section 22.04 to a child offenses in Texas

2025Injury-to-a-child offenses under Section 22.04 are “result-oriented” and “requir[e] a mental state that relates not to the specific conduct but to the result of that conduct.” Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim.

2023Injury-to-a-child offenses under Section 22.04 are “result-oriented” and “requir[e] a mental state that relates not to the specific conduct but to the result of that conduct.” Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim.

2023Injury-to-a-child offenses under section 22.04 are “result-oriented” and “requir[e] a mental state that relates not to the specific conduct but to the result of that conduct.” Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Alvarado v. State, 704 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).

2022Injury-to-a-child offenses under § 22.04 are “result- oriented” and “requir[e] a mental state that relates not to the specific conduct, but to the result of that conduct.” Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Alvarado v. State, 704 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).

2023Plants v. State, 124 S.W.3d 414, 416 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); see also Kelly v. State, 748 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (observing that culpable mental state must apply to serious bodily injury inflicted on elderly individual); Banks v. State, 819 S.W.2d 676, 680 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, pet. ref’d) (stating that conviction for result-oriented offense cannot be based solely on finding that defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in conduct which happened to cause bodily injury).

2003Kelly v. State, 748 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Maupin v. State, 930 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd).

2012See Freda, 704 S.W.2d at 43 (holding that, in absence of surprise or prejudice, variance between indictment and proof at trial was immaterial and not fatal when indictment correctly alleged date of prior offense, cause number of prior offense, court returning conviction for prior offense, location of convicting court, and fact that offense was felony); see also Wynn, 864 S.W.2d at 541 (holding correction of indictment at trial to reflect true name of defendant did not constitute amendment within purview of article 28.10 but was ministerial act under article 26.08); Simmons, 288 S.W.3d at 79-80

2012See Freda , 704 S.W.2d at 43 (holding that, in absence of surprise or prejudice, variance between indictment and proof at trial was immaterial and not fatal when indictment correctly alleged date of prior offense, cause number of prior offense, court returning conviction for prior offense, location of convicting court, and fact that offense was felony); see also Wynn , 864 S.W.2d at 541 (holding correction of indictment at trial to reflect true name of defendant did not constitute amendment within purview of article 28.10 but was ministerial act under article 26.08); Simmons , 288 S.W.3d at 79

2012See Freda, 704 S.W.2d at 43 (holding that, in absence of surprise or prejudice, variance between indictment and proof at trial was immaterial and not fatal when indictment correctly alleged date of prior offense, cause number of prior offense, court returning conviction for prior offense, location of convicting court, and fact that offense was felony); see also Wynn, 864 S.W.2d at 541 (holding correction of indictment at trial to reflect true name of defendant did not constitute amendment within purview of article 28.10 but was ministerial act under article 26.08); Simmons, 288 S.W.3d at 79-80

2012See Freda , 704 S.W.2d at 43 (holding that, in absence of surprise or prejudice, variance between indictment and proof at trial was immaterial and not fatal when indictment correctly alleged date of prior offense, cause number of prior offense, court returning conviction for prior offense, location of convicting court, and fact that offense was felony); see also Wynn , 864 S.W.2d at 541 (holding correction of indictment at trial to reflect true name of defendant did not constitute amendment within purview of article 28.10 but was ministerial act under article 26.08); Simmons , 288 S.W.3d at 79

2008See Martinez v. State, 883 S.W.2d 771, 774 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, pet. ref’d).2 2 Under the applicable statutes as they read at the time of the offense, the affirmative finding in the judgment will delay appellant’s eligibility for parole, but it will have no effect on his eligibility for mandatory supervision.

2008See Martinez v. State , 883 S.W.2d 771, 774 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1994, pet. ref'd). (2) A deadly weapon includes anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing serious bodily injury or death.

2012See Freda, 704 S.W.2d at 43 (holding that, in absence of surprise or prejudice, variance between indictment and proof at trial was immaterial and not fatal when indictment correctly alleged date of prior offense, cause number of prior offense, court returning conviction for prior offense, location of convicting court, and fact that offense was felony); see also Wynn, 864 S.W.2d at 541 (holding correction of indictment at trial to reflect true name of defendant did not constitute amendment within purview of article 28.10 but was ministerial act under article 26.08); Simmons, 288 S.W.3d at 79-80

2012See Freda , 704 S.W.2d at 43 (holding that, in absence of surprise or prejudice, variance between indictment and proof at trial was immaterial and not fatal when indictment correctly alleged date of prior offense, cause number of prior offense, court returning conviction for prior offense, location of convicting court, and fact that offense was felony); see also Wynn , 864 S.W.2d at 541 (holding correction of indictment at trial to reflect true name of defendant did not constitute amendment within purview of article 28.10 but was ministerial act under article 26.08); Simmons , 288 S.W.3d at 79

2023Plants v. State, 124 S.W.3d 414, 416 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); see also Kelly v. State, 748 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (observing that culpable mental state must apply to serious bodily injury inflicted on elderly individual); Banks v. State, 819 S.W.2d 676, 680 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, pet. ref’d) (stating that conviction for result-oriented offense cannot be based solely on finding that defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in conduct which happened to cause bodily injury).

2023Plants v. State, 124 S.W.3d 414, 416 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); see also Kelly v. State, 748 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (observing that culpable mental state must apply to serious bodily injury inflicted on elderly individual); Banks v. State, 819 S.W.2d 676, 680 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, pet. ref’d) (stating that conviction for result-oriented offense cannot be based solely on finding that defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in conduct which happened to cause bodily injury).

2014PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(e) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (providing that an offense under section 22.04 is a first- degree felony if engaged in “intentionally or knowingly” but a second-degree felony if engaged in “recklessly”). 2 In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim.

2014App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim.

2014Appellant is correct in his contention that the offense of committing injury to a child by causing “serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury” is a separate offense from causing “serious bodily injury.” See Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 717 (Tex. Crim.

2003Kelly v. State, 748 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Maupin v. State, 930 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd).

2000See Pickering v. State, 596 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (bruises that would eventually heal and a burn that would not result in scarring were not considered serious bodily injuries as defined by the Penal Code).