Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
15 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1994–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
LeConche v. Elligersyellow2 sentences2000Raphael, 33 Conn. App. 378 , 384 , 635 A.2d 1232 , cert denied, 228 Conn. 928 , 640 A.2d 115 (1994); see also LeConche v. Elligers, supra, 215 Conn. 701 . 1999Raphael , 33 Conn. App. 378 , 384 , 635 A.2d 1232 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 928 , 640 A.2d 115 (1994); see also LeConche v. Elligers , 215 Conn. 701 , 711 , 579 A.2d 1 (1990). | 2 | 2 |
Gabrielle v. Hospital of St. Raphaelgreen2 sentences2009Raphael, 33 Conn. App. 378 , 635 A.2d 1232 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 928 , 640 A.2d 115 (1994), for the proposition that the failure to include a good faith certificate under § 52-190a (a) was not a jurisdictional defect. 2009Raphael, 33 Conn. App. 378 , 635 A.2d 1232 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 928 , 640 A.2d 115 (1994), for the proposition that the failure to include a good faith certificate under § 52-190a (a) was not a jurisdictional defect. | 1 | 11 |
Camposano v. Claiborngreen1 sentence2002The Trimel court relied on language in Santopietro v. New Haven , 239 Conn. 207 , 226 (1996), which said: "Professional negligence or malpractice . . . is defined as the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss or damage to the recipient of those services." Camposano v. Claiborn , 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 135, 136-137 (1963), was also cited to the effect that malpractice "presupposes some improper con | 1 | 1 |
Caron v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2001See Caron v. Adams, 33 Conn. App. 673, 690 , 638 A.2d 1073 (1994). 2001See Caron v. Adams, 33 Conn. App. 673, 690 , 638 A.2d 1073 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gabrielle v. Hospital of St. Raphael
neutral
2 sentences2009Raphael, 33 Conn. App. 378 , 635 A.2d 1232 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 928 , 640 A.2d 115 (1994), for the proposition that the failure to include a good faith certificate under § 52-190a (a) was not a jurisdictional defect. 2009Raphael, 33 Conn. App. 378 , 635 A.2d 1232 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 928 , 640 A.2d 115 (1994), for the proposition that the failure to include a good faith certificate under § 52-190a (a) was not a jurisdictional defect. | 7 | 1999–2009 |
Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat
green
2 sentences2004I do not think that the legislature, in enacting these two separate but closely related statutory provisions, intended such an irrational and bizarre result. 6 Instead, I think that we should interpret these provisions so that they form a coherent and rational, rather than an inconsistent and irrational, statutory scheme; Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 557 , 800 A.2d 1102 (2002); so that they make sense when read together; Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat, 266 Conn. 130, 143-44 , 831 A.2d 235 (2003); and so that they carry out the closely related purposes of both, consistent with the limitat 2004I do not think that the legislature, in enacting these two separate but closely related statutory provisions, intended such an irrational and bizarre result. 6 Instead, I think that we should interpret these provisions so that they form a coherent and rational, rather than an inconsistent and irrational, statutory scheme; Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 557 , 800 A.2d 1102 (2002); so that they make sense when read together; Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat, 266 Conn. 130, 143-44 , 831 A.2d 235 (2003); and so that they carry out the closely related purposes of both, consistent with the limitat | 1 | 2004–2004 |
City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington
green
2 sentences2004I do not think that the legislature, in enacting these two separate but closely related statutory provisions, intended such an irrational and bizarre result. 6 Instead, I think that we should interpret these provisions so that they form a coherent and rational, rather than an inconsistent and irrational, statutory scheme; Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 557 , 800 A.2d 1102 (2002); so that they make sense when read together; Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat, 266 Conn. 130, 143-44 , 831 A.2d 235 (2003); and so that they carry out the closely related purposes of both, consistent with the limitat 2004I do not think that the legislature, in enacting these two separate but closely related statutory provisions, intended such an irrational and bizarre result. 6 Instead, I think that we should interpret these provisions so that they form a coherent and rational, rather than an inconsistent and irrational, statutory scheme; Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 557 , 800 A.2d 1102 (2002); so that they make sense when read together; Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat, 266 Conn. 130, 143-44 , 831 A.2d 235 (2003); and so that they carry out the closely related purposes of both, consistent with the limitat | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory
green
2 sentences2004I do not think that the legislature, in enacting these two separate but closely related statutory provisions, intended such an irrational and bizarre result. 6 Instead, I think that we should interpret these provisions so that they form a coherent and rational, rather than an inconsistent and irrational, statutory scheme; Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 557 , 800 A.2d 1102 (2002); so that they make sense when read together; Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat, 266 Conn. 130, 143-44 , 831 A.2d 235 (2003); and so that they carry out the closely related purposes of both, consistent with the limitat 2004I do not think that the legislature, in enacting these two separate but closely related statutory provisions, intended such an irrational and bizarre result. 6 Instead, I think that we should interpret these provisions so that they form a coherent and rational, rather than an inconsistent and irrational, statutory scheme; Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 557 , 800 A.2d 1102 (2002); so that they make sense when read together; Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat, 266 Conn. 130, 143-44 , 831 A.2d 235 (2003); and so that they carry out the closely related purposes of both, consistent with the limitat | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Davis v. Margolis
green
2 sentences2002Raphael , 33 Conn. App. 378 , 384 , 635 A.2d 1232 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 928 , 640 A.2d 115 (1994). 3 "Malpractice is commonly defined as the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss, or damage to the recipient of those services." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis v. Margolis , 215 Conn. 408 , 415 , 576 A.2d 489 (1990). 2002Raphael , 33 Conn. App. 378 , 384 , 635 A.2d 1232 , cert. denied, 228 Conn. 928 , 640 A.2d 115 (1994). 3 "Malpractice is commonly defined as the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss, or damage to the recipient of those services." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis v. Margolis , 215 Conn. 408 , 415 , 576 A.2d 489 (1990). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Santopietro v. City of New Haven
green
1 sentence2002The Trimel court relied on language in Santopietro v. New Haven , 239 Conn. 207 , 226 (1996), which said: "Professional negligence or malpractice . . . is defined as the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss or damage to the recipient of those services." Camposano v. Claiborn , 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 135, 136-137 (1963), was also cited to the effect that malpractice "presupposes some improper con | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Trimel v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital Rehabilitation Center
green
1 sentence2002If that is the case, a motion to strike should be sustained against the first two counts which allege a tort against a healthcare provider, a physician. 2 The defendant cites the case of Trimel v. Lawrence Memorial Hospital , 61 Conn. App. 353 (2001), which held that the plaintiffs negligence claim sounded in medical malpractice and thus required the filing of a good faith certificate under § 52-190a . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Barnes v. Schlein
green
2 sentences1999Raphael, 33 Conn. App. 378 , 383-84 , 635 A.2d 1232 (1994) [W]hether [a] plaintiff's cause of action is one for malpractice depends upon the definition of that work and the allegations of the complaint." Barnes v. Schlein, 192 Conn. 732 , 735 , 473 A.2d 1221 (1984). 1999Raphael, 33 Conn. App. 378 , 383-84 , 635 A.2d 1232 (1994) [W]hether [a] plaintiff's cause of action is one for malpractice depends upon the definition of that work and the allegations of the complaint." Barnes v. Schlein, 192 Conn. 732 , 735 , 473 A.2d 1221 (1984). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Ecker v. Town of West Hartford
green
2 sentences1994Statutes of limitations are statutes of repose and are designed to “(1) prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale and fraudulent claims by allowing persons after the lapse of a reasonable time, to plan their affairs with a reasonable degree of certainty, free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown potential liability, and (2) to aid in the search for truth that may be impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, dis appearance of documents or otherwise.” Ecker v. West Hartford, 205 Conn. 219, 240 , 530 A.2d 1056 (1987); Wynn 1994Statutes of limitations are statutes of repose and are designed to “(1) prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale and fraudulent claims by allowing persons after the lapse of a reasonable time, to plan their affairs with a reasonable degree of certainty, free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown potential liability, and (2) to aid in the search for truth that may be impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, dis appearance of documents or otherwise.” Ecker v. West Hartford, 205 Conn. 219, 240 , 530 A.2d 1056 (1987); Wynn | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.