section 473 six month time limit in California

2022(See Arambula, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 344 [“The six-month limit under section 473, subdivision (b) is more akin to a statute of limitations . . .

2022Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) “The six-month limit is mandatory; a court has no authority to grant relief under section 473, subdivision (b), unless an application is made within the six-month period.” (Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 340 .) Plaintiffs filed their motion on June 17, which was well within the six-month limit in section 473(b) that was triggered by the court’s April 16 entry of judgment. 8 BART contends that Plaintiffs’ motion to set aside judgment was invalid and incapable of extending their time to appeal because the trial court found it had not been ma

2024Equitable relief from default judgment “After six months from entry of default, a trial court may still vacate a default on equitable grounds even if statutory relief is unavailable.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981 (Rappleyea).) “To the extent that the court’s equity power to grant relief differs from its power under section 473, the equity power must be considered narrower, not wider.” (Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 857 ; accord, Aheroni v. Maxwell (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 284, 291 (Aheroni) [“A party who seeks to have his default vacated under the court’s equity powe

2021(Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 340 (Arambula), citing Brackett v. Banegas (1893) 99 Cal. 623 , 627–628 and Davies v. Superior Court (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 535 , 539–540.) The requirement that a party applying for relief under section 473, subdivision (b), must file and serve a notice of motion within six months serves different purposes, including: protecting the finality of judgments (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975 , 981–982 (Rappleyea)); providing repose to litigants by ensuring that judgments and orders are free from attack under the statute after a

2024(See Manson, Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 42 [six-month time limit under § 473 “is 9 jurisdictional and the court may not consider a motion for relief made after that period has elapsed”].) B.

2024The absence of a time limit in section 473(d) is also notable because in a different subsection of the very same statute, section 473, 15 CALIFORNIA CAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. HOEHN Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. subdivision (b), the Legislature prescribed a six-month time limit for defendants to obtain relief from default judgments resulting from their own “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (See Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73 [“When one part of a statute contains a term or provision, the omission of that term or provision from an

2024The absence of a time limit in section 473(d) is also notable because in a different subsection of the very same statute, section 473, 15 CALIFORNIA CAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. HOEHN Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. subdivision (b), the Legislature prescribed a six-month time limit for defendants to obtain relief from default judgments resulting from their own “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (See Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73 [“When one part of a statute contains a term or provision, the omission of that term or provision from an

2024The absence of a time limit in section 473(d) is also notable because in a different subsection of the very same statute, section 473, 15 CALIFORNIA CAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. HOEHN Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. subdivision (b), the Legislature prescribed a six-month time limit for defendants to obtain relief from default judgments resulting from their own “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (See Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73 [“When one part of a statute contains a term or provision, the omission of that term or provision from an

2024The absence of a time limit in section 473(d) is also notable because in a different subsection of the very same statute, section 473, 15 CALIFORNIA CAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. HOEHN Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. subdivision (b), the Legislature prescribed a six-month time limit for defendants to obtain relief from default judgments resulting from their own “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (See Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73 [“When one part of a statute contains a term or provision, the omission of that term or provision from an

2024The absence of a time limit in section 473(d) is also notable because in a different subsection of the very same statute, section 473, 15 CALIFORNIA CAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. HOEHN Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. subdivision (b), the Legislature prescribed a six-month time limit for defendants to obtain relief from default judgments resulting from their own “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (See Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73 [“When one part of a statute contains a term or provision, the omission of that term or provision from an

2024The absence of a time limit in section 473(d) is also notable because in a different subsection of the very same statute, section 473, 15 CALIFORNIA CAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. HOEHN Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. subdivision (b), the Legislature prescribed a six-month time limit for defendants to obtain relief from default judgments resulting from their own “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (See Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73 [“When one part of a statute contains a term or provision, the omission of that term or provision from an

2024Equitable relief from default judgment “After six months from entry of default, a trial court may still vacate a default on equitable grounds even if statutory relief is unavailable.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981 (Rappleyea).) “To the extent that the court’s equity power to grant relief differs from its power under section 473, the equity power must be considered narrower, not wider.” (Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 857 ; accord, Aheroni v. Maxwell (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 284, 291 (Aheroni) [“A party who seeks to have his default vacated under the court’s equity powe

2021Code, §§ 2120, 2122, 2129.) Family Code section 2121, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part, “In proceedings for dissolution of marriage . . . , the court may, on any terms that may be just, relieve a spouse from a judgment, or any part or parts thereof, adjudicating support or division of property, after the six-month time limit of Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure has run, based on the grounds, and within the time limits, provided in [Family Code sections 2120 et seq.].” The statute applies “ ‘when either party is seeking to “undo” a property division judgment that adjudicated

2021(Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 340 (Arambula), citing Brackett v. Banegas (1893) 99 Cal. 623 , 627–628 and Davies v. Superior Court (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 535 , 539–540.) The requirement that a party applying for relief under section 473, subdivision (b), must file and serve a notice of motion within six months serves different purposes, including: protecting the finality of judgments (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975 , 981–982 (Rappleyea)); providing repose to litigants by ensuring that judgments and orders are free from attack under the statute after a

2021(Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1021 [if the invalidity of a judgment can only be shown through consideration of extrinsic evidence, the judgment must be challenged within the six-month time limit of § 473, subd. (b), or by an independent action in equity]; § 473, subd. (b) [application for relief “shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment . . . was taken”].) Evonc contends the motion was timely because the six-month period was tolled during the pendency of the first appeal.

2017(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1009.) That provision states, “The court . . . may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (§ 473, subd. (d).) This provision “does not place any time limit on bringing such a motion.” (Tearlach Resources Limited v. Western States Internat., Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 773, 779 [ 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 110 ].) By contrast, a judgment that is not void but merely voidable may not be set aside beyond the six-month time limit of section 473, subdivision (b).

2017(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1009.) That provision states, “The court . . . may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (§ 473, subd. (d).) This provision “does not place any time limit on bringing such a motion.” (Tearlach Resources Limited v. Western States Internat., Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 773, 779 [ 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 110 ].) By contrast, a judgment that is not void but merely voidable may not be set aside beyond the six-month time limit of section 473, subdivision (b).

2017(See Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 563 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 ] (Lee); accord, Torjesen v. Mansdorf (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 111, 118 [ 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 325 ] (Torjesen); see also § 473, subd. (b).) After six months, once discretionary relief from a default judgment under section 473, subdivision (b) is no longer available, as already noted, the public policy favoring finality of judgments comes into play.

2017(See Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 563 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 ] (Lee); accord, Torjesen v. Mansdorf (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 111, 118 [ 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 325 ] (Torjesen); see also § 473, subd. (b).) After six months, once discretionary relief from a default judgment under section 473, subdivision (b) is no longer available, as already noted, the public policy favoring finality of judgments comes into play.

2017(See Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 563 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 ] (Lee); accord, Torjesen v. Mansdorf (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 111, 118 [ 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 325 ] (Torjesen); see also § 473, subd. (b).) After six months, once discretionary relief from a default judgment under section 473, subdivision (b) is no longer available, as already noted, the public policy favoring finality of judgments comes into play.

2017(See Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 563 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 ] (Lee); accord, Torjesen v. Mansdorf (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 111, 118 [ 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 325 ] (Torjesen); see also § 473, subd. (b).) After six months, once discretionary relief from a default judgment under section 473, subdivision (b) is no longer available, as already noted, the public policy favoring finality of judgments comes into play.

2016Gorham, supra, at pp. 1221, 1230 [trial court erred in denying equitable relief where defendant was incarcerated at the time he was said to have been served and court found proof of service was false].) Because California affords an alternative remedy in the event the two-year time limit of section 473, subdivision (d) has expired, we perceive no due process violation.6 5 As noted, the trial court specifically found “Essien has demonstrated that he resided at the Burbank Blvd address on the date of service to the court’s satisfaction.” 6 We express no opinion as to the viability of an independ

2008(See Heidary v. Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 862 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 ].) “A trial court has no statutory power under section 473, subdivision (d) to set aside a judgment that is not void . . . .” (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495-496 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 862 ].) As we explain, the judgment in this case was not void, but voidable, and thus not subject to being set aside beyond the six-month time limit of section 473.

2008(See Heidary v. Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 862 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 ].) “A trial court has no statutory power under section 473, subdivision (d) to set aside a judgment that is not void . . . .” (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495-496 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 862 ].) As we explain, the judgment in this case was not void, but voidable, and thus not subject to being set aside beyond the six-month time limit of section 473.

2008(See Heidary v. Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 862 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 ].) “A trial court has no statutory power under section 473, subdivision (d) to set aside a judgment that is not void . . . .” (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495-496 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 862 ].) As we explain, the judgment in this case was not void, but voidable, and thus not subject to being set aside beyond the six-month time limit of section 473.

2008(See Heidary v. Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 862 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 ].) “A trial court has no statutory power under section 473, subdivision (d) to set aside a judgment that is not void . . . .” (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495-496 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 862 ].) As we explain, the judgment in this case was not void, but voidable, and thus not subject to being set aside beyond the six-month time limit of section 473.

2005Fund, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1394 [held that section 473, subdivision (b), cannot extend a “jurisdictional” deadline].) Specifically, the six-month limit under section 473, subdivision (b), protects the finality of judgments, as does the time limit to file a notice of intention to move for a new trial or to set aside a judgment under section 663.

2005(Cf. Life Savings Bank v. Wilhelm (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 174, 177-178 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 657 ] [held that section 726, subdivision (b), establishing a three-month period to apply for a fair value determination and deficiency judgment, is a statute of limitations and therefore cannot be subject to relief under section 473, subdivision (b)]; Advanced Building Maintenance v. State Comp.

2005(Cf. Life Savings Bank v. Wilhelm (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 174, 177-178 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 657 ] [held that section 726, subdivision (b), establishing a three-month period to apply for a fair value determination and deficiency judgment, is a statute of limitations and therefore cannot be subject to relief under section 473, subdivision (b)]; Advanced Building Maintenance v. State Comp.

1994Under this statute, in addition to being made within the six months’ period, the application must be made within a ‘reasonable time’ and what is a reasonable time in any case depends upon the circumstances of that particular case.” While in “the determination of that question, a large discretion is necessarily confided to [the trial] court” . . . there must be some showing—some evidence—as the basis for the exercise of such discretion.’ ” (Carrasco v. Craft (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 796, 805 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 599 ].) Appellant moved to set aside the order of dismissal on the basis of the mutual mist

1994Under this statute, in addition to being made within the six months’ period, the application must be made within a ‘reasonable time’ and what is a reasonable time in any case depends upon the circumstances of that particular case.” While in “the determination of that question, a large discretion is necessarily confided to [the trial] court” . . . there must be some showing—some evidence—as the basis for the exercise of such discretion.’ ” (Carrasco v. Craft (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 796, 805 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 599 ].) Appellant moved to set aside the order of dismissal on the basis of the mutual mist

1991Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 492-493 [ 165 Cal. Rptr. 825 , 612 P.2d 915 ]; National Diversified Services, Inc. v. Bernstein (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 410, 416 [ 214 Cal. Rptr. 113 ].) [19] The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine paternity under section 7007.

1991Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 492-493 [ 165 Cal. Rptr. 825 , 612 P.2d 915 ]; National Diversified Services, Inc. v. Bernstein (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 410, 416 [ 214 Cal. Rptr. 113 ].) [19] The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine paternity under section 7007.

1991Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 492-493 [ 165 Cal. Rptr. 825 , 612 P.2d 915 ]; National Diversified Services, Inc. v. Bernstein (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 410, 416 [ 214 Cal. Rptr. 113 ].) [19] The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine paternity under section 7007.

1991Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 492-493 [ 165 Cal. Rptr. 825 , 612 P.2d 915 ]; National Diversified Services, Inc. v. Bernstein (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 410, 416 [ 214 Cal. Rptr. 113 ].) [19] The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine paternity under section 7007.

1991Accordingly, we deem her to have abandoned it. ( MacDonald v. Joslyn (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 282, 285 [ 79 Cal. Rptr. 707 , 35 A.L.R.3d 641 ].) Nancy's mention of the issue in the supplemental brief she submitted upon our request for further briefing regarding appealability does not put the issue before us. [17] Section 7005, subdivision (b), provides that "[t]he donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived." [18] Nancy's motion to vaca

1991Accordingly, we deem her to have abandoned it. ( MacDonald v. Joslyn (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 282, 285 [ 79 Cal. Rptr. 707 , 35 A.L.R.3d 641 ].) Nancy's mention of the issue in the supplemental brief she submitted upon our request for further briefing regarding appealability does not put the issue before us. [17] Section 7005, subdivision (b), provides that "[t]he donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived." [18] Nancy's motion to vaca