section 46b-59 request visitation rights in Connecticut

2001In Castagno v. Wholean , the Connecticut Supreme Court held that grandparents or any third party seeking visitation rights under General Statutes § 46b-59 "must demonstrate disruption of the family sufficient to justify state intervention." 239 Conn. 336 , 338 (1996).

2000The holding of Castagno v. Wholean, supra, bearing on the initiation of an independent visitation proceeding under § 46b-59 is inapplicable to the grandmother's motion to intervene, under §§ 46b-56 and 46b-57 , in an ongoing dispute.

2005The attorney general is permitted to become a party under General Statutes § 46b-55; any interested third party may intervene with regard to the custody of minor children under [General Statutes] § 46b-57; parties having physical custody of a child may be made parties under General Statutes § 46b-100; and any person may request visitation rights under General Statutes § 46b-59.” Livsey v. Livsey, 11 Conn. App. 43, 46 , 525 A.2d 546 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds by Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn. App. 287, 294 , 580 A.2d 1212 , cert. denied, 217 Conn. 803 , 584 A.2d 471 (1990).

2005The attorney general is permitted to become a party under General Statutes § 46b-55; any interested third party may intervene with regard to the custody of minor children under [General Statutes] § 46b-57; parties having physical custody of a child may be made parties under General Statutes § 46b-100; and any person may request visitation rights under General Statutes § 46b-59.” Livsey v. Livsey, 11 Conn. App. 43, 46 , 525 A.2d 546 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds by Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn. App. 287, 294 , 580 A.2d 1212 , cert. denied, 217 Conn. 803 , 584 A.2d 471 (1990).

2017The plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his petition without an evidentiary hearing on the ground that he failed to allege facts establishing the requirements for jurisdiction set forth in Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202 , 789 A.2d 431 (2002). 2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court. *453 The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history.

2017The plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his petition without an evidentiary hearing on the ground that he failed to allege facts establishing the requirements for jurisdiction set forth in Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202 , 789 A.2d 431 (2002). 2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court. *453 The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history.

1995See, e.g., Temple v. Meyer , 208 Conn. 404 , 544 A.2d 629 (1988) (former boyfriend, who originally brought action seeking custody of former girlfriend's child, mistakenly believed to be his, permitted to amend claim to one seeking visitation with child); Michaud v. Wawruck , 209 Conn. 407 , 551 A.2d 738 (1988) (genetic mother of child permitted visitation with child following child's adoption, because written visitation agreement between genetic mother and adoptive parents did not violate public policy); In re Jennifer P. , 17 Conn. App. 427 , 553 A.2d 196 , cert. denied, 211 Conn. 801 , 559 A

1995See, e.g., Temple v. Meyer , 208 Conn. 404 , 544 A.2d 629 (1988) (former boyfriend, who originally brought action seeking custody of former girlfriend's child, mistakenly believed to be his, permitted to amend claim to one seeking visitation with child); Michaud v. Wawruck , 209 Conn. 407 , 551 A.2d 738 (1988) (genetic mother of child permitted visitation with child following child's adoption, because written visitation agreement between genetic mother and adoptive parents did not violate public policy); In re Jennifer P. , 17 Conn. App. 427 , 553 A.2d 196 , cert. denied, 211 Conn. 801 , 559 A

1995See, e.g., Temple v. Meyer , 208 Conn. 404 , 544 A.2d 629 (1988) (former boyfriend, who originally brought action seeking custody of former girlfriend's child, mistakenly believed to be his, permitted to amend claim to one seeking visitation with child); Michaud v. Wawruck , 209 Conn. 407 , 551 A.2d 738 (1988) (genetic mother of child permitted visitation with child following child's adoption, because written visitation agreement between genetic mother and adoptive parents did not violate public policy); In re Jennifer P. , 17 Conn. App. 427 , 553 A.2d 196 , cert. denied, 211 Conn. 801 , 559 A

1995See, e.g., Temple v. Meyer , 208 Conn. 404 , 544 A.2d 629 (1988) (former boyfriend, who originally brought action seeking custody of former girlfriend's child, mistakenly believed to be his, permitted to amend claim to one seeking visitation with child); Michaud v. Wawruck , 209 Conn. 407 , 551 A.2d 738 (1988) (genetic mother of child permitted visitation with child following child's adoption, because written visitation agreement between genetic mother and adoptive parents did not violate public policy); In re Jennifer P. , 17 Conn. App. 427 , 553 A.2d 196 , cert. denied, 211 Conn. 801 , 559 A

2005The attorney general is permitted to become a party under General Statutes § 46b-55; any interested third party may intervene with regard to the custody of minor children under [General Statutes] § 46b-57; parties having physical custody of a child may be made parties under General Statutes § 46b-100; and any person may request visitation rights under General Statutes § 46b-59.” Livsey v. Livsey, 11 Conn. App. 43, 46 , 525 A.2d 546 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds by Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn. App. 287, 294 , 580 A.2d 1212 , cert. denied, 217 Conn. 803 , 584 A.2d 471 (1990).

2005The attorney general is permitted to become a party under General Statutes § 46b-55; any interested third party may intervene with regard to the custody of minor children under [General Statutes] § 46b-57; parties having physical custody of a child may be made parties under General Statutes § 46b-100; and any person may request visitation rights under General Statutes § 46b-59.” Livsey v. Livsey, 11 Conn. App. 43, 46 , 525 A.2d 546 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds by Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn. App. 287, 294 , 580 A.2d 1212 , cert. denied, 217 Conn. 803 , 584 A.2d 471 (1990).

2005The attorney general is permitted to become a party under General Statutes § 46b-55; any interested third party may intervene with regard to the custody of minor children under [General Statutes] § 46b-57; parties having physical custody of a child may be made parties under General Statutes § 46b-100; and any person may request visitation rights under General Statutes § 46b-59.” Livsey v. Livsey, 11 Conn. App. 43, 46 , 525 A.2d 546 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds by Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn. App. 287, 294 , 580 A.2d 1212 , cert. denied, 217 Conn. 803 , 584 A.2d 471 (1990).

2005The attorney general is permitted to become a party under General Statutes § 46b-55; any interested third party may intervene with regard to the custody of minor children under [General Statutes] § 46b-57; parties having physical custody of a child may be made parties under General Statutes § 46b-100; and any person may request visitation rights under General Statutes § 46b-59.” Livsey v. Livsey, 11 Conn. App. 43, 46 , 525 A.2d 546 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds by Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn. App. 287, 294 , 580 A.2d 1212 , cert. denied, 217 Conn. 803 , 584 A.2d 471 (1990).

2002Therefore, pursuant to this court’s inherent supervisory powers; see State v. Santiago, supra, 245 Conn. 333 -34; State v. Coleman, 242 Conn. 523, 540-42 , 700 A.2d 14 (1997); State v. Pouncey, supra, 241 Conn. 812 -13; we determine that a nonparent petitioning for visitation pursuant to § 46b-59 must prove the requisite relationship and harm, as we have previously articulated, by clear and convincing evidence.

2002Therefore, pursuant to this court’s inherent supervisory powers; see State v. Santiago, supra, 245 Conn. 333 -34; State v. Coleman, 242 Conn. 523, 540-42 , 700 A.2d 14 (1997); State v. Pouncey, supra, 241 Conn. 812 -13; we determine that a nonparent petitioning for visitation pursuant to § 46b-59 must prove the requisite relationship and harm, as we have previously articulated, by clear and convincing evidence.

2001A focal consideration of its analysis is the recognition by the U.S. Supreme Court that ". . . the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children — is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this court." Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57 , 120 S.Ct 2054 , 2060 , 1471 L.E.2d 49 (2000). "[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. . . . the law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making

2001A focal consideration of its analysis is the recognition by the U.S. Supreme Court that ". . . the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children — is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this court." Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57 , 120 S.Ct 2054 , 2060 , 1471 L.E.2d 49 (2000). "[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. . . . the law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making

1995"The potential for undue parental influence is greatly increased in the event of a specific conflict of interest between parent and child." In re Manuel R., 207 Conn. 725 , 739 40, 543 A.2d 719 (1988); see e.g., Parham v. J.

1995"The potential for undue parental influence is greatly increased in the event of a specific conflict of interest between parent and child." In re Manuel R., 207 Conn. 725 , 739 40, 543 A.2d 719 (1988); see e.g., Parham v. J.