children were located), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 909 , 826 A.2d 180 (2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 897 , 125 S. Ct. 92 , 160 L. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Clements v. Crosby, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Davila v. Connecticut neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Apostle red | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Winot green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Winot green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Blake green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Miranda green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Miranda green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Blake green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Kyles green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Miranda v. Connecticut green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Tucker neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Tirado neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Erzen green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Tucker neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Tirado green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Anderson red | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Dennis yellow | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.