section 425.16 official proceeding in California

2019(See Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC , supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 703 , 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 547 [contractual arbitration is not an official proceeding "even though arbitration awards are subject to judicial confirmation or vacation"]; Century 21 , supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 7-8, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 249 [an arbitration demand "does not ' "fit[ ]" ' any of the four anti-SLAPP categories"].) 3 Jenevein's reliance on the litigation privilege, Civil Code section 47, is misplaced.

2010Citing Century 21, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at page 5 , Mallard argues Morrell’s alleged wrongful conduct is not protected under the anti-SLAPP law because it occurred in the context of a “private contractual arbitration,” which does not qualify as an official proceeding under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).

2018However, the trial court agreed the gravamen of the causes of action arose from other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue or issue of public interest within the meaning of subdivision (e)(4) because, while defendants are not a media outlet publishing a news report on an issue of public interest, "the California Supreme Court acknowledged that 'governmental entities are entitled to invoke the protections of section 425.16 when such entities are sued on the basis of statements or activities engaged in by

2018However, the trial court agreed the gravamen of the causes of action arose from other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue or issue of public interest within the meaning of subdivision (e)(4) because, while defendants are not a media outlet publishing a news report on an issue of public interest, "the California Supreme Court acknowledged that 'governmental entities are entitled to invoke the protections of section 425.16 when such entities are sued on the basis of statements or activities engaged in by

2025As a result, they are not subject to being 7 The Zhang court went on to observe that “[t]he plaintiff [in Manhattan Loft supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 1040 ] did not argue, and the court did not hold, that contractual arbitration is a judicial or official proceeding within the meaning of section 425.16.

2025As a result, they are not subject to being 7 The Zhang court went on to observe that “[t]he plaintiff [in Manhattan Loft supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 1040 ] did not argue, and the court did not hold, that contractual arbitration is a judicial or official proceeding within the meaning of section 425.16.

2025The court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396 .) “For purposes of this inquiry, ‘the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does 7 Having decided that defendants met their initial burden to establish that the claims at issue arise from Officer Fletes’s oral statements made in connection with an issue under conside

2025The plaintiff argued only that the filing of the lis pendens did not arise from protected activity because the lis pendens were not related to the arbitration, an argument the court rejected because the ‘arbitration proceedings involved claims that affected title to and rights of possession’ of the property at issue in the dispute.” (Zhang v. Jenevein, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 594-595.) 23 stricken under section 425.16, and we need not consider whether Hester established a probability of prevailing on her claims.

2023Courts have found that an action involved an official proceeding under section 425.16 where, for example, a hospital was required by statute to have a peer review process as part of a 7 “comprehensive” regulatory scheme governing the “overall process for the licensure of California physicians.” (Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 192, 199 (Kibler).) In Kibler, the Supreme Court found notable that “decisions resulting from peer review proceedings are subject to judicial review by administrative mandate. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 200.) Similarly, in Fontani v. We

2022Beltran’s communications to From The Earth in an attempt to be retained to lobby in support of its license application (with the alleged accompanying threats) are the wrong complained of, not simply “evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060 .) Those efforts—an essential element of the cause of action for civil extortion—are properly considered an aspect of protected petitioning activity—statements made in connection with an issue pending in an official proceeding within the meaning of section 425.16, subd

2019Toy, Inc. v. Ruiz , supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 437 , 238 Cal.Rptr.3d 292 ["demanding private arbitration" is an "unprotected act"].) So do we.

2019Toy, Inc. v. Ruiz , supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 437 , 238 Cal.Rptr.3d 292 ["demanding private arbitration" is an "unprotected act"].) So do we.

2015Accepting that the NBPA was motivated to terminate the contract in part by the results of the internal investigation, which investigation in turn was triggered in part by the subpoenas from the United States Attorney’s Office, the NBPA’s motive is irrelevant in the analysis of the first anti-SLAPP prong. “[C]auses of action do not arise from motives; they arise from acts.” (Wallace v. McCubbin, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186 .) Nor is motive an element of breach of contract.

2015Anti-SLAPP principles “Section 425.16 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in 9 connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The purpose of the statute is “to provide a procedural remedy to dispose o

2012It further found all causes of action barred under Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d 465 , due to Nesson’s failure to exhaust his administrative and judicial remedies before filing this action.