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25 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Smith v. State, 960 S.W.2d 372, 374-75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d) (concluding after statutory analysis that an “aggravated” state jail felony 17 may be enhanced by two prior convictions in the proper sequence to habitual offender status under section 12.42(d) and noting legislature’s treatment of aggravated state jail felonies as equivalent to third-degree felonies when testing said conclusion to see if it resulted in a reasonable or absurd construction). 2010See Ester v. State, 941 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, pet. ref'd) (op. withdrawn on denial of reh’g) (holding the appellant’s sentence could not be enhanced because there was no deadly weapon finding, and the habitual offender enhancement did not apply); State v. Warner, 915 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd) (holding “that the legislature did not intend for state jail felonies to be enhanced to habitual offender status pursuant to section 12.42(d)”), overruled by Smith v. State, 960 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. refd); State v. M | 6 | 6 |
Ester v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Ester v. State , 941 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d) (op. withdrawn on denial of reh’g) (holding the appellant’s sentence could not be enhanced because there was no deadly weapon finding, and the habitual offender enhancement did not apply); State v. Warner , 915 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d) (holding “that the legislature did not intend for state jail felonies to be enhanced to habitual offender status pursuant to section 12.42(d)”), overruled by Smith v. State , 960 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d); Sta 2010See Ester v. State, 941 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, pet. ref'd) (op. withdrawn on denial of reh’g) (holding the appellant’s sentence could not be enhanced because there was no deadly weapon finding, and the habitual offender enhancement did not apply); State v. Warner, 915 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd) (holding “that the legislature did not intend for state jail felonies to be enhanced to habitual offender status pursuant to section 12.42(d)”), overruled by Smith v. State, 960 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. refd); State v. M | 4 | 4 |
State v. Warnergreen2 sentences2010See Ester v. State , 941 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d) (op. withdrawn on denial of reh’g) (holding the appellant’s sentence could not be enhanced because there was no deadly weapon finding, and the habitual offender enhancement did not apply); State v. Warner , 915 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d) (holding “that the legislature did not intend for state jail felonies to be enhanced to habitual offender status pursuant to section 12.42(d)”), overruled by Smith v. State , 960 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d); Sta 2010See Ester v. State, 941 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, pet. ref'd) (op. withdrawn on denial of reh’g) (holding the appellant’s sentence could not be enhanced because there was no deadly weapon finding, and the habitual offender enhancement did not apply); State v. Warner, 915 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd) (holding “that the legislature did not intend for state jail felonies to be enhanced to habitual offender status pursuant to section 12.42(d)”), overruled by Smith v. State, 960 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. refd); State v. M | 4 | 4 |
Griffith v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Griffith v. State, 81 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002). 2003Griffith v. State , 81 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002). | 2 | 2 |
Samaripas v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Id. at 7-8. 2023Davis - 12 enhancement to habitual-offender status under this provision, Samaripas had argued that, “although the punishment for [his prior state-jail] offense had been enhanced, that did not enhance the level of the underlying offense and, therefore, it should be excluded from use for punishment enhancement of his current offense.” 454 S.W.3d at 7 . | 1 | 1 |
Kendell Shawn Vanbelle A/K/A Shawn Vanbelle v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See Vanbelle v. State, No. 02- 12-00075-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5701, at *13-14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 9, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See also Campbell v. State, 49 S.W. 3d 874 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Any attempt to calculate how the trial court exercised its normative function in assessing Polen’s cocaine possession sentence “would necessarily entail pure speculation.” Id.; see Hernandez v. State, 332 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (“we cannot assume that the trial court would assess the same punishment on the conviction of a third-degree felony as it would on the conviction of a first-degree felony”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kershgreen1 sentence2005See Kersh, 127 S.W.3d at 776-77 ; Wooldridge, 135 S.W.3d at 313 . | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Stategreen1 sentence2001See Scott v. State, 19 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000) (“After satisfying the requirements of Section 12.42(c), the statute does not additionally require the State to satisfy the requirements of Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 12.42(d) ... ”) reversed on other grounds 55 S.W.3d 593 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Stategreen1 sentence2001See Scott v. State, 19 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000) (“After satisfying the requirements of Section 12.42(c), the statute does not additionally require the State to satisfy the requirements of Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 12.42(d) ... ”) reversed on other grounds 55 S.W.3d 593 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Price v. Stategreen1 sentence2001See Price v. State, 35 S.W.3d 136, 142-43 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. ref'd) (holding prior conviction requirement of section 12.42(c)(2) was satisfied by evidence showing defendant received deferred adjudication “regardless of whether the defendant’s conviction ever became ‘final.’ ”). 2 Once the State has proved the elements of section 12.42(e), the question of whether these exhibits were sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s habitual offender finding under section 12.42(d) is immaterial. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John Barkergreen1 sentence1984The State seems to say that they should be able to get a second go-around on proving appellant’s habitual offender status under § 12.42(d), Y.A.P.C., as “no fact previously alleged and not proved was here relied upon.” We cannot accept the State’s reasoning. 2 “This is not like the case where evidence prejudicial to the defendant is ad *355 mitted [or evidence beneficial is omitted] at the first trial, and a conviction obtained [and then reversed].” United States v. Barker, 558 F.2d 899, 902 (8th Cir.1977). | 1 | 1 |
Charles Edwin Bullard v. W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Correctionsyellow1 sentence1984Instead, the State, in the second proceeding, did not put on evidence which was simply erroneously excluded, but put on evidence which the State, by its own error, failed to present at the first punishment hearing. 3 See, Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, at 1359 (5th Cir.1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mancuso
green
2 sentences2010See Ester v. State , 941 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d) (op. withdrawn on denial of reh’g) (holding the appellant’s sentence could not be enhanced because there was no deadly weapon finding, and the habitual offender enhancement did not apply); State v. Warner , 915 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d) (holding “that the legislature did not intend for state jail felonies to be enhanced to habitual offender status pursuant to section 12.42(d)”), overruled by Smith v. State , 960 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d); Sta 2010See Ester v. State, 941 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, pet. ref'd) (op. withdrawn on denial of reh’g) (holding the appellant’s sentence could not be enhanced because there was no deadly weapon finding, and the habitual offender enhancement did not apply); State v. Warner, 915 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd) (holding “that the legislature did not intend for state jail felonies to be enhanced to habitual offender status pursuant to section 12.42(d)”), overruled by Smith v. State, 960 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. refd); State v. M | 5 | 1996–2010 |
State v. Mancuso
green
2 sentences2010See Ester v. State , 941 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d) (op. withdrawn on denial of reh’g) (holding the appellant’s sentence could not be enhanced because there was no deadly weapon finding, and the habitual offender enhancement did not apply); State v. Warner , 915 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d) (holding “that the legislature did not intend for state jail felonies to be enhanced to habitual offender status pursuant to section 12.42(d)”), overruled by Smith v. State , 960 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d); Sta 2010See Ester v. State, 941 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, pet. ref'd) (op. withdrawn on denial of reh’g) (holding the appellant’s sentence could not be enhanced because there was no deadly weapon finding, and the habitual offender enhancement did not apply); State v. Warner, 915 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd) (holding “that the legislature did not intend for state jail felonies to be enhanced to habitual offender status pursuant to section 12.42(d)”), overruled by Smith v. State, 960 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. refd); State v. M | 4 | 2010–2010 |
Jordan v. State
green
2 sentences2019Then, more recently, we reaffirmed this sequence in Jordan v. State, 256 S.W.3d 286 , 290–91 (Tex. Crim. 2018Jordan v. State, 256 S.W.3d 286 , 290–91 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Ballard v. State
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 696 . 2015Id. at 696 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Webb
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 809 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Edwards v. State
green
1 sentence2021Edwards, 313 S.W.2d at 618-19 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Tomlin v. State
green
1 sentence2019In Tomlin, this Court prescribed the procedure to follow in the habitual offender context under Section12.42(d): “The sequence of events must be proved as follows: (1) the first conviction becomes final; (2) the offense leading to a later conviction is committed; (3) the later conviction becomes final; (4) the offense for which defendant presently stands accused is committed.” Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Darcy, Christopher Earl
green
1 sentence2019Darcy, 488 S.W.3d at 327 ; Bekendam, 441 S.W.3d at 299 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Bekendam, Stephanie Lynn
green
1 sentence2019Darcy, 488 S.W.3d at 327 ; Bekendam, 441 S.W.3d at 299 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. White
green
1 sentence2015The legislature selected and used the language in the statutes in question in a careful and deliberate manner with the intent that they be construed to affect a reasonable result, we hold that the legislature intended to exclude state jail felonies punishable under section 12.35(a), and subject to enhancement under section 12.42 (a) (2), from the class of felony offenses that fall under the habitual offender provisions of section 12.42 (d).” State v. White, 959 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1998) (rev. on other grounds). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Porter v. State
green
1 sentence2007He further contends that, as a result, the trial court inaccurately admonished him on the applicable range of punishment, thereby preventing him from knowingly and voluntarily entering a guilty plea. [4] In support of his argument, appellant cites to Porter v. State , 566 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Wooldridge
green
1 sentence2005See Kersh, 127 S.W.3d at 776-77 ; Wooldridge, 135 S.W.3d at 313 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Childress v. State
green
1 sentence1990The court of appeals reversed, however, holding “that the offense of failure to stop and render aid may not be enhanced under article 12.42 of the Penal Code because its punishment is not classified in accordance with the Penal Code as required by section 1.03(b) of that code.” 756 S.W.2d at 13-14 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Ex Parte Augusta
red
2 sentences1986Ex parte Augusta, supra. At his new trial it may be shown that applicant is a repeat offender pursuant to § 12.42(a),- supra, but not that he is an habitual offender under § 12.42(d), supra. Relief is granted. 1986Ex parte Augusta, supra. At his new trial it may be shown that applicant is a repeat offender pursuant to § 12.42(a), supra, but not that he is an habitual offender under § 12.42(d), supra. Relief is granted. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.