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13 California opinions name it 2 courts 1927–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Manufacturing Co.green2 sentences1995Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 751, 771 [ 128 P.2d 665 ].) However, Civil Code section 3275 expressly provides forfeiture provisions will be enforced where the breach of a contractual obligation is the result of gross negligence, or willful or fraudulent conduct. 1995Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 751, 771 [ 128 P.2d 665 ].) However, Civil Code section 3275 expressly provides forfeiture provisions will be enforced where the breach of a contractual obligation is the result of gross negligence, or willful or fraudulent conduct. | 1 | 1 |
Whaler's Village Club v. Califonia Coastal Commissiongreen1 sentence1994(Whaler’s Village Club v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 240, 263 []; No Oil, Inc. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 8, 30 [].)” (Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 996-997 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 837 , 824 P.2d 643 ]; see also Crofoot v. Weger (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 839, 841-842 [ 241 P.2d 1017 ] [for purposes of relief from forfeiture under § 3275, failure to make a required payment, although intentional, might not be “willful” where obligor reasonably disputed whether the payment was in fact owed].) The statutory obligation Kwan claimed MBNA willf | 1 | 1 |
Crofoot v. Wegergreen2 sentences1994(Whaler’s Village Club v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 240, 263 []; No Oil, Inc. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 8, 30 [].)” (Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 996-997 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 837 , 824 P.2d 643 ]; see also Crofoot v. Weger (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 839, 841-842 [ 241 P.2d 1017 ] [for purposes of relief from forfeiture under § 3275, failure to make a required payment, although intentional, might not be “willful” where obligor reasonably disputed whether the payment was in fact owed].) The statutory obligation Kwan claimed MBNA willf 1994(Whaler’s Village Club v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 240, 263 []; No Oil, Inc. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 8, 30 [].)” (Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 996-997 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 837 , 824 P.2d 643 ]; see also Crofoot v. Weger (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 839, 841-842 [ 241 P.2d 1017 ] [for purposes of relief from forfeiture under § 3275, failure to make a required payment, although intentional, might not be “willful” where obligor reasonably disputed whether the payment was in fact owed].) The statutory obligation Kwan claimed MBNA willf | 1 | 1 |
No Oil, Inc. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.green1 sentence1994(Whaler’s Village Club v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 240, 263 []; No Oil, Inc. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 8, 30 [].)” (Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 996-997 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 837 , 824 P.2d 643 ]; see also Crofoot v. Weger (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 839, 841-842 [ 241 P.2d 1017 ] [for purposes of relief from forfeiture under § 3275, failure to make a required payment, although intentional, might not be “willful” where obligor reasonably disputed whether the payment was in fact owed].) The statutory obligation Kwan claimed MBNA willf | 1 | 1 |
Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubrygreen2 sentences1994(Whaler’s Village Club v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 240, 263 []; No Oil, Inc. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 8, 30 [].)” (Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 996-997 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 837 , 824 P.2d 643 ]; see also Crofoot v. Weger (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 839, 841-842 [ 241 P.2d 1017 ] [for purposes of relief from forfeiture under § 3275, failure to make a required payment, although intentional, might not be “willful” where obligor reasonably disputed whether the payment was in fact owed].) The statutory obligation Kwan claimed MBNA willf 1994(Whaler’s Village Club v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 240, 263 []; No Oil, Inc. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 8, 30 [].)” (Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 996-997 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 837 , 824 P.2d 643 ]; see also Crofoot v. Weger (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 839, 841-842 [ 241 P.2d 1017 ] [for purposes of relief from forfeiture under § 3275, failure to make a required payment, although intentional, might not be “willful” where obligor reasonably disputed whether the payment was in fact owed].) The statutory obligation Kwan claimed MBNA willf | 1 | 1 |
Ernst v. Searlegreen2 sentences1990(Curdo v. Svanevik (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 955, 961 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 499 ]; Ernst v. Searle (1933) 218 Cal. 233, 240-241 [ 22 P.2d 715 ].) *1201 Disposition As long as the trade fixtures remain part of the bankruptcy estate, the respondent court lacks power to issue orders concerning possession or control of those items. 1990(Curdo v. Svanevik (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 955, 961 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 499 ]; Ernst v. Searle (1933) 218 Cal. 233, 240-241 [ 22 P.2d 715 ].) *1201 Disposition As long as the trade fixtures remain part of the bankruptcy estate, the respondent court lacks power to issue orders concerning possession or control of those items. | 1 | 1 |
Curcio v. Svanevikgreen2 sentences1990(Curdo v. Svanevik (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 955, 961 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 499 ]; Ernst v. Searle (1933) 218 Cal. 233, 240-241 [ 22 P.2d 715 ].) *1201 Disposition As long as the trade fixtures remain part of the bankruptcy estate, the respondent court lacks power to issue orders concerning possession or control of those items. 1990(Curdo v. Svanevik (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 955, 961 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 499 ]; Ernst v. Searle (1933) 218 Cal. 233, 240-241 [ 22 P.2d 715 ].) *1201 Disposition As long as the trade fixtures remain part of the bankruptcy estate, the respondent court lacks power to issue orders concerning possession or control of those items. | 1 | 1 |
Baffa v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1964But the burden is upon the party in default to plead and prove facts entitling him to such relief (Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Cal.2d 36, 38 [ 216 P.2d 13 ]; Kelley v. Olympic Pharmacy, 144 Cal.App.2d 43, 54 [ 300 P.2d 858 ]). 1964But the burden is upon the party in default to plead and prove facts entitling him to such relief (Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Cal.2d 36, 38 [ 216 P.2d 13 ]; Kelley v. Olympic Pharmacy, 144 Cal.App.2d 43, 54 [ 300 P.2d 858 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Kelley v. Olympic Pharmacygreen2 sentences1964But the burden is upon the party in default to plead and prove facts entitling him to such relief (Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Cal.2d 36, 38 [ 216 P.2d 13 ]; Kelley v. Olympic Pharmacy, 144 Cal.App.2d 43, 54 [ 300 P.2d 858 ]). 1964But the burden is upon the party in default to plead and prove facts entitling him to such relief (Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Cal.2d 36, 38 [ 216 P.2d 13 ]; Kelley v. Olympic Pharmacy, 144 Cal.App.2d 43, 54 [ 300 P.2d 858 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Parsons v. Smiliegreen2 sentences1927The breach here was spontaneous and Voluntary, and, therefore, wilful within the meaning of the interpretation of that section given in Parsons v. Smilie, 97 Cal. 647, 654, 655 [ 32 Pac. 702 ], Appellant did not by his answer plead any equitable matter, nor ask the court to be relieved as from a forfeiture under Civil Code, section 3275 (Clifford v. Fleshman, 65 Cal. App. 762 [ 225 Pac. 45 ]), nor has it offered to pay actual damages nor suggested what admeasurement of actual damages it is possible to apply for its breach of the condition. 1927The breach here was spontaneous and Voluntary, and, therefore, wilful within the meaning of the interpretation of that section given in Parsons v. Smilie, 97 Cal. 647, 654, 655 [ 32 Pac. 702 ], Appellant did not by his answer plead any equitable matter, nor ask the court to be relieved as from a forfeiture under Civil Code, section 3275 (Clifford v. Fleshman, 65 Cal. App. 762 [ 225 Pac. 45 ]), nor has it offered to pay actual damages nor suggested what admeasurement of actual damages it is possible to apply for its breach of the condition. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Assn.
green
2 sentences2024JJD relies on Ridgley, supra, 17 Cal.4th 970 , to support its argument that it is being punished for taking a discretionary act under the contract and thus has suffered an unreasonable forfeiture under section 3275. 2024JJD relies on Ridgley, supra, 17 Cal.4th 970 , to support its argument that it is being punished for taking a discretionary act under the contract and thus has suffered an unreasonable forfeiture under section 3275. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Grand Prospect Partners v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022Indeed, JJD conceded at oral argument that the failure of the co-tenancy provision was not a breach of the lease and also conceded that Civil Code section 1671 therefore does not apply to the facts of this case. 13 (Grand Prospect, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1365 .) It thus appears the Grand Prospect court equated an unenforceable penalty with a forfeiture within the meaning of Civil Code section 3275. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson
green
2 sentences2016(Superior Motels, Inc. v. Rinn Motor Hotels, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1065-1066 .) Black Angus argues that Civil Code section 3275 does not apply here, citing Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson, supra, 6 Cal.4th 307 . 2016(Superior Motels, Inc. v. Rinn Motor Hotels, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1065-1066 .) Black Angus argues that Civil Code section 3275 does not apply here, citing Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson, supra, 6 Cal.4th 307 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Superior Motels, Inc. v. Rinn Motor Hotels, Inc.
green
1 sentence2016(Superior Motels, Inc. v. Rinn Motor Hotels, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1065-1066 .) Black Angus argues that Civil Code section 3275 does not apply here, citing Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson, supra, 6 Cal.4th 307 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Zalk v. General Exploration Co.
green
1 sentence2016What is key is that the notice itself did not mention the appraisal. “[C]ontemporaneous construction of a contract by the parties provides persuasive evidence of what the parties intended when they made their bargain. [Citations.]” (Zalk v. General Exploration Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 786, 794 .) Here, it confirms our conclusion that the lease did not require the parties’ notices to explain their respective calculations. 10 V RELIEF FROM FORFEITURE UNDER CIVIL CODE SECTION 3275 The Trust contends that it was entitled to relief from forfeiture under Civil Code section 3275. “[E]quity abhors a | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Peak-Las Positas Partners v. Bollag
green
1 sentence2016What is key is that the notice itself did not mention the appraisal. “[C]ontemporaneous construction of a contract by the parties provides persuasive evidence of what the parties intended when they made their bargain. [Citations.]” (Zalk v. General Exploration Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 786, 794 .) Here, it confirms our conclusion that the lease did not require the parties’ notices to explain their respective calculations. 10 V RELIEF FROM FORFEITURE UNDER CIVIL CODE SECTION 3275 The Trust contends that it was entitled to relief from forfeiture under Civil Code section 3275. “[E]quity abhors a | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Moeller v. Chun-Yen Lien
green
1 sentence2003A similar argument was rejected in Moeller, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th 822 , in which the trustor sought equitable relief from forfeiture under section 3275. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Williams Plumbing Co. v. Sinsley
neutral
2 sentences1978Thus, the Williams Plumbing Co. court observed that “[t]he opinion [in MacFadden] appears to recognize that loss of the benefit of the buyer’s bargain is the equivalent of a penalty or forfeiture within the meaning of the code sections relied on in Freedman, supra.” 3 (Williams Plumbing Co., supra, 53 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1033 .) In Williams Plumbing Co., the court concluded that, even though the contract provided that time was of the essence of the contract, the buyer’s failure to pay the $15,000 required on the date specified in the contract—January 4—did not give the sellers the right to termin 1978Thus, the Williams Plumbing Co. court observed that "[t]he opinion [in MacFadden ] appears to recognize that loss of the benefit of the buyer's bargain is the equivalent of a penalty or forfeiture within the meaning of the code sections relied on in Freedman, supra " [3] ( Williams Plumbing Co., supra, 53 Cal. App.3d 1027, 1033 .) In Williams Plumbing Co., the court concluded that, even though the contract provided that time was of the essence of the contract, the buyer's failure to pay the $15,000 required on the date specified in the contract — January 4 — did not give the sellers the right | 1 | 1978–1978 |
MacFadden v. Walker
green
2 sentences1978“We believe that the anti-forfeiture policy recognized in the Freedman case also justifies awarding even wilfully defaulting vendees specific performance in proper cases.” ( MacFadden, supra, 5 Cal.3d 809, 814 .) In Williams Plumbing Co., the buyer’s breach was not intentional and the court remarked: “It would be illogical to afford appellant less relief than that given to the defaulting vendee in MacFadden.” (Williams Plumbing Co., supra, 53 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1034 .) The Williams Plumbing Co. court reversed the trial court’s judgment denying the buyer specific performance against the sellers w 1978"We believe that the anti-forfeiture policy recognized in the Freedman case also justifies awarding even wilfully defaulting vendees specific performance in proper cases." ( MacFadden, supra, 5 Cal.3d 809, 814 .) In Williams Plumbing Co., the buyer's breach was not intentional and the court remarked: "It would be illogical to afford appellant less relief than that given to the defaulting vendee in MacFadden . " ( Williams Plumbing Co., supra, 53 Cal. App.3d 1027, 1034 .) The Williams Plumbing Co. court reversed the trial court's judgment denying the buyer specific performance against the selle | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Matthias Parish
green
2 sentences1975In Freedman v. The Rector (1951) 37 Cal.2d 16 [ 230 P.2d 629 , 31 A.L.R.2d 1 ], the court held that section 3275 was not the exclusive *1033 method of granting relief from forfeiture in these situations. 1975In Freedman v. The Rector (1951) 37 Cal.2d 16 [ 230 P.2d 629 , 31 A.L.R.2d 1 ], the court held that section 3275 was not the exclusive *1033 method of granting relief from forfeiture in these situations. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Barkis v. Scott
green
1 sentence1971In Barkis v. Scott, supra, 34 Cal.2d 116 , we reevaluated the long line of precedents dealing with the question of when the vendee’s interest may be forfeited because of his default in the performance of a land sale contract in which time is declared to be of the essence. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Bedell v. Barber
green
2 sentences1948(McDonald v. Kingsbury, 16 Cal.App. 244 [ 116 P. 380 ]; Bedell v. Barber, 80 Cal.App.2d 806 [ 182 P.2d 591 ].) There can be no doubt that the appellant Wilbur M. 1948(McDonald v. Kingsbury, 16 Cal.App. 244 [ 116 P. 380 ]; Bedell v. Barber, 80 Cal.App.2d 806 [ 182 P.2d 591 ].) There can be no doubt that the appellant Wilbur M. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
McDonald v. Kingsbury
green
2 sentences1948(McDonald v. Kingsbury, 16 Cal.App. 244 [ 116 P. 380 ]; Bedell v. Barber, 80 Cal.App.2d 806 [ 182 P.2d 591 ].) There can be no doubt that the appellant Wilbur M. 1948(McDonald v. Kingsbury, 16 Cal.App. 244 [ 116 P. 380 ]; Bedell v. Barber, 80 Cal.App.2d 806 [ 182 P.2d 591 ].) There can be no doubt that the appellant Wilbur M. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Clifford v. Fleshman
green
2 sentences1927The breach here was spontaneous and Voluntary, and, therefore, wilful within the meaning of the interpretation of that section given in Parsons v. Smilie, 97 Cal. 647, 654, 655 [ 32 Pac. 702 ], Appellant did not by his answer plead any equitable matter, nor ask the court to be relieved as from a forfeiture under Civil Code, section 3275 (Clifford v. Fleshman, 65 Cal. App. 762 [ 225 Pac. 45 ]), nor has it offered to pay actual damages nor suggested what admeasurement of actual damages it is possible to apply for its breach of the condition. 1927The breach here was spontaneous and Voluntary, and, therefore, wilful within the meaning of the interpretation of that section given in Parsons v. Smilie, 97 Cal. 647, 654, 655 [ 32 Pac. 702 ], Appellant did not by his answer plead any equitable matter, nor ask the court to be relieved as from a forfeiture under Civil Code, section 3275 (Clifford v. Fleshman, 65 Cal. App. 762 [ 225 Pac. 45 ]), nor has it offered to pay actual damages nor suggested what admeasurement of actual damages it is possible to apply for its breach of the condition. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.