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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Memrored2 sentences1997Applying the materiality standard of Evidence Code section 1043, the Supreme Court held *750 the defendant had established good cause for the information requested. ( 38 Cal.3d at p. 682 .) The court held that discovery might lead to admissible evidence that the interrogating officers had a “habit or custom” of obtaining confessions by use of excessive force. 1989Applying the materiality standard of section 1043 (informed by the principles set forth in Pitchess), we held that the defendant had demonstrated good cause for the information requested. ( 38 Cal. 3d at p. 684 .) Counsel’s declaration asserted that the confession had been coerced. | 1 | 2 |
Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.yellow2 sentences2006The courts are bound, if possible, to maintain the integrity of both statutes if the two may stand together.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 569 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 , 950 P.2d 1086 ].) Here, in the case of habeas corpus discovery for prisoners sentenced to death or life in prison without the possibility of parole, we may rationally harmonize the statutes, and adhere to the strong presumption that the Legislature did not intend section 1054.9 to work an implied repeal of section 1043’s materiality requirement. 2006The courts are bound, if possible, to maintain the integrity of both statutes if the two may stand together.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 569 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 , 950 P.2d 1086 ].) Here, in the case of habeas corpus discovery for prisoners sentenced to death or life in prison without the possibility of parole, we may rationally harmonize the statutes, and adhere to the strong presumption that the Legislature did not intend section 1054.9 to work an implied repeal of section 1043’s materiality requirement. | 1 | 1 |
City of San Jose v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2003(Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535 ; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1145 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 ].) When considering whether a defendant has demonstrated the “materiality” of the requested information, the Supreme Court has indicated we must apply the materiality standard of section 1043 in conjunction with the principles set forth in Pitchess . 2003(Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535 ; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1145 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 ].) When considering whether a defendant has demonstrated the “materiality” of the requested information, the Supreme Court has indicated we must apply the materiality standard of section 1043 in conjunction with the principles set forth in Pitchess . | 1 | 1 |
City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Courtgreen2 sentences2002Applying the materiality standard of section 1043 (informed by the principles set forth in Pitchess), we held that the defendant had demonstrated good cause for the information requested. [Citation.] • Counsel’s declaration asserted that the confession had been coerced. [Citation.] Discovery might lead to admissible evidence that the interrogating officers had a ‘habit or custom’ of obtaining confessions by use of excessive force. [Citations.] Hence, we concluded that ‘counsel’s allegations sufficiently “set forth the materiality” of the requested information. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Santa 2002Applying the materiality standard of section 1043 (informed by the principles set forth in Pitchess ), we held that the defendant had demonstrated good cause for the information requested. [Citation.] Counsel's declaration asserted that the confession had been coerced. [Citation.] Discovery might lead to admissible evidence that the interrogating officers had a `habit or custom' of obtaining confessions by use of excessive force. [Citations.] Hence, we concluded that `counsel's allegations sufficiently "set forth the materiality" of the requested information. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Santa C | 1 | 1 |
City of Redding v. Municipal Courtgreen2 sentences1998The legislative history, the case law background, and the statutory language all point to the same conclusion: the ‘materiality’ component of section 1043, subdivision (b) may be satisfied by affidavits based on information and belief.” (Id. at p. 89, italics in original.) The City argues that because the rule that an affidavit in support of a criminal defendant’s discovery motion need not be based on personal knowledge protects a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination (see City of Redding v. Municipal Court (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1181, 1187 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 41 1998The legislative history, the case law background, and the statutory language all point to the same conclusion: the ‘materiality’ component of section 1043, subdivision (b) may be satisfied by affidavits based on information and belief.” (Id. at p. 89, italics in original.) The City argues that because the rule that an affidavit in support of a criminal defendant’s discovery motion need not be based on personal knowledge protects a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination (see City of Redding v. Municipal Court (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1181, 1187 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 41 | 1 | 1 |
City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1989(See, e.g., Jalilie v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal. App.3d at p. 490 ; Larry E. v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal. App.3d at pp. 29-31; Pierre C. v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal. App.3d 1120, 1122-1123 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 82 ]; Arcelona v. Municipal Court (1980) 113 Cal. App.3d 523, 527 [ 169 Cal. Rptr. 877 ]; see also People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 676 [holding that § 1043, subd. (b) does not require the personal affidavit of the accused].) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in the instant matter, relying on its earlier decision in City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal 1989(See, e.g., Jalilie v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 490 ; Larry E. v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 29-31; Pierre C. v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1122-1123 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 82 ]; Arcelona v. Municipal Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 523, 527 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 877 ]; see also People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 676 [holding that § 1043, subd. (b) does not require the personal affidavit of the accused].) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in the instant matter, relying on its earlier decision in City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal.App.3 | 1 | 1 |
Arcelona v. Municipal Courtgreen2 sentences1989(See, e.g., Jalilie v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 490 ; Larry E. v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 29-31; Pierre C. v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1122-1123 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 82 ]; Arcelona v. Municipal Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 523, 527 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 877 ]; see also People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 676 [holding that § 1043, subd. (b) does not require the personal affidavit of the accused].) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in the instant matter, relying on its earlier decision in City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal.App.3 1989(See, e.g., Jalilie v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 490 ; Larry E. v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 29-31; Pierre C. v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1122-1123 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 82 ]; Arcelona v. Municipal Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 523, 527 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 877 ]; see also People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 676 [holding that § 1043, subd. (b) does not require the personal affidavit of the accused].) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in the instant matter, relying on its earlier decision in City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal.App.3 | 1 | 1 |
PIERRE C. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1989(See, e.g., Jalilie v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 490 ; Larry E. v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 29-31; Pierre C. v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1122-1123 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 82 ]; Arcelona v. Municipal Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 523, 527 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 877 ]; see also People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 676 [holding that § 1043, subd. (b) does not require the personal affidavit of the accused].) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in the instant matter, relying on its earlier decision in City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal.App.3 1989(See, e.g., Jalilie v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 490 ; Larry E. v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 29-31; Pierre C. v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1122-1123 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 82 ]; Arcelona v. Municipal Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 523, 527 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 877 ]; see also People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 676 [holding that § 1043, subd. (b) does not require the personal affidavit of the accused].) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in the instant matter, relying on its earlier decision in City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal.App.3 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pitchess v. Superior Court
red
2 sentences2004In determining whether the “materiality” requirement of section 1043, subdivision (b)(3) was satisfied, the Supreme Court held a trial court must apply the materiality standard of section 1043, subdivision (b) in conjunction with the principles set forth in Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 . 2003(Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535 ; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1145 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 ].) When considering whether a defendant has demonstrated the “materiality” of the requested information, the Supreme Court has indicated we must apply the materiality standard of section 1043 in conjunction with the principles set forth in Pitchess . | 2 | 2003–2004 |
Warrick v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2014The declaration must articulate how the discovery sought may itself lead to relevant evidence or may itself be admissible direct or impeachment evidence [citations] that would support those proposed defenses.” (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1024 .) Counsel’s affidavit also must describe a plausible factual scenario to support the claim of officer misconduct. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Hammon
green
1 sentence2014Petitioners are also mistaken in suggesting the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117 supports the requested judicial Brady review. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2014(Ibid.) Brandon held the court “did not act improperly in evaluating” the complaint, but cautioned, “[w]e do not suggest that trial courts must routinely review information that is contained in peace officer personnel files and is more than five years old to ascertain whether Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83 , requires its disclosure.” (Brandon, at p. 15, fn. 3.) Brandon did not suggest the prosecution could require the trial court to undertake an initial Brady materiality review under Sections 1043 and 1045. 2014(Ibid.) Brandon held the court “did not act improperly in evaluating” the complaint, but cautioned, “[w]e do not suggest that trial courts must routinely review information that is contained in peace officer personnel files and is more than five years old to ascertain whether Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83 , requires its disclosure.” (Brandon, at p. 15, fn. 3.) Brandon did not suggest the prosecution could require the trial court to undertake an initial Brady materiality review under Sections 1043 and 1045. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Brant v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2004(City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 84—85.) *302 In Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at page 538 , the Supreme Court determined the defendant “demonstrated sufficient good cause” for discovery of the deputies’ disciplinary records relating to complaints of excessive force because he requested information with “adequate specificity” which “may have considerable significance to the preparation of his defense.” In Brant v. Superior Court, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 100, 109 , the appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court and appellate division | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Jalilie v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1989(See, e.g., Jalilie v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal. App.3d at p. 490 ; Larry E. v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal. App.3d at pp. 29-31; Pierre C. v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal. App.3d 1120, 1122-1123 [ 206 Cal. Rptr. 82 ]; Arcelona v. Municipal Court (1980) 113 Cal. App.3d 523, 527 [ 169 Cal. Rptr. 877 ]; see also People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 676 [holding that § 1043, subd. (b) does not require the personal affidavit of the accused].) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in the instant matter, relying on its earlier decision in City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal 1989(See, e.g., Jalilie v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 490 ; Larry E. v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 29-31; Pierre C. v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1122-1123 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 82 ]; Arcelona v. Municipal Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 523, 527 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 877 ]; see also People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 676 [holding that § 1043, subd. (b) does not require the personal affidavit of the accused].) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in the instant matter, relying on its earlier decision in City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal.App.3 | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.