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11 California opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2022 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Green v. Obledogreen2 sentences1994Appellant’s “exclusive remedy” was to file an action for writ of administrative mandate in superior court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 to challenge the administrative judge’s decision. (§ 10962; Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 143, fn. 12 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 624 P.2d 256 ].) Where issues on appeal affect the general public interest and the future rights of the parties, and there is a reasonable probability that the same question will be litigated again and appealed, an appellate court may adjudicate the issue involved even though the appeal would otherwise be subj 1994Appellant’s “exclusive remedy” was to file an action for writ of administrative mandate in superior court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 to challenge the administrative judge’s decision. (§ 10962; Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 143, fn. 12 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 624 P.2d 256 ].) Where issues on appeal affect the general public interest and the future rights of the parties, and there is a reasonable probability that the same question will be litigated again and appealed, an appellate court may adjudicate the issue involved even though the appeal would otherwise be subj | 2 | 2 |
Bixby v. Piernogreen2 sentences1993(Turner v. Board of Trustees (1976) 16 Cal.3d 818, 824-825 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 548 P.2d 1115 ]; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ].) The trial court *1463 explicitly employed substantial evidence review. 1993(Turner v. Board of Trustees (1976) 16 Cal.3d 818, 824-825 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 548 P.2d 1115 ]; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ].) The trial court *1463 explicitly employed substantial evidence review. | 1 | 2 |
San Diego Cnty. Health & Human Servs. Agency v. M.M. (In re Charlotte C.)green1 sentence2021The Agency argues the approval or denial of an RFA applicant is “a core executive function of the child welfare agency” (In re Charlotte C. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 404, 429 (Charlotte C.)) and Grandmother’s remedy is to pursue an administrative appeal and, if unsuccessful, then judicial review in the superior court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. | 1 | 1 |
Abelleira v. District Court of Appealgreen2 sentences2008(Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 143, fn. 12 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 624 P.2d 256 ].) DCFS cites Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 293 [ 109 P.2d 942 ], for the proposition that “exhaustion of the administrative remedy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.” DCFS further cites In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 , 159 P.3d 49 ] (Joshua S.), as authority for its position that a juvenile court does not have the authority to order DCFS to make AFDC-FC payments without an administrative determination of eligibility. 2008(Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 143, fn. 12 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 624 P.2d 256 ].) DCFS cites Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 293 [ 109 P.2d 942 ], for the proposition that “exhaustion of the administrative remedy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.” DCFS further cites In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 , 159 P.3d 49 ] (Joshua S.), as authority for its position that a juvenile court does not have the authority to order DCFS to make AFDC-FC payments without an administrative determination of eligibility. | 1 | 1 |
People v. West Coast Shows, Inc.green2 sentences1994(People v. West Coast Shows, Inc. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 462, 468 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 290 ]; see also Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 677, fn. 7 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 , 842 P.2d 1240 ].) As appellant states, she is locked into a perpetual relationship with the respondents and is subject to their refusal to award interest at the administrative level. 1994(People v. West Coast Shows, Inc. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 462, 468 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 290 ]; see also Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 677, fn. 7 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 , 842 P.2d 1240 ].) As appellant states, she is locked into a perpetual relationship with the respondents and is subject to their refusal to award interest at the administrative level. | 1 | 1 |
Butt v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences1994(People v. West Coast Shows, Inc. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 462, 468 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 290 ]; see also Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 677, fn. 7 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 , 842 P.2d 1240 ].) As appellant states, she is locked into a perpetual relationship with the respondents and is subject to their refusal to award interest at the administrative level. 1994(People v. West Coast Shows, Inc. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 462, 468 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 290 ]; see also Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 677, fn. 7 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 , 842 P.2d 1240 ].) As appellant states, she is locked into a perpetual relationship with the respondents and is subject to their refusal to award interest at the administrative level. | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Board of Trusteesgreen2 sentences1993(Turner v. Board of Trustees (1976) 16 Cal.3d 818, 824-825 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 548 P.2d 1115 ]; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ].) The trial court *1463 explicitly employed substantial evidence review. 1993(Turner v. Board of Trustees (1976) 16 Cal.3d 818, 824-825 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 548 P.2d 1115 ]; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ].) The trial court *1463 explicitly employed substantial evidence review. | 1 | 1 |
McGlothlen v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences1985(McGlothlen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1017 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 168 ]; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 667, p. 4580.) However, the reasoning and conclusions expressed in that opinion are sound and we therefore follow them. 1985(McGlothlen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1017 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 168 ]; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 667, p. 4580.) However, the reasoning and conclusions expressed in that opinion are sound and we therefore follow them. | 1 | 1 |
Yakov v. Board of Medical Examinersgreen2 sentences1972The question to answer then, is whether his license properly can be revoked for such conduct or whether a further charge and finding of moral turpitude was required. *444 In a case like this, the function of the trial court is to exercise its independent judgment in reweighing the evidence (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]; Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 913-916 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 458 P.2d 33 ]; Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 71-72 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 435 P.2d 553 ]; Moran v. Board of Medical-Exam 1972The question to answer then, is whether his license properly can be revoked for such conduct or whether a further charge and finding of moral turpitude was required. *444 In a case like this, the function of the trial court is to exercise its independent judgment in reweighing the evidence (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]; Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 913-916 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 458 P.2d 33 ]; Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 71-72 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 435 P.2d 553 ]; Moran v. Board of Medical-Exam | 1 | 1 |
Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences1972The question to answer then, is whether his license properly can be revoked for such conduct or whether a further charge and finding of moral turpitude was required. *444 In a case like this, the function of the trial court is to exercise its independent judgment in reweighing the evidence (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]; Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 913-916 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 458 P.2d 33 ]; Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 71-72 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 435 P.2d 553 ]; Moran v. Board of Medical-Exam 1972The question to answer then, is whether his license properly can be revoked for such conduct or whether a further charge and finding of moral turpitude was required. *444 In a case like this, the function of the trial court is to exercise its independent judgment in reweighing the evidence (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]; Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 913-916 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 458 P.2d 33 ]; Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 71-72 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 435 P.2d 553 ]; Moran v. Board of Medical-Exam | 1 | 1 |
Moran v. Board of Medical Examinersgreen2 sentences1972The question to answer then, is whether his license properly can be revoked for such conduct or whether a further charge and finding of moral turpitude was required. *444 In a case like this, the function of the trial court is to exercise its independent judgment in reweighing the evidence (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]; Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 913-916 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 458 P.2d 33 ]; Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 71-72 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 435 P.2d 553 ]; Moran v. Board of Medical-Exam 1972The question to answer then, is whether his license properly can be revoked for such conduct or whether a further charge and finding of moral turpitude was required. *444 In a case like this, the function of the trial court is to exercise its independent judgment in reweighing the evidence (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]; Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 913-916 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 458 P.2d 33 ]; Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 71-72 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 435 P.2d 553 ]; Moran v. Board of Medical-Exam | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. State Water Resources Control Board
green
2 sentences2022(Johnson v. State Water Resource Control Bd. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1107, 114 .) The Porter-Cologne Act also allows regional water board decisions on waste discharge permits to be challenged through a petition for writ of mandate in superior court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (§ 13330, subds. (a), (b), (e).) 3 The Legislature has also directed the State Board to implement a “nonpoint source management plan.” (§ 13369, subd. (b)(2).) Under this mandate, the State Board adopted the NPS Policy. 2022(Johnson v. State Water Resource Control Bd. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1107, 114 .) The Porter-Cologne Act also allows regional water board decisions on waste discharge permits to be challenged through a petition for writ of mandate in superior court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (§ 13330, subds. (a), (b), (e).) 7 The Legislature has also directed the State Board to implement a “nonpoint source management plan.” (§ 13369, subd. (b)(2).) Under this mandate, the State Board adopted the NPS Policy. | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Taylor v. Crane
green
2 sentences1985(Taylor v. Crane, supra, [1979] 24 Cal.3d [442] at p. 452 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 695 , 595 P.2d 129 ].) Arbitration of this dispute is strongly favored over the alternative, a petition for writ of mandate filed in superior court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. ‘[W]here a city charter or ordinance may be construed to authorize grievance arbitration of broad scope, that construction is preferred.’ (Taylor v. Crane, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 452 .) [1] We hold that the memorandum of understanding between the parties requires employees whose grievance involves a suspension or dismissal t 1985(Taylor v. Crane, supra, [1979] 24 Cal.3d [442] at p. 452 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 695 , 595 P.2d 129 ].) Arbitration of this dispute is strongly favored over the alternative, a petition for writ of mandate filed in superior court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. ‘[W]here a city charter or ordinance may be construed to authorize grievance arbitration of broad scope, that construction is preferred.’ (Taylor v. Crane, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 452 .) [1] We hold that the memorandum of understanding between the parties requires employees whose grievance involves a suspension or dismissal t | 2 | 1984–1985 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Penny S.
green
2 sentences2008(Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 143, fn. 12 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 624 P.2d 256 ].) DCFS cites Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 293 [ 109 P.2d 942 ], for the proposition that “exhaustion of the administrative remedy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.” DCFS further cites In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 , 159 P.3d 49 ] (Joshua S.), as authority for its position that a juvenile court does not have the authority to order DCFS to make AFDC-FC payments without an administrative determination of eligibility. 2008(Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 143, fn. 12 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 624 P.2d 256 ].) DCFS cites Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 293 [ 109 P.2d 942 ], for the proposition that “exhaustion of the administrative remedy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.” DCFS further cites In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 , 159 P.3d 49 ] (Joshua S.), as authority for its position that a juvenile court does not have the authority to order DCFS to make AFDC-FC payments without an administrative determination of eligibility. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Menefee & Son v. Department of Food & Agriculture
green
2 sentences1992The trial court, relying upon Menefee & Son v. Department of Food & Agriculture (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 774 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 166 ], found section 12648 unconstitutional on its face because the section does not expressly provide a means for compensation in the event the Department seizes property wrongfully. 1992The trial court, relying upon Menefee & Son v. Department of Food & Agriculture (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 774 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 166 ], found section 12648 unconstitutional on its face because the section does not expressly provide a means for compensation in the event the Department seizes property wrongfully. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United Firefighters v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1985“Arbitration of this dispute is strongly favored over the alternative, a petition for writ of mandate filed in superior court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.” (United Firefighters v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 383, 389 .) In United *1149 Firefighters it does not appear that administrative mandamus proceedings were instituted prior to the filing of the petition to compel arbitration. 1985(Taylor v. Crane, supra, [1979] 24 Cal.3d [442] at p. 452 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 695 , 595 P.2d 129 ].) Arbitration of this dispute is strongly favored over the alternative, a petition for writ of mandate filed in superior court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. ‘[W]here a city charter or ordinance may be construed to authorize grievance arbitration of broad scope, that construction is preferred.’ (Taylor v. Crane, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 452 .) [1] We hold that the memorandum of understanding between the parties requires employees whose grievance involves a suspension or dismissal t | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.