section 19.03(a) offense in Texas

2024The following year, in Patrick v. State, the court applied this footnote to a jury charge in a capital-murder case involving an underlying burglary-of-a-habitation offense under Penal Code Section 19.03(a)(2). 906 S.W.2d 481 , 491-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

2021Given that the two murders occurred within relatively close proximity to each other—three miles apart, within thirteen minutes of each other, and in a continuous and uninterrupted series of events, a jury could have rationally concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant murdered Shelton and Patricia during the “same criminal transaction.” See Coble, 871 S.W.2d at 199 & n.10.

2014Saenz, 166 S.W.3d *743 at 273; Ex Parte Milner, 394 S.W.3d at 508 .

2005PROC., Art. 44.29(c)("If any court sets aside or invalidates the sentence of a defendant convicted of an offense under Section 19.03, Penal Code, and sentenced to death on the basis of any error affecting punishment only, the court shall not set the conviction aside but rather shall commence a new punishment hearing...") [19] 920 S.W.2d 288 , 297-298 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030 , 117 S.Ct. 587 , 136 L.Ed.2d 516 (1996). [20] Art. 44.29(b). [21] Carson v. State, 6 S.W.3d 536 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

2005Proc., Art. 44.29(c)("If any court sets aside or invalidates the sentence of a defendant convicted of an offense under Section 19.03, Penal Code, and sentenced to death on the basis of any error affecting punishment only, the court shall not set the conviction aside but rather shall commence a new punishment hearing ...”) . 920 S.W.2d 288 , 297-298 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030 , 117 S.Ct. 587 , 136 L.Ed.2d 516 (1996). .

2005PROC., Art. 44.29(c)("If any court sets aside or invalidates the sentence of a defendant convicted of an offense under Section 19.03, Penal Code, and sentenced to death on the basis of any error affecting punishment only, the court shall not set the conviction aside but rather shall commence a new punishment hearing...") [19] 920 S.W.2d 288 , 297-298 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030 , 117 S.Ct. 587 , 136 L.Ed.2d 516 (1996). [20] Art. 44.29(b). [21] Carson v. State, 6 S.W.3d 536 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

2005Proc., Art. 44.29(c)("If any court sets aside or invalidates the sentence of a defendant convicted of an offense under Section 19.03, Penal Code, and sentenced to death on the basis of any error affecting punishment only, the court shall not set the conviction aside but rather shall commence a new punishment hearing ...”) . 920 S.W.2d 288 , 297-298 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030 , 117 S.Ct. 587 , 136 L.Ed.2d 516 (1996). .

2005Proc., Art. 44.29(c)("If any court sets aside or invalidates the sentence of a defendant convicted of an offense under Section 19.03, Penal Code, and sentenced to death on the basis of any error affecting punishment only, the court shall not set the conviction aside but rather shall commence a new punishment hearing ...”) . 920 S.W.2d 288 , 297-298 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030 , 117 S.Ct. 587 , 136 L.Ed.2d 516 (1996). .

2005PROC., Art. 44.29(c)("If any court sets aside or invalidates the sentence of a defendant convicted of an offense under Section 19.03, Penal Code, and sentenced to death on the basis of any error affecting punishment only, the court shall not set the conviction aside but rather shall commence a new punishment hearing...") [19] 920 S.W.2d 288 , 297-298 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030 , 117 S.Ct. 587 , 136 L.Ed.2d 516 (1996). [20] Art. 44.29(b). [21] Carson v. State, 6 S.W.3d 536 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

2005Proc., Art. 44.29(c)("If any court sets aside or invalidates the sentence of a defendant convicted of an offense under Section 19.03, Penal Code, and sentenced to death on the basis of any error affecting punishment only, the court shall not set the conviction aside but rather shall commence a new punishment hearing ...”) . 920 S.W.2d 288 , 297-298 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030 , 117 S.Ct. 587 , 136 L.Ed.2d 516 (1996). .

1995See Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 690 -91 fn. 23; Morehead, 807 S.W.2d at 579 fn. 1. [1] Appellant's testimony establishes that he shot the infant once and then shot the mother.

1995See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 , 690-91 fn. 23 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); Morehead v. State, 807 S.W.2d 577 , 579 fn. 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). [23] At the time of trial, Article 37.071(f) read: "If a defendant is convicted of an offense under Section 19.03(a)(6), Penal Code, the court shall submit the three issues under Subsection (b) of this article only with regard to the conduct of the defendant in murdering the deceased individual first named in the indictment." [24] In his brief, appellant provides no substantive analysis and argument in separate grounds on how the protection provided by the Te

1992We pointed out earlier this term in Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 415 , No. 70,810 (Tex.Cr.

1992That call was for the prosecutor, the grand jury, and the petit jury to make, not for me or this Court to make. [2] At the time of appellant's trial, Article 37.071(f) provided: If a defendant is convicted of an offense under Section 19.03(a)(6), Penal Code, the court shall submit the three issues under Subsection (b) of this article only with regard to the conduct of the defendant in murdering the deceased individual first named in the indictment. [3] We pointed out earlier this term in Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 415 , No. 70,810 (Tex.Cr.

1992Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 , 98 S.Ct. at 2965 . [8] Appellant requested the issue relating to the provocation of Davis on February 27, 1987; however, Penry was not decided until June 26, 1989. [9] We pause to note the trial judge did not have benefit of Hitchcock , which was decided two months after appellant's trial. [10] In his Eighth Point of Error, appellant claimed: The State produced insufficient evidence to prove that there is a substantial probability appellant will commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. [1] Article 37.071(f). in effect at

1992Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 , 98 S.Ct. at 2965 . [8] Appellant requested the issue relating to the provocation of Davis on February 27, 1987; however, Penry was not decided until June 26, 1989. [9] We pause to note the trial judge did not have benefit of Hitchcock , which was decided two months after appellant's trial. [10] In his Eighth Point of Error, appellant claimed: The State produced insufficient evidence to prove that there is a substantial probability appellant will commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. [1] Article 37.071(f). in effect at

1987It is argued that the allegation in the indictment, that appellant “did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death ...” is vague and indefinite and does not adequately state an offense under Sec. 19.03(a)(2). 7 Appellant contends § 19.03(a)(2) unequivocally states that the mental state required for an offense thereunder is “intentionally” and the instant indictment alleges “intentionally and knowingly.” Appellant urges this Court to overrule Wilder v. State, 583 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) [vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 902 , 101 S.Ct. 3133 , 69 L.Ed.2d 987 (1981) ], in w

1987It is argued that the allegation in the indictment, that appellant “did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death ...” is vague and indefinite and does not adequately state an offense under Sec. 19.03(a)(2). 7 Appellant contends § 19.03(a)(2) unequivocally states that the mental state required for an offense thereunder is “intentionally” and the instant indictment alleges “intentionally and knowingly.” Appellant urges this Court to overrule Wilder v. State, 583 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) [vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 902 , 101 S.Ct. 3133 , 69 L.Ed.2d 987 (1981) ], in w

1987It is argued that the allegation in the indictment, that appellant “did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death ...” is vague and indefinite and does not adequately state an offense under Sec. 19.03(a)(2). 7 Appellant contends § 19.03(a)(2) unequivocally states that the mental state required for an offense thereunder is “intentionally” and the instant indictment alleges “intentionally and knowingly.” Appellant urges this Court to overrule Wilder v. State, 583 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) [vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 902 , 101 S.Ct. 3133 , 69 L.Ed.2d 987 (1981) ], in w

1987It is argued that the allegation in the indictment, that appellant “did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death ...” is vague and indefinite and does not adequately state an offense under Sec. 19.03(a)(2). 7 Appellant contends § 19.03(a)(2) unequivocally states that the mental state required for an offense thereunder is “intentionally” and the instant indictment alleges “intentionally and knowingly.” Appellant urges this Court to overrule Wilder v. State, 583 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) [vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 902 , 101 S.Ct. 3133 , 69 L.Ed.2d 987 (1981) ], in w

1986One clear result is that, contrary to Eads, supra, even a "nonanswer" in a verdict will compel a trial court to enter a judgment imposing life imprisonment. [4] "If defendant is convicted of an offense under Section 19.03(a)(6), Penal Code, the court shall submit the three issues under Subsection (b) of this article only with regard to the conduct of the defendant in murdering the deceased individual first named in the indictment."