section 301 preemption analysis in California

2023(Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985) 471 U.S. 202, 211 .) The “ ‘touchstone’ for [LMRA] section 301 preemption analysis is the nature of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.” (Levy v. Skywalker Sound (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 753, 763 .) Reviewing Gola’s claim, as alleged in the operative complaint, we conclude that resolution of the factual dispute that 24 underlies the first and third causes of action—whether adjuncts’ salary covered only the teaching semester, or whether it covered work before and after the semester as well—cannot be resolved without interpreting the CBA.

2023(Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985) 471 U.S. 202, 211 .) The “ ‘touchstone’ for [LMRA] section 301 preemption analysis is the nature of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.” (Levy v. Skywalker Sound (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 753, 763 .) Reviewing Gola’s claim, as alleged in the operative complaint, we conclude that resolution of the factual dispute that 24 underlies the first and third causes of action—whether adjuncts’ salary covered only the teaching semester, or whether it covered work before and after the semester as well—cannot be resolved without interpreting the CBA.

2014(Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris (1994) 512 U.S. 246, 261 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 203 , 114 S.Ct. 2239 ]; Foy v. Pratt & Whitney Group (2d Cir. 1997) 127 F.3d 229, 233 .) Nothing in the National Labor Relations Act, in general, or the J.I.

2014(Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris (1994) 512 U.S. 246, 261 ; Foy v. Pratt & Whitney Group (2d Cir. 1997) 127 F.3d 229 , 233.) Nothing in the National Labor Relations Act, in general, or the J.I.

2018They also cited Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp. (1998) 525 U.S. 70 (Wright) and argued that to overcome the presumption that statutory violations are not arbitrable, a CBA must be explicit on that point. 5 At the hearing on the motions, Save Mart argued that preemption analysis under section 301 was independent of the analysis required under the FAA and CAA and was unrelated to the arbitration provision of the CBA.

2014Code, § 203 claim because the wage rates are specified in a collective bargaining agreement]; Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp. (9th Cir. 2007) 491 F.3d 1053 , 1073-1074 [mere looking to the wage rate in a collective bargain agreement in order to calculate damages is not a basis for § 301(a) preemption of a state law claim]; Wadsworth v. KSL Grand Wailea Resort, Inc. (D.Hawaii 2010) 818 F.Supp.2d 1240, 1249 [“a court may look to a [collective bargaining agreement] to determine damages without triggering the need for preemption”].) This not a case which requires interpretation of the collective

2012In that case, the state labor commissioner challenged a utility’s calculation of overtime payment for its gas meter readers. ( 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1204 .) The reviewing court found there was no section 301 preemption because there was no issue regarding the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement with respect to the predicate issue of how the employer calculated overtime pay. (96 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1210-1211.) The court explained the disputed issue was whether the calculation of overtime wages in the collective bargaining agreement complied with state law and this issue did not trigger

2012(Id. at pp. 695-696.) The court reasoned that “[b]ecause a CBA cannot validly sanction illegal action, ... the terms of the CBA were irrelevant to plaintiffs’ [state law] claim . . . .” (Id. at p. 697.) Applying similar analysis, in Lujan v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1200 , the court rejected the defendant’s section 301 preemption defense.

2008(See, e.g., Paige, supra, 826 F.2d at p. 864 ; Garibaldi, supra, 726 F.2d at p. 1374 ; Abreu v. Svenhard’s Swedish Bakery (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1446 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 26 ]; see also Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 15 ].) Second, not all public policy wrongful termination cases are created equal for purposes of determining whether they are preempted by the NLRA.

2008(See, e.g., Paige, supra, 826 F.2d at p. 864 ; Garibaldi, supra, 726 F.2d at p. 1374 ; Abreu v. Svenhard’s Swedish Bakery (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1446 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 26 ]; see also Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 15 ].) Second, not all public policy wrongful termination cases are created equal for purposes of determining whether they are preempted by the NLRA.

2008(See, e.g., Paige, supra, 826 F.2d at p. 864 ; Garibaldi, supra, 726 F.2d at p. 1374 ; Abreu v. Svenhard’s Swedish Bakery (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1446 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 26 ]; see also Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 15 ].) Second, not all public policy wrongful termination cases are created equal for purposes of determining whether they are preempted by the NLRA.

2008(See, e.g., Paige, supra, 826 F.2d at p. 864 ; Garibaldi, supra, 726 F.2d at p. 1374 ; Abreu v. Svenhard’s Swedish Bakery (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1446 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 26 ]; see also Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 15 ].) Second, not all public policy wrongful termination cases are created equal for purposes of determining whether they are preempted by the NLRA.

2004Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (9th Cir. 1974) 497 F.2d 1200, 1202-1203 , is applicable because that test predates the NLRB’s change of the standard of determining when the acts of a single employee constitute concerted activity. 8 The text of section 7 of the NLRA shows that purpose is related to “mutual aid or protection.” ( 29 U.S.C. § 157 .) 9 We do not reach the questions whether the “peripheral concern” or “deeply rooted in local law” exceptions to Garmon preemption are applicable in this case, or whether the Sears “identical controversy” exception to preemption is applicable. 10 As a result of L

2003In support of his contention that his contract claims are not preempted because they are based on “individual employment agreements,” Levy cites Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams (1987) 482 U.S. 386 [ 107 S.Ct. 2425 , 96 L.Ed.2d 318 ].

2003In support of his contention that his contract claims are not preempted because they are based on “individual employment agreements,” Levy cites Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams (1987) 482 U.S. 386 [ 107 S.Ct. 2425 , 96 L.Ed.2d 318 ].

2003(Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. (9th Cir. 2001) 255 F.3d 683, 691 .) “[I]f the claim may be litigated without reference to the rights and duties established in a CBA . . . [and] is plainly based on state law,” it is not preempted, even if “the defendant refers to the CBA in mounting a defense.” (Ibid.) Thus, the “touchstone” for section 301 preemption analysis is the nature of the plaintiff’s underlying claim. ( 255 F.3d at p. 691 .) Accordingly, to facilitate our analysis in this case, we have grouped Levy’s claims into three categories.

2003(Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. (9th Cir. 2001) 255 F.3d 683, 691 .) “[I]f the claim may be litigated without reference to the rights and duties established in a CBA . . . [and] is plainly based on state law,” it is not preempted, even if “the defendant refers to the CBA in mounting a defense.” (Ibid.) Thus, the “touchstone” for section 301 preemption analysis is the nature of the plaintiff’s underlying claim. ( 255 F.3d at p. 691 .) Accordingly, to facilitate our analysis in this case, we have grouped Levy’s claims into three categories.

1987(Id. at p. 303, fn. 12 [ 51 L.Ed.2d at p. 352 ].) Because the case at bench does concern a collective bargaining agreement, Farmer does not control here.

1973It held that the case fell within the express language of section 301, subdivision (a), in that the settlement by the union and the employer “was a contract between them and in entering into it the union acted as the collective bargaining agent of the employees.” ( 234 F.Supp. at p. 567 .) Moreover, the court pointed out that settlement by methods agreed upon by the parties of grievances arising under collective bargaining agreements underlies the policy of the L.M.R.A. *601 We conclude the cause of action for breach of the alleged settlement agreement in the present case came within the purvi