section 1094.5 enactment in California

1993Public Works (1955) 44 Cal.2d 90, 105 [ 280 P.2d 1 ].) “Since the enactment of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is no longer open to question that in this state the writ of mandamus is appropriate ‘for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of *673 any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal(Boren v. State Personnel Board (1951) 37 Cal.2d 634, 637 [ 234 P.2d 981 ].) Thus, “[q]ui

1993Public Works (1955) 44 Cal.2d 90, 105 [ 280 P.2d 1 ].) “Since the enactment of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is no longer open to question that in this state the writ of mandamus is appropriate ‘for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of *673 any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal(Boren v. State Personnel Board (1951) 37 Cal.2d 634, 637 [ 234 P.2d 981 ].) Thus, “[q]ui

2021(See, e.g., People v. Travers (1891) 88 Cal. 233, 237 [addressing “the difference in the weight of evidence required in civil and criminal cases”]; People v. Bushton (1889) 80 Cal. 160, 164 [“[t]he well-settled rule that a defendant shall not be convicted unless the evidence proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the whole and every material part of the case . . . [¶] . . . [and] [a]ny other rule as to the weight of the evidence makes one measure applicable to one part of the case and a different one to another part, and leads to confusion ]; People v. Barker (1938) 29 Cal.App.2

2021(See, e.g., People v. Travers (1891) 88 Cal. 233, 237 [addressing “the difference in the weight of evidence required in civil and criminal cases”]; People v. Bushton (1889) 80 Cal. 160, 164 [“[t]he well-settled rule that a defendant shall not be convicted unless the evidence proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the whole and every material part of the case . . . [¶] . . . [and] [a]ny other rule as to the weight of the evidence makes one measure applicable to one part of the case and a different one to another part, and leads to confusion ]; People v. Barker (1938) 29 Cal.App.2

2021(Binyon v. State of California (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 952, 954-955 [“ ‘[t]he judicial remedy of mandamus is not a civil action, but a special proceeding of a civil nature, which is available for specified purposes and for which the code provides a separate procedure’ ”]; Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1115 [“[a]n application for a writ of administrative mandamus is a ‘special proceeding of a civil nature’ ”].) In fact, the Legislature referred to applications for a writ of mandate as special proceedings of a civil nature well before the enactment of section 1094.5.

2021(Binyon v. State of California (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 952, 954-955 [“ ‘[t]he judicial remedy of mandamus is not a civil action, but a special proceeding of a civil nature, which is available for specified purposes and for which the code provides a separate procedure’ ”]; Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1115 [“[a]n application for a writ of administrative mandamus is a ‘special proceeding of a civil nature’ ”].) In fact, the Legislature referred to applications for a writ of mandate as special proceedings of a civil nature well before the enactment of section 1094.5.

2021(Binyon v. State of California (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 952, 954-955 [“ ‘[t]he judicial remedy of mandamus is not a civil action, but a special proceeding of a civil nature, which is available for specified purposes and for which the code provides a separate procedure’ ”]; Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1115 [“[a]n application for a writ of administrative mandamus is a ‘special proceeding of a civil nature’ ”].) In fact, the Legislature referred to applications for a writ of mandate as special proceedings of a civil nature well before the enactment of section 1094.5.

2021(Binyon v. State of California (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 952, 954-955 [“ ‘[t]he judicial remedy of mandamus is not a civil action, but a special proceeding of a civil nature, which is available for specified purposes and for which the code provides a separate procedure’ ”]; Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1115 [“[a]n application for a writ of administrative mandamus is a ‘special proceeding of a civil nature’ ”].) In fact, the Legislature referred to applications for a writ of mandate as special proceedings of a civil nature well before the enactment of section 1094.5.

2021(See, e.g., People v. Travers (1891) 88 Cal. 233, 237 [addressing “the difference in the weight of evidence required in civil and criminal cases”]; People v. Bushton (1889) 80 Cal. 160, 164 [“[t]he well-settled rule that a defendant shall not be convicted unless the evidence proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the whole and every material part of the case . . . [¶] . . . [and] [a]ny other rule as to the weight of the evidence makes one measure applicable to one part of the case and a different one to another part, and leads to confusion ]; People v. Barker (1938) 29 Cal.App.2

2021(See, e.g., People v. Travers (1891) 88 Cal. 233, 237 [addressing “the difference in the weight of evidence required in civil and criminal cases”]; People v. Bushton (1889) 80 Cal. 160, 164 [“[t]he well-settled rule that a defendant shall not be convicted unless the evidence proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the whole and every material part of the case . . . [¶] . . . [and] [a]ny other rule as to the weight of the evidence makes one measure applicable to one part of the case and a different one to another part, and leads to confusion ]; People v. Barker (1938) 29 Cal.App.2

2021(See, e.g., People v. Travers (1891) 88 Cal. 233, 237 [addressing “the difference in the weight of evidence required in civil and criminal cases”]; People v. Bushton (1889) 80 Cal. 160, 164 [“[t]he well-settled rule that a defendant shall not be convicted unless the evidence proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the whole and every material part of the case . . . [¶] . . . [and] [a]ny other rule as to the weight of the evidence makes one measure applicable to one part of the case and a different one to another part, and leads to confusion ]; People v. Barker (1938) 29 Cal.App.2

2021(See, e.g., People v. Travers (1891) 88 Cal. 233, 237 [addressing “the difference in the weight of evidence required in civil and criminal cases”]; People v. Bushton (1889) 80 Cal. 160, 164 [“[t]he well-settled rule that a defendant shall not be convicted unless the evidence proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the whole and every material part of the case . . . [¶] . . . [and] [a]ny other rule as to the weight of the evidence makes one measure applicable to one part of the case and a different one to another part, and leads to confusion ]; People v. Barker (1938) 29 Cal.App.2

2021Co. (1895) 110 Cal. 513, 521-522 [objection as to the sufficiency of a witness’s knowledge “goes more to the weight of the evidence than its admissibility”]; People v. Sanders (1896) 114 Cal. 216, 235 [“the weight of the evidence . . . was exclusively for the jury” such that “how much or how little importance should be attached to it was for the jury alone to say”].) Even more pertinent is the fact that our Supreme Court, prior to the enactment of section 1094.5, used the weight of the evidence phrase in attorney disciplinary proceedings when it applied its independent judgment to determine wh

2021Co. (1895) 110 Cal. 513, 521-522 [objection as to the sufficiency of a witness’s knowledge “goes more to the weight of the evidence than its admissibility”]; People v. Sanders (1896) 114 Cal. 216, 235 [“the weight of the evidence . . . was exclusively for the jury” such that “how much or how little importance should be attached to it was for the jury alone to say”].) Even more pertinent is the fact that our Supreme Court, prior to the enactment of section 1094.5, used the weight of the evidence phrase in attorney disciplinary proceedings when it applied its independent judgment to determine wh

2021Co. (1895) 110 Cal. 513, 521-522 [objection as to the sufficiency of a witness’s knowledge “goes more to the weight of the evidence than its admissibility”]; People v. Sanders (1896) 114 Cal. 216, 235 [“the weight of the evidence . . . was exclusively for the jury” such that “how much or how little importance should be attached to it was for the jury alone to say”].) Even more pertinent is the fact that our Supreme Court, prior to the enactment of section 1094.5, used the weight of the evidence phrase in attorney disciplinary proceedings when it applied its independent judgment to determine wh

2021Co. (1895) 110 Cal. 513, 521-522 [objection as to the sufficiency of a witness’s knowledge “goes more to the weight of the evidence than its admissibility”]; People v. Sanders (1896) 114 Cal. 216, 235 [“the weight of the evidence . . . was exclusively for the jury” such that “how much or how little importance should be attached to it was for the jury alone to say”].) Even more pertinent is the fact that our Supreme Court, prior to the enactment of section 1094.5, used the weight of the evidence phrase in attorney disciplinary proceedings when it applied its independent judgment to determine wh

1999(Accord, Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 960 P.2d 1031 ] [when interpreting a statute, a court must afford deference to the agency’s interpretation, but ultimately exercise its own independent judgment]; cf. People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1045 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ].) The Legislature’s enactment of section 1094.5—in light of the Judicial Council’s 1944 Report, and Drummey and its progeny—indicates legislative acceptance of the limitations placed by Drummey and later cases upon independent judgment review.

1999(Accord, Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 960 P.2d 1031 ] [when interpreting a statute, a court must afford deference to the agency’s interpretation, but ultimately exercise its own independent judgment]; cf. People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1045 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ].) The Legislature’s enactment of section 1094.5—in light of the Judicial Council’s 1944 Report, and Drummey and its progeny—indicates legislative acceptance of the limitations placed by Drummey and later cases upon independent judgment review.

1993(Woods v. Superior Court (1981) 28 Cal.3d 668, 675 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 484 , 620 P.2d 1032 ] [addressing review of decisions of Department of Social Services].) Given that section 13559 “is not the statute granting subject matter jurisdiction in this type of case,” its provision for filing of a petition in the driver’s county of residence is not a jurisdictional requirement.

1993(Woods v. Superior Court (1981) 28 Cal.3d 668, 675 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 484 , 620 P.2d 1032 ] [addressing review of decisions of Department of Social Services].) Given that section 13559 “is not the statute granting subject matter jurisdiction in this type of case,” its provision for filing of a petition in the driver’s county of residence is not a jurisdictional requirement.

1993Public Works (1955) 44 Cal.2d 90, 105 [ 280 P.2d 1 ].) “Since the enactment of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is no longer open to question that in this state the writ of mandamus is appropriate ‘for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of *673 any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal(Boren v. State Personnel Board (1951) 37 Cal.2d 634, 637 [ 234 P.2d 981 ].) Thus, “[q]ui

1993Public Works (1955) 44 Cal.2d 90, 105 [ 280 P.2d 1 ].) “Since the enactment of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is no longer open to question that in this state the writ of mandamus is appropriate ‘for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of *673 any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal(Boren v. State Personnel Board (1951) 37 Cal.2d 634, 637 [ 234 P.2d 981 ].) Thus, “[q]ui

1985Ed. Bar 1966) § 15.25, pp. 280-281.] The judgment will be upheld if there is any substantial evidence in support of each of the trial court’s essential findings; all contrary evidence will be disregarded on appeal (ibid.).” (Thompson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 354, 358 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 626 ]; see also Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 308-309 [ 196 P.2d 20 ].) Although raised for the first time by Hittle in his petition for rehearing before the Court of Appeal, the issue of SBCERA’s fiduciary duty to fully inform Hittle of his retirement option

1985Ed. Bar 1966) § 15.25, pp. 280-281.] The judgment will be upheld if there is any substantial evidence in support of each of the trial court’s essential findings; all contrary evidence will be disregarded on appeal (ibid.).” (Thompson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 354, 358 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 626 ]; see also Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 308-309 [ 196 P.2d 20 ].) Although raised for the first time by Hittle in his petition for rehearing before the Court of Appeal, the issue of SBCERA’s fiduciary duty to fully inform Hittle of his retirement option

1985Ed. Bar 1966) § 15.25, pp. 280-281.] The judgment will be upheld if there is any substantial evidence in support of each of the trial court’s essential findings; all contrary evidence will be disregarded on appeal (ibid.).” (Thompson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 354, 358 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 626 ]; see also Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 308-309 [ 196 P.2d 20 ].) Although raised for the first time by Hittle in his petition for rehearing before the Court of Appeal, the issue of SBCERA’s fiduciary duty to fully inform Hittle of his retirement option

1985Ed. Bar 1966) § 15.25, pp. 280-281.] The judgment will be upheld if there is any substantial evidence in support of each of the trial court’s essential findings; all contrary evidence will be disregarded on appeal (ibid.).” (Thompson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 354, 358 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 626 ]; see also Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 308-309 [ 196 P.2d 20 ].) Although raised for the first time by Hittle in his petition for rehearing before the Court of Appeal, the issue of SBCERA’s fiduciary duty to fully inform Hittle of his retirement option

1985(See Faulkner v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 731, 735-736 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 190 ], decided before the enactment of § 1094.5.) In applying the substantial evidence test, “[t]he appellate court focuses on the findings of the trial court, rather than those of the administrative agency. [Deering, Cal. Administrative Mandamus (Cont.

1985(See Faulkner v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 731, 735-736 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 190 ], decided before the enactment of § 1094.5.) In applying the substantial evidence test, “[t]he appellate court focuses on the findings of the trial court, rather than those of the administrative agency. [Deering, Cal. Administrative Mandamus (Cont.

1965(Hostetter v. Alderson (1952) 38 Cal.2d 499, 500 [ 241 P.2d 230 ] ; Boren v. State Personnel Board, supra, 37 Cal.2d 634, 638 ; Savelli v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra.) Since the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 in 1945 it is no longer open to question that “administrative mandamus’’ is a proper remedy for judicial review of administrative action.

1965(Hostetter v. Alderson (1952) 38 Cal.2d 499, 500 [ 241 P.2d 230 ] ; Boren v. State Personnel Board, supra, 37 Cal.2d 634, 638 ; Savelli v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra.) Since the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 in 1945 it is no longer open to question that “administrative mandamus’’ is a proper remedy for judicial review of administrative action.