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11 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 2016–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
New v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See New v. State, 327 Ga. App. 87, 106-109 (5) ( 755 SE2d 568 ) (2014), disapproved in part on other grounds by Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143 , 146, n. 4 ( 860 SE2d 893 ) (2021). 2022See New v. State, 327 Ga. App. 87, 106-109 (5) ( 755 SE2d 568 ) (2014), disapproved in part on other grounds by Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 143 , 146, n. 4 ( 860 SE2d 893 ) (2021). | 4 | 5 |
HOOD v. the STATE.green2 sentences2020See Nazario, 293 Ga. at 485-486 (2) (b); Hood v. State, 343 Ga. App. 230, 234 (1) ( 807 SE2d 10 ) (2017) (“A sentence that does not comply with the OCGA § 17-10-6.2 split-sentence requirement is void. 2020See Nazario, 293 Ga. at 485-486 (2) (b); Hood v. State, 343 Ga. App. 230, 234 (1) ( 807 SE2d 10 ) (2017) (“A sentence that does not comply with the OCGA § 17-10-6.2 split-sentence requirement is void. | 3 | 4 |
Barton v. the Stategreen2 sentences2020A sentence which is not allowed by law is void, and its illegality may not be waived.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Cruz v. State, 346 Ga. App. 802 , 803 (1) ( 815 SE2d 311 ) (2018) (vacating as void sentences imposed on sexual offenses, where such sentences were inconsistent with the mandates of OCGA § 17- 10-6.2 (b)); Barton v. State, 338 Ga. App. 524, 525-526 ( 790 SE2d 538 ) (2016) (vacating as void the sentence imposed after defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea on a sexual offense count, because although the defendant’s sentence fell within the applicable statutory 2020A sentence which is not allowed by law is void, and its illegality may not be waived.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Cruz v. State, 346 Ga. App. 802 , 803 (1) ( 815 SE2d 311 ) (2018) (vacating as void sentences imposed on sexual offenses, where such sentences were inconsistent with the mandates of OCGA § 17- 10-6.2 (b)); Barton v. State, 338 Ga. App. 524, 525-526 ( 790 SE2d 538 ) (2016) (vacating as void the sentence imposed after defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea on a sexual offense count, because although the defendant’s sentence fell within the applicable statutory | 2 | 2 |
Nazario v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See Nazario, 293 Ga. at 485-486 (2) (b); Hood v. State, 343 Ga. App. 230, 234 (1) ( 807 SE2d 10 ) (2017) (“A sentence that does not comply with the OCGA § 17-10-6.2 split-sentence requirement is void. 2017We are required to correct a void sentence. ...A sentence which is not allowed by law is void, and its illegality may not be waived." Hughes v. State , 341 Ga. App. 594 , 597-598 (3), 802 S.E.2d 30 (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted) (where defendant appealed the denial of his motion for new trial and this Court affirmed the trial court's order with regard to the alleged errors raised by defendant, the Court nonetheless vacated his sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing because the sentence did not comply with OCGA § 17-10-6.2, an issue that was not raised by | 2 | 2 |
Jackson v. the Stategreen2 sentences2019Hood v. State , 343 Ga. App. 230 , 233 (1), 807 S.E.2d 10 (2017) ; Jackson v. State , 338 Ga. App. 509 , 510, 790 S.E.2d 295 (2016). 2019Hood v. State , 343 Ga. App. 230 , 233 (1), 807 S.E.2d 10 (2017) ; Jackson v. State , 338 Ga. App. 509 , 510, 790 S.E.2d 295 (2016). | 1 | 3 |
Hughes v. the Stategreen2 sentences2020Miller, P. J., and Rickman, J., concur. 27 Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 (III) (B) ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). 28 See OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b); Hughes v. State, 341 Ga. App. 594, 597-598 (3) ( 802 SE2d 594 ) (2017) (“A sentence that does not comply with the OCGA § 17-10-6.2 split-sentence requirement is void. 2017We are required to correct a void sentence. ...A sentence which is not allowed by law is void, and its illegality may not be waived." Hughes v. State , 341 Ga. App. 594 , 597-598 (3), 802 S.E.2d 30 (2017) (citations and punctuation omitted) (where defendant appealed the denial of his motion for new trial and this Court affirmed the trial court's order with regard to the alleged errors raised by defendant, the Court nonetheless vacated his sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing because the sentence did not comply with OCGA § 17-10-6.2, an issue that was not raised by | 1 | 2 |
Watkins v. the Stategreen1 sentence2020See Conwell v. State, 344 Ga. App. 67, 68 (2) ( 808 SE2d 434 ) (2017) (sentencing defendant to a split sentence as a recidivist); see also Watkins v. State, 336 Ga. App. 145, 151-153 (5) ( 748 SE2d 11 ) (2016) (even where defendant is sentenced as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7, the trial court is required to impose a split sentence under OCGA § 17-10-6.2 for applicable offenses). 14 In summary, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion for new trial as to one count of interference with custody of a minor, but that the convictions on the remaining three counts of interfere | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2020Miller, P. J., and Rickman, J., concur. 27 Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 (III) (B) ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). 28 See OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b); Hughes v. State, 341 Ga. App. 594, 597-598 (3) ( 802 SE2d 594 ) (2017) (“A sentence that does not comply with the OCGA § 17-10-6.2 split-sentence requirement is void. 2020Miller, P. J., and Rickman, J., concur. 27 Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 (III) (B) ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). 28 See OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b); Hughes v. State, 341 Ga. App. 594, 597-598 (3) ( 802 SE2d 594 ) (2017) (“A sentence that does not comply with the OCGA § 17-10-6.2 split-sentence requirement is void. | 1 | 1 |
CONWELL v. the STATE.green2 sentences2020See Conwell v. State, 344 Ga. App. 67, 68 (2) ( 808 SE2d 434 ) (2017) (sentencing defendant to a split sentence as a recidivist); see also Watkins v. State, 336 Ga. App. 145, 151-153 (5) ( 748 SE2d 11 ) (2016) (even where defendant is sentenced as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7, the trial court is required to impose a split sentence under OCGA § 17-10-6.2 for applicable offenses). 14 In summary, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion for new trial as to one count of interference with custody of a minor, but that the convictions on the remaining three counts of interfere 2020See Conwell v. State, 344 Ga. App. 67, 68 (2) ( 808 SE2d 434 ) (2017) (sentencing defendant to a split sentence as a recidivist); see also Watkins v. State, 336 Ga. App. 145, 151-153 (5) ( 748 SE2d 11 ) (2016) (even where defendant is sentenced as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7, the trial court is required to impose a split sentence under OCGA § 17-10-6.2 for applicable offenses). 14 In summary, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion for new trial as to one count of interference with custody of a minor, but that the convictions on the remaining three counts of interfere | 1 | 1 |
Ivan Cruz v. Stategreen2 sentences2020A sentence which is not allowed by law is void, and its illegality may not be waived.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Cruz v. State, 346 Ga. App. 802 , 803 (1) ( 815 SE2d 311 ) (2018) (vacating as void sentences imposed on sexual offenses, where such sentences were inconsistent with the mandates of OCGA § 17- 10-6.2 (b)); Barton v. State, 338 Ga. App. 524, 525-526 ( 790 SE2d 538 ) (2016) (vacating as void the sentence imposed after defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea on a sexual offense count, because although the defendant’s sentence fell within the applicable statutory 2020A sentence which is not allowed by law is void, and its illegality may not be waived.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Cruz v. State, 346 Ga. App. 802 , 803 (1) ( 815 SE2d 311 ) (2018) (vacating as void sentences imposed on sexual offenses, where such sentences were inconsistent with the mandates of OCGA § 17- 10-6.2 (b)); Barton v. State, 338 Ga. App. 524, 525-526 ( 790 SE2d 538 ) (2016) (vacating as void the sentence imposed after defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea on a sexual offense count, because although the defendant’s sentence fell within the applicable statutory | 1 | 1 |
Franks v. Stategreen2 sentences2020A sentence which is not allowed by law is void, and its illegality may not be waived.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Cruz v. State, 346 Ga. App. 802 , 803 (1) ( 815 SE2d 311 ) (2018) (vacating as void sentences imposed on sexual offenses, where such sentences were inconsistent with the mandates of OCGA § 17- 10-6.2 (b)); Barton v. State, 338 Ga. App. 524, 525-526 ( 790 SE2d 538 ) (2016) (vacating as void the sentence imposed after defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea on a sexual offense count, because although the defendant’s sentence fell within the applicable statutory 2020A sentence which is not allowed by law is void, and its illegality may not be waived.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Cruz v. State, 346 Ga. App. 802 , 803 (1) ( 815 SE2d 311 ) (2018) (vacating as void sentences imposed on sexual offenses, where such sentences were inconsistent with the mandates of OCGA § 17- 10-6.2 (b)); Barton v. State, 338 Ga. App. 524, 525-526 ( 790 SE2d 538 ) (2016) (vacating as void the sentence imposed after defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea on a sexual offense count, because although the defendant’s sentence fell within the applicable statutory | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Swanson v. State
green
1 sentence2020Miller, P. J., and Rickman, J., concur. 27 Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 (III) (B) ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). 28 See OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b); Hughes v. State, 341 Ga. App. 594, 597-598 (3) ( 802 SE2d 594 ) (2017) (“A sentence that does not comply with the OCGA § 17-10-6.2 split-sentence requirement is void. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Prince v. State
green
2 sentences2018Ga. L. 2017, § 5/HB 341 (effective July 1, 2017) amended this Code section, but the amendment does not affect this appeal. 9 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (1) ("Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person convicted of the offense of aggravated child molestation shall be punished by imprisonment for life or by a split sentence that is a term of imprisonment for not less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation for life, and shall be subject to the sentencing and punishment provisions of Code [s]ections 17-10-6.1 and 17-10-7."); OCGA § 16-6-22.2 ("A p 2018Ga. L. 2017, § 5/HB 341 (effective July 1, 2017) amended this Code section, but the amendment does not affect this appeal. 9 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (1) ("Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person convicted of the offense of aggravated child molestation shall be punished by imprisonment for life or by a split sentence that is a term of imprisonment for not less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation for life, and shall be subject to the sentencing and punishment provisions of Code [s]ections 17-10-6.1 and 17-10-7."); OCGA § 16-6-22.2 ("A p | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Riggs
green
2 sentences2018Ga. L. 2017, § 5/HB 341 (effective July 1, 2017) amended this Code section, but the amendment does not affect this appeal. 9 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (1) ("Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person convicted of the offense of aggravated child molestation shall be punished by imprisonment for life or by a split sentence that is a term of imprisonment for not less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation for life, and shall be subject to the sentencing and punishment provisions of Code [s]ections 17-10-6.1 and 17-10-7."); OCGA § 16-6-22.2 ("A p 2018Ga. L. 2017, § 5/HB 341 (effective July 1, 2017) amended this Code section, but the amendment does not affect this appeal. 9 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (1) ("Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person convicted of the offense of aggravated child molestation shall be punished by imprisonment for life or by a split sentence that is a term of imprisonment for not less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation for life, and shall be subject to the sentencing and punishment provisions of Code [s]ections 17-10-6.1 and 17-10-7."); OCGA § 16-6-22.2 ("A p | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.