section 189 torture in California

2025In Steger, this Court held “that murder by means of torture under section 189, is murder committed with a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain.” (Steger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 546 ; accord, People v. Brown (2023) 14 Cal.5th 453 , 456.) In Steger, the defendant continuously beat her three-year-old stepdaughter, who ultimately died from a fatal head injury.

2006In People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 546 P.2d 665 ], upon which defendant relies, the California Supreme Court considered section 189, which states in pertinent part: “All murder which is perpetrated by means of . . . torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing ... is murder of the first degree.” The court held “that murder by means of torture under section 189 is murder committed with a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged *372 pain.” ( 16 Cal.3d at p. 546 .) While section 189 does not require

2023(See Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1149 [lying in wait special circumstance requires “ ‘an intentional murder,’ ” whereas first degree murder requires “ ‘only a wanton and reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause 16 PEOPLE v. BROWN Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. death’ ”]; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 (Davenport) [special circumstance can be “distinguished from murder by torture under section 189” because for the torture-murder special circumstance “the defendant must have acted with the intent to kill”].) Our narrow constructions of “torture” and “lying in w

2017(People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ] [‘“The special circumstance is distinguished from murder by torture under section 189 because under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18) the defendant must have acted with the intent to kill”].) 19 Finally, in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 408-409 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 339 , 266 P.3d 1030 ], our Supreme Court held that ‘“by making the felony murderer but not the simple murde

2023(Massie, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 371 ; People v. Hale (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 107 [“The intent required for torture as defined by section 206 is not identical to the intent for murder by torture under section 189”].) And Willis does not contend that the evidence here was insufficient to show that he intended to inflict extreme pain on John.

2006(People v. Hale, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 107 .) Torture under section 206 does not require premeditation and deliberation, and it does not require an intent to inflict prolonged pain.

2023(See Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1149 [lying in wait special circumstance requires “ ‘an intentional murder,’ ” whereas first degree murder requires “ ‘only a wanton and reckless intent to inflict injury likely to cause 16 PEOPLE v. BROWN Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. death’ ”]; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 (Davenport) [special circumstance can be “distinguished from murder by torture under section 189” because for the torture-murder special circumstance “the defendant must have acted with the intent to kill”].) Our narrow constructions of “torture” and “lying in w

2017(People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ] [‘“The special circumstance is distinguished from murder by torture under section 189 because under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18) the defendant must have acted with the intent to kill”].) 19 Finally, in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 408-409 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 339 , 266 P.3d 1030 ], our Supreme Court held that ‘“by making the felony murderer but not the simple murde

2017(People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ] [‘“The special circumstance is distinguished from murder by torture under section 189 because under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18) the defendant must have acted with the intent to kill”].) 19 Finally, in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 408-409 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 339 , 266 P.3d 1030 ], our Supreme Court held that ‘“by making the felony murderer but not the simple murde

2017(People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ] [‘“The special circumstance is distinguished from murder by torture under section 189 because under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18) the defendant must have acted with the intent to kill”].) 19 Finally, in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 408-409 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 339 , 266 P.3d 1030 ], our Supreme Court held that ‘“by making the felony murderer but not the simple murde

2017(People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ] [‘“The special circumstance is distinguished from murder by torture under section 189 because under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18) the defendant must have acted with the intent to kill”].) 19 Finally, in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 408-409 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 339 , 266 P.3d 1030 ], our Supreme Court held that ‘“by making the felony murderer but not the simple murde

2005(Cf. Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 877 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 .) Alternatively and preferably, defendant argues, by deleting the language regarding "extreme physical pain" and failing to further define "the infliction of torture," as that phrase is used in the special circumstance, the electorate may have intended to give "torture" under the special circumstance the same meaning afforded that term for purposes of proving a murder by torture under section 189; i.e., requiring a "`wil[l]ful, deliberate and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain'" for the pur

2005(Cf. Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 877 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 .) Alternatively and preferably, defendant argues, by deleting the language regarding "extreme physical pain" and failing to further define "the infliction of torture," as that phrase is used in the special circumstance, the electorate may have intended to give "torture" under the special circumstance the same meaning afforded that term for purposes of proving a murder by torture under section 189; i.e., requiring a "`wil[l]ful, deliberate and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain'" for the pur

1999(People v. Aguilar (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1206 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619 ] [premeditation element of section 189 but not section 206]; People v. Vital (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 441, 444 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 676 ] [a premeditated intent to cause pain not a requirement of section 206].) To the extent Hale suggests the brevity of the attack precludes his harboring an intent to torture, we reject that contention as a misstatement of *108 the law.

1999(People v. Aguilar (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1206 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619 ] [premeditation element of section 189 but not section 206]; People v. Vital (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 441, 444 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 676 ] [a premeditated intent to cause pain not a requirement of section 206].) To the extent Hale suggests the brevity of the attack precludes his harboring an intent to torture, we reject that contention as a misstatement of *108 the law.

1999(People v. Aguilar (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1206 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619 ] [premeditation element of section 189 but not section 206]; People v. Vital (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 441, 444 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 676 ] [a premeditated intent to cause pain not a requirement of section 206].) To the extent Hale suggests the brevity of the attack precludes his harboring an intent to torture, we reject that contention as a misstatement of *108 the law.

1999(People v. Aguilar (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1206 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619 ] [premeditation element of section 189 but not section 206]; People v. Vital (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 441, 444 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 676 ] [a premeditated intent to cause pain not a requirement of section 206].) To the extent Hale suggests the brevity of the attack precludes his harboring an intent to torture, we reject that contention as a misstatement of *108 the law.

1984(People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1037-1038 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 197 ]; People v. Lynn, supra, 159 Cal.App.3d 715, 729 .) The jury was fully and correctly instructed on murder and malice.

1984(People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1037-1038 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 197 ]; People v. Lynn, supra, 159 Cal.App.3d 715, 729 .) The jury was fully and correctly instructed on murder and malice.

1984Murder by torture under section 189 requires “independent proof beyond a reasonable doubt the crime was murder, i.e., an unlawful killing with malice aforethought (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 465 . . .) and there must be a similar degree of proof of a coldblooded, calculated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose (People v. Wiley (1976) *672 18 Cal.3d 162, 173 , fn. 4 . . .; People v. Tubby (1949) 34 Cal.2d 72 , 77 . . .).” (People v. Lynn (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 715, 726 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 181 ].) In d

1984Murder by torture under section 189 requires “independent proof beyond a reasonable doubt the crime was murder, i.e., an unlawful killing with malice aforethought (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 465 . . .) and there must be a similar degree of proof of a coldblooded, calculated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose (People v. Wiley (1976) *672 18 Cal.3d 162, 173 , fn. 4 . . .; People v. Tubby (1949) 34 Cal.2d 72 , 77 . . .).” (People v. Lynn (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 715, 726 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 181 ].) In d

1976(Cf. People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 185 , 481 P.2d 193 ] (sale of lethal methyl alcohol to fellow prison inmate held not to be first degree murder by poison in absence of any proof of intent to kill or injure).) 3 In People v. Gilliam (1952) 39 Cal.2d 235 [ 246 P.2d 31 ], defendant, for no reason at all, beat and trampled to death a fellow prison inmate he had just met.

1976A defendant need not have any intent to kill to be convicted of this crime (People v. Mattison (1971) supra, 4 Cal.3d 177, 183), but he or she must have the defined intent to inflict pain. *547 Our conclusion is consistent with the prior opinions of this court on torture murder.

1949(People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387 [ 281 P. 609 ]; People v. Holt, 25 Cal.2d 59, 90 [ 153 P.2d 21 ]; People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 186 [ 163 P.2d 8 ].) In support of the verdict the attorney general asserts that the infliction of multiple injuries as a result of continued beating of an aged victim, frail and unarmed, indicates an intention on the part of the defendant to inflict pain and suffering which may reasonably be said to constitute torture within the meaning of section 189 of the Penal Code, and therefore to result in murder of the first degree by statutory declaration.

1949(People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387 [ 281 P. 609 ]; People v. Holt, 25 Cal.2d 59, 90 [ 153 P.2d 21 ]; People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 186 [ 163 P.2d 8 ].) In support of the verdict the attorney general asserts that the infliction of multiple injuries as a result of continued beating of an aged victim, frail and unarmed, indicates an intention on the part of the defendant to inflict pain and suffering which may reasonably be said to constitute torture within the meaning of section 189 of the Penal Code, and therefore to result in murder of the first degree by statutory declaration.

1949(People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387 [ 281 P. 609 ]; People v. Holt, 25 Cal.2d 59, 90 [ 153 P.2d 21 ]; People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 186 [ 163 P.2d 8 ].) In support of the verdict the attorney general asserts that the infliction of multiple injuries as a result of continued beating of an aged victim, frail and unarmed, indicates an intention on the part of the defendant to inflict pain and suffering which may reasonably be said to constitute torture within the meaning of section 189 of the Penal Code, and therefore to result in murder of the first degree by statutory declaration.

1949(People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387 [ 281 P. 609 ]; People v. Holt, 25 Cal.2d 59, 90 [ 153 P.2d 21 ]; People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 186 [ 163 P.2d 8 ].) In support of the verdict the attorney general asserts that the infliction of multiple injuries as a result of continued beating of an aged victim, frail and unarmed, indicates an intention on the part of the defendant to inflict pain and suffering which may reasonably be said to constitute torture within the meaning of section 189 of the Penal Code, and therefore to result in murder of the first degree by statutory declaration.