one satisfaction rule in Texas

2026Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 390 (Tex. 2000); see also TMRJ Holdings, Inc. v. Inhance Techs., LLC, 540 S.W.3d 202, 208 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (“Under the one- satisfaction rule, a plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery for any damages suffered because of a particular injury.”).

2025See Crown Life Ins. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 390 (Tex. 2000) (“Under the one satisfaction rule, a plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery for any damages suffered.”); see also Stewart Title Guar.

2026Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1991) (“The one satisfaction rule applies to prevent a plaintiff from obtaining more than one recovery for the same injury.”).

2025Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1991) (“The one satisfaction rule applies to 20 prevent a plaintiff from obtaining more than one recovery for the same injury.”).

2023“Under the one-satisfaction rule, a plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery for any damages suffered because of a particular injury.” Utts v. Short, 81 S.W.3d 822, 831 (Tex. 2002); accord Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. 2006).

2022Texas follows the one- satisfaction rule, so when the plaintiff sues the defendant under multiple theories of liability, the plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery for the damages caused by a particular injury. 22 When a trial court grants a default judgment on an unliquidated claim, “all allegations of fact set forth in the petition are deemed admitted, except the amount of damages.” 23 So the “default judgment admits that the defendant’s conduct caused the event upon which the plaintiff’s suit is based.” 24 Damages are considered unliquidated when they are not proven by an instrument in

2024“Under the one- satisfaction rule, a plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery for any damages suffered because of a particular injury.” Utts v. Short, 81 S.W.3d 822, 831 (Tex. 2002) (citation omitted).

2023The Texas Supreme Court noted that this “is a proper time and method to raise the one-satisfaction rule.” Id.; see also Utts, 81 S.W.3d at 830 (holding that nonsettling defendant properly raised settlement-credit issue in response to plaintiff’s motion for judgment).

2023Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 390 ; see El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Berryman, 858 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam) (“The one satisfaction rule provides that a party which suffers but one injury can recover only one satisfaction for damages arising 7 from that injury.”).

2023See El Paso Natural Gas Co., 858 S.W.2d at 363 (“Because we find Berryman’s claims barred by the one satisfaction rule and collateral estoppel, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the [summary] judgment of the trial court.”).

2026“Under the one satisfaction rule, a plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery for any damages suffered.” Sky View at Las Palmas, LLC v. Mendez, 555 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Crown Life Ins.

2025See Mendez, 555 S.W.3d at 106–07 (“Under the one satisfaction rule, a plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery for any damages suffered.” (quoting Crown Life Ins.

2020Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 390 (Tex. 2000) (op. on reh’g); see Waite Hill Servs., Inc. v. World Class Metal Works, Inc., 959 S.W.2d 182 , 184 Appellants acknowledge that the trial court applied the one-satisfaction rule 99 when damages compensated Maxus for the same injury against the same defendant. 123 (Tex. 1998) (“A double recovery exists when a plaintiff obtains more than one recovery for the same injury.”).

2016Cf. Waite Hill Servs. v. World Class Metal 38 Works, Inc., 959 S.W.2d 182, 184-85 (Tex. 1998) (holding that when technically differing acts cause the same injury, the one satisfaction rule prohibits the plaintiff from recovering the same damages twice).

2018There being but one injury, there can, in justice, be but one satisfaction for that injury. 126 Tex. 99 , 84 S.W.2d 703 , 705 (1935), overruled in part by Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. , 665 S.W.2d 414 , 432 (Tex. 1984). 7 In Stewart Title , we clarified that the fundamental consideration in applying the one-satisfaction rule is whether the plaintiff has suffered a single, indivisible injury-not the causes of action the plaintiff asserts: "There can be but one recovery for one injury, and the fact that more than one defendant may have caused the injury or that there may be more than one theory

2018There being but one injury, there can, in justice, be but one satisfaction for that injury. 126 Tex. 99 , 84 S.W.2d 703 , 705 (1935), overruled in part by Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. , 665 S.W.2d 414 , 432 (Tex. 1984). 7 In Stewart Title , we clarified that the fundamental consideration in applying the one-satisfaction rule is whether the plaintiff has suffered a single, indivisible injury-not the causes of action the plaintiff asserts: "There can be but one recovery for one injury, and the fact that more than one defendant may have caused the injury or that there may be more than one theory

2015Co. v. American Permanent Ware Co., 201 S.W.3d 301, 314-15 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)(“the absence of tort liability does not preclude the application of the one-satisfaction rule”); AMX Enterps., Inc. v. Bank One, N.A., 196 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (“Whether the [one-satisfaction] rule applies is determined not by the cause of action asserted but by the injury sustained”); Cunningham v. Haroona, 382 S.W.3d 492, 512-13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (“Whether the [one-satisfaction] rule applies is determined not by the cause of action bu

2011Buccaneer Homes of Alabama, Inc. v. Pelis, 43 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). “[T]he absence of tort liability does not preclude the application of the one satisfaction rule.” AMX Enters., 196 S.W.3d at 206 .

2022See Casteel, 55 S.W.3d at 391-92 (requiring a showing of an allocation between joint and separate damages); Ellender, 968 S.W.2d at 928 (requiring a showing of an allocation between actual and punitive damages); First Title, 860 S.W.2d at 79 (applying the one-satisfaction rule when the plaintiff did not show it settled for a separate injury).

2020Under the common law’s one-satisfaction rule, “a defendant seeking a settlement credit has the burden of proving its right to such a credit.” Ellender, 968 S.W.2d at 927 .

2015We find that focus to be misplaced and 32 MHDocs 6062453_7 12690.2 decline to follow those decisions.… If we were to hold that, due to the indivisible nature of the resulting injury, breach of contract defendants and tort defendants are jointly and severally liable for all damages, we would be forced to hold a person not a party to a contract liable for the breach of that contract. ( 164 S.W.3d at 684-85 ; emphasis added).

2015To the contrary, this Court in CTTI explained the burden shifting procedure that occurs for credits under the one-satisfaction rule to mean “Where there are at least some damages for which there could be joint and several liability,” the burden 11 895484.2 402/122 shifts to the Plaintiff to establish an allocation of damages applicable solely to the settling parties.4 164 S.W.3d 675, at 685, n.3 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.).

2017In using a determination of whether the injury is indivisible as the basis for application of the rule, Galle and several other cases have applied the one-satisfaction rule without addressing or requiring joint and several liability. 7 See Matthews v. Sohn, No. 13-12-00302-CV, 2013 WL 2949562 , at *5 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Allan v. Nersesova, 307 S.W.3d 564, 574 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.); Galle, 262 S.W.3d at 573-74 ; Osborne, 252 S.W.3d at 75, 78 ; Burke v. Union Pac.

2017Specifically, in Galle, we stated, “In cases where [the statutory scheme for application of the one-satisfaction rule in tort cases] or another settlement credit scheme does not apply, the ‘one-satisfaction’ rule may require a trial court to reduce a damage recovery based on a settlement.” 262 S.W.3d at 573 .

2020According to the court, “the common law requires only that the record show, in the settlement agreement or otherwise, the settlement credit amount.” Id. (citing First Title Co. v. Garrett, 860 S.W.2d 74, 78-79 (Tex. 1993), which explained that under the common law, a defendant is entitled to seek a settlement credit under the one- satisfaction rule).

2020According to the court, “the common law requires only that the record show, in the settlement agreement or otherwise, the settlement credit amount.” Id. (citing First Title Co. v. Garrett, 860 S.W.2d 74, 78-79 (Tex. 1993), which explained - 57 - 04-18-00118-CV that under the common law, a defendant is entitled to seek a settlement credit under the one- satisfaction rule).

2017In using a determination of whether the injury is indivisible as the basis for application of the rule, Galle and several other cases have applied the one-satisfaction rule without addressing or requiring joint and several liability. 7 See Matthews v. Sohn, No. 13-12-00302-CV, 2013 WL 2949562 , at *5 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Allan v. Nersesova, 307 S.W.3d 564, 574 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.); Galle, 262 S.W.3d at 573-74 ; Osborne, 252 S.W.3d at 75, 78 ; Burke v. Union Pac.

2015As this Court has recognized, the one-satisfaction rule “is not limited to tort claims, and whether the rule may be applied depends not on the cause of action asserted but rather the injury sustained.” Osborne v. Jauregui, Inc., 252 S.W.3d 70, 75 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (en banc).

2021See In re Xerox Corp., 555 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (explaining that “chapter 33’s proportionate-responsibility scheme . . . incorporates the one-satisfaction rule”); Virlar v. Puente, 613 S.W.3d 652 , 685–86 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. filed).

2020See In re Xerox Corp., 555 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (explaining that “chapter 33’s proportionate-responsibility scheme . . . incorporates the one- satisfaction rule”); see also TEX.

2015See Osborne, 252 S.W.3d at 76 - 77 (holding plaintiffs could not recover attorneys’ fees from nonsettling defendant when application of one-satisfaction rule barred plaintiffs’ damage recovery against the nonsettling defendant); Buccaneer Homes, 43 S.W.3d at 590-91 (applying one-satisfaction rule, reversing and rendering judgment in nonsettling defendant’s favor, and holding that because the one-satisfaction rule prevented the plaintiff’s recovery against the nonsettling defendant on the liability theory, attorney fee award also could not stand).

2013The one satisfaction rule applies when “there is only one injury, even if it is based on several overlapping and varied theories of liability.” Buccaneer Homes of Ala. v. Pelis, 43 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); see Galle, Inc., 262 S.W.3d at 573 (noting that “if the plaintiff has suffered only one injury, even if based on ‘overlapping and varied theories of liability,’ the plaintiff may only recover once”); Nowak, 248 S.W.3d at 741 (“Whether the [one satisfaction] rule applies is determined not by the cause of action, but by the injury.”); Cohen, 106 S.W.3d at

2018Martinez relies heavily on both our Casteel decision and on GE Capital Commercial, Inc. v. Worthington National Bank , 754 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2014), a case in which the Fifth Circuit made an Eerie guess as to whether this Court would apply the one-satisfaction rule to contract claims and without joint liability.

2018Id. at 308 ("In sum, the one-satisfaction rule emerges in Texas Supreme Court jurisprudence as a tort law contribution doctrine, and its application has generally been limited to cases in which a plaintiff settles with an alleged joint tortfeasor.").

2017In using a determination of whether the injury is indivisible as the basis for application of the rule, Galle and several other cases have applied the one-satisfaction rule without addressing or requiring joint and several liability. 7 See Matthews v. Sohn, No. 13-12-00302-CV, 2013 WL 2949562 , at *5 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Allan v. Nersesova, 307 S.W.3d 564, 574 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.); Galle, 262 S.W.3d at 573-74 ; Osborne, 252 S.W.3d at 75, 78 ; Burke v. Union Pac.

2015Kizer v. Meyer, Lytton, Alen & Whit-Aker, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 384, 392, n.3 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007) (“some or all of his potential recovery on a breach of contract claim in a later district court lawsuit might well be barred due to the application of the one-satisfaction rule which prohibits more than one recovery for a given harm”) (emphasis added); Allan v. Nersesova, 307 S.W.3d 564, 574 (Tex.App.— Dallas 2010, no pet.) (“The one-satisfaction rule prohibits a plaintiff from recovering twice for a single injury . . .

2010Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 391 (Tex.2000); Garrett, 860 S.W.2d at 78 ; Paschall v. Peevey, 813 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).

2010Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 391 (Tex.2000); Garrett, 860 S.W.2d at 78 ; Paschall v. Peevey, 813 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).

2023In an effort to avoid this result, Nalle, citing Cohen v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 106 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.), argues the one satisfaction rule is inapplicable because it does not apply to claims for punitive or exemplary damages.

2015Applicable Law “The one satisfaction rule prohibits a plaintiff from recovering twice for a single injury.” Cohen v. Arthur Anderson, L.L.P., 106 S.W.3d 304 , 308 14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (citing Crown Life Ins.

2012See generally Allan, 307 S.W.3d at 574 (“The one-satisfaction rule prohibits a plaintiff from recovering twice for a single injury.”) (citing Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 390 ; and Va- nasek, 50 S.W.3d at 10 ).

2012See generally Allan , 307 S.W.3d at 574 (“The one-satisfaction rule prohibits a plaintiff from recovering twice for a single injury.”) (citing Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 390 ; and Vanasek , 50 S.W.3d at 10 ).

2026“When a defendant’s acts result in a single injury, and the jury returns favorable findings on more than one theory of liability, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the theory affording him the greatest relief.” Saden v. Smith, 415 S.W.3d 450 , 465–66 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (citing Birchfield v. Texarkana Mem’l Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tex. 1987)).

2016“Where the trial court fails to do so, the appellate court will reform the trial court’s judgment to effect such an election.” Star Houston, 886 S.W.2d at 423 ; see also Saden, 415 S.W.3d at 469 (“Ordinarily [upon finding a violation of the one-satisfaction rule] we would reform the judgment to effect an election of the remedy that affords the prevailing party the greatest relief.”).

2018II, Inc. , 176 S.W.3d 307 , 327 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) ("[T]he absence of tort liability does not preclude the application of the one satisfaction rule.").

2018II, Inc., 176 S.W.3d 307, 327 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (“[T]he absence of tort liability does not preclude the application of the one satisfaction rule.”).

2026“The one satisfaction rule may limit a plaintiff’s recovery even where the amounts awarded vary from claim to claim.” Lundy v. Masson, 260 S.W.3d 482, 506 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).

2022“The one satisfaction rule may limit a plaintiff’s recovery even where the amounts awarded vary from claim to claim.” Lundy v. Masson, 260 S.W.3d 482, 506 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).

2022Such a recovery is prohibited by the one- satisfaction rule, under which “a claimant is entitled to only one recovery for any damages suffered.” Nat’l City Bank of Indiana v. Ortiz, 401 S.W.3d 867, 887 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied); see also Mundheim v. Lepp, No. 05- 19-01490-CV, 2021 WL 1921122 , at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 13, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“The prohibition against double recovery is a corollary of the rule that a party is entitled to but one satisfaction for the injuries sustained by him.”).

2015See Ortiz, 401 S.W.3d at 888 (holding defendant was not required to “object to the submission of more than one acceptable measure of his damages” or “request a limiting instruction” as a prerequisite to application of the one- satisfaction rule).

2020CODE ANN. § 33.012; see Dalworth Restoration, Inc. v. Rife- Marshall, 433 S.W.3d 773, 787 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (“the jury’s 7 Duffey also cites to pre-Mendez caselaw stating that the one-satisfaction rule only applies when there is a finding of joint and several liability.

2015See Ellender, 938 S.W.2d at 927-28 (applying rule to Chapter 33 analysis); see also Utts, 81 S.W.3d at 832 ; Dalworth Restoration, 433 S.W.3d at 781 (“[S]ection 33.012(b) ‘upholds’ the common-law’s one-satisfaction rule.”). 16 duty, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and Espinosa alleged that these parties were jointly and severally liable for $77 million, which included the return of all commissions paid by RV to Poe and the other Licensees. [CR 613, 615, 617, 640, 681, 685, 687-91] Espinosa alleged in part as follows: The Conspiring Defendants – as identified below, and which

2020“The one-satisfaction rule applies both when several defendants commit the same act and when multiple defendants commit technically different acts that result in the same, single injury.” Elness Swenson Graham, 520 S.W.3d at 163 ; see Mendez, 555 S.W.3d at 110 (“our precedent makes clear that the causes of action pled are not the proper inquiry in applying the one- satisfaction rule”).

2019See Elness Swenson Graham Architects, 520 S.W.3d at 162 (concluding that the one-satisfaction rule can apply to both tort and breach-of-contract claims). 8 Applying the one-satisfaction rule would allow the Salinases to recover for breach of contract or unconscionable conduct but not both; recovering for both breach of contract and unconscionable conduct in this case would be allowing a double recovery, which is exactly what the one-satisfaction rule is designed to prevent.

2018There being but one injury, there can, in justice, be but one satisfaction for that injury. 126 Tex. 99 , 84 S.W.2d 703 , 705 (1935), overruled in part by Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. , 665 S.W.2d 414 , 432 (Tex. 1984). 7 In Stewart Title , we clarified that the fundamental consideration in applying the one-satisfaction rule is whether the plaintiff has suffered a single, indivisible injury-not the causes of action the plaintiff asserts: "There can be but one recovery for one injury, and the fact that more than one defendant may have caused the injury or that there may be more than one theory

2018There being but one injury, there can, in justice, be but one satisfaction for that injury. 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. 1935), overruled in part by Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 432 (Tex. 1984).7 In Stewart Title, we clarified that the fundamental consideration in applying the one-satisfaction rule is whether the plaintiff has suffered a single, indivisible injury—not the causes of action the plaintiff asserts: “There can be but one recovery for one injury, and the fact that more than one defendant may have caused the injury or that there may be more than one theory of liability,

2003The children also rely on Vanasek v. Underkofler, 50 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. App-Dallas 1999), aff'd in part rev’d in part Underkofler v. Vanasek, 53 S.W.3d 343, 346 (Tex.2001), to support their contention that the one satisfaction rule is not a ground upon which to grant a motion for summary judgment.

2003The children also rely on Vanasek v. Underkofler , 50 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. App—Dallas 1999, aff’d in part rev’d in part Underkofler v. Vanasek , 53 S.W.3d 343, 346 (Tex. 2001), to support their contention that the one satisfaction rule is not a ground upon which to grant a motion for summary judgment.

2011The prohibition against double recovery is a corollary to the one satisfaction rule, Foley, 68 S.W.3d at 883 , which provides that a plaintiff may recover only for the damages suffered as a result of a particular injury.

2011The prohibition against double recovery is a corollary to the one satisfaction rule, Foley, 68 S.W.3d at 883 , which provides that a plaintiff may recover only for the damages suffered as a result of a particular injury.