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10 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fairfax County Fire & Rescue Department v. Mottramgreen2 sentences2018Cf. Mottram, 263 Va. at 375, 559 S.E.2d at 703 (concluding that claimant’s PTSD was an occupational disease under Code § 65.2-400 as a matter of law on appeal when there was no evidence in the record that claimant was exposed to traumatic events outside his employment). - 11 - 2018Cf. Mottram, 263 Va. at 375, 559 S.E.2d at 703 (concluding that claimant’s PTSD was an occupational disease under Code § 65.2-400 as a matter of law on appeal when there was no evidence in the record that claimant was exposed to traumatic events outside his employment). - 11 - | 2 | 2 |
T. Brooks Mims & Travelers Insurance v. McCoygreen2 sentences2002See Mims v. McCoy, 219 Va. 616, 618 , 248 S.E.2d 817, 818 (1978) (where the evidence was not in conflict, whether an individual was a covered employee entitled to workers’ compensation benefits was a question of law for the court). 2002See Mims v. McCoy, 219 Va. 616, 618 , 248 S.E.2d 817, 818 (1978) (where the evidence was not in conflict, whether an individual was a covered employee entitled to workers’ compensation benefits was a question of law for the court). | 2 | 2 |
Piedmont Manufacturing Co. v. Eastgreen2 sentences1995This argument is without merit because the commission correctly concluded that Miller's carpal tunnel syndrome constituted a compensable occupational disease under the requirements of Code § 65.2-400, rather than an ordinary disease of life. 3 438 S.E.2d at 774 (quoting Breeding, 6 Va. App. at 9-10 , 365 S.E.2d at 787 ). "'The diagnosis need not contain precise medical terminology as long as the diagnosis is definite and informs the claimant in clear and understandable language that he or she is suffering from a disease that arises out of and in the course of employment.'" Piedmont, 17 Va. App 1995This argument is without merit because the commission correctly concluded that Miller's carpal tunnel syndrome constituted a compensable occupational disease under the requirements of Code § 65.2-400, rather than an ordinary disease of life. 3 438 S.E.2d at 774 (quoting Breeding, 6 Va. App. at 9-10 , 365 S.E.2d at 787 ). "'The diagnosis need not contain precise medical terminology as long as the diagnosis is definite and informs the claimant in clear and understandable language that he or she is suffering from a disease that arises out of and in the course of employment.'" Piedmont, 17 Va. App | 1 | 2 |
Lee County School Board v. Millergreen2 sentences2005Bd. v. Miller, 38 Va.App. 253, 260-61 , 563 S.E.2d 374, 377-78 (2002) (noting physician’s express statement of causation not required to permit commission to find necessary “direct causal connection” between work and occupational disease under Code § 65.2-400 (emphasis added)), the medical and other evidence as a whole, viewed in the light most favorable to claimant, supported the commission’s con elusion that the requisite “direct” causal connection existed. 2005Bd. v. Miller, 38 Va.App. 253, 260-61 , 563 S.E.2d 374, 377-78 (2002) (noting physician’s express statement of causation not required to permit commission to find necessary “direct causal connection” between work and occupational disease under Code § 65.2-400 (emphasis added)), the medical and other evidence as a whole, viewed in the light most favorable to claimant, supported the commission’s con elusion that the requisite “direct” causal connection existed. | 1 | 1 |
Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2005Cf. Robinson, 37 Va.App. at 439-43 , 559 S.E.2d at 382-84 (decided three years after Amoco Foam Prods, and, although not discussing impact of decision, holding doctrine of compensable consequences provided coverage where increased stress and anxiety caused by compensable physical injury aggravated pre-existing depression and rendered claimant totally disabled). 2005Cf. Robinson, 37 Va.App. at 439-43 , 559 S.E.2d at 382-84 (decided three years after Amoco Foam Prods, and, although not discussing impact of decision, holding doctrine of compensable consequences provided coverage where increased stress and anxiety caused by compensable physical injury aggravated pre-existing depression and rendered claimant totally disabled). | 1 | 1 |
Knott v. Blue Bell, Inc.green2 sentences2004CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT DISEASE WAS OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE RATHER THAN NON-COMPENSABLE ORDINARY DISEASE OF LIFE For a condition that qualifies as a disease under the Act to be compensable, a claimant “must show either that [the disease] is an occupational disease under the provisions of Code § 65.2-400 or that it is an ordinary disease of life that may be treated as an occupational disease pursuant to Code § 65.2-401.” Mottram, 263 Va. at 373-74, 559 S.E.2d at 702. “[T]he question whether a condition or disease is an ordinary disease of life [or an occupational disease] is essentially a medical i 2004CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT DISEASE WAS OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE RATHER THAN NON-COMPENSABLE ORDINARY DISEASE OF LIFE For a condition that qualifies as a disease under the Act to be compensable, a claimant “must show either that [the disease] is an occupational disease under the provisions of Code § 65.2-400 or that it is an ordinary disease of life that may be treated as an occupational disease pursuant to Code § 65.2-401.” Mottram, 263 Va. at 373-74, 559 S.E.2d at 702. “[T]he question whether a condition or disease is an ordinary disease of life [or an occupational disease] is essentially a medical i | 1 | 1 |
County of Chesterfield v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2000The causative danger must be peculiar to the work, incidental to the character of the business, and not independent of the master-servant relationship.'" County of 2 The commission affirmed the deputy commissioner's conclusion that claimant's back injury was not a compensable occupational disease under Code § 65.2-400. - 5 - Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 183-84 , 376 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1989) (quoting United Parcel Serv. v. Fetterman, 230 Va. 257, 258-59 , 336 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1985)). 2000The causative danger must be peculiar to the work, incidental to the character of the business, and not independent of the master-servant relationship.'" County of 2 The commission affirmed the deputy commissioner's conclusion that claimant's back injury was not a compensable occupational disease under Code § 65.2-400. - 5 - Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 183-84 , 376 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1989) (quoting United Parcel Serv. v. Fetterman, 230 Va. 257, 258-59 , 336 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
United Parcel Service of America v. Fettermangreen2 sentences2000The causative danger must be peculiar to the work, incidental to the character of the business, and not independent of the master-servant relationship.'" County of 2 The commission affirmed the deputy commissioner's conclusion that claimant's back injury was not a compensable occupational disease under Code § 65.2-400. - 5 - Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 183-84 , 376 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1989) (quoting United Parcel Serv. v. Fetterman, 230 Va. 257, 258-59 , 336 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1985)). 2000The causative danger must be peculiar to the work, incidental to the character of the business, and not independent of the master-servant relationship.'" County of 2 The commission affirmed the deputy commissioner's conclusion that claimant's back injury was not a compensable occupational disease under Code § 65.2-400. - 5 - Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 183-84 , 376 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1989) (quoting United Parcel Serv. v. Fetterman, 230 Va. 257, 258-59 , 336 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Perdue Farms, Inc. v. McCutchangreen2 sentences1996Perdue Farms, 21 Va.App. at 69 , 461 S.E.2d at 433 (CTS); Piedmont, 17 Va.App. at 504 , 438 S.E.2d at 772 (de Quervain’s); The Greif Companies v. Sipe, 16 Va.App. 709, 714 , 434 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1993) (tendinitis). 1996Perdue Farms, 21 Va.App. at 69 , 461 S.E.2d at 433 (CTS); Piedmont, 17 Va.App. at 504 , 438 S.E.2d at 772 (de Quervain’s); The Greif Companies v. Sipe, 16 Va.App. 709, 714 , 434 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1993) (tendinitis). | 1 | 1 |
Greif Companies (GENESCO) v. Sipegreen2 sentences1996Perdue Farms, 21 Va.App. at 69 , 461 S.E.2d at 433 (CTS); Piedmont, 17 Va.App. at 504 , 438 S.E.2d at 772 (de Quervain’s); The Greif Companies v. Sipe, 16 Va.App. 709, 714 , 434 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1993) (tendinitis). 1996Perdue Farms, 21 Va.App. at 69 , 461 S.E.2d at 433 (CTS); Piedmont, 17 Va.App. at 504 , 438 S.E.2d at 772 (de Quervain’s); The Greif Companies v. Sipe, 16 Va.App. 709, 714 , 434 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1993) (tendinitis). | 1 | 1 |
Via v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc.green2 sentences1995This argument is without merit because the commission correctly concluded that Miller's carpal tunnel syndrome constituted a compensable occupational disease under the requirements of Code § 65.2-400, rather than an ordinary disease of life. 3 438 S.E.2d at 774 (quoting Breeding, 6 Va. App. at 9-10 , 365 S.E.2d at 787 ). "'The diagnosis need not contain precise medical terminology as long as the diagnosis is definite and informs the claimant in clear and understandable language that he or she is suffering from a disease that arises out of and in the course of employment.'" Piedmont, 17 Va. App 1995This argument is without merit because the commission correctly concluded that Miller's carpal tunnel syndrome constituted a compensable occupational disease under the requirements of Code § 65.2-400, rather than an ordinary disease of life. 3 438 S.E.2d at 774 (quoting Breeding, 6 Va. App. at 9-10 , 365 S.E.2d at 787 ). "'The diagnosis need not contain precise medical terminology as long as the diagnosis is definite and informs the claimant in clear and understandable language that he or she is suffering from a disease that arises out of and in the course of employment.'" Piedmont, 17 Va. App | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Merillat Industries, Inc. v. Parks
green
2 sentences1994The sole issue on appeal is whether George’s carpal tunnel syndrome is a disease within the meaning of Code § 65.2-400 and the holding of Merillat Industries, Inc. v. Parks, 246 Va. 429 , 436 S.E.2d 600 (1993). 1994The sole issue on appeal is whether George’s carpal tunnel syndrome is a disease within the meaning of Code § 65.2-400 and the holding of Merillat Industries, Inc. v. Parks, 246 Va. 429 , 436 S.E.2d 600 (1993). | 2 | 1994–1995 |
Mottram v. Fairfax County Fire & Rescue
green
2 sentences2004Because the medical evidence in Mottram “emphasized that Mottram’s PTSD was ‘intimately related to his service-connected activities’” and the record contained “no evidence that Mottram was exposed to traumatic events outside his employment,” the Court “conclude[d], as a matter of law, that Mottram’s PTSD [was] an occupational disease under Code § 65.2-400.” In doing so, the Court rejected our conclusion that Mottram’s condition was an ordinary disease of life “[b]ecause PTSD is a condition that may develop from the general stresses of life and is not necessarily tied to occupational stress.” M 2004Because the medical evidence in Mottram “emphasized that Mottram’s PTSD was ‘intimately related to his service-connected activities’” and the record contained “no evidence that Mottram was exposed to traumatic events outside his employment,” the Court “conclude[d], as a matter of law, that Mottram’s PTSD [was] an occupational disease under Code § 65.2-400.” In doing so, the Court rejected our conclusion that Mottram’s condition was an ordinary disease of life “[b]ecause PTSD is a condition that may develop from the general stresses of life and is not necessarily tied to occupational stress.” M | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Western Electric Co. v. Gilliam
green
2 sentences1995Regrettably, from the briefs and oral argument in these cases I must conclude that the general issue is the subject of considerable inconsistency, if not total confusion. *437 In Holly Farms v. Yancey, 228 Va. 337 , 321 S.E.2d 298 (1984), Western Electric Co. v. Gilliam, 229 Va. 245 , 329 S.E.2d 13 (1985), [1] and finally in Merillat, the Supreme Court declined to cite with approval a definitive and comprehensive definition of "disease" applicable to these Code sections. 1995Regrettably, from the briefs and oral argument in these cases I must conclude that the general issue is the subject of considerable inconsistency, if not total confusion. *437 In Holly Farms v. Yancey, 228 Va. 337 , 321 S.E.2d 298 (1984), Western Electric Co. v. Gilliam, 229 Va. 245 , 329 S.E.2d 13 (1985), [1] and finally in Merillat, the Supreme Court declined to cite with approval a definitive and comprehensive definition of "disease" applicable to these Code sections. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Holly Farms/Federal Co. v. Yancey
green
2 sentences1995Regrettably, from the briefs and oral argument in these cases I must conclude that the general issue is the subject of considerable inconsistency, if not total confusion. *437 In Holly Farms v. Yancey, 228 Va. 337 , 321 S.E.2d 298 (1984), Western Electric Co. v. Gilliam, 229 Va. 245 , 329 S.E.2d 13 (1985), [1] and finally in Merillat, the Supreme Court declined to cite with approval a definitive and comprehensive definition of "disease" applicable to these Code sections. 1995Regrettably, from the briefs and oral argument in these cases I must conclude that the general issue is the subject of considerable inconsistency, if not total confusion. *437 In Holly Farms v. Yancey, 228 Va. 337 , 321 S.E.2d 298 (1984), Western Electric Co. v. Gilliam, 229 Va. 245 , 329 S.E.2d 13 (1985), [1] and finally in Merillat, the Supreme Court declined to cite with approval a definitive and comprehensive definition of "disease" applicable to these Code sections. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding
green
2 sentences1995This argument is without merit because the commission correctly concluded that Miller's carpal tunnel syndrome constituted a compensable occupational disease under the requirements of Code § 65.2-400, rather than an ordinary disease of life. 3 438 S.E.2d at 774 (quoting Breeding, 6 Va. App. at 9-10 , 365 S.E.2d at 787 ). "'The diagnosis need not contain precise medical terminology as long as the diagnosis is definite and informs the claimant in clear and understandable language that he or she is suffering from a disease that arises out of and in the course of employment.'" Piedmont, 17 Va. App 1995This argument is without merit because the commission correctly concluded that Miller's carpal tunnel syndrome constituted a compensable occupational disease under the requirements of Code § 65.2-400, rather than an ordinary disease of life. 3 438 S.E.2d at 774 (quoting Breeding, 6 Va. App. at 9-10 , 365 S.E.2d at 787 ). "'The diagnosis need not contain precise medical terminology as long as the diagnosis is definite and informs the claimant in clear and understandable language that he or she is suffering from a disease that arises out of and in the course of employment.'" Piedmont, 17 Va. App | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.