section 12-81(7) tax exemption in Connecticut

2009The plaintiff [corporation was] under no legal obligation to provide any services that would impose any significant financial burden on it." Id., at 721, 539 A.2d 573 .

2002Our Supreme Court in United Church of Christ v. West Hartford, 206 Conn. 711, 718 , 539 A.2d 523 (1988) delineated the three requirements for a tax exemption under § 12-81 (7): “[t]he property must belong to or be held in a trust for an organization exempt from taxation ... it must be held for one of the purposes stated in [the] statute’s list of exemptions; and it must produce no rent, profits or income.” *524 Isaiah argues that it meets these three requirements.

2026“Thus, in order for real property used for charitable purposes to qualify for tax exemption under §§ 12-81 (7) and 12-88, the property must: (1) belong to or be held in trust for a corporation organized exclusively for charitable purposes; (2) be used exclusively for carrying out such charitable purposes; (3) not be leased, rented or otherwise used for a purpose other than the furtherance of its charitable purposes . . . .” Id., 76-77.4 The court in Isaiah 61:1 cited with approval its decision in Hartford Hospital v. Hartford, 160 Conn. 370 , 279 A.2d 561 (1971), in which the court considered

2026“Thus, in order for real property used for charitable purposes to qualify for tax exemption under §§ 12-81 (7) and 12-88, the property must: (1) belong to or be held in trust for a corporation organized exclusively for charitable purposes; (2) be used exclusively for carrying out such charitable purposes; (3) not be leased, rented or otherwise used for a purpose other than the furtherance of its charitable purposes . . . .” Id., 76-77.4 The court in Isaiah 61:1 cited with approval its decision in Hartford Hospital v. Hartford, 160 Conn. 370 , 279 A.2d 561 (1971), in which the court considered

2002Our Supreme Court in United Church of Christ v. West Hartford, 206 Conn. 711, 718 , 539 A.2d 523 (1988) delineated the three requirements for a tax exemption under § 12-81 (7): “[t]he property must belong to or be held in a trust for an organization exempt from taxation ... it must be held for one of the purposes stated in [the] statute’s list of exemptions; and it must produce no rent, profits or income.” *524 Isaiah argues that it meets these three requirements.

2001United Church of Christ v. West Hartford, 206 Conn. 711 , 718 , 539 A.2d 523 (1988).

2025It is well settled that, ‘‘[w]here a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject . . . is significant to show that a different intention existed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Viera v. Cohen, 283 Conn. 412, 431 , 927 A.2d 843 (2007).

2025It is well settled that, ‘‘[w]here a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject . . . is significant to show that a different intention existed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Viera v. Cohen, 283 Conn. 412, 431 , 927 A.2d 843 (2007).

2025Subsection (72), however, ‘‘is effective for assessment years commencing on or after October 1, 2002, but prior to assessment years commencing on or after October 1, 2011,’’ whereas subsection (76) is ‘‘[e]ffective for assessment years commencing on or after October 1, 2011.’’ Because the plaintiff challenges the tax assessed on its property for the assessment year commencing October 1, 2022, it claims the exemption pursuant to § 12-81 (76). 7 ‘‘Manufacturing facility’’ means ‘‘that portion of a plant, building or other real property improvement used for manufacturing, processing or fabricatin

2025Subsection (72), however, ‘‘is effective for assessment years commencing on or after October 1, 2002, but prior to assessment years commencing on or after October 1, 2011,’’ whereas subsection (76) is ‘‘[e]ffective for assessment years commencing on or after October 1, 2011.’’ Because the plaintiff challenges the tax assessed on its property for the assessment year commencing October 1, 2022, it claims the exemption pursuant to § 12-81 (76). 7 ‘‘Manufacturing facility’’ means ‘‘that portion of a plant, building or other real property improvement used for manufacturing, processing or fabricatin

2009The trial court disagreed, concluding that it was not exempt from property tax because, "although [the Center is] operated efficiently and with the best of intentions, [it] is simply not a charity nor are its uses charitable." After setting out what it deemed to be the applicable legal framework, the trial court found eleven characteristics that distinguished the Center from the organizations that we found to be tax-exempt under § 12-81(7) in Camp Isabella Freedman of Connecticut, Inc. v. Canaan, 147 Conn. 510 , 162 A.2d 700 (1960), and Isaiah 61:1, Inc. v. Bridgeport, 270 Conn. 69 , 851 A.2d

2009The trial court disagreed, concluding that it was not exempt from property tax because, "although [the Center is] operated efficiently and with the best of intentions, [it] is simply not a charity nor are its uses charitable." After setting out what it deemed to be the applicable legal framework, the trial court found eleven characteristics that distinguished the Center from the organizations that we found to be tax-exempt under § 12-81(7) in Camp Isabella Freedman of Connecticut, Inc. v. Canaan, 147 Conn. 510 , 162 A.2d 700 (1960), and Isaiah 61:1, Inc. v. Bridgeport, 270 Conn. 69 , 851 A.2d

2009As the majority recognizes, in Isaiah 61:1, Inc. v. Bridgeport, 270 Conn. 69, 76-77 , 851 A.2d 277 (2004), we set forth a five part test to determine whether a subject real property qualifies for a tax exemption under § 12-81 (7) and General Statutes § 12-88.1 agree with the majority that the present case raises only the first two prongs of this test.

2009As the majority recognizes, in Isaiah 61:1, Inc. v. Bridgeport, 270 Conn. 69, 76-77 , 851 A.2d 277 (2004), we set forth a five part test to determine whether a subject real property qualifies for a tax exemption under § 12-81 (7) and General Statutes § 12-88.1 agree with the majority that the present case raises only the first two prongs of this test.

2004Crosby Memorial, Inc. v. Bridgeport, supra, 262 Conn. 213 , the plaintiff, a charitable organization, appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its appeal from the decision of the local board of tax review that the organization’s property did not qualify for tax exemption under § 12-81 (7) because the organization provided housing for persons of low and moderate income.

2002Citing Hartford Hospital v. Hartford, 160 Conn. 370, 377 , 279 A.2d 561 (1971), this court concluded in Isaiah 61:1, Inc. v. Bridgeport, 47 Conn. Sup. 520, 525 , 809 A.2d 551 (2002) that “[i]t is the use of the rental income, not the fact that rent is charged, that determines whether the exemption under § 12-81 (7) applies.” In the present case, the services performed by the caretaker in lieu of rent are in furtherance of the charitable and educational purposes of the property.

2002Citing Hartford Hospital v. Hartford, 160 Conn. 370, 377 , 279 A.2d 561 (1971), this court concluded in Isaiah 61:1, Inc. v. Bridgeport, 47 Conn. Sup. 520, 525 , 809 A.2d 551 (2002) that “[i]t is the use of the rental income, not the fact that rent is charged, that determines whether the exemption under § 12-81 (7) applies.” In the present case, the services performed by the caretaker in lieu of rent are in furtherance of the charitable and educational purposes of the property.

2002For example, in Common Fund v. Fairfield, 228 Conn. 375 , 636 A.2d 795 (1994), our Supreme Court considered a corporation’s eligibility for a charitable exemption under General Statutes §§ 12-81 (7) and 12-89a.

2002For example, in Common Fund v. Fairfield, 228 Conn. 375 , 636 A.2d 795 (1994), our Supreme Court considered a corporation’s eligibility for a charitable exemption under General Statutes §§ 12-81 (7) and 12-89a.

1995In order to qualify for a tax exemption under General Statutes § 12-81 (7), two requirements must be established: (1) The corporation that owns the property must be "organized exclusively for scientific, educational, literary, historical, or charitable purposes . . ." and (2) the property must be used "exclusively for carrying out one or more of such purposes." (Emphasis added.) Loomis Institute v. Windsor, 234 Conn. 169 , 175 , 661 A.2d 1001 (1995); quoting General Statutes § 12-81 (7).

1995In order to qualify for a tax exemption under General Statutes § 12-81 (7), two requirements must be established: (1) The corporation that owns the property must be "organized exclusively for scientific, educational, literary, historical, or charitable purposes . . ." and (2) the property must be used "exclusively for carrying out one or more of such purposes." (Emphasis added.) Loomis Institute v. Windsor, 234 Conn. 169 , 175 , 661 A.2d 1001 (1995); quoting General Statutes § 12-81 (7).

1994“Because the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Bart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

1994“Because the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Bart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

1994“Because the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Bart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

1994“Because the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Bart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

1994“Because the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Bart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

1994“Because the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Bart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

1994“Because the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Bart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

1994“Because the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law, the proper construction of any statute must take into account the mandates of related statutes governing the same general subject matter.” Bart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575 , 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 187 , 571 A.2d 89 (1990); State v. West, 192 Conn. 488, 494 , 472 A.2d 775 (1984); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422 , 426 A.2d 1324 (1980).

1988Viewing the legislature’s actions in light of the maxim that “statutes which exempt from taxation are to be strictly construed against the party claiming an exemption”; Hartford Hospital v. Board of Tax Review, 158 Conn. 138, 147 , 256 A.2d 234 (1969); we hold that the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to a tax exemption under General Statutes § 12-81 (7).

1988Viewing the legislature’s actions in light of the maxim that “statutes which exempt from taxation are to be strictly construed against the party claiming an exemption”; Hartford Hospital v. Board of Tax Review, 158 Conn. 138, 147 , 256 A.2d 234 (1969); we hold that the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to a tax exemption under General Statutes § 12-81 (7).

1987(See Wood v. Wood, 165 Conn. 777, 780 [ 345 A.2d 5 (1974)].) “(4) As to the plaintiff’s request that the Court articulate how and why the plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of proof, the court is unaware of what evidence may have been available to support the plaintiff’s contention but, as noted in the Memorandum of Decision, it is concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that the property in question is now devoted to and used exclusively for charitable purposes.” For a similar life care program, see Whitney Center v. Hamden, 4 Conn. App. 426 , 494 A.2d 624 (1985).

1987(See Wood v. Wood, 165 Conn. 777, 780 [ 345 A.2d 5 (1974)].) “(4) As to the plaintiff’s request that the Court articulate how and why the plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of proof, the court is unaware of what evidence may have been available to support the plaintiff’s contention but, as noted in the Memorandum of Decision, it is concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that the property in question is now devoted to and used exclusively for charitable purposes.” For a similar life care program, see Whitney Center v. Hamden, 4 Conn. App. 426 , 494 A.2d 624 (1985).

1975The plaintiff argues to the contrary, claiming that it is not seeking an exemption under § 12-81 (7) or (8), which are expressly limited to Connecticut educational corporations and designated institutions, respectively, but, rather, under its constitutional right to equal protection of the law within the holding of the United States Supreme Court in WHYY v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 .

1971Luke’s Hospital v. Boyland, 12 N.Y.2d 135 , 187 N.E.2d 769 ; Columbia Hospital Assn. v. Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d 660 , 151 N.W.2d 750 ; note, 15 A.L.R.2d 1064 , 1075. *378 In the present ease the conclusions of the trial court that the property in question was used exclusively for hospital purposes, that the exclusiveness of the use was not impaired by the fact that the plaintiff charged rent for occupancy of the property and that it qualified for tax exemption under the provisions of §§ 12-81 (16) and 12-88 are correct.

1971Luke’s Hospital v. Boyland, 12 N.Y.2d 135 , 187 N.E.2d 769 ; Columbia Hospital Assn. v. Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d 660 , 151 N.W.2d 750 ; note, 15 A.L.R.2d 1064 , 1075. *378 In the present ease the conclusions of the trial court that the property in question was used exclusively for hospital purposes, that the exclusiveness of the use was not impaired by the fact that the plaintiff charged rent for occupancy of the property and that it qualified for tax exemption under the provisions of §§ 12-81 (16) and 12-88 are correct.

1971Luke’s Hospital v. Boyland, 12 N.Y.2d 135 , 187 N.E.2d 769 ; Columbia Hospital Assn. v. Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d 660 , 151 N.W.2d 750 ; note, 15 A.L.R.2d 1064 , 1075. *378 In the present ease the conclusions of the trial court that the property in question was used exclusively for hospital purposes, that the exclusiveness of the use was not impaired by the fact that the plaintiff charged rent for occupancy of the property and that it qualified for tax exemption under the provisions of §§ 12-81 (16) and 12-88 are correct.

1971Luke’s Hospital v. Boyland, 12 N.Y.2d 135 , 187 N.E.2d 769 ; Columbia Hospital Assn. v. Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d 660 , 151 N.W.2d 750 ; note, 15 A.L.R.2d 1064 , 1075. *378 In the present ease the conclusions of the trial court that the property in question was used exclusively for hospital purposes, that the exclusiveness of the use was not impaired by the fact that the plaintiff charged rent for occupancy of the property and that it qualified for tax exemption under the provisions of §§ 12-81 (16) and 12-88 are correct.