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10 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
JD v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Article [I], Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution provides: “No law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever: but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.” The right of free speech protected in Section 9 is “expressly qualified by the phrase ‘but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.’” J.D. v. State, 859 N.E.2d 341, 344 (Ind. 2007). 2009The Indiana Supreme Court recently reiterated "that the right of free speech protected in Section 9 is expressly qualified by the phrase 'but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible"" J.D. v. State, 859 N.E.2d 341, 344 (Ind.2007). | 4 | 4 |
Blackman v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Blackman v. State, 868 N.E.2d 579, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. 2009In order to satisfy the second prong of the test, a defendant "must prove that 'the State could not reasonably conclude that the restricted expression was an "abuse" of [his] right to speak, and therefore, the State could not properly proscribe the conduct, pursuant to its police power, via the disorderly conduct statute"" Blackman, 868 N.E.2d at 585 (quoting Johnson, 719 N.E.2d at 449 ). | 1 | 2 |
In Re Paternity of Kdgreen1 sentence2024A prior restraint on speech is not per se unconstitutional but “does come to a court ‘bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’” Id. (quoting In re Paternity of K.D., 929 N.E.2d 863, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting N.Y. Times Co., v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 824 (1971))). | 1 | 1 |
New York Times Co. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2024A prior restraint on speech is not per se unconstitutional but “does come to a court ‘bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’” Id. (quoting In re Paternity of K.D., 929 N.E.2d 863, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting N.Y. Times Co., v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 824 (1971))). | 1 | 1 |
Dorothy Williams v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2019See Williams , 59 N.E.3d at 293 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Price v. State
green
2 sentences2007Sufficiency of Evidence J.D. first contends that, because her expressions to Deputy Gibbons were protected political speech under Article 1, Section 9, of the Indiana Constitution, [3] as applied in Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954 (Ind.1993), there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's adjudication that she was a delinquent child. 2007Sufficiency of Evidence J.D. first contends that, because her expressions to Deputy Gibbons were protected political speech under Article 1, Section 9, of the Indiana Constitution, 3 as applied in Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954 (Ind.1993), there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's adjudication that she was a delinquent child. | 3 | 2006–2007 |
Lakisha Jordan v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2019His shouting at police officers for thirty minutes was not protected under section 9. [20] Boyd cites Jordan v. State, 37 N.E.3d 525 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), in support of his claim that he did not abuse his right to engage in political speech, but that case is distinguishable. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Johnson v. State
green
1 sentence2009In order to satisfy the second prong of the test, a defendant "must prove that 'the State could not reasonably conclude that the restricted expression was an "abuse" of [his] right to speak, and therefore, the State could not properly proscribe the conduct, pursuant to its police power, via the disorderly conduct statute"" Blackman, 868 N.E.2d at 585 (quoting Johnson, 719 N.E.2d at 449 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.