section 395 states the general rule in California

2025(Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1258 [applying de novo review when entitlement to attorney fees and costs depends on interpretation of a statute].) Section 395, subdivision (b) provides that a consumer action “arising from an offer or provision of goods [or] services” is proper “where the buyer or lessee in fact signed the contract, where the buyer or lessee resided at the time the contract was entered into, or where the buyer or lessee resides at the commencement of the action.” However, the trial court failed to cite, and we have been unable to locate, any author

2025(Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1258 [applying de novo review when entitlement to attorney fees and costs depends on interpretation of a statute].) Section 395, subdivision (b) provides that a consumer action “arising from an offer or provision of goods [or] services” is proper “where the buyer or lessee in fact signed the contract, where the buyer or lessee resided at the time the contract was entered into, or where the buyer or lessee resides at the commencement of the action.” However, the trial court failed to cite, and we have been unable to locate, any author

1991See also In re Elizabeth M., supra, 232 Cal. App.3d at p. 562 ; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 234, 245-246 [ 271 Cal. Rptr. 629 ].) (4) Annette's first two arguments refer to matters that were instrumental in enabling the court to authorize termination of parental rights, and therefore are not independent of that order.

1991See also In re Elizabeth M„ supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 562 ; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 245-246 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 629 ].) Annette’s first two arguments refer to matters that were instrumental in enabling the court to authorize termination of parental rights, and therefore are not independent of that order.

1991See also In re Elizabeth M„ supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 562 ; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 245-246 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 629 ].) Annette’s first two arguments refer to matters that were instrumental in enabling the court to authorize termination of parental rights, and therefore are not independent of that order.

1991See also In re Elizabeth M„ supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 562 ; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 245-246 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 629 ].) Annette’s first two arguments refer to matters that were instrumental in enabling the court to authorize termination of parental rights, and therefore are not independent of that order.

1989(See In re Corey, supra, 230 Cal.App.2d at p. 821 ; In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 111, 114-115 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 298 ]; Moch v. Superior Court (1919) 39 Cal.App. 471, 478 [ 179 P. 440 ].) That statute provides in part, “A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed from in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed from as from an order after judgment; . . -” 1 California Rules of Court, rule 1396(b) also provides in part: “In proceedings under section 300, the petitioner, minor, and the parent or guardian may appeal from any judgment, order,

1989(See In re Corey, supra, 230 Cal.App.2d at p. 821 ; In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 111, 114-115 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 298 ]; Moch v. Superior Court (1919) 39 Cal.App. 471, 478 [ 179 P. 440 ].) That statute provides in part, “A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed from in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed from as from an order after judgment; . . -” 1 California Rules of Court, rule 1396(b) also provides in part: “In proceedings under section 300, the petitioner, minor, and the parent or guardian may appeal from any judgment, order,

1989(See In re Corey, supra, 230 Cal.App.2d at p. 821 ; In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 111, 114-115 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 298 ]; Moch v. Superior Court (1919) 39 Cal.App. 471, 478 [ 179 P. 440 ].) That statute provides in part, “A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed from in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed from as from an order after judgment; . . -” 1 California Rules of Court, rule 1396(b) also provides in part: “In proceedings under section 300, the petitioner, minor, and the parent or guardian may appeal from any judgment, order,

1989(See In re Corey, supra, 230 Cal.App.2d at p. 821 ; In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 111, 114-115 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 298 ]; Moch v. Superior Court (1919) 39 Cal.App. 471, 478 [ 179 P. 440 ].) That statute provides in part, “A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed from in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed from as from an order after judgment; . . -” 1 California Rules of Court, rule 1396(b) also provides in part: “In proceedings under section 300, the petitioner, minor, and the parent or guardian may appeal from any judgment, order,

1989(People v. Keener (1961) 55 Cal.2d 714, 720 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 361 P.2d 587 ]; In re Richard C. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 477, 482 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 787 ]; In re Corey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 813, 820 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 2, p. 33.) Section 395 states the general rule governing appeals from section 300 proceedings.

1989(People v. Keener (1961) 55 Cal.2d 714, 720 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 361 P.2d 587 ]; In re Richard C. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 477, 482 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 787 ]; In re Corey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 813, 820 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 2, p. 33.) Section 395 states the general rule governing appeals from section 300 proceedings.

1989(People v. Keener (1961) 55 Cal.2d 714, 720 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 361 P.2d 587 ]; In re Richard C. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 477, 482 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 787 ]; In re Corey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 813, 820 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 2, p. 33.) Section 395 states the general rule governing appeals from section 300 proceedings.

1989(People v. Keener (1961) 55 Cal.2d 714, 720 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 361 P.2d 587 ]; In re Richard C. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 477, 482 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 787 ]; In re Corey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 813, 820 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 2, p. 33.) Section 395 states the general rule governing appeals from section 300 proceedings.

1989(People v. Keener (1961) 55 Cal.2d 714, 720 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 361 P.2d 587 ]; In re Richard C. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 477, 482 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 787 ]; In re Corey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 813, 820 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 2, p. 33.) Section 395 states the general rule governing appeals from section 300 proceedings.

1989(People v. Keener (1961) 55 Cal.2d 714, 720 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 361 P.2d 587 ]; In re Richard C. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 477, 482 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 787 ]; In re Corey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 813, 820 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 2, p. 33.) Section 395 states the general rule governing appeals from section 300 proceedings.

1989(See In re Corey, supra, 230 Cal.App.2d at p. 821 ; In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 111, 114-115 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 298 ]; Moch v. Superior Court (1919) 39 Cal.App. 471, 478 [ 179 P. 440 ].) That statute provides in part, “A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed from in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed from as from an order after judgment; . . -” 1 California Rules of Court, rule 1396(b) also provides in part: “In proceedings under section 300, the petitioner, minor, and the parent or guardian may appeal from any judgment, order,

1989(See In re Corey, supra, 230 Cal.App.2d at p. 821 ; In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 111, 114-115 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 298 ]; Moch v. Superior Court (1919) 39 Cal.App. 471, 478 [ 179 P. 440 ].) That statute provides in part, “A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed from in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed from as from an order after judgment; . . -” 1 California Rules of Court, rule 1396(b) also provides in part: “In proceedings under section 300, the petitioner, minor, and the parent or guardian may appeal from any judgment, order,

2004(See Massae v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 527, 530 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 527 ].) Generally (but with numerous exceptions), when the main relief sought in a case does not relate to rights in real property, “the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.” (§ 395, subd. (a).) When a case is founded on a contractual obligation, venue is also proper “where the contract was in fact entered into.” {Ibid.) If a case is filed in a county that is not the proper venue under section 395, th

2004(See Massae v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 527, 530 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 527 ].) Generally (but with numerous exceptions), when the main relief sought in a case does not relate to rights in real property, “the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.” (§ 395, subd. (a).) When a case is founded on a contractual obligation, venue is also proper “where the contract was in fact entered into.” {Ibid.) If a case is filed in a county that is not the proper venue under section 395, th

1992(Lummis v. Lummis (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 255, 257 [ 300 P.2d 869 ].) “ ‘Generally this removed the action from the locality where the parties maintained their matrimonial domicile *789 and where witnesses and persons have a knowledge of facts bearing upon various issues are apt to be found . . that the proposed change in section 395 would remove the defendant’s absolute right to have the venue changed to his county of residence in such a case; and that the proposed change in section 397 was sufficiently flexible to permit the court to order a change of venue where the ends of justice would be p

1992(Lummis v. Lummis (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 255, 257 [ 300 P.2d 869 ].) “ ‘Generally this removed the action from the locality where the parties maintained their matrimonial domicile *789 and where witnesses and persons have a knowledge of facts bearing upon various issues are apt to be found . . that the proposed change in section 395 would remove the defendant’s absolute right to have the venue changed to his county of residence in such a case; and that the proposed change in section 397 was sufficiently flexible to permit the court to order a change of venue where the ends of justice would be p

1992Section 396b is an “explicit codification of the general ‘waivability’ of venue defects . . . .” (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 115 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 496 P.2d 817 ].) Notwithstanding the governing venue provisions, unless the defendant makes a timely motion for change of venue, the action may generally be tried where commenced.

1992Section 396b is an “explicit codification of the general ‘waivability’ of venue defects . . . .” (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 115 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 496 P.2d 817 ].) Notwithstanding the governing venue provisions, unless the defendant makes a timely motion for change of venue, the action may generally be tried where commenced.

1992(Lummis v. Lummis (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 255, 257 [ 300 P.2d 869 ].) “ ‘Generally this removed the action from the locality where the parties maintained their matrimonial domicile *789 and where witnesses and persons have a knowledge of facts bearing upon various issues are apt to be found . . that the proposed change in section 395 would remove the defendant’s absolute right to have the venue changed to his county of residence in such a case; and that the proposed change in section 397 was sufficiently flexible to permit the court to order a change of venue where the ends of justice would be p

1992(Lummis v. Lummis (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 255, 257 [ 300 P.2d 869 ].) “ ‘Generally this removed the action from the locality where the parties maintained their matrimonial domicile *789 and where witnesses and persons have a knowledge of facts bearing upon various issues are apt to be found . . that the proposed change in section 395 would remove the defendant’s absolute right to have the venue changed to his county of residence in such a case; and that the proposed change in section 397 was sufficiently flexible to permit the court to order a change of venue where the ends of justice would be p

1984In that instance, venue would be in Alameda County — the county in which the discriminatory practices were allegedly committed. (§ 12965, subd. (b). [3] ) However, here, two non-FEHA causes of action were also alleged. (2) (See fn. 5.) These claims would normally be governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (a), [4] which controls venue in "transitory" actions. [5] (3a), (4) (See fn. 6.) This court must determine whether the special provisions of the FEHA or the general provisions of section 395 control if both FEHA and non-FEHA claims arising from the same facts are alleged

1984In that instance, venue would be in Alameda County — the county in which the discriminatory practices were allegedly committed. (§ 12965, subd. (b). [3] ) However, here, two non-FEHA causes of action were also alleged. (2) (See fn. 5.) These claims would normally be governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (a), [4] which controls venue in "transitory" actions. [5] (3a), (4) (See fn. 6.) This court must determine whether the special provisions of the FEHA or the general provisions of section 395 control if both FEHA and non-FEHA claims arising from the same facts are alleged

1984In that instance, venue would be in Alameda County — the county in which the discriminatory practices were allegedly committed. (§ 12965, subd. (b). [3] ) However, here, two non-FEHA causes of action were also alleged. (2) (See fn. 5.) These claims would normally be governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (a), [4] which controls venue in "transitory" actions. [5] (3a), (4) (See fn. 6.) This court must determine whether the special provisions of the FEHA or the general provisions of section 395 control if both FEHA and non-FEHA claims arising from the same facts are alleged

1984In that instance, venue would be in Alameda County — the county in which the discriminatory practices were allegedly committed. (§ 12965, subd. (b). [3] ) However, here, two non-FEHA causes of action were also alleged. (2) (See fn. 5.) These claims would normally be governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (a), [4] which controls venue in "transitory" actions. [5] (3a), (4) (See fn. 6.) This court must determine whether the special provisions of the FEHA or the general provisions of section 395 control if both FEHA and non-FEHA claims arising from the same facts are alleged

1964This assumption is based upon the rule governing applications for change of venue under section 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure that “the filing of a motion for the change of place of trial suspends the power of the trial court to act upon any other question until the motion has been determined.” (Beard v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.App.2d 284, 286 [ 102 P.2d 1087 ].) However, even assuming that the rule in question applies to an action subject to the provisions of section 394 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is doubtful (City of Oakland v. Darbee, 102 Cal.App.2d 493, 502, 504 [ 227 P.2d 9

1964This assumption is based upon the rule governing applications for change of venue under section 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure that “the filing of a motion for the change of place of trial suspends the power of the trial court to act upon any other question until the motion has been determined.” (Beard v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.App.2d 284, 286 [ 102 P.2d 1087 ].) However, even assuming that the rule in question applies to an action subject to the provisions of section 394 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is doubtful (City of Oakland v. Darbee, 102 Cal.App.2d 493, 502, 504 [ 227 P.2d 9

1964This assumption is based upon the rule governing applications for change of venue under section 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure that “the filing of a motion for the change of place of trial suspends the power of the trial court to act upon any other question until the motion has been determined.” (Beard v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.App.2d 284, 286 [ 102 P.2d 1087 ].) However, even assuming that the rule in question applies to an action subject to the provisions of section 394 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is doubtful (City of Oakland v. Darbee, 102 Cal.App.2d 493, 502, 504 [ 227 P.2d 9

1964This assumption is based upon the rule governing applications for change of venue under section 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure that “the filing of a motion for the change of place of trial suspends the power of the trial court to act upon any other question until the motion has been determined.” (Beard v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.App.2d 284, 286 [ 102 P.2d 1087 ].) However, even assuming that the rule in question applies to an action subject to the provisions of section 394 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is doubtful (City of Oakland v. Darbee, 102 Cal.App.2d 493, 502, 504 [ 227 P.2d 9

1943The petition of Arden for a writ of mandate was doubtless framed with the decisions of the Supreme Court in Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75, 82 [ 87 P.2d 848 ]; Bodinson Mfg.

1943The petition of Arden for a writ of mandate was doubtless framed with the decisions of the Supreme Court in Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75, 82 [ 87 P.2d 848 ]; Bodinson Mfg.