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19 California opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc.green2 sentences2022(See Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 815 [“Liability for negligent supervision and/or retention of an employee is one of direct liability for negligence, not vicarious liability.”].) Under such a theory of liability, any noneconomic damages would be subject to the cap in section 3333.2 because a supervising physician who negligently supervises a physician assistant who commits malpractice acts “within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed.” (§ 3333.2, subd. (c)(2).) But, in Lopez’s view, if the plaintiff pursued a negligence claim against th 2022(See Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 815 [“Liability for negligent supervision and/or retention of an employee is one of direct liability for negligence, not vicarious liability.”].) Under such a theory of liability, any noneconomic damages would be subject to the cap in section 3333.2 because a supervising physician who negligently supervises a physician assistant who commits malpractice acts “within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed.” (§ 3333.2, subd. (c)(2).) But, in Lopez’s view, if the plaintiff pursued a negligence claim against th | 3 | 3 |
Barris v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2017(Unruh-Haxton, at p. 353; see Barris, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 116 .) Oasis contends the remaining causes of action against it—medical malpractice, negligent failure to warn, and breach of fiduciary duty—are “based on professional negligence” and subject to MICRA’s noneconomic damage cap under Civil Code section 3333.2. 2016The relevant provision here imposes a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages "[i]n any action for injury against a health care provider based on professional negligence[.]" (Civ. Code, § 3333.2, subds. (a), (b).) The statute defines professional negligence as "a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the lic | 2 | 3 |
Lopez v. Ledesmagreen2 sentences2022“Permitting an unlimited award of noneconomic damages against the physician assistant and only a limited award against the supervising physician based upon the same harm would be both irrational and inconsistent with MICRA’s goal of 11 LOPEZ v. LEDESMA Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. predictability in damage awards.” (Lopez, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 998.) Second, the regulations governing physician assistants place most of the onus of ensuring compliance with day-to-day supervisory obligations on the supervising physician, not the physician assistant. 2022“Permitting an unlimited award of noneconomic damages against the physician assistant and only a limited award against the supervising physician based upon the same harm would be both irrational and inconsistent with MICRA’s goal of 11 LOPEZ v. LEDESMA Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. predictability in damage awards.” (Lopez, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 998.) Second, the regulations governing physician assistants place most of the onus of ensuring compliance with day-to-day supervisory obligations on the supervising physician, not the physician assistant. | 2 | 2 |
Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2001In Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 188 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 208 , 832 P.2d 924 ], our Supreme Court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13, a non-MICRA statute imposing procedural limitations on punitive damage claims in actions for damages “arising out of the professional negligence” of health care providers (not actions based on professional negligence, as in section 3333.2), is not “limited to causes of action alleging professional negligence.” In Barris v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 20 Cal.4th 101, 115-116 , where the issue wa 2001In Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 188 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 208 , 832 P.2d 924 ], our Supreme Court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13, a non-MICRA statute imposing procedural limitations on punitive damage claims in actions for damages “arising out of the professional negligence” of health care providers (not actions based on professional negligence, as in section 3333.2), is not “limited to causes of action alleging professional negligence.” In Barris v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 20 Cal.4th 101, 115-116 , where the issue wa | 2 | 2 |
Fein v. Permanente Medical Groupgreen2 sentences2020“One of the problems identified in the legislative hearings [preceding MICRA] was the unpredictability of the size of large noneconomic damage awards, resulting from the inherent difficulties in valuing such damages and the great disparity in the price tag which different juries placed on such losses.” (Fein, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 163 .) Section 3333.2 addressed that problem by imposing a cap on such damages. 2015(See Fein, supra, 38 Cal.3d 137 .) The court reasoned that “the Legislature retains broad control over the measure, as well as the timing, of damages that a defendant is obligated to pay and a plaintiff is entitled to receive, and that the Legislature may expand or limit recoverable damages so long as its action is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” (Id. at p. 158 [emphases in original].) In determining whether the requisite rational relationship existed, the court conducted a “serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification 8 and the le | 1 | 3 |
Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospitalgreen2 sentences1994Code, § 3333.2 limitation on noneconomic damages applies to actions brought by relatives of the patient for emotional distress and loss of consortium]; Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1048-1052 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 886 ] [hospital’s breach of duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting and reviewing the competency of staff physicians held to be professional negligence under Civ. 1994Code, § 3333.2 limitation on noneconomic damages applies to actions brought by relatives of the patient for emotional distress and loss of consortium]; Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1048-1052 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 886 ] [hospital’s breach of duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting and reviewing the competency of staff physicians held to be professional negligence under Civ. | 1 | 2 |
Atkins v. Strayhorngreen2 sentences1997Specifically, Rand explained that under the case of Atkins v. Strayhorn (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1380 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 231 ], the limitation of $250,000 on noneconomic damages under Civil Code section 3333.2 for a medical malpractice suit is applied separately to the claims of a patient and his spouse who simultaneously claims loss of consortium. 1997Specifically, Rand explained that under the case of Atkins v. Strayhorn (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1380 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 231 ], the limitation of $250,000 on noneconomic damages under Civil Code section 3333.2 for a medical malpractice suit is applied separately to the claims of a patient and his spouse who simultaneously claims loss of consortium. | 1 | 2 |
Waters v. Bourhisgreen1 sentence2016The relevant provision here imposes a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages "[i]n any action for injury against a health care provider based on professional negligence[.]" (Civ. Code, § 3333.2, subds. (a), (b).) The statute defines professional negligence as "a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the lic | 1 | 1 |
Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospitalgreen1 sentence2016The relevant provision here imposes a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages "[i]n any action for injury against a health care provider based on professional negligence[.]" (Civ. Code, § 3333.2, subds. (a), (b).) The statute defines professional negligence as "a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the lic | 1 | 1 |
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospitalgreen2 sentences2011We are bound to reject the argument by the California Supreme Court’s opinions in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital (1984) 36 Cal.3d 359, 376-377 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 671 , 683 P.2d 670 ], and Fein v. Permanente Medical Group (1985) 38 Cal.3d 137, 159-160 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 368 , 695 P.2d 665 ]. 2011We are bound to reject the argument by the California Supreme Court’s opinions in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital (1984) 36 Cal.3d 359, 376-377 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 671 , 683 P.2d 670 ], and Fein v. Permanente Medical Group (1985) 38 Cal.3d 137, 159-160 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 368 , 695 P.2d 665 ]. | 1 | 1 |
BFGC Architects Planners, Inc. v. Forcum/Mackey Construction, Inc.green2 sentences2009Accordingly, this opinion uses the term “traditional equitable indemnity” to refer to the other form of equitable indemnity, which is not based on the existence of a contractual relationship between the indemnitor and the indemnitee. “[J]oint and several liability in the context of equitable indemnity is fairly expansive.” (BFGC Architects Planners, Inc. v. Forcum/Mackey Construction, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 848, 852 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 721 ].) It extends beyond the term “joint tortfeasor” and may “apply to acts that are concurrent or successive, joint or several, as long as they create a det 2009Accordingly, this opinion uses the term “traditional equitable indemnity” to refer to the other form of equitable indemnity, which is not based on the existence of a contractual relationship between the indemnitor and the indemnitee. “[J]oint and several liability in the context of equitable indemnity is fairly expansive.” (BFGC Architects Planners, Inc. v. Forcum/Mackey Construction, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 848, 852 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 721 ].) It extends beyond the term “joint tortfeasor” and may “apply to acts that are concurrent or successive, joint or several, as long as they create a det | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc.green2 sentences1999(See Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___, 119 S.Ct. at p. 687 [improper motive not required to establish a failure to stabilize under EMTALA].) [8] The County urges that the cap on damages under Civil Code section 3333.2 should be extended to apply not only in cases of "professional negligence," but, more broadly, whenever the injury for which damages are sought is directly related to the professional services rendered by a health care provider. 1999(See Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., supra, 525 U.S. at p. _ [ 119 S.Ct. at p. 687 ] [improper motive not required to establish a failure to stabilize under EMTALA].) 8 The County urges that the cap on damages under Civil Code section 3333.2 should be extended to apply not only in cases of “professional negligence,” but, more broadly, whenever the injury for which damages are sought is directly related to the professional services rendered by a health care provider. | 1 | 1 |
Hedlund v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1994Code, § 3333.2 in wrongful death action by a patient’s survivor].) Most notably, our Supreme Court in Hedlund v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 695, 704 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 669 P.2d 41 , 41 A.L.R.4th 1063 ] (Hedlund) held section 340.5, the MICRA statute of limitations governing actions for breach of professional negligence, applied where a woman sued two psychologists after she had been shot by the psychologists’ patient. 1994Code, § 3333.2 in wrongful death action by a patient’s survivor].) Most notably, our Supreme Court in Hedlund v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 695, 704 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 669 P.2d 41 , 41 A.L.R.4th 1063 ] (Hedlund) held section 340.5, the MICRA statute of limitations governing actions for breach of professional negligence, applied where a woman sued two psychologists after she had been shot by the psychologists’ patient. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Santa Monica v. Stewart
green
2 sentences2023Their declaratory relief cause of action incorporates all prior allegations contained in the complaint and then alleges “[a]n actual and justiciable controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants because Plaintiffs contend, and Defendants dispute, that Defendants’ actions, inactions, and intended actions as described above have and will violate the constitutional provisions cited herein” and “Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Civil Code § 3333.2’s cap on noneconomic damages separately and, especially when coupled with Business and Professions Code § 6146’s restrictions on attorneys’ fee 2023Their declaratory relief cause of action incorporates all prior allegations contained in the complaint and then alleges “[a]n actual and justiciable controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants because Plaintiffs contend, and Defendants dispute, that Defendants’ actions, inactions, and intended actions as described above have and will violate the constitutional provisions cited herein” and “Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Civil Code § 3333.2’s cap on noneconomic damages separately and, especially when coupled with Business and Professions Code § 6146’s restrictions on attorneys’ fee | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Wilson & Wilson v. City Council
green
2 sentences2023Their declaratory relief cause of action incorporates all prior allegations contained in the complaint and then alleges “[a]n actual and justiciable controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants because Plaintiffs contend, and Defendants dispute, that Defendants’ actions, inactions, and intended actions as described above have and will violate the constitutional provisions cited herein” and “Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Civil Code § 3333.2’s cap on noneconomic damages separately and, especially when coupled with Business and Professions Code § 6146’s restrictions on attorneys’ fee 2023Their declaratory relief cause of action incorporates all prior allegations contained in the complaint and then alleges “[a]n actual and justiciable controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants because Plaintiffs contend, and Defendants dispute, that Defendants’ actions, inactions, and intended actions as described above have and will violate the constitutional provisions cited herein” and “Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Civil Code § 3333.2’s cap on noneconomic damages separately and, especially when coupled with Business and Professions Code § 6146’s restrictions on attorneys’ fee | 2 | 2023–2023 |
McAdory v. Rogers
green
2 sentences1991No purpose would be served by further reducing that plaintiff’s award.” (McAdory v. Rogers, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1279 .) Atkins followed McAdory , holding that the trial court properly applied the jury’s comparative fault finding before reducing the noneconomic damages under Civil Code section 3333.2. 1990(See McAdory v. Rogers, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1279 .) 7 Thus, the court properly applied the jury’s comparative fault finding before reducing the noneconomic damages under section 3333.2. 8 *1394 III Strayhorn contends the court erred in failing to apply a single $250,000 noneconomic limit to this case. | 2 | 1990–1991 |
DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025It was thus incumbent on Snover to explain either why this understanding of Proposition 51 is incorrect, or why the imposition of greater liability on Gupta is permissible under it simply because other tortfeasors the jury identified as partially responsible for Snover’s injury were no longer “present in the lawsuit.” (DaFonte, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 603 .) Snover fails to address this issue because she locates the problem elsewhere: She contends that Gilman “presupposes that Section 3333.2 is a legislative determination of damages.” But this contention is unexplained, and we see no such presu | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance v. Reiswig
green
1 sentence2020Co. v. Reiswig (1999) 21 Cal.4th 208, 215 .) As the trial court here correctly recognized, once an agency relationship is formed, both the supervising physician and the physician assistant are legally responsible for malpractice that the physician assistant commits during the relationship. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Stinnett v. Tam
green
1 sentence2015(Stinnett, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427 .) “Thus, ‘[t]o mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party must “‘negative every conceivable basis’” that might support the disputed statutory disparity. [Citations.] If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second- guess its “‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Chan, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 613 .) The Supreme Court upheld section 3333.2’s damages cap against an equal protection challenge in 1985. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Perry v. Shaw
green
1 sentence2015Plaintiff also draws our attention to Perry v. Shaw (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 658 , 668–669 (Perry), which held that the noneconomic damages limitation of Civil Code section 3333.2 did not apply to a battery claim that was based on a doctor’s action in performing a breast augmentation to which the patient had not consented, because the cause of action was not based on professional negligence as defined by MICRA. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Chan v. Curran
green
1 sentence2015(Stinnett, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427 .) “Thus, ‘[t]o mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party must “‘negative every conceivable basis’” that might support the disputed statutory disparity. [Citations.] If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second- guess its “‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Chan, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 613 .) The Supreme Court upheld section 3333.2’s damages cap against an equal protection challenge in 1985. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Salazar v. Eastin
green
1 sentence2014“To the extent a specific statute is inconsistent with a general statute potentially covering the same subject matter, the specific statute must be read as an exception to the more general statute.” (Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 Cal.4th 836, 857 .) Because section 3333.2 places a cap on the total recovery of noneconomic damages from health care providers, it is the more specific statute, and we read it as an exception to section 1431.2.9 9 Whether MICRA operates as an exception to the bar created by section 1431.2 is currently on review before the California Supreme Court in Rashidi v. Moser, re | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Western Steamship Lines v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp.
green
1 sentence2009Accordingly, this opinion uses the term “traditional equitable indemnity” to refer to the other form of equitable indemnity, which is not based on the existence of a contractual relationship between the indemnitor and the indemnitee. “[J]oint and several liability in the context of equitable indemnity is fairly expansive.” (BFGC Architects Planners, Inc. v. Forcum/Mackey Construction, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 848, 852 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 721 ].) It extends beyond the term “joint tortfeasor” and may “apply to acts that are concurrent or successive, joint or several, as long as they create a det | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell
green
2 sentences2009(See also Children’s Hospital, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1780 [anesthesiologist’s exoneration from liability in patient’s prior malpractice action barred hospital’s equitable indemnity action against anesthesiologist]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1225 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 714 ] [consistent with a tariff limiting telephone company’s negligence liability to its customers, contractor could not recover equitable indemnity against Pacific Bell for ordinary negligence but could seek indemnification for gross negligence].) In Jackson, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 1110 , the Court of Appeal he 2009(See also Children’s Hospital, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1780 [anesthesiologist’s exoneration from liability in patient’s prior malpractice action barred hospital’s equitable indemnity action against anesthesiologist]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1225 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 714 ] [consistent with a tariff limiting telephone company’s negligence liability to its customers, contractor could not recover equitable indemnity against Pacific Bell for ordinary negligence but could seek indemnification for gross negligence].) In Jackson, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 1110 , the Court of Appeal he | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Children's Hospital v. Sedgwick
green
1 sentence2009(See also Children’s Hospital, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1780 [anesthesiologist’s exoneration from liability in patient’s prior malpractice action barred hospital’s equitable indemnity action against anesthesiologist]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1225 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 714 ] [consistent with a tariff limiting telephone company’s negligence liability to its customers, contractor could not recover equitable indemnity against Pacific Bell for ordinary negligence but could seek indemnification for gross negligence].) In Jackson, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 1110 , the Court of Appeal he | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Jackson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
green
1 sentence2009(See also Children’s Hospital, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1780 [anesthesiologist’s exoneration from liability in patient’s prior malpractice action barred hospital’s equitable indemnity action against anesthesiologist]; Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1225 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 714 ] [consistent with a tariff limiting telephone company’s negligence liability to its customers, contractor could not recover equitable indemnity against Pacific Bell for ordinary negligence but could seek indemnification for gross negligence].) In Jackson, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 1110 , the Court of Appeal he | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Taylor v. United States
green
2 sentences1994Code, § 3333.2 limitation on noneconomic damages applied separately to spouse’s claim for loss of consortium]; Taylor v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1987) 821 F.2d 1428 , 1431, fn. 2 [Civ. 1994Code, § 3333.2 limitation on noneconomic damages applied separately to spouse’s claim for loss of consortium]; Taylor v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1987) 821 F.2d 1428 , 1431, fn. 2 [Civ. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.