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17 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1992–1998 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Howard v. Stategreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Howard v. State, 705 So.2d 947 , (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (affirming as unpreserved the trial court's failure to award credit for time served); Cargle v. State, 701 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (affirming as unpreserved a claim that the trial court erred in sentencing juvenile as adult without considering statutory criteria in section 39.059(7)); Johnson v. State, 697 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (affirming *1252 as unpreserved a claim that defendant received an improper upward departure sentence because the sole reason given for the departure had already been taken into account in co 1998See e.g., Howard v. State, 705 So.2d 947 , (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(affirming as unpreserved the trial court's failure to award credit for time served); Cargle v. State, 701 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(affirming as unpreserved a claim that the trial court erred in sentencing juvenile as adult without considering statutory criteria in section 39.059(7)); Johnson v. State, 697 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(affirming as unpreserved a claim that defendant received an improper upward departure sentence because the sole reason given for the departure had already been taken into account in computing hi | 2 | 2 |
Troutman v. Stateyellow2 sentences1996V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. In Troutman v. State, 630 So.2d 528 (Fla. 1993), we held that pursuant to the legislature’s clear mandate, a trial court must consider each of the criteria of section 39.059(7)(c) before determining the suitability of adult sanctions and contemporaneously reduce its evaluation and findings to writing. 1995The importance of setting out the criteria in section 39.059(7) was recently reiterated by the Supreme Court of Florida in Troutman v. State, 630 So.2d 528 (Fla.1993). | 1 | 8 |
Edler v. Stategreen2 sentences1994The court framed the issues to be: [W]hether a trial court must consider each of the statutory criteria required under sections 39.059(7)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1991), at the time of sentencing a juvenile as an adult, and, if so, whether the resultant findings at the time of sentencing must be contemporaneously reduced to writing. 630 So.2d at 530 (footnote omitted). [6] Relying on the statute, the court noted that "[t]he Legislature has made clear in the *558 statute itself that adherence to the requirements of section 39.059 is not optional." 630 So.2d at 531 (emphasis added). 1994The court framed the issues to be: [W]hether a trial court must consider each of the statutory criteria required under sections 39.059(7)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1991), at the time of sentencing a juvenile as an adult, and, if so, whether the resultant findings at the time of sentencing must be contemporaneously reduced to writing. 630 So.2d at 530 (footnote omitted). [6] Relying on the statute, the court noted that "[t]he Legislature has made clear in the *558 statute itself that adherence to the requirements of section 39.059 is not optional." 630 So.2d at 531 (emphasis added). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Rhodengreen2 sentences1994Under State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984) and, more recently, Troutman v. State, 630 So.2d 528 (Fla.1993), a trial court is required to consider each of the statutory criteria found in section 39.059(7)(c). 1993We review Troutman v. State, 603 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), based on express and direct conflict with State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984), Bell v. State, 598 So.2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), Meyers v. State, 593 So.2d 609 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), and *530 Flowers v. State, 546 So.2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). [1] The issues are whether a trial court must consider each of the statutory criteria required under sections 39.059(7)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1991), [2] at the time of sentencing a juvenile as an adult, and, if so, whether the resultant findings at the time of sentencing must | 1 | 3 |
Lunn v. Stategreen1 sentence1997This offense did not fall within the statutory provisions for sentencing a juvenile as an adult. § 39.022(5)(c)3, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1992); State v. Berry, 647 So.2d 830 (Fla.1994); Robinson v. State, 642 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); see Lunn v. State, 675 So.2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); B.B. v. State, 647 So.2d 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Messam v. Stategreen1 sentence1995See Messam v. State, 640 So.2d 162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); see also Frattallone v. State, 658 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Satalino v. State, 652 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Frattallone v. Stategreen1 sentence1995See Messam v. State, 640 So.2d 162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); see also Frattallone v. State, 658 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Satalino v. State, 652 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cargle v. State
green
2 sentences1998See, e.g., Howard v. State, 705 So.2d 947 , (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (affirming as unpreserved the trial court's failure to award credit for time served); Cargle v. State, 701 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (affirming as unpreserved a claim that the trial court erred in sentencing juvenile as adult without considering statutory criteria in section 39.059(7)); Johnson v. State, 697 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (affirming *1252 as unpreserved a claim that defendant received an improper upward departure sentence because the sole reason given for the departure had already been taken into account in co 1998See e.g., Howard v. State, 705 So.2d 947 , (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(affirming as unpreserved the trial court's failure to award credit for time served); Cargle v. State, 701 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(affirming as unpreserved a claim that the trial court erred in sentencing juvenile as adult without considering statutory criteria in section 39.059(7)); Johnson v. State, 697 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(affirming as unpreserved a claim that defendant received an improper upward departure sentence because the sole reason given for the departure had already been taken into account in computing hi | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences1998See, e.g., Howard v. State, 705 So.2d 947 , (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (affirming as unpreserved the trial court's failure to award credit for time served); Cargle v. State, 701 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (affirming as unpreserved a claim that the trial court erred in sentencing juvenile as adult without considering statutory criteria in section 39.059(7)); Johnson v. State, 697 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (affirming *1252 as unpreserved a claim that defendant received an improper upward departure sentence because the sole reason given for the departure had already been taken into account in co 1998See e.g., Howard v. State, 705 So.2d 947 , (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(affirming as unpreserved the trial court's failure to award credit for time served); Cargle v. State, 701 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(affirming as unpreserved a claim that the trial court erred in sentencing juvenile as adult without considering statutory criteria in section 39.059(7)); Johnson v. State, 697 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(affirming as unpreserved a claim that defendant received an improper upward departure sentence because the sole reason given for the departure had already been taken into account in computing hi | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences1998See, e.g., Howard v. State, 705 So.2d 947 , (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (affirming as unpreserved the trial court's failure to award credit for time served); Cargle v. State, 701 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (affirming as unpreserved a claim that the trial court erred in sentencing juvenile as adult without considering statutory criteria in section 39.059(7)); Johnson v. State, 697 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (affirming *1252 as unpreserved a claim that defendant received an improper upward departure sentence because the sole reason given for the departure had already been taken into account in co 1998See e.g., Howard v. State, 705 So.2d 947 , (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(affirming as unpreserved the trial court's failure to award credit for time served); Cargle v. State, 701 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(affirming as unpreserved a claim that the trial court erred in sentencing juvenile as adult without considering statutory criteria in section 39.059(7)); Johnson v. State, 697 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(affirming as unpreserved a claim that defendant received an improper upward departure sentence because the sole reason given for the departure had already been taken into account in computing hi | 2 | 1998–1998 |
BB v. State
green
1 sentence1997This offense did not fall within the statutory provisions for sentencing a juvenile as an adult. § 39.022(5)(c)3, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1992); State v. Berry, 647 So.2d 830 (Fla.1994); Robinson v. State, 642 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); see Lunn v. State, 675 So.2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); B.B. v. State, 647 So.2d 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Berry
green
1 sentence1997This offense did not fall within the statutory provisions for sentencing a juvenile as an adult. § 39.022(5)(c)3, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1992); State v. Berry, 647 So.2d 830 (Fla.1994); Robinson v. State, 642 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); see Lunn v. State, 675 So.2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); B.B. v. State, 647 So.2d 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Robinson v. State
green
1 sentence1997This offense did not fall within the statutory provisions for sentencing a juvenile as an adult. § 39.022(5)(c)3, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1992); State v. Berry, 647 So.2d 830 (Fla.1994); Robinson v. State, 642 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); see Lunn v. State, 675 So.2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); B.B. v. State, 647 So.2d 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Grayson v. State
green
1 sentence1996I agree with Judge Pariente in her recent opinion in Grayson v. State, 671 So.2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), that imposing adult sanctions still requires that the trial court consider the relevant statutory criteria. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Satalino v. State
neutral
1 sentence1995See Messam v. State, 640 So.2d 162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); see also Frattallone v. State, 658 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Satalino v. State, 652 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Bell v. State
green
1 sentence1993We review Troutman v. State, 603 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), based on express and direct conflict with State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984), Bell v. State, 598 So.2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), Meyers v. State, 593 So.2d 609 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), and *530 Flowers v. State, 546 So.2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). [1] The issues are whether a trial court must consider each of the statutory criteria required under sections 39.059(7)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1991), [2] at the time of sentencing a juvenile as an adult, and, if so, whether the resultant findings at the time of sentencing must | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Troutman v. State
green
1 sentence1993We review Troutman v. State, 603 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), based on express and direct conflict with State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984), Bell v. State, 598 So.2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), Meyers v. State, 593 So.2d 609 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), and *530 Flowers v. State, 546 So.2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). [1] The issues are whether a trial court must consider each of the statutory criteria required under sections 39.059(7)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1991), [2] at the time of sentencing a juvenile as an adult, and, if so, whether the resultant findings at the time of sentencing must | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Meyers v. State
neutral
1 sentence1993We review Troutman v. State, 603 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), based on express and direct conflict with State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984), Bell v. State, 598 So.2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), Meyers v. State, 593 So.2d 609 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), and *530 Flowers v. State, 546 So.2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). [1] The issues are whether a trial court must consider each of the statutory criteria required under sections 39.059(7)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1991), [2] at the time of sentencing a juvenile as an adult, and, if so, whether the resultant findings at the time of sentencing must | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Flowers v. State
green
1 sentence1993We review Troutman v. State, 603 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), based on express and direct conflict with State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984), Bell v. State, 598 So.2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), Meyers v. State, 593 So.2d 609 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), and *530 Flowers v. State, 546 So.2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). [1] The issues are whether a trial court must consider each of the statutory criteria required under sections 39.059(7)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1991), [2] at the time of sentencing a juvenile as an adult, and, if so, whether the resultant findings at the time of sentencing must | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.