section 63-30-10(1) retains immunity in Utah

1993In both cases, the underlying cause of the injury was assault or battery, and we noted in both that section 63-30-10(2) retains immunity from suit for negligence that results in an "injury [that] arises out of ... [an] assault [or] battery." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (2); Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240 ; Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1166-67 .

1993In both cases, the underlying cause of the injury was assault or battery, and we noted in both that section 63-30-10(2) retains immunity from suit for negligence that results in an “injury [that] arises out of ... [an] assault [or] battery.” Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (2); Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240 ; Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1166-67 .

2002See Sanford v. Univ. of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285 , 488 P.2d 741, 745 (1971) (holding that waiver of immunity in section 63-30-10(9) permits cause of action for private nuisance based on dangerous or defective public improvement). ¶ 37 The District’s attempts to distinguish Williams and Branam are not persuasive.

2002See Sanford v. Univ. of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285 , 488 P.2d 741, 745 (1971) (holding that waiver of immunity in section 63-30-10(9) permits cause of action for private nuisance based on dangerous or defective public improvement). ¶ 37 The District’s attempts to distinguish Williams and Branam are not persuasive.

1996Instead, we have “focus[ed] on the conduct or situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged.” Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1166 (school district immune where high school students beat fellow student); see also Malcolm, 878 P.2d at 1146-47 (State immune where parolee who had been on work program sexually assaulted and raped former employer’s daughter); S.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah 1993) (State immune where cab driver under state contract sexually molested deaf child); Petersen, 855 P.2d at 243 (school distr

1994Turning to the immunity analysis, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1) provides that “all governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function.” Section 63-30-10 waives this immunity for “injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment.” However, sub-part (2) of section 63-30-10 “retains immunity from suit for negligence that results in an ‘injury [that] arises out of ... [an] assault [or] battery.’ ” S.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah 1993).

1995Discretionary function immunity under section 63-30-10 is designed “ ‘to shield those governmental acts and decisions impacting on large numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseen ways from individual and class legal actions, the continual threat of which would make public administration all but impossible.’” Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 846 (Utah 1990) (quoting Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980)).

1994See Little v. Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1983) (interpreting section 63-30-10(1)); Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980) (same). .

1994When determining whether a governmental entity's conduct falls within the exceptions to section 63-30-10's waiver of governmental immunity, it is necessary for a court to "`focus[] on the conduct or situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged.'" Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 383 (Utah App.1994) (quoting Ledfors v. Emery County Sch.

1994When determining whether a governmental entity’s conduct falls within the exceptions to section 63-30-10’s waiver of governmental immunity, it is necessary for a court to “ ‘focus[ ] on the conduct or situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged.’ ” Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 383 (Utah App.1994) (quoting Ledfors v. Emery County Sch.

1996In Ledfors , this court first observed that the language of section 63-30-10(1)(b) plainly retained immunity for governmental entities where a government employee committed an assault or battery: We applied the plain language of this subpart in Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987), to bar a suit in which the plaintiff alleged that he was wrongfully arrested by three Salt Lake City police officers, one of whom unlawfully beat him while the others negligently failed to intervene.

1996In Ledfors , this court first observed that the language of section 63-30-10(l)(b) plainly retained immunity for governmental entities where a government employee committed an assault or battery: We applied the plain language of this sub-part in Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987), to bar a suit in which the plaintiff alleged that he was wrongfully arrested by three Salt Lake City police officers, one of whom unlawfully beat him while the others negligently failed to intervene.

1996Finally, section 63-30-10(1)(k) retains immunity for injuries arising out of any natural condition on publicly owned land. [4] Other subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1) (1989) retain immunity where an injury arises out of (a) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; or . . .; (c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or (d) a failure to make a

1996Finally, section 63-30-10(1)(k) retains immunity for injuries arising out of any natural condition on publicly owned land. [4] Other subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1) (1989) retain immunity where an injury arises out of (a) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; or . . .; (c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or (d) a failure to make a

2008Id. at 244 . 22 . 784 P.2d 1255 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 23 . 2006 UT App 494 , 153 P.3d 789 . 24 .

2008Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978) (holding that the plain meaning of section 63-30-10(10) retained immunity for "injuries occurring while the incarcerated person .is in prison and under control of the State"). 20 . 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976). 21 .

2008Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978) (holding that the plain meaning of section 63-30-10(10) retained immunity for "injuries occurring while the incarcerated person .is in prison and under control of the State"). 20 . 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976). 21 .

2002ANALYSIS ¶ 7 We note the long-standing principle that “unnecessary decisions are to be avoided and that the courts should pass upon the constitutionality of a statute only when such a determination is essential to the decision in a case.” Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980).

1996Instead, we have “focus[ed] on the conduct or situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged.” Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1166 (school district immune where high school students beat fellow student); see also Malcolm, 878 P.2d at 1146-47 (State immune where parolee who had been on work program sexually assaulted and raped former employer’s daughter); S.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah 1993) (State immune where cab driver under state contract sexually molested deaf child); Petersen, 855 P.2d at 243 (school distr

1996Instead, we have “focus[ed] on the conduct or situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged.” Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1166 (school district immune where high school students beat fellow student); see also Malcolm, 878 P.2d at 1146-47 (State immune where parolee who had been on work program sexually assaulted and raped former employer’s daughter); S.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah 1993) (State immune where cab driver under state contract sexually molested deaf child); Petersen, 855 P.2d at 243 (school distr

1996Morrison v. Salt Lake City Corp., 600 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah 1979).

1995R.R., 842 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992) (applying discretionary function analysis under section 63-30-10 in case brought under section 63-30-8); Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 54 (Utah 1980) (discussing 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-8); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah 1975) (employing section 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-9); Carroll v. State, 27 Utah 2d 384, 387-90 , 496 P.2d 888, 890-92 (1972) (using section 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-8). *622 However, dieta in other cases subsequent to Velasquez have appar

1995R.R., 842 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992) (applying discretionary function analysis under section 63-30-10 in case brought under section 63-30-8); Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 54 (Utah 1980) (discussing 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-8); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah 1975) (employing section 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-9); Carroll v. State, 27 Utah 2d 384, 387-90 , 496 P.2d 888, 890-92 (1972) (using section 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-8). *622 However, dieta in other cases subsequent to Velasquez have appar

1995R.R., 842 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992) (applying discretionary function analysis under section 63-30-10 in case brought under section 63-30-8); Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 54 (Utah 1980) (discussing 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-8); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah 1975) (employing section 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-9); Carroll v. State, 27 Utah 2d 384, 387-90 , 496 P.2d 888, 890-92 (1972) (using section 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-8). *622 However, dieta in other cases subsequent to Velasquez have appar

1995R.R., 842 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992) (applying discretionary function analysis under section 63-30-10 in case brought under section 63-30-8); Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 54 (Utah 1980) (discussing 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-8); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah 1975) (employing section 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-9); Carroll v. State, 27 Utah 2d 384, 387-90 , 496 P.2d 888, 890-92 (1972) (using section 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-8). *622 However, dieta in other cases subsequent to Velasquez have appar

1995R.R., 842 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992) (applying discretionary function analysis under section 63-30-10 in case brought under section 63-30-8); Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 54 (Utah 1980) (discussing 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-8); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah 1975) (employing section 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-9); Carroll v. State, 27 Utah 2d 384, 387-90 , 496 P.2d 888, 890-92 (1972) (using section 63-30-10 analysis in case brought under section 63-30-8). *622 However, dieta in other cases subsequent to Velasquez have appar

1995Discretionary function immunity under section 63-30-10 is designed “ ‘to shield those governmental acts and decisions impacting on large numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseen ways from individual and class legal actions, the continual threat of which would make public administration all but impossible.’” Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 846 (Utah 1990) (quoting Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980)).

1994Compare Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990) (stating § 63-30-10 exceptions are subject to other waivers); Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 292 , 488 P.2d 741, 745 (1971) (holding § 63-30-10 did not modify §§ 63-30-8 and -9); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R.

1994See Little v. Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1983) (interpreting section 63-30-10(1)); Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980) (same). [12] See also Hoot v. United States, 790 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir.1986) (section 2680(h) barred suit against government based on attack by "mentally unbalanced" serviceman); Wine v. United States, 705 F.2d 366, 367 (10th Cir.1983) (plaintiff's suit against government based on assault by serviceman needing psychiatric care barred by section 2680(h)). [13] Article I, section 11 provides, in pertinent part: All courts shall be open, and every person, fo

1994See Little v. Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1983) (interpreting section 63-30-10(1)); Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980) (same). .

1994See Little v. Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1983) (interpreting section 63-30-10(1)); Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980) (same). [12] See also Hoot v. United States, 790 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir.1986) (section 2680(h) barred suit against government based on attack by "mentally unbalanced" serviceman); Wine v. United States, 705 F.2d 366, 367 (10th Cir.1983) (plaintiff's suit against government based on assault by serviceman needing psychiatric care barred by section 2680(h)). [13] Article I, section 11 provides, in pertinent part: All courts shall be open, and every person, fo

1994See Little v. Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1983) (interpreting section 63-30-10(1)); Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980) (same). [12] See also Hoot v. United States, 790 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir.1986) (section 2680(h) barred suit against government based on attack by "mentally unbalanced" serviceman); Wine v. United States, 705 F.2d 366, 367 (10th Cir.1983) (plaintiff's suit against government based on assault by serviceman needing psychiatric care barred by section 2680(h)). [13] Article I, section 11 provides, in pertinent part: All courts shall be open, and every person, fo