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25 California opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associatesgreen2 sentences2005The Fund argued that even if it is valued at $1 million, the consideration paid is not grossly disproportionate to the Fund’s potential liability, and thus meets the criteria for a good faith settlement under sections 877 and 877.6 and Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 256 , 698 P.2d 159 ]. 2005The Fund argued that even if it is valued at $1 million, the consideration paid is not grossly disproportionate to the Fund’s potential liability, and thus meets the criteria for a good faith settlement under sections 877 and 877.6 and Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 256 , 698 P.2d 159 ]. | 4 | 7 |
Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co.green2 sentences2009(Mattco Forge, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1353 .) As explained, “[s]ection 877.6 is grounded in the equitable policies of the ‘encouragement of settlements and the equitable allocation of costs among multiple tortfeasors.’ [Citation.]” (West v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1636.) “The good faith provision of section 877 ‘mandates that the courts review agreements purportedly made under its aegis to insure that such settlements appropriately balance the contribution statute’s dual objectives. . . . 2003(Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 581 ].) Among the relevant factors a court must consider in exercising that discretion is the existence of collusion or fraud by the settling parties that might harm the interests of the nonsettling defendants. | 1 | 2 |
Far West Financial Corp. v. D & S Companygreen2 sentences1990In 1988, Far West Financial Corp. v.D & S Co. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 796 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 202 , 760 P.2d 399 ] held that tort defendants who entered into good faith settlements under Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 through 877.6 1 were absolved of any further liability to codefendants for all equitable indemnity claims, including total equitable indemnity. 1990In 1988, Far West Financial Corp. v.D & S Co. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 796 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 202 , 760 P.2d 399 ] held that tort defendants who entered into good faith settlements under Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 through 877.6 1 were absolved of any further liability to codefendants for all equitable indemnity claims, including total equitable indemnity. | 1 | 2 |
TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011Good Faith Settlement Standards A good faith settlement under Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 must strike a balance between the competing public policies of encouraging settlements and the equitable sharing of liability among parties at fault. ( Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 498—499.) To determine whether a settlement is in good faith a trial court must inquire “whether the amount of the settlement is within the .reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor’s proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.” (Id. at p. 499.) By necessity, this “ ‘rea 2011Good Faith Settlement Standards A good faith settlement under Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 must strike a balance between the competing public policies of encouraging settlements and the equitable sharing of liability among parties at fault. ( Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 498—499.) To determine whether a settlement is in good faith a trial court must inquire “whether the amount of the settlement is within the .reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor’s proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.” (Id. at p. 499.) By necessity, this “ ‘rea | 1 | 1 |
Willdan v. SIALIC CONTRACTORS CORPORATIONgreen2 sentences2010“A settlement made in good faith under sections 877 and 877.6 bars claims against the settling defendant for contribution or indemnity by other joint tortfeasors, including claims for total indemnity, partial indemnity and implied contractual indemnity. [Citations.]” (Willdan v. Sialic Contractors Corp., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 54 .) 1 The HSAA authorizes the Department to order PRP’s to clean up property contaminated with hazardous substances, and then grants to the *433 PRP’s who incur costs in doing so the right to seek contribution and indemnity from others who are liable for those co 2010(Willdan v. Sialic Contractors Corp. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 47, 54 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 633 ].) Resolution of this case requires synthesis of two sets of statutes. | 1 | 1 |
West v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2009(Mattco Forge, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1353 .) As explained, “[s]ection 877.6 is grounded in the equitable policies of the ‘encouragement of settlements and the equitable allocation of costs among multiple tortfeasors.’ [Citation.]” (West v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1636.) “The good faith provision of section 877 ‘mandates that the courts review agreements purportedly made under its aegis to insure that such settlements appropriately balance the contribution statute’s dual objectives. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Wakefield v. Bohlinyellow2 sentences2008Finally, third paragraph comes full circle, noting that statements cited (from Zamora ) "necessarily follow from" the Wakefield's majority's interpretation of the words, "net monetary recovery." The paragraph ends with a rule that simply restates the conclusion that a "damage award for one litigant" means a "net monetary recovery for purposes of the prevailing party determination under section 1032, even if the judgment is later reduced to zero as a result of offsets for good faith settlement under section 877." ( Wakefield, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 982-983, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 .) Signific 2008Finally, third paragraph comes full circle, noting that statements cited (from Zamora ) "necessarily follow from" the Wakefield's majority's interpretation of the words, "net monetary recovery." The paragraph ends with a rule that simply restates the conclusion that a "damage award for one litigant" means a "net monetary recovery for purposes of the prevailing party determination under section 1032, even if the judgment is later reduced to zero as a result of offsets for good faith settlement under section 877." ( Wakefield, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 982-983, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 .) Signific | 1 | 1 |
Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2007(Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1032 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290 ] [“good faith settlement bars a claim for implied contractual indemnity”]; Far West Financial Corp. v. D & S Co. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 796, 817 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 202 , 760 P.2d 399 ] [“a tort defendant who has entered into a good faith settlement within the meaning of section 877.6, subdivision (c) is absolved of any further liability for all equitable indemnity claims”].) Although the trial court’s determination of the good faith or lack of good faith of a settlement is reviewed for an abuse of d 2007(Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1032 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 791 P.2d 290 ] [“good faith settlement bars a claim for implied contractual indemnity”]; Far West Financial Corp. v. D & S Co. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 796, 817 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 202 , 760 P.2d 399 ] [“a tort defendant who has entered into a good faith settlement within the meaning of section 877.6, subdivision (c) is absolved of any further liability for all equitable indemnity claims”].) Although the trial court’s determination of the good faith or lack of good faith of a settlement is reviewed for an abuse of d | 1 | 1 |
Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences2003(Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 ].) When determining whether a settlement was made in good faith within the meaning of sections 877 and 877.6, a trial court exercises its discretion. 2003(Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 ].) When determining whether a settlement was made in good faith within the meaning of sections 877 and 877.6, a trial court exercises its discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Turcon Construction, Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd.green2 sentences1988(See, e.g., Turcon Construction, Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 280, 283 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 580 ].) Still, however, the old pro rata scheme remains alive and has been applied even post -AMA. 1988(See, e.g., Turcon Construction, Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 280, 283 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 580 ].) Still, however, the old pro rata scheme remains alive and has been applied even post -AMA. | 1 | 1 |
Standard Pacific of San Diego v. AA Baxter Corp.green2 sentences1987(See Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499-500; Standard Pacific of San Diego v. A. A. Baxter Corp. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 577, 583 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 106 ].) Because Tech-Bilt mandates a rough approximation of the settling defendant’s proportionate liability and consideration of all other defendants’ proportionate liability and consideration of all other factors that might affect the fairness of the settlement as respects nonsettling defendants, the affidavits, declarations or other evidence should provide the court with the facts necessary to evaluate the settlement in terms of the factors cont 1987(See Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499-500; Standard Pacific of San Diego v. A. A. Baxter Corp. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 577, 583 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 106 ].) Because Tech-Bilt mandates a rough approximation of the settling defendant’s proportionate liability and consideration of all other defendants’ proportionate liability and consideration of all other factors that might affect the fairness of the settlement as respects nonsettling defendants, the affidavits, declarations or other evidence should provide the court with the facts necessary to evaluate the settlement in terms of the factors cont | 1 | 1 |
Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Holdenergreen2 sentences1987Tech-Bilt and its progeny make clear that the requirement of good faith in sections 877 and 877.6, which a settling defendant must satisfy to invoke the statutory bar against indemnity claims, was imposed primarily to protect the interests of nonsettling defendants. “[W]e accept as a general proposition that the Legislature intended the ‘good faith’ concept in section 877.6 to be a flexible principle imposing on reviewing courts the obligation to guard against the numerous ways in which the interests of non-settling defendants may be unfairly prejudiced.” (Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3 1987Tech-Bilt and its progeny make clear that the requirement of good faith in sections 877 and 877.6, which a settling defendant must satisfy to invoke the statutory bar against indemnity claims, was imposed primarily to protect the interests of nonsettling defendants. “[W]e accept as a general proposition that the Legislature intended the ‘good faith’ concept in section 877.6 to be a flexible principle imposing on reviewing courts the obligation to guard against the numerous ways in which the interests of non-settling defendants may be unfairly prejudiced.” (Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3 | 1 | 1 |
Rankin v. Curtisgreen2 sentences1987Tech-Bilt and its progeny make clear that the requirement of good faith in sections 877 and 877.6, which a settling defendant must satisfy to invoke the statutory bar against indemnity claims, was imposed primarily to protect the interests of nonsettling defendants. “[W]e accept as a general proposition that the Legislature intended the ‘good faith’ concept in section 877.6 to be a flexible principle imposing on reviewing courts the obligation to guard against the numerous ways in which the interests of non-settling defendants may be unfairly prejudiced.” (Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3 1987Tech-Bilt and its progeny make clear that the requirement of good faith in sections 877 and 877.6, which a settling defendant must satisfy to invoke the statutory bar against indemnity claims, was imposed primarily to protect the interests of nonsettling defendants. “[W]e accept as a general proposition that the Legislature intended the ‘good faith’ concept in section 877.6 to be a flexible principle imposing on reviewing courts the obligation to guard against the numerous ways in which the interests of non-settling defendants may be unfairly prejudiced.” (Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3 | 1 | 1 |
Stambaugh v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1983Experience teaches us that insurance companies usually and ordinarily pay their policy limits only to have their insureds and themselves discharged from all liability in any given case.” (Fisher v. Superior Court, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d 434, 445 ), and that: “[W]e opine that it would be a rare case indeed, where, as here, a joint tortfeasor who was the immediate causative agent of a claimant’s injuries, who settles for the full amount of his insurance coverage, may reasonably be charged with lack of good faith under section 877.” (Stambaugh v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 239 [ 132 1983Experience teaches us that insurance companies usually and ordinarily pay their policy limits only to have their insureds and themselves discharged from all liability in any given case.” (Fisher v. Superior Court, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d 434, 445 ), and that: “[W]e opine that it would be a rare case indeed, where, as here, a joint tortfeasor who was the immediate causative agent of a claimant’s injuries, who settles for the full amount of his insurance coverage, may reasonably be charged with lack of good faith under section 877.” (Stambaugh v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 239 [ 132 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zamora v. Shell Oil Co.
green
2 sentences2008The five cases (more accurately, point cites) mentioned in the Wakefield opinion as emphasizing the proposition that offsets do not affect prevailing party determinations are: Great Western Bank v. Converse Consultants (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 609, 613 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 224 ( Great Western) ; Zamora, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 213-215, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 ; Pirkig, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1565-1568, 264 Cal.Rptr. 494 ; Syverson, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at 112-114 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 581 *291 and Ferraro, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at pp. 52-53, 162 Cal.Rptr. 238 . 2006Under these circumstances, Western cannot proclaim itself to be the section 1032 prevailing party." ( Zamora v. Shell Oil Co ., at p. 215, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 .) We agree with the foregoing statements of law, which necessarily follow from our interpretation of the statutory phrase "net monetary recovery." [5] We therefore hold as follows: When a jury verdict results in a damage award for one litigant, that party has obtained a net monetary recovery for purposes of the prevailing party determination under section 1032, even if the judgment is later reduced to zero as a result of offsets for good | 2 | 2006–2008 |
Peter Culley & Associates v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1999(Peter Culley & Associates v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488 , original italics.) The fundamental inquiry in a good faith hearing pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 is whether the settling defendant is paying the plaintiff an amount that is so far below defendant’s proportionate share of liability as to be completely “ ‘out of the ball park.’ ” (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 256 , 698 P.2d 159 ].) In an indemnity action, the crucial question is whether the settling indemnitee acted unreasonably 1999(Peter Culley & Associates v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488 , original italics.) The fundamental inquiry in a good faith hearing pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 is whether the settling defendant is paying the plaintiff an amount that is so far below defendant’s proportionate share of liability as to be completely “ ‘out of the ball park.’ ” (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 256 , 698 P.2d 159 ].) In an indemnity action, the crucial question is whether the settling indemnitee acted unreasonably | 2 | 1999–2002 |
Gouvis Engineering v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1998The effect of an order adjudicating a settlement to be in good faith pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 is to bar cross-complaints against parties who have settled and to provide an offset in the amount of the settlement to the subsequent liability of nonsettlors. ( Gouvis Engineering v Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal. App.4th 642 [ 43 Cal. Rptr.2d 785 ].) On the other hand, the $10,000 Sylvia Morales settlement should not be applied as an offset, unless part of that settlement was paid to the Ortegas. 1998The effect of an order adjudicating a settlement to be in good faith pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 is to bar cross-complaints against parties who have settled and to provide an offset in the amount of the settlement to the subsequent liability of nonsettlors. ( Gouvis Engineering v Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal. App.4th 642 [ 43 Cal. Rptr.2d 785 ].) On the other hand, the $10,000 Sylvia Morales settlement should not be applied as an offset, unless part of that settlement was paid to the Ortegas. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
PacifiCare of California v. Bright Medical Associates, Inc.
green
1 sentence2016(PacifiCare, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1464 .) Factors to be evaluated include the overall likely recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid, the allocation of the settlement among plaintiffs, the possibility of collusion, and the settlor’s financial ability to pay, including available insurance. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Oldham v. California Capital Fund, Inc.
green
1 sentence2013The appellate court explained that one purpose of the judgment creditor lien statutes is “to prevent the judgment debtor, with or without the active assistance of other parties to the settlement agreement, from structuring a settlement so it receives benefits while evading the lien of the judgment creditor, absent appropriate equitable considerations.” (Id. at p. 430.) Analogizing approval of a settlement under section 708.440 to the type of evaluation required for a class action settlement or a good faith settlement under sections 877 and 877.6, the Oldham court held that the trial court must | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Ferraro v. Southern California Gas Co.
red
1 sentence2008The five cases (more accurately, point cites) mentioned in the Wakefield opinion as emphasizing the proposition that offsets do not affect prevailing party determinations are: Great Western Bank v. Converse Consultants (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 609, 613 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 224 ( Great Western) ; Zamora, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 213-215, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 ; Pirkig, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1565-1568, 264 Cal.Rptr. 494 ; Syverson, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at 112-114 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 581 *291 and Ferraro, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at pp. 52-53, 162 Cal.Rptr. 238 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Syverson v. Heitmann
green
1 sentence2008The five cases (more accurately, point cites) mentioned in the Wakefield opinion as emphasizing the proposition that offsets do not affect prevailing party determinations are: Great Western Bank v. Converse Consultants (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 609, 613 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 224 ( Great Western) ; Zamora, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 213-215, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 ; Pirkig, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1565-1568, 264 Cal.Rptr. 494 ; Syverson, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at 112-114 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 581 *291 and Ferraro, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at pp. 52-53, 162 Cal.Rptr. 238 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Pirkig v. Dennis
red
2 sentences2008Finally, third paragraph comes full circle, noting that statements cited (from Zamora ) "necessarily follow from" the Wakefield's majority's interpretation of the words, "net monetary recovery." The paragraph ends with a rule that simply restates the conclusion that a "damage award for one litigant" means a "net monetary recovery for purposes of the prevailing party determination under section 1032, even if the judgment is later reduced to zero as a result of offsets for good faith settlement under section 877." ( Wakefield, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 982-983, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 .) Signific 2008Finally, third paragraph comes full circle, noting that statements cited (from Zamora ) "necessarily follow from" the Wakefield's majority's interpretation of the words, "net monetary recovery." The paragraph ends with a rule that simply restates the conclusion that a "damage award for one litigant" means a "net monetary recovery for purposes of the prevailing party determination under section 1032, even if the judgment is later reduced to zero as a result of offsets for good faith settlement under section 877." ( Wakefield, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 982-983, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 .) Signific | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Great Western Bank v. Converse Consultants, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008The five cases (more accurately, point cites) mentioned in the Wakefield opinion as emphasizing the proposition that offsets do not affect prevailing party determinations are: Great Western Bank v. Converse Consultants (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 609, 613 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 224 ( Great Western) ; Zamora, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 213-215, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 ; Pirkig, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1565-1568, 264 Cal.Rptr. 494 ; Syverson, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at 112-114 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 581 *291 and Ferraro, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at pp. 52-53, 162 Cal.Rptr. 238 . 2008The five cases (more accurately, point cites) mentioned in the Wakefield opinion as emphasizing the proposition that offsets do not affect prevailing party determinations are: Great Western Bank v. Converse Consultants (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 609, 613 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 224 ( Great Western) ; Zamora, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 213-215, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 ; Pirkig, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1565-1568, 264 Cal.Rptr. 494 ; Syverson, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at 112-114 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 581 *291 and Ferraro, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at pp. 52-53, 162 Cal.Rptr. 238 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Heppler v. J.M. Peters Co.
green
1 sentence2002Peters Co. supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1283 .) “An adjudication that a settlement was made in ‘good faith’ under Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 bars cross-complaints against the settling parties and provides an offset to nonsettling tortfeasors against their remaining liability. [Citation.] Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 allows a settling tortfeasor to insulate itself from contribution and equitable indemnity claims. [Citation.] Thus, these statutes provide a ‘defensive ’ procedure by which a joint tortfeasor may extricate itself from a lawsuit and bar actions for equita | 1 | 2002–2002 |
La Jolla Village Homeowners' Ass'n v. Superior Court
red
1 sentence1999(Peter Culley & Associates v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488 , original italics.) The fundamental inquiry in a good faith hearing pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 is whether the settling defendant is paying the plaintiff an amount that is so far below defendant’s proportionate share of liability as to be completely “ ‘out of the ball park.’ ” (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 256 , 698 P.2d 159 ].) In an indemnity action, the crucial question is whether the settling indemnitee acted unreasonably | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Widson v. International Harvester Co.
green
2 sentences1997Widson v. International Harvester Co. Penske also discusses Widson v. International Harvester Co. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 45 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] and its holding that sections 877 and 877.6 apply where the settling tortfeasor is merely a cross-defendant in an action for indemnity and is not a defendant in the main action. 1997Widson v. International Harvester Co. Penske also discusses Widson v. International Harvester Co. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 45 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 136 ] and its holding that sections 877 and 877.6 apply where the settling tortfeasor is merely a cross-defendant in an action for indemnity and is not a defendant in the main action. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1994Thus, while a good faith settlement cuts off the right of other defendants to seek contribution or comparative indemnity from the settling defendant, the nonsettling defendants obtain in return a reduction in their ultimate liability to the plaintiff.” (Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 872-873.) By requiring a settling tortfeasor to settle “in the ballpark” in order to gain immunity from comparative indemnity, the good faith requirement of sections 877 and 877.6 assures that “. . . the nonsettling defendants’ liability to the plaintiff will be reduced by a sum that | 1 | 1994–1994 |
River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1986This appeal followed. 5 *30 Discussion In our unpublished decision in the appeal of Mid-Valley’s settlement with HCC (Mid-ValleyDairy Company v. Ex-Cell-O Corporation (3 Civ. 24049)), we reviewed previous court decisions interpreting the good faith settlement provisions of Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 as follows: “In River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 986 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 498 ], this court first addressed the issue [of whether a settlement was made in ‘good faith’]. 1986This appeal followed. 5 *30 Discussion In our unpublished decision in the appeal of Mid-Valley’s settlement with HCC (Mid-ValleyDairy Company v. Ex-Cell-O Corporation (3 Civ. 24049)), we reviewed previous court decisions interpreting the good faith settlement provisions of Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 as follows: “In River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 986 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 498 ], this court first addressed the issue [of whether a settlement was made in ‘good faith’]. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Fisher v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1983Experience teaches us that insurance companies usually and ordinarily pay their policy limits only to have their insureds and themselves discharged from all liability in any given case.” (Fisher v. Superior Court, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d 434, 445 ), and that: “[W]e opine that it would be a rare case indeed, where, as here, a joint tortfeasor who was the immediate causative agent of a claimant’s injuries, who settles for the full amount of his insurance coverage, may reasonably be charged with lack of good faith under section 877.” (Stambaugh v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 239 [ 132 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court
yellow
2 sentences1980Opinion McCLOSKY, J. * This petition was filed March 13, 1980, requesting this court to issue a writ of mandate to compel the superior court in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. SWC 29079 to give a particular instruction on the burden of proof on the issue of whether or not the settlement entered into between defendant Norma Jean Schultz and plaintiff Frank A. Fisher was in good faith within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 877, subdivision (b), and American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 182 , 578 P.2d 899 ]. 1980Opinion McCLOSKY, J. * This petition was filed March 13, 1980, requesting this court to issue a writ of mandate to compel the superior court in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. SWC 29079 to give a particular instruction on the burden of proof on the issue of whether or not the settlement entered into between defendant Norma Jean Schultz and plaintiff Frank A. Fisher was in good faith within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 877, subdivision (b), and American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 182 , 578 P.2d 899 ]. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.