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17 California opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Winet v. Pricegreen2 sentences2024(See Casey, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 101.) Since Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159 (Winet) more than three decades ago, Court of Appeal decisions repeatedly have held that unknown claims may be released pursuant to express contractual waivers of section 1542. 4 The second release states in full: “Tobin has read and understand the following language of Section 1542 of the California Code: “A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HER MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFEFCTED HER 2024(See Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1170-1171 [finding unknown claims released under Casey based on an express waiver of section 1542].) Citing a Court of Appeal decision, Butler v. Vons Companies, Inc. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 943 (Butler), Tobin also argues that the separation agreement’s release should be construed to be implicitly limited to claims concerning Tobin’s “loan” to United Way of Silicon Valley. | 5 | 5 |
Casey v. Proctorgreen2 sentences2004(See Winet , at p. 1170.) Because the plaintiff in Sumner was unsophisticated and lacked independent counsel, we applied these rules to hold that the preprinted release form and addendum did not bar the plaintiff’s unknown claim for death benefits. 1 (See Casey v. Proctor (1963) 59 Cal.2d 97, 109 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 307 , 378 P.2d 579 ].) Thus, Sumner followed our rules of contract interpretation and did not create an exception to these rules for preprinted release forms used in workers’ compensation settlements. 2004(See Winet , at p. 1170.) Because the plaintiff in Sumner was unsophisticated and lacked independent counsel, we applied these rules to hold that the preprinted release form and addendum did not bar the plaintiff’s unknown claim for death benefits. 1 (See Casey v. Proctor (1963) 59 Cal.2d 97, 109 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 307 , 378 P.2d 579 ].) Thus, Sumner followed our rules of contract interpretation and did not create an exception to these rules for preprinted release forms used in workers’ compensation settlements. | 1 | 3 |
Salehi v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Ass'ngreen2 sentences2015(Salehi v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1160 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 886 ] (Salehi); San Diego Hospice, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1053 ; Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1173 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 ].) “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that counsel explained to Salehi ‘the import of the release in general and of the waiver of section 1542 in particular.’ (Winet v. Price, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168.)” (Salehi, supra, at p. 1160 .) Because Belasco is “an attorney in [his] own right, [he] should have understood the import of the s 2015(Salehi v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1160 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 886 ] (Salehi); San Diego Hospice, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1053 ; Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1173 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 ].) “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that counsel explained to Salehi ‘the import of the release in general and of the waiver of section 1542 in particular.’ (Winet v. Price, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168.)” (Salehi, supra, at p. 1160 .) Because Belasco is “an attorney in [his] own right, [he] should have understood the import of the s | 1 | 2 |
Belasco v. Wellsgreen1 sentence2024By placing her initials in the foregoing paragraph, Tobin acknowledges that she has knowingly waived any and all rights under Civil Code 1542.” 2 (See id. at pp. 1170-1171; see also Belasco v. Wells (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 409, 422 ; Salehi v. Surfside III Condominium Owners’ Assn. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1146 , 1159- 1161; San Diego Hospice v. County of San Diego (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1048 , 1053- 1055.) Moreover, the Supreme Court has endorsed Winet and held it consistent with Casey. | 1 | 1 |
Kostick v. Swaingreen1 sentence2021(Kostick v. Swain (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 187, 194 [“where the parties involved in action for negligence expressly and intentionally settle for unknown injuries,” release is incontestable]; Larsen v. Johannes (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 491, 504 [mutual release of claims and obligations under Civil Code section 1542 held valid].) In Leaf, the plaintiffs settled a lawsuit against the sellers and developers of a property they purchased. | 1 | 1 |
Larsen v. Johannesgreen1 sentence2021(Kostick v. Swain (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 187, 194 [“where the parties involved in action for negligence expressly and intentionally settle for unknown injuries,” release is incontestable]; Larsen v. Johannes (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 491, 504 [mutual release of claims and obligations under Civil Code section 1542 held valid].) In Leaf, the plaintiffs settled a lawsuit against the sellers and developers of a property they purchased. | 1 | 1 |
Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co.green2 sentences2002The parties understand and acknowledge the consequences of such specific waiver of Section 1542 of the California Civil Code. ..." [5] Plaintiffs' request that we take judicial notice of the Ninth Circuit's published opinion is denied as unnecessary. ( Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46, fn. 9 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 960 P.2d 513 .) We also deny plaintiffs' request that we take judicial notice of Sletten's responses to certain interrogatories propounded in a case pending in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, the relevance of which to t 2002The parties understand and acknowledge the consequences of such specific waiver of Section 1542 of the California Civil Code. ..." [5] Plaintiffs' request that we take judicial notice of the Ninth Circuit's published opinion is denied as unnecessary. ( Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46, fn. 9 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 960 P.2d 513 .) We also deny plaintiffs' request that we take judicial notice of Sletten's responses to certain interrogatories propounded in a case pending in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, the relevance of which to t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
San Diego Hospice v. County of San Diego
green
2 sentences2024By placing her initials in the foregoing paragraph, Tobin acknowledges that she has knowingly waived any and all rights under Civil Code 1542.” 2 (See id. at pp. 1170-1171; see also Belasco v. Wells (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 409, 422 ; Salehi v. Surfside III Condominium Owners’ Assn. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1146 , 1159- 1161; San Diego Hospice v. County of San Diego (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1048 , 1053- 1055.) Moreover, the Supreme Court has endorsed Winet and held it consistent with Casey. 2015(Salehi v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1160 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 886 ] (Salehi); San Diego Hospice, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1053 ; Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1173 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 ].) “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that counsel explained to Salehi ‘the import of the release in general and of the waiver of section 1542 in particular.’ (Winet v. Price, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168.)” (Salehi, supra, at p. 1160 .) Because Belasco is “an attorney in [his] own right, [he] should have understood the import of the s | 2 | 2015–2024 |
Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC
green
2 sentences2018Goglin involved a plaintiff who in November 2014 settled her action under the Act against the defendants for $75,000, less her loan balance. ( Goglin , supra , 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 468-469, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 646 .) Defendants had previously offered to resolve the matter several times: Before the plaintiff filed suit, one of the defendants offered to repurchase her vehicle for all costs with an offset and reimburse her reasonable attorney fees, but conditioned the offer on her agreeing to sign a general release, a waiver of section 1542, and a confidentiality clause. ( Id . at p. 465, 208 Cal.Rpt 2018Goglin involved a plaintiff who in November 2014 settled her action under the Act against the defendants for $75,000, less her loan balance. ( Goglin , supra , 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 468-469, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 646 .) Defendants had previously offered to resolve the matter several times: Before the plaintiff filed suit, one of the defendants offered to repurchase her vehicle for all costs with an offset and reimburse her reasonable attorney fees, but conditioned the offer on her agreeing to sign a general release, a waiver of section 1542, and a confidentiality clause. ( Id . at p. 465, 208 Cal.Rpt | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Perez v. Uline, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026The protections of section 1542 can be waived as long as the waiver is “‘“‘clear, explicit and comprehensible in each [of its] essential details.’”’” (Perez v. Uline, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 953, 959 .) The releases in the modification agreement clearly and explicitly stated the release of unknown claims applied to the borrowers. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Ignacio v. Caracciolo
green
1 sentence2025(Ignacio v. Caracciolo (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 81, 86 .) “ ‘That limitation exists because of the difficulty in calculating whether a jury award is more or less favorable than a settlement offer when the jury’s award encompasses claims that are not one and the same with those the offer covers. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] If the settlement offer includes ‘terms or conditions, apart from the termination of the pending action in exchange for monetary consideration, that make it exceedingly difficult or impossible to determine the value of the offer to the plaintiff,’ the offer is invalid under section | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Butler v. Vons Companies, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024(See Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1170-1171 [finding unknown claims released under Casey based on an express waiver of section 1542].) Citing a Court of Appeal decision, Butler v. Vons Companies, Inc. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 943 (Butler), Tobin also argues that the separation agreement’s release should be construed to be implicitly limited to claims concerning Tobin’s “loan” to United Way of Silicon Valley. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
McKenzie v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2018Rejecting the prelitigation settlement because of these unfavorable extraneous terms was not unreasonable." ( Ibid . ) In reaching this conclusion, we relied in part on McKenzie , supra , 238 Cal.App.4th 695 , 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 . ( Goglin , supra , 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 471 , 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 646 .) In McKenzie , after the plaintiff settled his lemon law claims with the defendant, the trial court awarded him $28,350 in attorney fees out of his requested $48,000. ( McKenzie , 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 697 , 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 .) The defendant had made earlier settlement offers, the first in April 2 2018Rejecting the prelitigation settlement because of these unfavorable extraneous terms was not unreasonable." ( Ibid . ) In reaching this conclusion, we relied in part on McKenzie , supra , 238 Cal.App.4th 695 , 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 . ( Goglin , supra , 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 471 , 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 646 .) In McKenzie , after the plaintiff settled his lemon law claims with the defendant, the trial court awarded him $28,350 in attorney fees out of his requested $48,000. ( McKenzie , 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 697 , 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 .) The defendant had made earlier settlement offers, the first in April 2 | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Po-Jen Chen v. Interinsurance Exchange of Automobile Club
green
1 sentence2016(Chen, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 123 .) Such a strategy is as unsuccessful today as it was in Chen . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Vasquez
green
2 sentences2016We believe that the current law specifies that if Ms. McDaniel personally paid insurance premiums [then] she is entitled under law to offset any payments in regards to any criminal restitution order.” McGregor attached to his letter a decision from this court filed December 13, 2010, People v. Vasquez (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1126 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 29 ], 4 Barickman and Mclnteer argue Mercury’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence should be deemed forfeited because it failed to submit an adequate record on appeal. 2016We believe that the current law specifies that if Ms. McDaniel personally paid insurance premiums [then] she is entitled under law to offset any payments in regards to any criminal restitution order.” McGregor attached to his letter a decision from this court filed December 13, 2010, People v. Vasquez (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1126 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 29 ], 4 Barickman and Mclnteer argue Mercury’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence should be deemed forfeited because it failed to submit an adequate record on appeal. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Brown v. Ransweiler
green
1 sentence2015Appellants response is: “Denied as a result of the statements, half truths and subsequent discovery, that [respondent] was aware of prior to agreeing to the Settlement Agreement and the resolution of Arbitration.” In short, appellants do not deny that they entered into the agreement. “‘An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict of evidence.’” (Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 525 .) Appellants’ denial is nonsensical, vague, and irrelevant, and fails to create a triable issue of fact. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Skrbina v. Fleming Companies, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007That section provides that “[a] general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor.” The agreement stated that plaintiff waived “all claims existing as of the date [he] signs this [agreement arising from or relating to [his] employment or the termination of his[] employment and any claims which arise under the common law of contract, implied contract, tort, public policy, or statute, such as [claim 2007That section provides that “[a] general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor.” The agreement stated that plaintiff waived “all claims existing as of the date [he] signs this [agreement arising from or relating to [his] employment or the termination of his[] employment and any claims which arise under the common law of contract, implied contract, tort, public policy, or statute, such as [claim | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Torrey Pines Bank v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2005Relying on Torrey Pines Bank, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d 813 , Alpha argued that the settlement and RAS’s receipt of consideration in exchange for the dismissal with prejudice of its cross-complaint as a matter of law prevented RAS from introducing evidence regarding the subject matter of die cross-complaint or its sixth, eighth and 11th, affirmative defenses because those affirmative defenses involved the same nucleus of operative facts and raised the same legal issues (Alpha’s breach of contract and asserted negligence) as those presented in RAS’s cross-complaint. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
City of Cotati v. Cashman
green
1 sentence2002Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 , 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 , 875 P.2d 73 .) [6] The dissent confusedly argues that Navellier's claim is a SLAPP for the same reasons that the claim at issue in the companion case, Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th 69 , 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 , is not a SLAPP (dis. opn., post, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 544-545, 52 P.3d at pp. 715-717), but there is no analogy. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
yellow
2 sentences2002Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 , 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 , 875 P.2d 73 .) [6] The dissent confusedly argues that Navellier's claim is a SLAPP for the same reasons that the claim at issue in the companion case, Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th 69 , 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 , is not a SLAPP (dis. opn., post, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 544-545, 52 P.3d at pp. 715-717), but there is no analogy. 2002Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 , 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 , 875 P.2d 73 .) [6] The dissent confusedly argues that Navellier's claim is a SLAPP for the same reasons that the claim at issue in the companion case, Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th 69 , 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 , is not a SLAPP (dis. opn., post, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 544-545, 52 P.3d at pp. 715-717), but there is no analogy. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 , 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 , 875 P.2d 73 .) [6] The dissent confusedly argues that Navellier's claim is a SLAPP for the same reasons that the claim at issue in the companion case, Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th 69 , 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 , is not a SLAPP (dis. opn., post, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 544-545, 52 P.3d at pp. 715-717), but there is no analogy. 2002Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 , 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 , 875 P.2d 73 .) [6] The dissent confusedly argues that Navellier's claim is a SLAPP for the same reasons that the claim at issue in the companion case, Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th 69 , 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 , is not a SLAPP (dis. opn., post, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 544-545, 52 P.3d at pp. 715-717), but there is no analogy. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.