section 13 capital murder conviction in Alabama

2010“As we stated in Woods v. State, 789 So.2d 896 (Ala.Crim.App.1999): “ ‘Although this court has held that the taking of property as a mere afterthought to a murder will not support a capital murder conviction under § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Bufford v. State, 382 So.2d 1162 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 382 So.2d 1175 (Ala.1980), we have not held that the trial court must use the term “mere afterthought” in its jury instructions on robbery-murder.

2010P. “Although this court has held that the taking of property as a mere afterthought to a murder will not support a capital murder conviction under § 13A-5^40(a)(l), Bufford v. State, 382 So.2d 1162 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert, denied, 382 So.2d 1175 (Ala.1980), we have not held that the trial court must use the term ‘mere afterthought’ in the jury instructions on robbery-murder.

2010“As we stated in Woods v. State, 789 So.2d 896 (Ala.Crim.App.1999): “ ‘Although this court has held that the taking of property as a mere afterthought to a murder will not support a capital murder conviction under § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Bufford v. State, 382 So.2d 1162 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 382 So.2d 1175 (Ala.1980), we have not held that the trial court must use the term “mere afterthought” in its jury instructions on robbery-murder.

2010P. “Although this court has held that the taking of property as a mere afterthought to a murder will not support a capital murder conviction under § 13A-5^40(a)(l), Bufford v. State, 382 So.2d 1162 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert, denied, 382 So.2d 1175 (Ala.1980), we have not held that the trial court must use the term ‘mere afterthought’ in the jury instructions on robbery-murder.

2015But see, Pennell v. State, [ 429 So.2d 679 (Ala.Crim.App.1983)] (evidence did not justify a manslaughter instruction [where evidence established there was no provocation recognized by law and, even if there were, there was sufficient time for the accused to cool off]).

1996But see, Pennell v. State , [ 429 So.2d 679 (Ala.Cr.App.)] (evidence did not justify a manslaughter instruction).

2026In support of his position, Justice Shaw cites to Ex parte Hall, 844 So. 2d 571 (Ala. 2002), Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d 532 (Ala. 2003), and Ex parte Wilding, 41 So. 3d 75 (Ala. 2009).

2026In support of his position, Justice Shaw cites to Ex parte Hall, 844 So. 2d 571 (Ala. 2002), Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d 532 (Ala. 2003), and Ex parte Wilding, 41 So. 3d 75 (Ala. 2009).

2026In support of his position, Justice Shaw cites to Ex parte Hall, 844 So. 2d 571 (Ala. 2002), Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d 532 (Ala. 2003), and Ex parte Wilding, 41 So. 3d 75 (Ala. 2009).

2026In support of his position, Justice Shaw cites to Ex parte Hall, 844 So. 2d 571 (Ala. 2002), Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d 532 (Ala. 2003), and Ex parte Wilding, 41 So. 3d 75 (Ala. 2009).

2026In support of his position, Justice Shaw cites to Ex parte Hall, 844 So. 2d 571 (Ala. 2002), Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d 532 (Ala. 2003), and Ex parte Wilding, 41 So. 3d 75 (Ala. 2009).

2026In support of his position, Justice Shaw cites to Ex parte Hall, 844 So. 2d 571 (Ala. 2002), Ex parte Patel, 879 So. 2d 532 (Ala. 2003), and Ex parte Wilding, 41 So. 3d 75 (Ala. 2009).

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2015Thus, the State had to prove an intentional murder, as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and that Katherine was less than 14 years of age at the time she was murdered. " ' "In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' " Ballenger v. State , 720 So.2d 1033 , 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State , 471 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd,

2006The only difference between capital murder under § 13A-5-40(a)(17) and felony murder committed by shooting into an occupied vehicle under § 13A — 6—2(a)(3) and § 13A-ll-61(b) is the element of intent. ‘[Fjelony murder does not require intent to kill; the only intent necessary is the intent to commit the underlying felony.’ George v. State, [717] So.2d [827] (Ala.Cr.App.), rev’d on other grounds, [717] So.2d [844] (Ala.1996). ‘By definition, a murder must be intentional to constitute a capital offense. § 13A-5-40(b).’ D.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571 , 577 (Ala.Cr.App.1994) (citing § 13A-5-40(b),

1997"By definition, a murder must be intentional to constitute a capital offense. § 13A-5-40 (b)." D.D.A. v. State , 650 So.2d 571 , 577 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994) (citing § 13A-5-40 (b), Ala. Code 1975).

2026However, the Court's disposition -- as well as its determination, pursuant to Sisson v. State, 528 So. 2d 1159 (Ala. 1988), that a double-jeopardy analysis under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), is inapplicable to multiple convictions under § 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, see Ex parte Rice, 766 So. 2d at 150 -51 -- is still controlling in this case. 16 CR-2025-0003 concern a double-jeopardy violation.

2026However, the Court's disposition -- as well as its determination, pursuant to Sisson v. State, 528 So. 2d 1159 (Ala. 1988), that a double-jeopardy analysis under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), is inapplicable to multiple convictions under § 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, see Ex parte Rice, 766 So. 2d at 150 -51 -- is still controlling in this case. 16 CR-2025-0003 concern a double-jeopardy violation.

2026However, the Court's disposition -- as well as its determination, pursuant to Sisson v. State, 528 So. 2d 1159 (Ala. 1988), that a double-jeopardy analysis under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), is inapplicable to multiple convictions under § 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, see Ex parte Rice, 766 So. 2d at 150 -51 -- is still controlling in this case. 16 CR-2025-0003 concern a double-jeopardy violation.

2023However, this Court also noted on return to remand that it had instructed the circuit court to reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances "in an abundance of caution." See Shaw, 207 So. 3d at 132 .

2023As the Supreme Court explained, consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance will 8 CR-18-0060 skew the sentencing scheme 'and give rise to constitutional error, only where the jury could not have given aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances under the rubric of some other, valid sentencing factor.' Brown, 546 U.S. at 221." Adopting this reasoning, we hold that, because the same aggravating facts were properly considered to support Dearman's remaining capital- murder conviction under § 13A-5-40(a)(10), Ala. Code 1975, the fact that this Court has ordered four of Dearman'

2014Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 223 , 126 S.Ct. 884 , 163 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006).

2014Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 223 , 126 S.Ct. 884 , 163 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006).

2010The trial court more than adequately instructed the jury that the robbery had to occur ‘during’ the course of the murder.” Woods v. State, 789 So.2d 896, 932-33 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), affirmed, 789 So.2d 941 (Ala.2001), cert, denied, Woods v. Alabama, 534 U.S. 831 , 122 S.Ct. 77 , 151 L.Ed.2d 41 (2001).

2010The trial court more than adequately instructed the jury that the robbery had to occur ‘during’ the course of the murder.” Woods v. State, 789 So.2d 896, 932-33 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), affirmed, 789 So.2d 941 (Ala.2001), cert, denied, Woods v. Alabama, 534 U.S. 831 , 122 S.Ct. 77 , 151 L.Ed.2d 41 (2001).

2010The trial court more than adequately instructed the jury that the robbery had to occur ‘during’ the course of the murder.” Woods v. State, 789 So.2d 896, 932-33 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), affirmed, 789 So.2d 941 (Ala.2001), cert, denied, Woods v. Alabama, 534 U.S. 831 , 122 S.Ct. 77 , 151 L.Ed.2d 41 (2001).

2000Before the petitioner filed the instant Rule 32 petition, he had already appealed his capital murder conviction *Page 976 itself; and the Court of Criminal Appeals had already affirmed the conviction, Thomas v. State , 539 So.2d 375 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988), this Court had already affirmed the judgment by the Court of Criminal Appeals, Ex parte Thomas , 539 So.2d 399 (Ala. 1988), and the United States Supreme Court had already denied the petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari, Thomas v. Alabama , 491 U.S. 910 (1989).

2000Before the petitioner filed the instant Rule 32 petition, he had already appealed his capital murder conviction *Page 976 itself; and the Court of Criminal Appeals had already affirmed the conviction, Thomas v. State , 539 So.2d 375 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988), this Court had already affirmed the judgment by the Court of Criminal Appeals, Ex parte Thomas , 539 So.2d 399 (Ala. 1988), and the United States Supreme Court had already denied the petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari, Thomas v. Alabama , 491 U.S. 910 (1989).

1993For such convictions, sentencing must be in accordance with § 13A-11-84 (a)." Graves v. State , 632 So.2d at 32 (citing this Court's September 18, 1992, opinion in Ex parte Johnson ).

1992Johnson v. State , 620 So.2d 665 (Ala. 1993).

1992Johnson v. State, 620 So.2d 665 (Ala.1993).

1988Connolly v. State , 500 So.2d 57 , 62 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985), aff'd , 500 So.2d 68 (Ala. 1986).

1988Connolly v. State , 500 So.2d 57 , 62 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985), aff'd , 500 So.2d 68 (Ala. 1986).