four-tiered framework in New York

2026In laying out this four-tiered analysis, the Court of Appeals recognized "that police-citizen encounters are dynamic situations during which the degree of belief possessed at the point of inception may blossom by virtue of responses or other matters which authorize and indeed require additional action as the scenario unfolds" ( De Bour at 225 ; see People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 191 [1992]).

2024To assess the propriety of a street encounter with police, the Court must employ the four-tiered framework set forth in People v. DeBour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) and reaffirmed in People v. Hollman ( 79 NY2d 181 [1992]).

2025In People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210 ), the Court of Appeals "established a four-tiered framework for evaluating the propriety of police-initiated encounters with civilians" ( People v Johnson , 40 NY3d 172 , 174). "[L]evel one permits a police officer to request information from an individual and merely requires that the request be supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality; level two, the common-law right of inquiry, permits a somewhat greater intrusion and requires a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot; level three authorizes an officer

2024To assess the propriety of a street encounter with police, the Court must employ the four-tiered framework set forth in People v. DeBour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) and reaffirmed in People v. Hollman ( 79 NY2d 181 [1992]).

2025In People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210 ), the Court of Appeals "established a four-tiered framework for evaluating the propriety of police-initiated encounters with civilians" ( People v Johnson , 40 NY3d 172 , 174). "[L]evel one permits a police officer to request information from an individual and merely requires that the request be supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality; level two, the common-law right of inquiry, permits a somewhat greater intrusion and requires a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot; level three authorizes an officer

2023The majority largely ignores this seminal case, but in De Bour we “established a four-tiered framework for evaluating the propriety of police-initiated encounters with civilians” (People v Johnson, 40 NY3d 172 , 174 [2023]; see People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 498 [2006]).

2025Under the four-tiered framework set out in De Bour , pursuit of a fleeing suspect constitutes a level three detention, for which the police must "have a reasonable suspicion that defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime" ( People v Martinez , 80 NY2d 444, 446 [1992]; see id. at 447, citing People v Leung , 68 NY2d 734, 736 [1986]).

2025Under the four-tiered framework set out in De Bour , pursuit of a fleeing suspect constitutes a level three detention, for which the police must "have a reasonable suspicion that defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime" ( People v Martinez , 80 NY2d 444, 446 [1992]; see id. at 447 , citing People v Leung , 68 NY2d 734, 736 [1986]).

2013We analyze defendant’s contentions pursuant to the four-tiered framework for citizen-police encounters set forth in People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]; see People v Garcia, 20 NY3d 317, 322 [2012]; People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 184-185 [1992]).

2013We analyze defendant’s contentions pursuant to the four-tiered framework for citizen-police encounters set forth in People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]; see People v Garcia, 20 NY3d 317, 322 [2012]; People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 184-185 [1992]).

2020In contrast to the Fourth Amendment, which “permits brief investigative stops . . . when a law enforcement officer has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity’” (Navarette v California, 572 US 393, 396 [2014]; see also Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 [1968]), this Court has adopted greater protections than Terry and its federal progeny for pedestrian stops by the police (see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976] [creating a four-tiered framework for evaluating police-civilian encounters]).

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) — also sometimes called a level-three stop under De Bour or, in federal constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, 572 US —, —, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 3

2012In addition, we “accord great weight to the determination of the hearing court with its particular advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses” (People v Williams, 202 AD2d 976, 976 [1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 916 [1994]).

2012In addition, we “accord great weight to the determination of the hearing court with its particular advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses” (People v Williams, 202 AD2d 976, 976 [1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 916 [1994]).

2025Under the four-tiered framework set out in De Bour , pursuit of a fleeing suspect constitutes a level three detention, for which the police must "have a reasonable suspicion that defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime" ( People v Martinez , 80 NY2d 444, 446 [1992]; see id. at 447 , citing People v Leung , 68 NY2d 734, 736 [1986]).

2025Under the four-tiered framework set out in De Bour , pursuit of a fleeing suspect constitutes a level three detention, for which the police must "have a reasonable suspicion that defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime" ( People v Martinez , 80 NY2d 444, 446 [1992]; see id. at 447 , citing People v Leung , 68 NY2d 734, 736 [1986]).

2025Like a level three stop, pursuit results in "infringement on freedom of movement," but "a lesser interference with freedom than does a[ level four] arrest" ( id. at 447). [FN1] Thus, "a defendant's flight in response to an approach by the police, combined with other specific circumstances indicating that the suspect may be engaged in criminal activity" may give rise to a lawful pursuit ( People v Sierra , 83 NY2d 928, 929 [1994]).

2025Like a level three stop, pursuit results in "infringement on freedom of movement," but "a lesser interference with freedom than does a[ level four] arrest" ( id. at 447). [FN1] Thus, "a defendant's flight in response to an approach by the police, combined with other specific circumstances indicating that the suspect may be engaged in criminal activity," may give rise to a lawful pursuit ( People v Sierra , 83 NY2d 928, 929 [1994]).

2020In contrast to the Fourth Amendment, which “permits brief investigative stops . . . when a law enforcement officer has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity’” (Navarette v California, 572 US 393, 396 [2014]; see also Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 [1968]), this Court has adopted greater protections than Terry and its federal progeny for pedestrian stops by the police (see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976] [creating a four-tiered framework for evaluating police-civilian encounters]).

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) — also sometimes called a level-three stop under De Bour or, in federal constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, 572 US —, —, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 3

2005Under the four-tiered analysis of police-civilian encounters first propounded by the Court of Appeals in People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]), a level I “request for information”— the least intrusive level of police inquiry—is justified by an “objective, credible reason not necessarily indicative of criminality” (People v Ocasio, 85 NY2d 982, 985 [1995], citing People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 187, 194 [1992]).

1998(People v Ocasio, supra, at 985 ; People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 185 [1992]; People v De Bour, supra at 223.) This is the same standard used for evaluating an officer’s conduct in approaching a citizen on the street under the first level of the four-tiered analysis of Be Bour (supra).

2006It is well-established as a matter of federal and state constitutional law that police-civilian encounters undertaken for the purpose of obtaining information do not constitute seizures and that such encounters ordinarily do not implicate the Fourth Amendment ( Terry v. Ohio , 392 US 1 [1968]; California v. Hodari D. , 499 US 621, 626 [1991]; Hiibel v. Sixth District Court of Nevada , 542 US 177, 185-186 [2004]; People v. Bora , 83 NY2d 531, 534 [1994]; Matter of Jamaal C. , 19 AD3d 144, 145 [2005]).

1992(Cf., California v Hodari D., 499 US 621 , 111 S Ct 1547 [1991].) For a thorough exploration of the divergent case law on the subject see Kamins, Search and Seizure (1991). .

2006The decision in People v. DeBour ( 40 NY2d 210 ), in which the Court of Appeals set out a four-tiered framework representing the gradation of permissible warrantless police encounters with citizens in a public place and which correlates the degree of the officer's objectively credible belief with the permissible scope of the officer's intervention, is applicable to this case ( People v. Hollman , 79 NY2d 181, 195 ; People v. Leung , 68 NY2d 734, 736 ; People v. McIntosh , 96 NY2d 521, 526 ).

2006The decision in People v. DeBour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]), in which the Court of Appeals set out a four-tiered framework representing the gradation of permissible warrantless police encounters with citizens in a public place and which correlates the degree of the officer's objectively credible belief with the permissible scope of the officer's intervention, is applicable to this case ( People v. Hollman , 79 NY2d 181, 195 [1992]; People v. Leung , 68 NY2d 734, 736 [1986]; People v. McIntosh , 96 NY2d 521, 526 [2001]; People v. Pines , 99 NY2d 525, 527 [2002]; People v. Moore , 6 NY3d 496, 498-499

2026Where, as here, a defendant is charged with a driving while intoxicated related offense, probable cause exists when an officer "can demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had been driving in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192" ( People v Kowalski, 291 AD2d 669, 670 [3d Dept 2002]).

2025In circumstances justifying a level two encounter, the officer may request an individual's consent to conduct a search, so long as the request is "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place" ( People v Mercado , 120 [*2]AD3d 441, 443, affd 25 NY3d 936 ; see People v Dunbar , 5 NY3d 834, 835 ; People v Irizarry , 79 NY2d 890, 892 ).

2021The “reasonable suspicion” standard is higher than - 16 - the “founded suspicion” standard under the New York Constitution (see DeBour, 40 NY2d at 223 [describing a four-tiered framework for levels of suspicion, with the second level of suspicion (required for police officers to make inquiries) as “a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot” and a third, higher level of suspicion (required for police officers to complete a forcible stop and detention) as a “reasonable suspicion that a particular person has committed or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor”]; Devone, 15 NY3d at 1

2020Our De Bour test, in which “constitutional law and common law both played a part” (People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 195 [1992]), is more protective of the rights of individuals “to be free from aggressive governmental interference” (De Bour, 40 NY2d at 216 ; cf. People v Gates, 31 NY3d 1028, 1030 [Garcia, J., dissenting] [“The De Bour method differs significantly from the federal approach . . .

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) — also sometimes called a level-three stop under De Bour or, in federal constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, 572 US —, —, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 3

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v DeBour -- also sometimes called a level-three stop under DeBour or, in federal - 14 - - 15 - No. 198, 199, 210 constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, __US__, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 36

2014In the past, we interpreted the State Constitution to permit a level-three stop based on a hearsay report that did not meet both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli standard for reliability (see People v Salaman, 71 NY2d 869, 870 [1988]; Landy, 59 NY2d at 376 ).

2014In the past, we interpreted the state constitution to permit a level-three stop based on a hearsay report that did not meet both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli standard for reliability (see People v Salaman, 71 NY2d 869, 870 [1988]; Landy, 59 NY2d at 376 ).

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v De Bour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]) — also sometimes called a level-three stop under De Bour or, in federal constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, 572 US —, —, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 3

2014Just as reliable hearsay can supply the police with probable cause, such hearsay can give rise to reasonable suspicion, which is the lesser level of suspicion required to authorize an investigatory stop of a person or a moving car under the four-tiered framework of People v DeBour -- also sometimes called a level-three stop under DeBour or, in federal - 14 - - 15 - No. 198, 199, 210 constitutional parlance, a Terry stop (see Navarette v California, __US__, 134 S Ct 1683, 1687-1688 [2014]; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143, 147 [1972]; Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20-27 [1968]; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 36

2006The decision in People v. DeBour ( 40 NY2d 210 [1976]), in which the Court of Appeals set out a four-tiered framework representing the gradation of permissible warrantless police encounters with citizens in a public place and which correlates the degree of the officer's objectively credible belief with the permissible scope of the officer's intervention, is applicable to this case ( People v. Hollman , 79 NY2d 181, 195 [1992]; People v. Leung , 68 NY2d 734, 736 [1986]; People v. McIntosh , 96 NY2d 521, 526 [2001]; People v. Pines , 99 NY2d 525, 527 [2002]; People v. Moore , 6 NY3d 496, 498-499