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19 California opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc.green2 sentences2008(Toland, at p. 264.) As the court in Toland explained: “Section 413 of the Restatement . . . reads: ‘One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer [f] (a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions, or [][] (b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manne 2008(Toland, at p. 264.) As the court in Toland explained: “Section 413 of the Restatement . . . reads: ‘One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer [f] (a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions, or [][] (b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manne | 3 | 13 |
Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairygreen2 sentences2002In Toland , we rejected the argument that Privette did not bar recovery for direct liability under section 413, but only for vicarious liability under section 416. “[Pjeculiar risk liability is not a traditional theory of direct liability for the risks created by one’s own conduct: Liability under both sections is in essence ‘vicarious’ or ‘derivative’ in the sense that it derives from the ‘act or omission’ of the hired contractor, because it is the hired contractor who has caused the injury by failing to use reasonable care in performing the work.” ( Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 265 .) In 2002To repeat: In Toland , we rejected the plaintiffs argument that Privette did not bar recovery for direct liability under section 413, but only for vicarious liability under section 416." ( Camargo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 1243-1244, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 617 , 25 P.3d 1096 .) The Grahn court repeated its mistake in applying Privette to the doctrine of retained control. | 1 | 5 |
Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co.red2 sentences1981(Prosser, supra, at pp. 472-474; 4 Witkin, supra, Torts, §§ 661, 662, pp. 2939-2942.) This exception is most often called the “peculiar risk” doctrine in California, after the language used in sec *911 tions 413 and 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts. 3 Section 413 imposes direct liability on the employer for failing to provide in the agreement with the contractor for the taking of appropriate precautions: “One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to other 1981(Prosser, supra, at pp. 472-474; 4 Witkin, supra, Torts, §§ 661, 662, pp. 2939-2942.) This exception is most often called the “peculiar risk” doctrine in California, after the language used in sec *911 tions 413 and 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts. 3 Section 413 imposes direct liability on the employer for failing to provide in the agreement with the contractor for the taking of appropriate precautions: “One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to other | 1 | 2 |
Jimenez v. Pacific Western Construction Co.green1 sentence2025(Jimenez, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 109 [Rest.2d Torts, § 413 imposes liability on hirer “when he has made no provision in the contract or otherwise for the taking of required precautions”].) Defendants contend there was no basis to find Coachella liable under the peculiar risk doctrine because the demolition was an ordinary act, the risk of fire and attendant precautions were not peculiar, and the fire resulted from the subcontractor’s collateral negligence in using power tools to perform a salvage instead of a demolition. | 1 | 1 |
Moloso v. Stategreen2 sentences1998It merely requires an employer to act in a reasonable manner in providing for precautions to be taken in work that involves a peculiar risk.” (Moloso v. State (Alaska 1982) 644 P.2d 205, 215 [ 29 A.L.R.4th 1165 ], fn. omitted.) Recognizing that section 413 liability rests on personal negligence rather than vicarious responsibility does not, however, fully solve "the problem before us; we must still decide the scope of the hirer’s duty. 1998It merely requires an employer to act in a reasonable manner in providing for precautions to be taken in work that involves a peculiar risk.” (Moloso v. State (Alaska 1982) 644 P.2d 205, 215 [ 29 A.L.R.4th 1165 ], fn. omitted.) Recognizing that section 413 liability rests on personal negligence rather than vicarious responsibility does not, however, fully solve "the problem before us; we must still decide the scope of the hirer’s duty. | 1 | 1 |
Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc.red2 sentences1981(Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., supra, 24 Cal.3d 502, 508-509 ; Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 578, 585 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 213 , 591 P.2d 503 ].) Section 416 states: “One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions i 1981(Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., supra, 24 Cal.3d 502, 508-509 ; Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 578, 585 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 213 , 591 P.2d 503 ].) Section 416 states: “One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions i | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Privette v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2001The rationale of Privette and Toland , however, is that it is unfair to hold a hirer liable when it did nothing to create the risk that caused the injury. ( Camargo, supra, 25 Cal.4th 1239 -1240, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 617 , 25 P.3d 1096 .) Again, in Privette, *176 supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 698 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 , 854 P.2d 721 , the court held the application of the peculiar risk doctrine to a hirer "produces the anomalous result that a nonnegligent person's liability for an injury is greater than that of the person whose negligence actually caused the injury." (Italics added.) In Toland the court 2001The rationale of Privette and Toland , however, is that it is unfair to hold a hirer liable when it did nothing to create the risk that caused the injury. ( Camargo, supra, 25 Cal.4th 1239 -1240, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 617 , 25 P.3d 1096 .) Again, in Privette, *176 supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 698 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 , 854 P.2d 721 , the court held the application of the peculiar risk doctrine to a hirer "produces the anomalous result that a nonnegligent person's liability for an injury is greater than that of the person whose negligence actually caused the injury." (Italics added.) In Toland the court | 8 | 2000–2005 |
Hooker v. Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2002To repeat: In Toland , we rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Privette did not bar recovery for direct liability under section 413, but only for vicarious liability under section 416. . . . ‘. . .In either situation, it would be unfair to impose liability on the hiring person when the liability of the contractor, the one primarily responsible for the worker’s on-the-job injuries, is limited to providing workers’ compensation coverage.’ “For the same reasons, an employee of a contractor should be barred from seeking recovery from the hirer under the theory of negligent hiring set forth in se 2002To repeat: In Toland , we rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Privette did not bar recovery for direct liability under section 413, but only for vicarious liability under section 416. . . . ‘. . .In either situation, it would be unfair to impose liability on the hiring person when the liability of the contractor, the one primarily responsible for the worker’s on-the-job injuries, is limited to providing workers’ compensation coverage.’ “For the same reasons, an employee of a contractor should be barred from seeking recovery from the hirer under the theory of negligent hiring set forth in se | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Grahn v. Tosco Corp.
red
2 sentences2002“Having retained control of the independent contractor’s work, the hirer has a direct and nonimputed obligation to see that reasonable precautions are taken to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm to the employees of its independent contractors.” (Grahn, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1394 , italics added.) Again, the conclusion that a hirer’s liability can be characterized as direct does not end the inquiry into whether the hirer should be held liable for injuries to a contractor’s employees, as we explained in Camargo . 2002"Having retained control of the independent contractor's work, the hirer has a direct and nonimputed obligation to see that reasonable precautions are taken to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm to the employees of its independent contractors." ( Grahn, supra, 58 Cal. App.4th at p. 1394 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 806 , italics added.) Again, the conclusion that a hirer's liability can be characterized as direct does not end the inquiry into whether the hirer should be held liable for injuries to a contractor's employees, as we explained in Camargo . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Kinney v. CSB Construction, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001"Because section 413 rests the liability of the hiring person on his or her omission to provide for special precautions in the contract [with the independent contractor] or in some other manner, it is sometimes described as a rule of `direct liability.'" ( Toland, at p. 259, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 , 955 P.2d 504 .) "Because the hiring person's liability under section 416 . . . flows from the independent contractor's negligent failure to take special precautions in performing the inherently dangerous work, as required by `the contract or otherwise,' the hiring person's liability is often referred t 2001"Because section 413 rests the liability of the hiring person on his or her omission to provide for special precautions in the contract [with the independent contractor] or in some other manner, it is sometimes described as a rule of `direct liability.'" ( Toland, at p. 259, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 , 955 P.2d 504 .) "Because the hiring person's liability under section 416 . . . flows from the independent contractor's negligent failure to take special precautions in performing the inherently dangerous work, as required by `the contract or otherwise,' the hiring person's liability is often referred t | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Zamudio v. City and County of San Francisco
green
2 sentences2000Toland expanded Privette in the sense that it criticized the "misleading" distinction between the two peculiar risk theories of the Restatement Second of Torts the "vicarious" liability of section 416 (addressed by Privette ) and the "direct" liability of section 413. ( Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc., supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 264 , 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 878 , 955 P.2d 504 .) The court explained: "[U]nder either section 413 or section 416, the hiring person is subject to liability for injuries to others resulting from the contractor's failure to take safety precautions while performing the inhe 2000Toland expanded Privette in the sense that it criticized the "misleading" distinction between the two peculiar risk theories of the Restatement Second of Torts the "vicarious" liability of section 416 (addressed by Privette ) and the "direct" liability of section 413. ( Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc., supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 264 , 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 878 , 955 P.2d 504 .) The court explained: "[U]nder either section 413 or section 416, the hiring person is subject to liability for injuries to others resulting from the contractor's failure to take safety precautions while performing the inhe | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Peone v. Regulus Stud Mills, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 Yale L.J. 656 (1975).” (Nelson, supra, at p. 476 .) The Nelson court therefore concluded that application of the section 413 theory to contractors’ employees should depend “on the relation between the owner[-hirer] and the contractor.” (Nelson, supra, 639 F.2d at p. 476 .) In the case before it, the court held section 413 liability should not be imposed because there was no evidence “that the Government was in a better position than the contractor either to anticipate dangers to workmen, to foresee and evaluate the best methods of protection, or 1998Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 Yale L.J. 656 (1975).” (Nelson, supra, at p. 476 .) The Nelson court therefore concluded that application of the section 413 theory to contractors’ employees should depend “on the relation between the owner[-hirer] and the contractor.” (Nelson, supra, 639 F.2d at p. 476 .) In the case before it, the court held section 413 liability should not be imposed because there was no evidence “that the Government was in a better position than the contractor either to anticipate dangers to workmen, to foresee and evaluate the best methods of protection, or | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Phyllis M. Nelson, Etc., and Cross-Appellant v. United States of America, and Cross-Appellee v. Duncanson-Harrelson Co., Third Party
green
2 sentences1998Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 Yale L.J. 656 (1975).” (Nelson, supra, at p. 476 .) The Nelson court therefore concluded that application of the section 413 theory to contractors’ employees should depend “on the relation between the owner[-hirer] and the contractor.” (Nelson, supra, 639 F.2d at p. 476 .) In the case before it, the court held section 413 liability should not be imposed because there was no evidence “that the Government was in a better position than the contractor either to anticipate dangers to workmen, to foresee and evaluate the best methods of protection, or 1998Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 Yale L.J. 656 (1975).” (Nelson, supra, at p. 476 .) The Nelson court therefore concluded that application of the section 413 theory to contractors’ employees should depend “on the relation between the owner[-hirer] and the contractor.” (Nelson, supra, 639 F.2d at p. 476 .) In the case before it, the court held section 413 liability should not be imposed because there was no evidence “that the Government was in a better position than the contractor either to anticipate dangers to workmen, to foresee and evaluate the best methods of protection, or | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.