section 425.16(e) statutory definitions in California

2023As noted, this provision defines protected activity to include “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) This “‘catchall’ provision [is] meant to round out the statutory safeguards for constitutionally protected expression.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 144 (FilmOn).) 12 Our Supreme Court has articulated a two-part inquiry for deciding whether a claim arises from protected activity

2020(FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 149 [“court must consider the context as well as the content of a statement in determining whether that statement furthers the exercise of constitutional speech rights in connection with a matter of public interest”].) We conclude that the trial court’s distinction based on whether an active dispute with the HOA had actually commenced leads to an excessively narrow construction of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), contrary to the statutory directive in section 425.16, subdivision (a), that “this section shall be construed broadly” i

2026But constitutional protection is a separate question from anti-SLAPP protection. 9 (Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v. Happening House Ventures (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1548 [“To make their threshold showing under the first prong of the [section 425.16] analysis, [defendants] need not prove that the targeted activity is in fact constitutionally protected.”]; see also City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 422 [courts “determining whether conduct is protected under [section 425.16] look not to First Amendment law, but to the statutory definitions in section 425.16, subdivisio

2025(Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 410 (Contreras).) “[W]hether [activity] is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute” turns “not [on] First Amendment law, but [rather on] the statutory definitions in section 425.16, 8 subdivision (e).” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 422 .) Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e) defines four categories of protected activity.

2025(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063 (Park).) 7 To evaluate whether allegedly protected conduct gives rise to a particular claim, “courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Park, at p. 1063.) “Allegations of protected activity that merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394 .) II.

2025A ‘claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.’ [Citation.] To determine whether a claim arises from protected activity, courts must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what 4 Section 425.16, subdivision (e) identifies two other categories of statements or writings that are “ ‘ “in furtherance of” ’ a defendant’s free speech or petition rights: ‘(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, exe

2025(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063 (Park).) 7 To evaluate whether allegedly protected conduct gives rise to a particular claim, “courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Park, at p. 1063.) “Allegations of protected activity that merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394 .) II.

2023To avoid dwelling on an issue the parties have not raised, we will therefore assume, without deciding, that the College Defendants’ use of the new name could qualify for protection under subdivision (e)(3), which covers “any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest,” or under subdivision (e)(4), which covers “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public inter

2025Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995 , 1009.) When determining whether conduct is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, we “look not to First Amendment law, but to the statutory definitions in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 422 .) The moving defendant must “demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described” in that subdivision.

2025A ‘claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.’ [Citation.] To determine whether a claim arises from protected activity, courts must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what 4 Section 425.16, subdivision (e) identifies two other categories of statements or writings that are “ ‘ “in furtherance of” ’ a defendant’s free speech or petition rights: ‘(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, exe

2014(Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 790, 806 .) ... “‘Even if the conduct of individual public officials in discussing and voting on a public entity’s action or decision could constitute an exercise of rights protected under the anti-SLAPP statute[,] . . . this does not mean . . . litigation challenging a public entity’s action or decision always arises from protected activity.’ (San Ramon [Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2004)] 125 Cal.App.4th 343, 346-347 .) An act of governance mandated by law, without more, is

2012(Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 790, 806 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 ].) As referred to in Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at page 193, “ ‘[t]he point of the anti-SLAPP statute is that you have a right not to be dragged through the courts because you exercised your constitutional rights.’ ” (See People ex rel.

2026But constitutional protection is a separate question from anti-SLAPP protection. 9 (Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v. Happening House Ventures (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1548 [“To make their threshold showing under the first prong of the [section 425.16] analysis, [defendants] need not prove that the targeted activity is in fact constitutionally protected.”]; see also City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 422 [courts “determining whether conduct is protected under [section 425.16] look not to First Amendment law, but to the statutory definitions in section 425.16, subdivisio

2025(Accord, Talega Maintenance Corp. v. Standard Pacific Corp. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 722, 729 [voting is not per se protected activity], citing Donovan v. Dan Murphy Foundation (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1506 [“The mere act of voting . . . is insufficient to demonstrate that conduct challenged in a cause of action arose from protected activity”; addressing the vote of a nonprofit organization board member]; Dubac v. Itkoff (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 540 .) In Dubac, involving a dispute between owners living in a six-unit condominium building, the court observed that case law rejects the notion tha

2025(Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 410 (Contreras).) “[W]hether [activity] is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute” turns “not [on] First Amendment law, but [rather on] the statutory definitions in section 425.16, 8 subdivision (e).” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 422 .) Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e) defines four categories of protected activity.

2025(Accord, Talega Maintenance Corp. v. Standard Pacific Corp. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 722, 729 [voting is not per se protected activity], citing Donovan v. Dan Murphy Foundation (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1506 [“The mere act of voting . . . is insufficient to demonstrate that conduct challenged in a cause of action arose from protected activity”; addressing the vote of a nonprofit organization board member]; Dubac v. Itkoff (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 540 .) In Dubac, involving a dispute between owners living in a six-unit condominium building, the court observed that case law rejects the notion tha

2023(See, e.g., City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 [“That a cause of action arguably may have been triggered by protected activity does not entail that it is one arising from such”]; Durkin v. City and County of San Francisco (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 643 , 652-654.) 8 name used to describe the College falls within the range of speech entitled to First Amendment protection, “courts determining whether conduct is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute look not to First Amendment law, but to the statutory definitions in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (20

2023(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149-150; see Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238 , 1243 (Geiser).) “FilmOn’s first step is satisfied so long as the challenged speech or conduct, considered in light of its context, may reasonably be understood to implicate a public issue, even if it also implicates a private dispute.” (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1253.) Relevant considerations might include “whether the subject of the speech or activity ‘was a person or entity in the public eye’ or ‘could affect large numbers of people beyond the direct participants’ [citation]; and whether the activity

2023(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149-150; see Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238 , 1243 (Geiser).) “FilmOn’s first step is satisfied so long as the challenged speech or conduct, considered in light of its context, may reasonably be understood to implicate a public issue, even if it also implicates a private dispute.” (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1253.) Relevant considerations might include “whether the subject of the speech or activity ‘was a person or entity in the public eye’ or ‘could affect large numbers of people beyond the direct participants’ [citation]; and whether the activity

2016The council members’ participation in the meeting that preceded the vote was constitutionally protected activity. “[PJublic meetings, at which council members discuss matters of public interest and legislate, are conduct in furtherance of the council members’ constitutional right of free speech in connection with public issues and issues of public interest. ‘Under the First Amendment, legislators are “given the widest latitude to express their views” and there are no “stricter ‘free speech’ standards on [them] than on the general public.” [Citation.]’ (Levy v. City of Santa Monica (2004) 114 C

2016The council members’ participation in the meeting that preceded the vote was constitutionally protected activity. “[PJublic meetings, at which council members discuss matters of public interest and legislate, are conduct in furtherance of the council members’ constitutional right of free speech in connection with public issues and issues of public interest. ‘Under the First Amendment, legislators are “given the widest latitude to express their views” and there are no “stricter ‘free speech’ standards on [them] than on the general public.” [Citation.]’ (Levy v. City of Santa Monica (2004) 114 C

2016The council members’ participation in the meeting that preceded the vote was constitutionally protected activity. “[PJublic meetings, at which council members discuss matters of public interest and legislate, are conduct in furtherance of the council members’ constitutional right of free speech in connection with public issues and issues of public interest. ‘Under the First Amendment, legislators are “given the widest latitude to express their views” and there are no “stricter ‘free speech’ standards on [them] than on the general public.” [Citation.]’ (Levy v. City of Santa Monica (2004) 114 C

2016The council members’ participation in the meeting that preceded the vote was constitutionally protected activity. “[PJublic meetings, at which council members discuss matters of public interest and legislate, are conduct in furtherance of the council members’ constitutional right of free speech in connection with public issues and issues of public interest. ‘Under the First Amendment, legislators are “given the widest latitude to express their views” and there are no “stricter ‘free speech’ standards on [them] than on the general public.” [Citation.]’ (Levy v. City of Santa Monica (2004) 114 C

2016The council members’ participation in the meeting that preceded the vote was constitutionally protected activity. “[PJublic meetings, at which council members discuss matters of public interest and legislate, are conduct in furtherance of the council members’ constitutional right of free speech in connection with public issues and issues of public interest. ‘Under the First Amendment, legislators are “given the widest latitude to express their views” and there are no “stricter ‘free speech’ standards on [them] than on the general public.” [Citation.]’ (Levy v. City of Santa Monica (2004) 114 C

2016The council members’ participation in the meeting that preceded the vote was constitutionally protected activity. “[PJublic meetings, at which council members discuss matters of public interest and legislate, are conduct in furtherance of the council members’ constitutional right of free speech in connection with public issues and issues of public interest. ‘Under the First Amendment, legislators are “given the widest latitude to express their views” and there are no “stricter ‘free speech’ standards on [them] than on the general public.” [Citation.]’ (Levy v. City of Santa Monica (2004) 114 C

2016As our high court recently reaffirmed, “courts determining whether conduct is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute look not to First Amendment law, but to the statutory definitions in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (City of Montebello, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 422 , citing Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 ].) The same is true with respect to the determination whether conduct is exempt from the statute; courts must look not to general First Amendment law, but to the statutory exemptions defined in section 425.17, subdivi

2016As our high court recently reaffirmed, “courts determining whether conduct is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute look not to First Amendment law, but to the statutory definitions in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (City of Montebello, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 422 , citing Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 ].) The same is true with respect to the determination whether conduct is exempt from the statute; courts must look not to general First Amendment law, but to the statutory exemptions defined in section 425.17, subdivi

2012(Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 790, 806 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 ].) As referred to in Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at page 193, “ ‘[t]he point of the anti-SLAPP statute is that you have a right not to be dragged through the courts because you exercised your constitutional rights.’ ” (See People ex rel.

1996(Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 645-654 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 152 , 871 P.2d 204 ]; Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 364 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 143 , 696 P.2d 637 , 49 A.L.R.4th 417 ].) Consequently, IAS argues that its activities fall within phrases 1 and 2 of the statutory definition in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e).

1996(Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 645-654 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 152 , 871 P.2d 204 ]; Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 364 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 143 , 696 P.2d 637 , 49 A.L.R.4th 417 ].) Consequently, IAS argues that its activities fall within phrases 1 and 2 of the statutory definition in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e).

1996(Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 645-654 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 152 , 871 P.2d 204 ]; Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 364 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 143 , 696 P.2d 637 , 49 A.L.R.4th 417 ].) Consequently, IAS argues that its activities fall within phrases 1 and 2 of the statutory definition in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e).

1996(Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 645-654 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 152 , 871 P.2d 204 ]; Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 364 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 143 , 696 P.2d 637 , 49 A.L.R.4th 417 ].) Consequently, IAS argues that its activities fall within phrases 1 and 2 of the statutory definition in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e).