section 1354(f) entitlement to attorney fees in California

2013There are no favorable parties in this case.’” (Heather Farms, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1571 .) Nevertheless, Robinson sought to recover his attorney fees pursuant to section 1354, “maintain[ing] that since he had received a dismissal, he was the ‘prevailing party’. . . .” (Heather Farms, at p. 1571.) The trial “court agreed with the settlement judge and concluded there was no ‘prevailing party’ . . . within the meaning of section 1354.” (Ibid.) The appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling, explaining that to determine the “prevailing party” within the meaning of section 1354, the tr

2013(Heather Farms, supra, at p. 1571 .) Agreeing with the settlement judge that there was no prevailing party, the trial court ruled that Robinson was not entitled to receive his attorney fees under section 1354.

2022The words “shall be awarded” in the statute “ ‘reflect a legislative intent that [the prevailing party] receive attorney fees as a matter of right (and that the trial court is therefore obligated to award attorney fees) whenever the statutory conditions have been satisfied.’ (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 872 .)” (Salehi v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1152 [interpreting former Civil Code section 1354 which is now section 5975].) “[T]he statutory award of attorney fees under Civil Code section 1354 [now section 5975] is expressly awarded to the preva

2011The court concluded: “In the final analysis, ... the dismissals] seem[] to be due more to [Salehi’s] inexperience and poor decisions than any implied concession to the merits of [Association’s] case.” Association Is the Prevailing Party Section 1354 does not define “prevailing party.” It only provides that “the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” (Id., subd. (c).) “The words ‘shall be [awarded]’ reflect a legislative intent that [the prevailing party] receive attorney fees as a matter of right (and that the trial court is therefore obligated to award attorn

2026(See, e.g., Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 321 [holding that court lacking subject matter jurisdiction could still properly award fees to the defendant under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16]; Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1039 [awarding fees under Civil Code section 1354 to defendant when plaintiffs lacked standing]; accord, Farber v. Bay View Terrace Homeowners Assn. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1007 , 1014-1016.) Section 809.9, by its terms, applies to “any suit brought to challenge an action taken or a restriction imposed wh

2026(See, e.g., Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 321 [holding that court lacking subject matter jurisdiction could still properly award fees to the defendant under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16]; Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1039 [awarding fees under Civil Code section 1354 to defendant when plaintiffs lacked standing]; accord, Farber v. Bay View Terrace Homeowners Assn. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1007 , 1014-1016.) Section 809.9, by its terms, applies to “any suit brought to challenge an action taken or a restriction imposed wh

2026(See, e.g., Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 321 [holding that court lacking subject matter jurisdiction could still properly award fees to the defendant under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16]; Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1039 [awarding fees under Civil Code section 1354 to defendant when plaintiffs lacked standing]; accord, Farber v. Bay View Terrace Homeowners Assn. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1007 , 1014-1016.) Section 809.9, by its terms, applies to “any suit brought to challenge an action taken or a restriction imposed wh

2022The words “shall be awarded” in the statute “ ‘reflect a legislative intent that [the prevailing party] receive attorney fees as a matter of right (and that the trial court is therefore obligated to award attorney fees) whenever the statutory conditions have been satisfied.’ (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 872 .)” (Salehi v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1152 [interpreting former Civil Code section 1354 which is now section 5975].) “[T]he statutory award of attorney fees under Civil Code section 1354 [now section 5975] is expressly awarded to the preva

2015(Cf. Chee, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1380-1381 [interpreted fee provisions of section 1354, subdivisions (a) and (c) as applicable to cause of action for breach of contract that sought damages for CC&R's violation].) The court in Chee also noted that 24 equitable theories can support an award of attorney fees under section 1354, where their effect was to enforce the CC&R's.

2015(Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1379-1381 (Chee) [relevant question on entitlement to fees under section 1354 is whether the action enforced rights and obligations of parties under development's governing documents].) In part V, post, we discuss the request for monetary sanctions on appeal, concluding that they are not justified and will be denied. 6 II FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Background of Dispute; Complaint and Cross-complaint Filed We take the factual background from the record and the trial court's statement of decision, to give context t

2014(Salawy v. Ocean Towers Housing Corp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 664, 668 .) The determination of the prevailing party and the amount of the award are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (§§ 1354, subd. (c), 1369.580; Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Association v. Terifaj (2004) 33 Cal.4th 73, 94 (Villa De Las Palmas), citing Heather Farms Homeowners Association v. Robinson (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1574 (Heather Farms).) Two statutes affect this appeal.

2014(Mahoney v. Southland Mental Health Associates Medical 5 Group (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 167, 170 (Mahoney).) In determining the entitlement to attorney’s fees under section 1354, subdivision (c), the appellate court conducts an independent review of whether an action is one to enforce an association’s governing documents.

2013In Mount Olympus, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pages 895-896, we found that because the Act did not apply, the trial court had erred in awarding attorney fees under section 1354.

2013Kynard; (10) Diane Island; (11) Marcia Brewer; (12) Eugene Collier and Dorothy Collier; (Fn. continued.) 2 Shpirt (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 885, 895-896 (Mount Olympus) [because the Act did not apply, the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees under § 1354].) PREFACE In order to place the facts in their proper context, we begin by noting that a declaration of restrictions may be extended (1) by the unanimous vote of 100 percent of the property owners; (2) by the vote of a lesser number of owners as provided in the declaration; or (3) in common interest developments only, by compliance with sp

2013(See Gil v. Mansano (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 739, 743 [“A tort claim does not enforce a contract,” and therefore does not implicate attorney fee provisions triggered by enforcement actions].) Consequently, Carmel’s tort claims and voluntary dismissal provided no basis to obtain attorney fees under section 1354 for 2 enforcement of an owners association agreement.

2006(See also Harbor View Hills Community Assn. v. Torley (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 343, 345, 350 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 96 ] [fee award proper under both Civ.

2006(See also Harbor View Hills Community Assn. v. Torley (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 343, 345, 350 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 96 ] [fee award proper under both Civ.

2006(See, e.g., Cutujian v. Benedict Hills Estates Assn., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385 [party damaged by a violation of the CC&R’s may seek money damages]; Posey v. Leavitt (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1246 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 568 ] [“Under well-accepted principles of condominium law, a homeowner can sue the association for damages and an injunction to compel the association to enforce the provisions of the declaration”].) Indeed, the CC&R’s themselves provided that they were enforceable “in any manner provided by law or in equity.” Therefore, the fact the plaintiff did not limit her prayer for rel

2006(See, e.g., Cutujian v. Benedict Hills Estates Assn., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385 [party damaged by a violation of the CC&R’s may seek money damages]; Posey v. Leavitt (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1246 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 568 ] [“Under well-accepted principles of condominium law, a homeowner can sue the association for damages and an injunction to compel the association to enforce the provisions of the declaration”].) Indeed, the CC&R’s themselves provided that they were enforceable “in any manner provided by law or in equity.” Therefore, the fact the plaintiff did not limit her prayer for rel

2006(See, e.g., Cutujian v. Benedict Hills Estates Assn., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385 [party damaged by a violation of the CC&R’s may seek money damages]; Posey v. Leavitt (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1246 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 568 ] [“Under well-accepted principles of condominium law, a homeowner can sue the association for damages and an injunction to compel the association to enforce the provisions of the declaration”].) Indeed, the CC&R’s themselves provided that they were enforceable “in any manner provided by law or in equity.” Therefore, the fact the plaintiff did not limit her prayer for rel

2004DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review; however, the “ ‘determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs have been met is a question of law.’ ” (Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1169 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 79 ], quoting Ramos v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 615, 621 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 388 ].) Respondent’s entitlement to attorney fees under section 1354, subdivision (f) is a question of law requiring

2004DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review; however, the “ ‘determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs have been met is a question of law.’ ” (Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1169 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 79 ], quoting Ramos v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 615, 621 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 388 ].) Respondent’s entitlement to attorney fees under section 1354, subdivision (f) is a question of law requiring

2004DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review; however, the “ ‘determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs have been met is a question of law.’ ” (Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1169 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 79 ], quoting Ramos v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 615, 621 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 388 ].) Respondent’s entitlement to attorney fees under section 1354, subdivision (f) is a question of law requiring

2004DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review An order granting or denying an award of attorney fees is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review; however, the “ ‘determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs have been met is a question of law.’ ” (Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1169 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 79 ], quoting Ramos v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 615, 621 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 388 ].) Respondent’s entitlement to attorney fees under section 1354, subdivision (f) is a question of law requiring