section 845 immunity in California

2002(Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 814 , italics added.) As we explained, the immunity extended by Government Code section 845 “is meant to protect the budgetary and political decisions which are involved in hiring and deploying a police force.” (Peterson, at p. 815. ) Other examples in which immunity pursuant to Government Code section 845 has shielded public entities include: an asserted failure to provide *1143 adequate security patrols in the parking lot of the state fairgrounds despite the foreseeability of gang violence there (Turner v. State of Cal

1984Respondents urge that such liability is barred by the provisions of section 845. 11 While we agree that section 845 provides a general immunity for failure to provide adequate police protection (see, e.g., Susman v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 240 ]), we disagree that the provisions of that section defeat appellants’ cause of action. *812 Respondents rely principally on Moncur v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 118 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 239 ], to support their contention.

1995In Hernandez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1063, 1067 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 436 ], Division Four of this appellate district concluded that the section 845 immunity applied to allegations that public transit officials knew of the danger of crime on buses but failed to provide “adequate police protection . . . .” In Stone v. State of California (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 924, 926-927 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 339 ], the Third District Court of Appeal held that the section 845 immunity applied to the failure to provide adequate security at the front gate of a state fairgrounds.

1995In Hernandez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1063, 1067 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 436 ], Division Four of this appellate district concluded that the section 845 immunity applied to allegations that public transit officials knew of the danger of crime on buses but failed to provide “adequate police protection . . . .” In Stone v. State of California (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 924, 926-927 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 339 ], the Third District Court of Appeal held that the section 845 immunity applied to the failure to provide adequate security at the front gate of a state fairgrounds.

2002(Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 814 , italics added.) As we explained, the immunity extended by Government Code section 845 “is meant to protect the budgetary and political decisions which are involved in hiring and deploying a police force.” (Peterson, at p. 815. ) Other examples in which immunity pursuant to Government Code section 845 has shielded public entities include: an asserted failure to provide *1143 adequate security patrols in the parking lot of the state fairgrounds despite the foreseeability of gang violence there (Turner v. State of Cal

1995The Supreme Court found the district was immune from this claim pursuant to section 845. ( 36 Cal.3d at p. 815 .) We discuss section 845 immunity, post, at part 2.c.(2). [5] The overwhelming majority of section 845 cases focus on police protection service by municipalities or the state.

2025(Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1130 .).

2025(See Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1142 [immunity “ ‘was designed to prevent political decisions of policy-making officials of government from being second-guessed by judges and juries in personal injury litigation’ ”].) Immunity under section 845 can factor into the court’s analysis of whether a public entity’s maintenance decisions created or contributed to the existence of a dangerous condition on public property.

2002(Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 814 , italics added.) As we explained, the immunity extended by Government Code section 845 “is meant to protect the budgetary and political decisions which are involved in hiring and deploying a police force.” (Peterson, at p. 815. ) Other examples in which immunity pursuant to Government Code section 845 has shielded public entities include: an asserted failure to provide *1143 adequate security patrols in the parking lot of the state fairgrounds despite the foreseeability of gang violence there (Turner v. State of Cal

2002(Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 814 , italics added.) As we explained, the immunity extended by Government Code section 845 “is meant to protect the budgetary and political decisions which are involved in hiring and deploying a police force.” (Peterson, at p. 815. ) Other examples in which immunity pursuant to Government Code section 845 has shielded public entities include: an asserted failure to provide *1143 adequate security patrols in the parking lot of the state fairgrounds despite the foreseeability of gang violence there (Turner v. State of Cal

2002(Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 814 , italics added.) As we explained, the immunity extended by Government Code section 845 “is meant to protect the budgetary and political decisions which are involved in hiring and deploying a police force.” (Peterson, at p. 815. ) Other examples in which immunity pursuant to Government Code section 845 has shielded public entities include: an asserted failure to provide *1143 adequate security patrols in the parking lot of the state fairgrounds despite the foreseeability of gang violence there (Turner v. State of Cal

2002(Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 814 , italics added.) As we explained, the immunity extended by Government Code section 845 “is meant to protect the budgetary and political decisions which are involved in hiring and deploying a police force.” (Peterson, at p. 815. ) Other examples in which immunity pursuant to Government Code section 845 has shielded public entities include: an asserted failure to provide *1143 adequate security patrols in the parking lot of the state fairgrounds despite the foreseeability of gang violence there (Turner v. State of Cal

1995In Hernandez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1063, 1067 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 436 ], Division Four of this appellate district concluded that the section 845 immunity applied to allegations that public transit officials knew of the danger of crime on buses but failed to provide “adequate police protection . . . .” In Stone v. State of California (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 924, 926-927 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 339 ], the Third District Court of Appeal held that the section 845 immunity applied to the failure to provide adequate security at the front gate of a state fairgrounds.

1995In Hernandez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1063, 1067 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 436 ], Division Four of this appellate district concluded that the section 845 immunity applied to allegations that public transit officials knew of the danger of crime on buses but failed to provide “adequate police protection . . . .” In Stone v. State of California (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 924, 926-927 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 339 ], the Third District Court of Appeal held that the section 845 immunity applied to the failure to provide adequate security at the front gate of a state fairgrounds.

2023Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 445 (Stockett).) The purpose of these requirements is “ ‘to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. [Citation.]’ ” 7 Section 845 provides immunity to public entities and public employees for failure to establish a police department, failure to provide police protection service, or failure to provide sufficient police protection service. 17 (Stockett, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 446 .) “[T]he claims statute ‘should not be applied to snare the

2023Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 445 (Stockett).) The purpose of these requirements is “ ‘to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. [Citation.]’ ” 7 Section 845 provides immunity to public entities and public employees for failure to establish a police department, failure to provide police protection service, or failure to provide sufficient police protection service. 17 (Stockett, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 446 .) “[T]he claims statute ‘should not be applied to snare the

2021(See Adams v. City of Fremont (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 317 (dis. opn. of P.J.

2002We granted review on petition of defendants county and sheriff’s department. 3 (Defendant Harry Zelig is not a party in this appeal.) *1126 II In determining whether plaintiffs properly stated a claim for relief, our standard of review is clear: “ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] When a

2002We granted review on petition of defendants county and sheriff’s department. 3 (Defendant Harry Zelig is not a party in this appeal.) *1126 II In determining whether plaintiffs properly stated a claim for relief, our standard of review is clear: “ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] When a

2002We granted review on petition of defendants county and sheriff’s department. 3 (Defendant Harry Zelig is not a party in this appeal.) *1126 II In determining whether plaintiffs properly stated a claim for relief, our standard of review is clear: “ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] When a

2002We granted review on petition of defendants county and sheriff’s department. 3 (Defendant Harry Zelig is not a party in this appeal.) *1126 II In determining whether plaintiffs properly stated a claim for relief, our standard of review is clear: “ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] When a

1995From these cases, we glean the following: to the extent that appellants allege damages from the City’s and the Authority’s failure to (1) provide sufficient numbers of police personnel to patrol that particular housing project; (2) combat vandalism and terrorism by drug dealers (Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 490-493 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 ]); (3) provide police protection at certain hours or in certain areas (Slapin v. Los Angeles International Airport, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d at p. 487 ; Hernandez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1063, 1067 [ 19

1995From these cases, we glean the following: to the extent that appellants allege damages from the City's and the Authority's failure to (1) provide sufficient numbers of police personnel to patrol that particular housing project; (2) combat vandalism and terrorism by drug dealers ( Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 481, 490-493 [ 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 489 ]); (3) provide police protection at certain hours or in certain areas ( Slapin v. Los Angeles International Airport, supra, 65 Cal. App.3d at p. 487 ; Hernandez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 142 Cal. App.3d 1063, 106

1995From these cases, we glean the following: to the extent that appellants allege damages from the City's and the Authority's failure to (1) provide sufficient numbers of police personnel to patrol that particular housing project; (2) combat vandalism and terrorism by drug dealers ( Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 481, 490-493 [ 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 489 ]); (3) provide police protection at certain hours or in certain areas ( Slapin v. Los Angeles International Airport, supra, 65 Cal. App.3d at p. 487 ; Hernandez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 142 Cal. App.3d 1063, 106

1995From these cases, we glean the following: to the extent that appellants allege damages from the City's and the Authority's failure to (1) provide sufficient numbers of police personnel to patrol that particular housing project; (2) combat vandalism and terrorism by drug dealers ( Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 481, 490-493 [ 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 489 ]); (3) provide police protection at certain hours or in certain areas ( Slapin v. Los Angeles International Airport, supra, 65 Cal. App.3d at p. 487 ; Hernandez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 142 Cal. App.3d 1063, 106

1995From these cases, we glean the following: to the extent that appellants allege damages from the City's and the Authority's failure to (1) provide sufficient numbers of police personnel to patrol that particular housing project; (2) combat vandalism and terrorism by drug dealers ( Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 481, 490-493 [ 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 489 ]); (3) provide police protection at certain hours or in certain areas ( Slapin v. Los Angeles International Airport, supra, 65 Cal. App.3d at p. 487 ; Hernandez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 142 Cal. App.3d 1063, 106

1995From these cases, we glean the following: to the extent that appellants allege damages from the City's and the Authority's failure to (1) provide sufficient numbers of police personnel to patrol that particular housing project; (2) combat vandalism and terrorism by drug dealers ( Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 481, 490-493 [ 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 489 ]); (3) provide police protection at certain hours or in certain areas ( Slapin v. Los Angeles International Airport, supra, 65 Cal. App.3d at p. 487 ; Hernandez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 142 Cal. App.3d 1063, 106

1995Absolute immunities apply to both ministerial and discretionary acts. ( Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 418-419 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 428 , 682 P.2d 1093 ]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 479, 481-484 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 374 , 503 P.2d 1382 ].) Absolute immunity from the duty to pay tort damages has been recognized in the following situations: failure of the police to properly detain a motorist who escapes and thereafter causes injury ( Kisbey v. State of California, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 417-419 [§ 845.8]); failure of the county to properly maintain a jai

1995Absolute immunities apply to both ministerial and discretionary acts. ( Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 418-419 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 428 , 682 P.2d 1093 ]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 479, 481-484 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 374 , 503 P.2d 1382 ].) Absolute immunity from the duty to pay tort damages has been recognized in the following situations: failure of the police to properly detain a motorist who escapes and thereafter causes injury ( Kisbey v. State of California, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 417-419 [§ 845.8]); failure of the county to properly maintain a jai

1995(Cf. Wallace v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1402 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 113 ].) Section 845 applies to “ ‘political decisions which are involved in . . . deploying a police force.’ ” (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 40 Cal. 3d at p. 792 .) Section 845 is an absolute immunity from the duty to pay monetary damages when by its terms it applies to a discretionary policy determination concerning police deployment.

1995(Cf. Wallace v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1402 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 113 ].) Section 845 applies to “ ‘political decisions which are involved in . . . deploying a police force.’ ” (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 40 Cal. 3d at p. 792 .) Section 845 is an absolute immunity from the duty to pay monetary damages when by its terms it applies to a discretionary policy determination concerning police deployment.

1995Absolute immunities apply to both ministerial and discretionary acts. ( Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 418-419 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 428 , 682 P.2d 1093 ]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 479, 481-484 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 374 , 503 P.2d 1382 ].) Absolute immunity from the duty to pay tort damages has been recognized in the following situations: failure of the police to properly detain a motorist who escapes and thereafter causes injury ( Kisbey v. State of California, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 417-419 [§ 845.8]); failure of the county to properly maintain a jai

1995Absolute immunities apply to both ministerial and discretionary acts. ( Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 418-419 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 428 , 682 P.2d 1093 ]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 479, 481-484 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 374 , 503 P.2d 1382 ].) Absolute immunity from the duty to pay tort damages has been recognized in the following situations: failure of the police to properly detain a motorist who escapes and thereafter causes injury ( Kisbey v. State of California, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 417-419 [§ 845.8]); failure of the county to properly maintain a jai

1995Absolute immunities apply to both ministerial and discretionary acts. ( Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 418-419 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 428 , 682 P.2d 1093 ]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 479, 481-484 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 374 , 503 P.2d 1382 ].) Absolute immunity from the duty to pay tort damages has been recognized in the following situations: failure of the police to properly detain a motorist who escapes and thereafter causes injury ( Kisbey v. State of California, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 417-419 [§ 845.8]); failure of the county to properly maintain a jai

1995Absolute immunities apply to both ministerial and discretionary acts. ( Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 418-419 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 428 , 682 P.2d 1093 ]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 479, 481-484 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 374 , 503 P.2d 1382 ].) Absolute immunity from the duty to pay tort damages has been recognized in the following situations: failure of the police to properly detain a motorist who escapes and thereafter causes injury ( Kisbey v. State of California, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 417-419 [§ 845.8]); failure of the county to properly maintain a jai

1995From these cases, we glean the following: to the extent that appellants allege damages from the City's and the Authority's failure to (1) provide sufficient numbers of police personnel to patrol that particular housing project; (2) combat vandalism and terrorism by drug dealers ( Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 481, 490-493 [ 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 489 ]); (3) provide police protection at certain hours or in certain areas ( Slapin v. Los Angeles International Airport, supra, 65 Cal. App.3d at p. 487 ; Hernandez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 142 Cal. App.3d 1063, 106

1995From these cases, we glean the following: to the extent that appellants allege damages from the City's and the Authority's failure to (1) provide sufficient numbers of police personnel to patrol that particular housing project; (2) combat vandalism and terrorism by drug dealers ( Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 481, 490-493 [ 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 489 ]); (3) provide police protection at certain hours or in certain areas ( Slapin v. Los Angeles International Airport, supra, 65 Cal. App.3d at p. 487 ; Hernandez v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 142 Cal. App.3d 1063, 106

1995Despite its reference to suits against the "state," article III, section 5 applies to all suits even those against local agencies and their employees. ( Edgington v. County of San Diego (1981) 118 Cal. App.3d 39, 42-43 [ 173 Cal. Rptr. 225 ]; Smith v. City and County of San Francisco (1977) 68 Cal. App.3d 227, 230 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 146 ].) Article III, section 5 is an enabling provision which allows the Legislature to comprehensively regulate "suits" against the state, local governmental agencies, and public employees.

1995Despite its reference to suits against the "state," article III, section 5 applies to all suits even those against local agencies and their employees. ( Edgington v. County of San Diego (1981) 118 Cal. App.3d 39, 42-43 [ 173 Cal. Rptr. 225 ]; Smith v. City and County of San Francisco (1977) 68 Cal. App.3d 227, 230 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 146 ].) Article III, section 5 is an enabling provision which allows the Legislature to comprehensively regulate "suits" against the state, local governmental agencies, and public employees.