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26 California opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jacobs v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1969There this court reviewed the effect of the filing of the affidavit of prejudice, and pointed out and marshalled the precedents for the principle that “. . . since the motion for disqualification under section 170.6 ‘must be made before *463 the trial has commenced, it cannot be entertained as to subsequent hearings which are a part or a continuation of the original proceedings.’ (Jacobs v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 187 , 190 ... [other citations omitted].)” ( 239 Cal.App.2d at p. 294 .) See also Schonberg v. Perry (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 436, 438 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 579 ]; and cf. Oksner v. Su 1966(Lewis v. Linn, supra, 209 Cal.App.2d 394, 399-400 .) However, since the motion for disqualification under section 170.6 “must be made before the trial has commenced, it cannot be entertained as to subsequent hearings which are a part or a continuation of the original proceedings.” (Jacobs v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 187, 190 [ 347 P.2d 9 ]; McClenny v. Superior Court, supra, 60 Cal.2d 677, 680-681 ; People v. Paramount Citrus Assn. (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 505, 511-512 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 216 ] ; Dennis v. Overholtzer (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 110, 111-112 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 458 ]; Stafford v. Russell ( | 2 | 4 |
Le Louis v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1997(See Taylor v. Hayes (1974) 418 U.S. 488, 501 [ 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-2705 , 41 L.Ed.2d 897 ]; Say & Say, Inc. v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1759, 1764 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 ]; see also Pacific etc. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72, 84 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 44 ] [judge may not properly try case where he formed partisan opinions from outside sources]; cf. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531-532 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 260 , 526 P.2d 268 ] [disapproved on other grounds in Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 1 1997(See Taylor v. Hayes (1974) 418 U.S. 488, 501 [ 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-2705 , 41 L.Ed.2d 897 ]; Say & Say, Inc. v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1759, 1764 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 ]; see also Pacific etc. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72, 84 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 44 ] [judge may not properly try case where he formed partisan opinions from outside sources]; cf. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531-532 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 260 , 526 P.2d 268 ] [disapproved on other grounds in Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 1 | 2 | 2 |
Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualificationsgreen2 sentences1997(See Taylor v. Hayes (1974) 418 U.S. 488, 501 [ 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-2705 , 41 L.Ed.2d 897 ]; Say & Say, Inc. v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1759, 1764 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 ]; see also Pacific etc. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72, 84 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 44 ] [judge may not properly try case where he formed partisan opinions from outside sources]; cf. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531-532 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 260 , 526 P.2d 268 ] [disapproved on other grounds in Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 1 1997(See Taylor v. Hayes (1974) 418 U.S. 488, 501 [ 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-2705 , 41 L.Ed.2d 897 ]; Say & Say, Inc. v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1759, 1764 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 ]; see also Pacific etc. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72, 84 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 44 ] [judge may not properly try case where he formed partisan opinions from outside sources]; cf. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531-532 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 260 , 526 P.2d 268 ] [disapproved on other grounds in Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 1 | 2 | 2 |
Say & Say, Inc. v. Ebershoffgreen2 sentences1997(See Taylor v. Hayes (1974) 418 U.S. 488, 501 [ 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-2705 , 41 L.Ed.2d 897 ]; Say & Say, Inc. v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1759, 1764 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 ]; see also Pacific etc. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72, 84 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 44 ] [judge may not properly try case where he formed partisan opinions from outside sources]; cf. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531-532 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 260 , 526 P.2d 268 ] [disapproved on other grounds in Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 1 1997(See Taylor v. Hayes (1974) 418 U.S. 488, 501 [ 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-2705 , 41 L.Ed.2d 897 ]; Say & Say, Inc. v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1759, 1764 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 ]; see also Pacific etc. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72, 84 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 44 ] [judge may not properly try case where he formed partisan opinions from outside sources]; cf. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531-532 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 260 , 526 P.2d 268 ] [disapproved on other grounds in Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 1 | 2 | 2 |
Pac. & Sw. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church v. Superior Court of San Diego Cty.green2 sentences1997(See Taylor v. Hayes (1974) 418 U.S. 488, 501 [ 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-2705 , 41 L.Ed.2d 897 ]; Say & Say, Inc. v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1759, 1764 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 ]; see also Pacific etc. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72, 84 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 44 ] [judge may not properly try case where he formed partisan opinions from outside sources]; cf. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531-532 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 260 , 526 P.2d 268 ] [disapproved on other grounds in Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 1 1997(See Taylor v. Hayes (1974) 418 U.S. 488, 501 [ 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-2705 , 41 L.Ed.2d 897 ]; Say & Say, Inc. v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1759, 1764 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 ]; see also Pacific etc. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72, 84 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 44 ] [judge may not properly try case where he formed partisan opinions from outside sources]; cf. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531-532 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 260 , 526 P.2d 268 ] [disapproved on other grounds in Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 1 | 2 | 2 |
Taylor v. Hayesgreen2 sentences1997(See Taylor v. Hayes (1974) 418 U.S. 488, 501 [ 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-2705 , 41 L.Ed.2d 897 ]; Say & Say, Inc. v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1759, 1764 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 ]; see also Pacific etc. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72, 84 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 44 ] [judge may not properly try case where he formed partisan opinions from outside sources]; cf. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531-532 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 260 , 526 P.2d 268 ] [disapproved on other grounds in Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 1 1997(See Taylor v. Hayes (1974) 418 U.S. 488, 501 [ 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-2705 , 41 L.Ed.2d 897 ]; Say & Say, Inc. v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1759, 1764 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 ]; see also Pacific etc. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72, 84 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 44 ] [judge may not properly try case where he formed partisan opinions from outside sources]; cf. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531-532 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 260 , 526 P.2d 268 ] [disapproved on other grounds in Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 1 | 2 | 2 |
McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualificationsred2 sentences1997(See Taylor v. Hayes (1974) 418 U.S. 488, 501 [ 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-2705 , 41 L.Ed.2d 897 ]; Say & Say, Inc. v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1759, 1764 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 ]; see also Pacific etc. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72, 84 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 44 ] [judge may not properly try case where he formed partisan opinions from outside sources]; cf. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531-532 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 260 , 526 P.2d 268 ] [disapproved on other grounds in Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 1 1997(See Taylor v. Hayes (1974) 418 U.S. 488, 501 [ 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-2705 , 41 L.Ed.2d 897 ]; Say & Say, Inc. v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1759, 1764 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 ]; see also Pacific etc. Conference of United Methodist Church v. Court (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 72, 84 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 44 ] [judge may not properly try case where he formed partisan opinions from outside sources]; cf. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531-532 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 260 , 526 P.2d 268 ] [disapproved on other grounds in Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 1 | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Superior Court of Nevada Countygreen2 sentences2019"As a general rule, a motion for disqualification under section 170.6 is allowed any time before the commencement of the trial or hearing." ( Maas , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 978 , 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 , 383 P.3d 637 .) "Subdivision (2) of section 170.6, however, establishes three exceptions to the general rule, namely, the '10-day/5-day' rule, [ 2 ] the 'master calendar' rule, [ 3 ] and the 'all purpose assignment' rule." ( People v. Superior Court ( Lavi ) (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164 , 1171, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 815 , 847 P.2d 1031 ( Lavi ).) These provisions impose shorter deadlines on a party bringing a 2019"As a general rule, a motion for disqualification under section 170.6 is allowed any time before the commencement of the trial or hearing." ( Maas , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 978 , 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 , 383 P.3d 637 .) "Subdivision (2) of section 170.6, however, establishes three exceptions to the general rule, namely, the '10-day/5-day' rule, [ 2 ] the 'master calendar' rule, [ 3 ] and the 'all purpose assignment' rule." ( People v. Superior Court ( Lavi ) (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164 , 1171, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 815 , 847 P.2d 1031 ( Lavi ).) These provisions impose shorter deadlines on a party bringing a | 1 | 2 |
People v. Superior Court (Lavi)green2 sentences2019"As a general rule, a motion for disqualification under section 170.6 is allowed any time before the commencement of the trial or hearing." ( Maas , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 978 , 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 , 383 P.3d 637 .) "Subdivision (2) of section 170.6, however, establishes three exceptions to the general rule, namely, the '10-day/5-day' rule, [ 2 ] the 'master calendar' rule, [ 3 ] and the 'all purpose assignment' rule." ( People v. Superior Court ( Lavi ) (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164 , 1171, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 815 , 847 P.2d 1031 ( Lavi ).) These provisions impose shorter deadlines on a party bringing a 2019"As a general rule, a motion for disqualification under section 170.6 is allowed any time before the commencement of the trial or hearing." ( Maas , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 978 , 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 , 383 P.3d 637 .) "Subdivision (2) of section 170.6, however, establishes three exceptions to the general rule, namely, the '10-day/5-day' rule, [ 2 ] the 'master calendar' rule, [ 3 ] and the 'all purpose assignment' rule." ( People v. Superior Court ( Lavi ) (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164 , 1171, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 815 , 847 P.2d 1031 ( Lavi ).) These provisions impose shorter deadlines on a party bringing a | 1 | 2 |
Solberg v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016Because I conclude the Supreme Court’s opinion in Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 460 , 561 P.2d 1148 ] (Solberg) resolves the issues raised here, I join Justice O’Leary’s opinion that Solberg compels us to grant the petition by the People of the State of California (petitioner) for a peremptory writ of mandate directing respondent Superior Court of Orange County (respondent court) to vacate its order denying petitioner’s disqualification motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. 1 Respondent court denied petitioner’s section 170.6 motion because it con 2016Because I conclude the Supreme Court’s opinion in Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 460 , 561 P.2d 1148 ] (Solberg) resolves the issues raised here, I join Justice O’Leary’s opinion that Solberg compels us to grant the petition by the People of the State of California (petitioner) for a peremptory writ of mandate directing respondent Superior Court of Orange County (respondent court) to vacate its order denying petitioner’s disqualification motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. 1 Respondent court denied petitioner’s section 170.6 motion because it con | 1 | 2 |
People v. Giffordgreen1 sentence2025Proc., § 170.6 disqualification affidavit, because, “[t]he summary revocation of probation . . . did not involve a determination of disputed facts; it was instead a finding that there was probable cause to support revocation. [Citations.] The merits of the revocation petition were to be determined at [a subsequent] hearing”]; People v. Gifford (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 89, 91 [“The two-stage hearings required under Morrissey and Vickers are designed to insure that a person who has been granted conditional release from a penal institution shall not be deprived of that liberty without a hearing and t | 1 | 1 |
Swift v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA CTY.green2 sentences2016(Swift v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 878, 883 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 504 ].) Although a section 170.6 motion is often referred to as an “automatic” disqualification motion because a court may not inquire into the basis for alleged prejudice, a court presented with such a motion retains authority to determine whether it is “duly presented.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(4); Frisk v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 402, 410 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 602 ]; see also Jacobs v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 187, 190 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 9 , 347 P.2d 9 ] [assessing whether challenge timely].) One circumstance i 2016(Swift v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 878, 883 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 504 ].) Although a section 170.6 motion is often referred to as an “automatic” disqualification motion because a court may not inquire into the basis for alleged prejudice, a court presented with such a motion retains authority to determine whether it is “duly presented.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(4); Frisk v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 402, 410 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 602 ]; see also Jacobs v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 187, 190 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 9 , 347 P.2d 9 ] [assessing whether challenge timely].) One circumstance i | 1 | 1 |
Fight for the Rams v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016(See, e.g., Fight for the Rams v. Superior Court (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 953, 958 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 ] [plaintiffs’ failure to challenge the assigned judge before the hearing and rulings on the demurrer and other defense motions did not preclude them from making a post-hearing motion to disqualify].) The various decisions cited by the Attorney General hold only that a party is permitted to move for disqualification under section 170.6 subsequent to certain pretrial hearings, however. 2016(See, e.g., Fight for the Rams v. Superior Court (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 953, 958 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 ] [plaintiffs’ failure to challenge the assigned judge before the hearing and rulings on the demurrer and other defense motions did not preclude them from making a post-hearing motion to disqualify].) The various decisions cited by the Attorney General hold only that a party is permitted to move for disqualification under section 170.6 subsequent to certain pretrial hearings, however. | 1 | 1 |
Frisk v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016(Swift v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 878, 883 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 504 ].) Although a section 170.6 motion is often referred to as an “automatic” disqualification motion because a court may not inquire into the basis for alleged prejudice, a court presented with such a motion retains authority to determine whether it is “duly presented.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(4); Frisk v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 402, 410 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 602 ]; see also Jacobs v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 187, 190 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 9 , 347 P.2d 9 ] [assessing whether challenge timely].) One circumstance i 2016(Swift v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 878, 883 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 504 ].) Although a section 170.6 motion is often referred to as an “automatic” disqualification motion because a court may not inquire into the basis for alleged prejudice, a court presented with such a motion retains authority to determine whether it is “duly presented.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(4); Frisk v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 402, 410 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 602 ]; see also Jacobs v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 187, 190 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 9 , 347 P.2d 9 ] [assessing whether challenge timely].) One circumstance i | 1 | 1 |
National Financial Lending, LLC v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2015(See e.g., National Financial Lending, LLC v. Superior Court (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 262, 270 [section 170.6 disqualification affidavit must be filed within 15 days of civil assignment to all purpose trial judge or before judge rules on a contested fact].) Judge O'Neill ruled on a motion to set aside a default, a demurrer, a motion to strike, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, discovery motions, and a motion to continue trial before appellant filed the section 170.6 peremptory challenge. | 1 | 1 |
Schoenberg v. Romike Propertiesgreen2 sentences2013(Johnson, at p. 697.) Twenty years later in Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 460 , 561 P.2d 1148 ] (Solberg), the court reaffirmed the rule that a party seeking disqualification under section 170.6 need neither prove nor even allege the cause of his or her belief of judicial prejudice. ( 19 Cal.3d at p. 187 .) Section 170.6 requires the party or attorney submitting the peremptory challenge to file not only an affidavit of prejudice but also an oral or written motion “made to the assigned judge or to the presiding judge.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2); see Schoenberg v. R 2013(Johnson, at p. 697.) Twenty years later in Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 460 , 561 P.2d 1148 ] (Solberg), the court reaffirmed the rule that a party seeking disqualification under section 170.6 need neither prove nor even allege the cause of his or her belief of judicial prejudice. ( 19 Cal.3d at p. 187 .) Section 170.6 requires the party or attorney submitting the peremptory challenge to file not only an affidavit of prejudice but also an oral or written motion “made to the assigned judge or to the presiding judge.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2); see Schoenberg v. R | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jimenezyellow | 1 | 1 |
| Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage District v. Jarvisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oksner v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ball v. City Council of Coachellagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schonberg v. Perrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rojasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mayr v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stafford v. Russellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dennis v. Overholtzergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oak Grove School District v. City Title Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Paramount Citrus Assn.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc.
green
2 sentences2026(Unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) This court invited respondent and real party in interest to respond, and we advised the parties that we were considering issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance pursuant to Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178 . 2026(Unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) This court invited respondent and real party in interest to respond, and we advised the parties that we were considering issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance pursuant to Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178 . | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Maas v. Superior Court of San Diego County
green
2 sentences2019"As a general rule, a motion for disqualification under section 170.6 is allowed any time before the commencement of the trial or hearing." ( Maas , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 978 , 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 , 383 P.3d 637 .) "Subdivision (2) of section 170.6, however, establishes three exceptions to the general rule, namely, the '10-day/5-day' rule, [ 2 ] the 'master calendar' rule, [ 3 ] and the 'all purpose assignment' rule." ( People v. Superior Court ( Lavi ) (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164 , 1171, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 815 , 847 P.2d 1031 ( Lavi ).) These provisions impose shorter deadlines on a party bringing a 2019"As a general rule, a motion for disqualification under section 170.6 is allowed any time before the commencement of the trial or hearing." ( Maas , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 978 , 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 , 383 P.3d 637 .) "Subdivision (2) of section 170.6, however, establishes three exceptions to the general rule, namely, the '10-day/5-day' rule, [ 2 ] the 'master calendar' rule, [ 3 ] and the 'all purpose assignment' rule." ( People v. Superior Court ( Lavi ) (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164 , 1171, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 815 , 847 P.2d 1031 ( Lavi ).) These provisions impose shorter deadlines on a party bringing a | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Heathman v. Vant
green
2 sentences1960Thereafter, he was not in a position to assert a claim of disqualification under section 170.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure because that section is limited in its prohibition to a trial or hearing "which involves a contested issue of law or fact." [2] As this court said in Heathman v. Vant, 172 Cal.App.2d 639 , at page 646 [ 343 P.2d 104 ]: "When defendant failed to demur or answer, the court properly entered his default. 1960Thereafter, he was not in a position to assert a claim of disqualification under section 170.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure because that section is limited in its prohibition to a trial or hearing "which involves a contested issue of law or fact." As this court said in Heathman v. Vant, 172 Oal.App. 2d 639, at page 646 [ 343 P.2d 104 ]: "When defendant failed to de~nur or answer, the court properly entered his default. | 2 | 1960–1960 |
People v. Superior Court of Orange County
green
2 sentences2026J.).) In 2016, in Tejeda, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th 892 , after Judge Thomas Goethals found that the Orange County District Attorney’s Office committed misconduct in a high-profile murder case, the district attorney’s office began issuing section 170.6 challenges against him regularly. 2026J.).) In 2016, in Tejeda, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th 892 , after Judge Thomas Goethals found that the Orange County District Attorney’s Office committed misconduct in a high-profile murder case, the district attorney’s office began issuing section 170.6 challenges against him regularly. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In Re Frias
green
1 sentence2025Proc., § 170.6 disqualification affidavit, because, “[t]he summary revocation of probation . . . did not involve a determination of disputed facts; it was instead a finding that there was probable cause to support revocation. [Citations.] The merits of the revocation petition were to be determined at [a subsequent] hearing”]; People v. Gifford (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 89, 91 [“The two-stage hearings required under Morrissey and Vickers are designed to insure that a person who has been granted conditional release from a penal institution shall not be deprived of that liberty without a hearing and t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Anderson
green
1 sentence2025Proc., § 170.6 disqualification affidavit, because, “[t]he summary revocation of probation . . . did not involve a determination of disputed facts; it was instead a finding that there was probable cause to support revocation. [Citations.] The merits of the revocation petition were to be determined at [a subsequent] hearing”]; People v. Gifford (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 89, 91 [“The two-stage hearings required under Morrissey and Vickers are designed to insure that a person who has been granted conditional release from a penal institution shall not be deprived of that liberty without a hearing and t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Mower
green
1 sentence2025Proc., § 170.6 disqualification affidavit, because, “[t]he summary revocation of probation . . . did not involve a determination of disputed facts; it was instead a finding that there was probable cause to support revocation. [Citations.] The merits of the revocation petition were to be determined at [a subsequent] hearing”]; People v. Gifford (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 89, 91 [“The two-stage hearings required under Morrissey and Vickers are designed to insure that a person who has been granted conditional release from a penal institution shall not be deprived of that liberty without a hearing and t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Hurtado
green
1 sentence2025Proc., § 170.6 disqualification affidavit, because, “[t]he summary revocation of probation . . . did not involve a determination of disputed facts; it was instead a finding that there was probable cause to support revocation. [Citations.] The merits of the revocation petition were to be determined at [a subsequent] hearing”]; People v. Gifford (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 89, 91 [“The two-stage hearings required under Morrissey and Vickers are designed to insure that a person who has been granted conditional release from a penal institution shall not be deprived of that liberty without a hearing and t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Peracchi v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2016Various restrictions on the timing of the motion are imposed by this statute, and a party may exercise such a challenge only once during the trial of an action or a special proceeding.” 2 (Peracchi v. Superior Court (2003) 30 *429 Cal.4th 1245, 1248-1249 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 639 , 70 P.3d 1054 ].) A section 170.6 disqualification motion accompanied by an affidavit or declaration alleging such prejudice is alone sufficient, and the motion requires no proof of actual prejudice. 2016Various restrictions on the timing of the motion are imposed by this statute, and a party may exercise such a challenge only once during the trial of an action or a special proceeding.” 2 (Peracchi v. Superior Court (2003) 30 *429 Cal.4th 1245, 1248-1249 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 639 , 70 P.3d 1054 ].) A section 170.6 disqualification motion accompanied by an affidavit or declaration alleging such prejudice is alone sufficient, and the motion requires no proof of actual prejudice. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC
green
1 sentence2015"The mere fact that the trial court issued rulings adverse to [appellant] on several matters in this case, even assuming one or more of those rulings were erroneous, does not indicate an 3 appearance of bias, much less demonstrate actual bias. [Citation.]" (Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665, 674 .) Appellant makes no showing that he was denied due process or that the order denying reconsideration is appealable. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lloyd v. Green
green
2 sentences2014(See Lloyd, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th 216, 219 .) Also not cognizable on appeal is Eliahu’s contention that the May 15, 2013 order is void because the judge who issued the order was disqualified due to the judge’s failure to respond to Eliahu’s statement of disqualification under sections 170.6 and 170.1. 2014(See Lloyd, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th 216, 219 .) Also not cognizable on appeal is Eliahu’s contention that the May 15, 2013 order is void because the judge who issued the order was disqualified due to the judge’s failure to respond to Eliahu’s statement of disqualification under sections 170.6 and 170.1. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Barnes v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2002Proc., § 170.4.) The People’s argument, accordingly, is quite straightforward: because of the peremptory challenge, Judge Pastor lacks power to act further in the case and is, therefore, no longer available to rehear the suppression motion. 2 The same issue arose in Barnes, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 631. 3 Barnes concluded “that a judge who has been disqualified pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 may nevertheless hear a suppression motion under the provisions of Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (p); disqualification pursuant to section 170.6 does not make a judge unavailable t | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Kohn v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1986(Kohn v. Superior Court (1966) 239 *305 Cal.App.2d 428, 431 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 832 ].) In that case, we aptly observed, “It is not enough that a judge make a determination which relates to contested fact issues. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance
green
1 sentence1984In argument to this court, petitioner disputes that premise, citing Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 29 Cal.3d 615, 646 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Kirkpatrick v. Edgar M. green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Andrews v. Joint Clerks Port Labor Relations Committee green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| McClenny v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Lewis v. Linn green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Ingrao v. Karsten green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.