M'Naughton test in California

1977(See People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795, 800-801, 821-822 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 271 , 394 P.2d *262 959] [inability to appreciate quality of act evidence of either insanity or inability to premeditate]; People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 322 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 411 P.2d 911 ] [inability to “comprehend duty to govern” actions evidence of either insanity or inability to harbor malice].) 2 Although the precise issue of a defendant’s sanity under the M’Naughton standard—whether defendant did not know or understand the nature and quality of his act, or was incapable of distinguishing right from wro

1977(See People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795, 800-801, 821-822 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 271 , 394 P.2d *262 959] [inability to appreciate quality of act evidence of either insanity or inability to premeditate]; People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 322 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 411 P.2d 911 ] [inability to “comprehend duty to govern” actions evidence of either insanity or inability to harbor malice].) 2 Although the precise issue of a defendant’s sanity under the M’Naughton standard—whether defendant did not know or understand the nature and quality of his act, or was incapable of distinguishing right from wro

1964As we have repeatedly stated in recent years, the M’Naughton test (of course, as evolved and applied in the California rule) has become “an integral part of the legislative scheme for the appraisal of criminal responsibility in California and any change therein should come from the Legislature.” (People v. Darling (1962) 58 Cal.2d 15, 23 [9] [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 484 , 372 P.2d 316 ]; People v. Rittger (1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 732 [9] [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 901 , 355 P.2d 645 ]; People v. Nash (1959) 52 Cal.2d 36, 43 [1] - 49 [4] [ 338 P.2d 416 ], and cases there cited.) Indeed, the entire problem is currently u

1964As we have repeatedly stated in recent years, the M’Naughton test (of course, as evolved and applied in the California rule) has become “an integral part of the legislative scheme for the appraisal of criminal responsibility in California and any change therein should come from the Legislature.” (People v. Darling (1962) 58 Cal.2d 15, 23 [9] [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 484 , 372 P.2d 316 ]; People v. Rittger (1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 732 [9] [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 901 , 355 P.2d 645 ]; People v. Nash (1959) 52 Cal.2d 36, 43 [1] - 49 [4] [ 338 P.2d 416 ], and cases there cited.) Indeed, the entire problem is currently u

1973It requires an incalculable degree of presumption to say whether another individual ‘knows’ right from wrong, especially when few of us could truly say . . . what our own degree of expertise is in this distinction, [f] Trying to get around the absurdity of the M’Naghten criteria has invited the ingenuity of many lawyers, judges, and psychiatrists for a century.” (Menninger, The Crime of Punishment (1966) p. 115.) Efforts to “get around” the M’Naughton rule were undertaken in New Hampshire as long ago as 1870 (State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 429 ), by Judge Bazelon in 1954 in Durham v. United State

1973It requires an incalculable degree of presumption to say whether another individual ‘knows’ right from wrong, especially when few of us could truly say . . . what our own degree of expertise is in this distinction, [f] Trying to get around the absurdity of the M’Naghten criteria has invited the ingenuity of many lawyers, judges, and psychiatrists for a century.” (Menninger, The Crime of Punishment (1966) p. 115.) Efforts to “get around” the M’Naughton rule were undertaken in New Hampshire as long ago as 1870 (State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 429 ), by Judge Bazelon in 1954 in Durham v. United State

1973It requires an incalculable degree of presumption to say whether another individual ‘knows’ right from wrong, especially when few of us could truly say . . . what our own degree of expertise is in this distinction, [f] Trying to get around the absurdity of the M’Naghten criteria has invited the ingenuity of many lawyers, judges, and psychiatrists for a century.” (Menninger, The Crime of Punishment (1966) p. 115.) Efforts to “get around” the M’Naughton rule were undertaken in New Hampshire as long ago as 1870 (State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 429 ), by Judge Bazelon in 1954 in Durham v. United State

1973It requires an incalculable degree of presumption to say whether another individual ‘knows’ right from wrong, especially when few of us could truly say . . . what our own degree of expertise is in this distinction, [f] Trying to get around the absurdity of the M’Naghten criteria has invited the ingenuity of many lawyers, judges, and psychiatrists for a century.” (Menninger, The Crime of Punishment (1966) p. 115.) Efforts to “get around” the M’Naughton rule were undertaken in New Hampshire as long ago as 1870 (State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 429 ), by Judge Bazelon in 1954 in Durham v. United State

1973While in People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 490 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ], Justice Traynor frankly conceded the Wells-Gorshen “purpose and effect are to ameliorate the law governing criminal responsibility prescribed by the M’Naughton rule,” the following year this court in People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 271 , 394 P.2d 959 ], reaffirmed M’Naughton once again, declaring (at p. 803) that it has become “ ‘an integral part of the legislative scheme for the appraisal of criminal responsibility in California and any change therein should come from the Legislature

1973While in People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 490 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ], Justice Traynor frankly conceded the Wells-Gorshen “purpose and effect are to ameliorate the law governing criminal responsibility prescribed by the M’Naughton rule,” the following year this court in People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 271 , 394 P.2d 959 ], reaffirmed M’Naughton once again, declaring (at p. 803) that it has become “ ‘an integral part of the legislative scheme for the appraisal of criminal responsibility in California and any change therein should come from the Legislature

1977(See People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795, 800-801, 821-822 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 271 , 394 P.2d *262 959] [inability to appreciate quality of act evidence of either insanity or inability to premeditate]; People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 322 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 411 P.2d 911 ] [inability to “comprehend duty to govern” actions evidence of either insanity or inability to harbor malice].) 2 Although the precise issue of a defendant’s sanity under the M’Naughton standard—whether defendant did not know or understand the nature and quality of his act, or was incapable of distinguishing right from wro

1977(See People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795, 800-801, 821-822 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 271 , 394 P.2d *262 959] [inability to appreciate quality of act evidence of either insanity or inability to premeditate]; People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 322 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 411 P.2d 911 ] [inability to “comprehend duty to govern” actions evidence of either insanity or inability to harbor malice].) 2 Although the precise issue of a defendant’s sanity under the M’Naughton standard—whether defendant did not know or understand the nature and quality of his act, or was incapable of distinguishing right from wro

1985As Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” (New York Trust Co. v. Eisner (1921) 256 U.S. 345, 349 [ 65 L.Ed. 963, 983 , 41 S.Ct. 506 , 16 A.L.R. 660 ].) In 1973 I wrote a separate opinion in People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565, 578 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 171 , 516 P.2d 875 ], urging that the M’Naughton test 1 be “disavowed] as outmoded and unsupportable in either medical science or law,” and that pending legislative action the American Law Institute formulation be adopted by trial courts as the test for insanity.

1985As Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” (New York Trust Co. v. Eisner (1921) 256 U.S. 345, 349 [ 65 L.Ed. 963, 983 , 41 S.Ct. 506 , 16 A.L.R. 660 ].) In 1973 I wrote a separate opinion in People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565, 578 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 171 , 516 P.2d 875 ], urging that the M’Naughton test 1 be “disavowed] as outmoded and unsupportable in either medical science or law,” and that pending legislative action the American Law Institute formulation be adopted by trial courts as the test for insanity.

1967This policy is now firmly established in the law of California (People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal.2d 716 [ 336 P.2d 492 ]; People v. Baker, 42 Cal.2d 550, 569-571 [ 268 P.2d 705 ] . . . ; People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal.2d 522, 526-529 [ 219 P.2d 9 ] . . . ; People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ] ; People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 683-684 ). ...” What was said with reference to premeditation in People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795, 822 , is pertinent here: “Certainly in the case now at bench the defendant had ample time for any normal person to maturely and appreciatively reflect upon Ms contemplated

1967This policy is now firmly established in the law of California (People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal.2d 716 [ 336 P.2d 492 ]; People v. Baker, 42 Cal.2d 550, 569-571 [ 268 P.2d 705 ] . . . ; People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal.2d 522, 526-529 [ 219 P.2d 9 ] . . . ; People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ] ; People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 683-684 ). ...” What was said with reference to premeditation in People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795, 822 , is pertinent here: “Certainly in the case now at bench the defendant had ample time for any normal person to maturely and appreciatively reflect upon Ms contemplated

1967This policy is now firmly established in the law of California (People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal.2d 716 [ 336 P.2d 492 ]; People v. Baker, 42 Cal.2d 550, 569-571 [ 268 P.2d 705 ] . . . ; People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal.2d 522, 526-529 [ 219 P.2d 9 ] . . . ; People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ] ; People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 683-684 ). ...” What was said with reference to premeditation in People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795, 822 , is pertinent here: “Certainly in the case now at bench the defendant had ample time for any normal person to maturely and appreciatively reflect upon Ms contemplated

1967This policy is now firmly established in the law of California (People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal.2d 716 [ 336 P.2d 492 ]; People v. Baker, 42 Cal.2d 550, 569-571 [ 268 P.2d 705 ] . . . ; People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal.2d 522, 526-529 [ 219 P.2d 9 ] . . . ; People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ] ; People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 683-684 ). ...” What was said with reference to premeditation in People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795, 822 , is pertinent here: “Certainly in the case now at bench the defendant had ample time for any normal person to maturely and appreciatively reflect upon Ms contemplated

1964As we have repeatedly stated in recent years, the M’Naughton test (of course, as evolved and applied in the California rule) has become “an integral part of the legislative scheme for the appraisal of criminal responsibility in California and any change therein should come from the Legislature.” (People v. Darling (1962) 58 Cal.2d 15, 23 [9] [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 484 , 372 P.2d 316 ]; People v. Rittger (1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 732 [9] [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 901 , 355 P.2d 645 ]; People v. Nash (1959) 52 Cal.2d 36, 43 [1] - 49 [4] [ 338 P.2d 416 ], and cases there cited.) Indeed, the entire problem is currently u

1964As we have repeatedly stated in recent years, the M’Naughton test (of course, as evolved and applied in the California rule) has become “an integral part of the legislative scheme for the appraisal of criminal responsibility in California and any change therein should come from the Legislature.” (People v. Darling (1962) 58 Cal.2d 15, 23 [9] [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 484 , 372 P.2d 316 ]; People v. Rittger (1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 732 [9] [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 901 , 355 P.2d 645 ]; People v. Nash (1959) 52 Cal.2d 36, 43 [1] - 49 [4] [ 338 P.2d 416 ], and cases there cited.) Indeed, the entire problem is currently u

1980Under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished responsibility [or ‘diminished capacity,’ per People v. Anderson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 351, 364 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 763 , 406 P.2d 43 ]] even though a defendant be legally sane according to the M’Naughton test, if he was suffering from a mental illness that prevented his acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation, he cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree.

1980Under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished responsibility [or ‘diminished capacity,’ per People v. Anderson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 351, 364 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 763 , 406 P.2d 43 ]] even though a defendant be legally sane according to the M’Naughton test, if he was suffering from a mental illness that prevented his acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation, he cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree.

2002There is no degree of insanity which may be established to affect the degree of crime." ( People v. Cordova (1939) 14 Cal.2d 308, 311 , 94 P.2d 40 .) Thus, "`there is no degree of insanity sufficient to acquit of murder but not of manslaughter.'" ( People v. Phillips (1929) 102 Cal.App. 705, 708 , 283 P. 821 .) At least in part to "ameliorate the law governing criminal responsibility" prescribed by the M'Naughton rule ( People v. Nicolaus (1967) 65 Cal.2d 866, 877 , 56 Cal.Rptr. 635 , 423 P.2d 787 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318 , 323-325 & fn. 5, 149 C

2002There is no degree of insanity which may be established to affect the degree of crime." ( People v. Cordova (1939) 14 Cal.2d 308, 311 , 94 P.2d 40 .) Thus, "`there is no degree of insanity sufficient to acquit of murder but not of manslaughter.'" ( People v. Phillips (1929) 102 Cal.App. 705, 708 , 283 P. 821 .) At least in part to "ameliorate the law governing criminal responsibility" prescribed by the M'Naughton rule ( People v. Nicolaus (1967) 65 Cal.2d 866, 877 , 56 Cal.Rptr. 635 , 423 P.2d 787 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318 , 323-325 & fn. 5, 149 C

1984(In re Jones, 260 Cal.App.2d 906 , 911-912 . . .; see In re Slayback [1930] 209 Cal. 480, 490 [‘no longer a menace to the public nor dangerous to themselves’]; People v. Mallory, 254 Cal.App.2d 151 , 155-156 . . . [rejecting M’Naughton test as appropriate for determining restoration of sanity]; Welf. & Inst.

1972(In re Jones, 260 Cal.App.2d 906, 911-912 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 32 ]; see In re Slayback, supra, 209 Cal. 480, 490 [“no longer a menace to the public nor dangerous to themselves”]; People v. Mallory, 254 Cal.App.2d 151, 155-156 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 825 ] [rejecting M’Naughton test as appropriate for determining restoration of sanity]; Welf. & Inst.

1964As we have repeatedly stated in recent years, the M’Naughton test (of course, as evolved and applied in the California rule) has become “an integral part of the legislative scheme for the appraisal of criminal responsibility in California and any change therein should come from the Legislature.” (People v. Darling (1962) 58 Cal.2d 15, 23 [9] [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 484 , 372 P.2d 316 ]; People v. Rittger (1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 732 [9] [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 901 , 355 P.2d 645 ]; People v. Nash (1959) 52 Cal.2d 36, 43 [1] - 49 [4] [ 338 P.2d 416 ], and cases there cited.) Indeed, the entire problem is currently u

1964As we have repeatedly stated in recent years, the M’Naughton test (of course, as evolved and applied in the California rule) has become “an integral part of the legislative scheme for the appraisal of criminal responsibility in California and any change therein should come from the Legislature.” (People v. Darling (1962) 58 Cal.2d 15, 23 [9] [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 484 , 372 P.2d 316 ]; People v. Rittger (1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 732 [9] [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 901 , 355 P.2d 645 ]; People v. Nash (1959) 52 Cal.2d 36, 43 [1] - 49 [4] [ 338 P.2d 416 ], and cases there cited.) Indeed, the entire problem is currently u

1959It is an impracticable rule.” The M’Naughton rule continued to be accepted in California, over arguments that it was unscientific (e.g., People v. Sloper (1926), 198 Cal. 238, 245-246 [1-3] [ 244 P. 362 ]), at the time the Legislature in 1927 (Pen.

1959It is an impracticable rule.” The M’Naughton rule continued to be accepted in California, over arguments that it was unscientific (e.g., People v. Sloper (1926), 198 Cal. 238, 245-246 [1-3] [ 244 P. 362 ]), at the time the Legislature in 1927 (Pen.

1959(Italics of the code commissioners.) Promptly after the adoption of the Penal Code, there was judicial reiteration of the basic M’Naughton rule (People v. M’Donnell (1873), 47 Cal. 134, 135, 136-137 ) and rejection of the irresistible impulse test (People v. Hoin (1882), 62 Cal. 120, 123 [ 45 Am.Rep. 651 ]).

1959(Italics of the code commissioners.) Promptly after the adoption of the Penal Code, there was judicial reiteration of the basic M’Naughton rule (People v. M’Donnell (1873), 47 Cal. 134, 135, 136-137 ) and rejection of the irresistible impulse test (People v. Hoin (1882), 62 Cal. 120, 123 [ 45 Am.Rep. 651 ]).

1959(Italics of the code commissioners.) Promptly after the adoption of the Penal Code, there was judicial reiteration of the basic M’Naughton rule (People v. M’Donnell (1873), 47 Cal. 134, 135, 136-137 ) and rejection of the irresistible impulse test (People v. Hoin (1882), 62 Cal. 120, 123 [ 45 Am.Rep. 651 ]).

1959(Italics of the code commissioners.) Promptly after the adoption of the Penal Code, there was judicial reiteration of the basic M’Naughton rule (People v. M’Donnell (1873), 47 Cal. 134, 135, 136-137 ) and rejection of the irresistible impulse test (People v. Hoin (1882), 62 Cal. 120, 123 [ 45 Am.Rep. 651 ]).

1959And in People v. Kerrigan (1887), 73 Cal. 222, 224-225 [ 14 P. 849 ], the court recognized that authorities cited by the appealing defendant “support his contention that ‘moral insanity is now as well understood by medico-jurists, and almost as well established by judicial recognition, as the intellectual form,’ ” but adhered “with confidence” to the M’Naughton rule and approved an instruction that “In our courts of law there is no such doctrine established or recognized as moral insanity, distinguished from mental derangement, as an excuse for crime.” People v. Hubert (1897), 119 Cal. 216, 22

1959And in People v. Kerrigan (1887), 73 Cal. 222, 224-225 [ 14 P. 849 ], the court recognized that authorities cited by the appealing defendant “support his contention that ‘moral insanity is now as well understood by medico-jurists, and almost as well established by judicial recognition, as the intellectual form,’ ” but adhered “with confidence” to the M’Naughton rule and approved an instruction that “In our courts of law there is no such doctrine established or recognized as moral insanity, distinguished from mental derangement, as an excuse for crime.” People v. Hubert (1897), 119 Cal. 216, 22

1959And in People v. Kerrigan (1887), 73 Cal. 222, 224-225 [ 14 P. 849 ], the court recognized that authorities cited by the appealing defendant “support his contention that ‘moral insanity is now as well understood by medico-jurists, and almost as well established by judicial recognition, as the intellectual form,’ ” but adhered “with confidence” to the M’Naughton rule and approved an instruction that “In our courts of law there is no such doctrine established or recognized as moral insanity, distinguished from mental derangement, as an excuse for crime.” People v. Hubert (1897), 119 Cal. 216, 22

1959And in People v. Kerrigan (1887), 73 Cal. 222, 224-225 [ 14 P. 849 ], the court recognized that authorities cited by the appealing defendant “support his contention that ‘moral insanity is now as well understood by medico-jurists, and almost as well established by judicial recognition, as the intellectual form,’ ” but adhered “with confidence” to the M’Naughton rule and approved an instruction that “In our courts of law there is no such doctrine established or recognized as moral insanity, distinguished from mental derangement, as an excuse for crime.” People v. Hubert (1897), 119 Cal. 216, 22

1984(In re Jones, 260 Cal.App.2d 906 , 911-912 . . .; see In re Slayback [1930] 209 Cal. 480, 490 [‘no longer a menace to the public nor dangerous to themselves’]; People v. Mallory, 254 Cal.App.2d 151 , 155-156 . . . [rejecting M’Naughton test as appropriate for determining restoration of sanity]; Welf. & Inst.

1972(In re Jones, 260 Cal.App.2d 906, 911-912 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 32 ]; see In re Slayback, supra, 209 Cal. 480, 490 [“no longer a menace to the public nor dangerous to themselves”]; People v. Mallory, 254 Cal.App.2d 151, 155-156 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 825 ] [rejecting M’Naughton test as appropriate for determining restoration of sanity]; Welf. & Inst.

1973The Wolff court held the California version of the *274 M’Naughton standard for insanity to be constitutional under the principles announced by the United States Supreme Court in Leland v. Oregon (1952) 343 U.S. 790 [ 96 L.Ed. 1302 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 ].

1973The Wolff court held the California version of the *274 M’Naughton standard for insanity to be constitutional under the principles announced by the United States Supreme Court in Leland v. Oregon (1952) 343 U.S. 790 [ 96 L.Ed. 1302 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 ].

1984(In re Jones, 260 Cal.App.2d 906 , 911-912 . . .; see In re Slayback [1930] 209 Cal. 480, 490 [‘no longer a menace to the public nor dangerous to themselves’]; People v. Mallory, 254 Cal.App.2d 151 , 155-156 . . . [rejecting M’Naughton test as appropriate for determining restoration of sanity]; Welf. & Inst.

1972(In re Jones, 260 Cal.App.2d 906, 911-912 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 32 ]; see In re Slayback, supra, 209 Cal. 480, 490 [“no longer a menace to the public nor dangerous to themselves”]; People v. Mallory, 254 Cal.App.2d 151, 155-156 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 825 ] [rejecting M’Naughton test as appropriate for determining restoration of sanity]; Welf. & Inst.