collateral or irrelevant inquiry in Texas

2017See, e.g., Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678–79, 106 S. Ct. at 1435 (“[E]xposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.”); Billodeau, 277 S.W.3d at 42–43 (“The possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution witness who testifies against the defendant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is entitled, subject to reasonable restrictions, to show any relevant fact that might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness testifyin

2017“The possible animus, motive, or ill will of a 16 prosecution witness who testified against the defendant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is entitled, subject to reasonable restrictions, to show any relevant fact that might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness testifying against him.” Billodeau v. State, 277 S.W.3d 34 , 42–43 (Tex. Crim.

2017See, e.g., Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678–79, 106 S. Ct. at 1435 (“[E]xposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.”); Billodeau, 277 S.W.3d at 42–43 (“The possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution witness who testifies against the defendant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is entitled, subject to reasonable restrictions, to show any relevant fact that might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness testifyin

2015App. 2009). ("The possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution witness who testified against the defendant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is entitled, subject to reasonable restrictions, to show any relevant fact that might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness testifying against him."); Carpenter v. State, 979 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex. Crim.

2014App. 2009) (citing London v. State, 739 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. Crim.

2011Billodeau v. State, 277 S.W.3d 34, 42-43 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (citing London v. State, 739 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1987)).

2015App. 1998) ("Exposing a witness' motivation to testify for or against the accused or the State is a proper and important purpose of cross-examination.") The scope of permissible cross-examination is "necessarily broad." Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. Crim.

2015App. 1998) (“Exposing a witness’s motivation to testify for or against the accused or the State is a proper and important purpose of cross-examination.”) The scope of permissible cross-examination is “necessarily broad.” Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 497 .

1990In Coleman v. State, 545 S.W.2d 831, 833-34 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), our Court of Criminal Appeals explained *600 that the animus, motive, or ill-will of a prosecuting witness who testifies against the accused is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the accused may show by himself, or by others if necessary, why the witness is unfriendly toward him.

1988To hold, as the majority implicitly does, that a witness, while under the Witness Protection Program, can voluntarily expose himself to additional danger by violating the law, and then claim the protection of the Act defies reason. 3 In a number of cases this Court has commented that “[t]he animus, motive or ill-will of a prosecuting witness who testifies against the appellant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry ...” Coleman v. State, 545 S.W.2d 831, 832, 833 (Tex.Cr.

2011See, e.g., De La Paz v. State , 279 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 15.

2011EVID . 607. 13 Billodeau v. State, 277 S.W.3d 34, 42-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“The possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution witness who testifies against the defendant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is entitled, subject to reasonable restrictions, to show any relevant fact that might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness testifying against him.”) (allegation that child witness was biased because defendant took away his remote-control cars); see Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 430-31 (Tex. Crim.

2011Billodeau v. State , 277 S.W.3d 34, 42-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ("The possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution witness who testifies against the defendant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is entitled, subject to reasonable restrictions, to show any relevant fact that might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness testifying against him.") (allegation that child witness was biased because defendant took away his remote-control cars); s ee Smith v. State , 779 S.W.2d 417, 430-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)

2011EVID . 607. 13 Billodeau v. State, 277 S.W.3d 34, 42-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“The possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution witness who testifies against the defendant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is entitled, subject to reasonable restrictions, to show any relevant fact that might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness testifying against him.”) (allegation that child witness was biased because defendant took away his remote-control cars); see Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 430-31 (Tex. Crim.

2011Billodeau v. State , 277 S.W.3d 34, 42-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ("The possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution witness who testifies against the defendant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is entitled, subject to reasonable restrictions, to show any relevant fact that might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness testifying against him.") (allegation that child witness was biased because defendant took away his remote-control cars); s ee Smith v. State , 779 S.W.2d 417, 430-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)

2011EVID . 607. 13 Billodeau v. State, 277 S.W.3d 34, 42-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“The possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution witness who testifies against the defendant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is entitled, subject to reasonable restrictions, to show any relevant fact that might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness testifying against him.”) (allegation that child witness was biased because defendant took away his remote-control cars); see Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 430-31 (Tex. Crim.

1978Kissinger v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 182 , 70 S.W.2d 740, 742 (1934).

1978Kissinger v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 182 , 70 S.W.2d 740, 742 (1934).

2024App. 2009) (“The possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution witness who testifies against the defendant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is entitled . . . to show any relevant fact that might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness testifying against him.”); Michael v. State, 235 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Tex. Crim.

2024App. 2007) (explaining the five major forms of impeachment); see United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) (“Bias may be induced by a witness’ like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness’ self-interest.”). 4 See, e.g., Hurst v. State, 406 S.W.3d 617 , 624–25 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.) (evidence that the defendant owned weapons was relevant to support witnesses’ explanations that they initially lied to police because they were scared); Wilson v. State, 90 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.) (holding that a child victim could testify about the defendant assaulti

2024App. 2007) (explaining the five major forms of impeachment); see United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) (“Bias may be induced by a witness’ like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness’ self-interest.”). 4 See, e.g., Hurst v. State, 406 S.W.3d 617 , 624–25 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.) (evidence that the defendant owned weapons was relevant to support witnesses’ explanations that they initially lied to police because they were scared); Wilson v. State, 90 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.) (holding that a child victim could testify about the defendant assaulti

2024App. 2007) (explaining the five major forms of impeachment); see United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) (“Bias may be induced by a witness’ like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness’ self-interest.”). 4 See, e.g., Hurst v. State, 406 S.W.3d 617 , 624–25 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.) (evidence that the defendant owned weapons was relevant to support witnesses’ explanations that they initially lied to police because they were scared); Wilson v. State, 90 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.) (holding that a child victim could testify about the defendant assaulti

2017See, e.g., Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678–79, 106 S. Ct. at 1435 (“[E]xposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.”); Billodeau, 277 S.W.3d at 42–43 (“The possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution witness who testifies against the defendant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is entitled, subject to reasonable restrictions, to show any relevant fact that might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness testifyin

2017See, e.g., Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678–79, 106 S. Ct. at 1435 (“[E]xposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.”); Billodeau, 277 S.W.3d at 42–43 (“The possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution witness who testifies against the defendant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is entitled, subject to reasonable restrictions, to show any relevant fact that might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness testifyin

2017See, e.g., Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678–79, 106 S. Ct. at 1435 (“[E]xposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.”); Billodeau, 277 S.W.3d at 42–43 (“The possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution witness who testifies against the defendant is never a collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is entitled, subject to reasonable restrictions, to show any relevant fact that might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness testifyin

2017App. 2009); see Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895 , 909–10 (Tex. Crim.

2015Ramirez v. State, 802 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). “ ‘The test as to whether a matter is collateral is whether the cross-examining party would be entitled to prove it as a part of his case tending to establish his plea.’ ” Id. (quoting Bates v. State, 587 S.W.2d 121, 133 (Tex.Crim.App.1979)); see also Keller v. State, 662 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (“[A] ‘collateral’' question is one which seeks only to test the witnesses] general credibility, or relates to facts irrelevant to the issues at trial.”). 21 Additionally, “[t]he possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution

2015Ramirez v. State, 802 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). “ ‘The test as to whether a matter is collateral is whether the cross-examining party would be entitled to prove it as a part of his case tending to establish his plea.’ ” Id. (quoting Bates v. State, 587 S.W.2d 121, 133 (Tex.Crim.App.1979)); see also Keller v. State, 662 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (“[A] ‘collateral’' question is one which seeks only to test the witnesses] general credibility, or relates to facts irrelevant to the issues at trial.”). 21 Additionally, “[t]he possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution

2015Ramirez v. State, 802 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). “ ‘The test as to whether a matter is collateral is whether the cross-examining party would be entitled to prove it as a part of his case tending to establish his plea.’ ” Id. (quoting Bates v. State, 587 S.W.2d 121, 133 (Tex.Crim.App.1979)); see also Keller v. State, 662 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (“[A] ‘collateral’' question is one which seeks only to test the witnesses] general credibility, or relates to facts irrelevant to the issues at trial.”). 21 Additionally, “[t]he possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution

2015Ramirez v. State, 802 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). “ ‘The test as to whether a matter is collateral is whether the cross-examining party would be entitled to prove it as a part of his case tending to establish his plea.’ ” Id. (quoting Bates v. State, 587 S.W.2d 121, 133 (Tex.Crim.App.1979)); see also Keller v. State, 662 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (“[A] ‘collateral’' question is one which seeks only to test the witnesses] general credibility, or relates to facts irrelevant to the issues at trial.”). 21 Additionally, “[t]he possible animus, motive, or ill will of a prosecution